Sunday, September 9, 2012

Can a Red Line be Drawn on Iran?



We can define “red lines” as acts, activities, or situations that if carried out or reached mandate actions to redress the situation. The purpose of drawing these lines is twofold: to deter these said acts or activities, and to judge that the situation is serious enough to warrant reactions. Red lines, virtual or real, have been drawn in the past as part of strategies to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue. These lines were defined and later crossed without any action taken – other than verbal.

The issue is now resurfacing as part of a proposed understanding between the US administration and Israel, with the intention of lowering the tension between them. The main point of contention is that Israel assesses that Iran has already gone far enough with its nuclear weapons development program to produce them at will, while the US administration thinks that there is time enough for a “diplomatic solution” to this issue.

The US also assesses that it will know well in advance if the Iranians are “breaking out” and starting the relatively short route towards the production of nuclear weapons. The Times of Israel reported that on August 10, 2012, Jay Carney, spokesman for the White House, said that the United States “can see what’s going on with Iran’s nuclear program” and that it would know “if Tehran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon. I would also say that we have eyes – we have visibility into the program, and we would know if and when Iran made what’s called a breakout move towards acquiring a weapon.” He later said he was referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency officials who are mandated to inspect Iran’s nuclear sites. This, in a way, set a red line for Iran.

There are two implicit assumptions here: the first is that the US intelligence system is infallible, and the second is that the IAEA inspectors would discover an Iranian “breakout” in time to sound a reliable warning. The problem is that Israel does not share these assumptions, and indeed, both are difficult to embrace. Intelligence is not infallible, as history has shown, and the IAEA is very limited in its observational powers, especially in Iran. Reliance on intelligence can lead to overconfidence and misread facts, and the stakes, at least for Israel, are too high for that.

In order to be effective, red lines must fulfill several conditions. They must be well-defined and realistic, referring to determinable parameters; they must be timely, in that there would be enough time left for preventive actions; the consequences of crossing the lines must be serious enough to be considered a deterrent; and they must be made known to the other side, or even be made public.

Setting the red line at the breakout point could be effective only if the consequences of crossing it would be serious enough for Iran. In a larger view, consider a breakout scenario against the conditions listed above. In order to be well-defined, the term “breakout” must be well-defined. Does crossing the 20 percent enrichment level fulfill this condition? The Iranians have already started to delegitimize this criterion by announcing that they are planning to use nuclear energy for submarine propulsion, which will need highly enriched uranium (which is not necessarily technically true). Does working on the nuclear weapons explosive mechanism constitute a red line? According to IAEA indications, they have been already doing this for some time.

Is the breakout red line timely? Probably not. As time goes on, Iran is perfecting its breakout technology and accumulating more and more low enriched uranium. Because of uncertain intelligence (especially if this depends on the IAEA inspection teams), information concerning Iran’s breakout activities would be considerably delayed. What would be the consequences of crossing the red line? Is the US prepared to take military action to stop Iran’s progress in producing nuclear weapons? Although the US made several statements referring to this possibility, it has never stated it as such in clear language. Is it ready and prepared to resort to military action if the signal comes from the intelligence community tomorrow? This is highly uncertain. The fact that the US has maintained that there is still time for a diplomatic solution may also imply that the US has not issued any warning or even an ultimatum to Iran, so that the third and fourth conditions are not fulfilled. Is there an alternate red line to be applied?

There certainly is. It is simply the setting of a deadline. One deadline could be a date for acquiescing to the Security Council resolutions concerning Iran. Another could involve the unending talks with Iran, with the P5+1 setting the requirements for an interim arrangement: the suspension of work at the Fordow enrichment site; the stopping of uranium enrichment at 20 percent, and the transfer of all 20 percent enriched uranium out of Iran. If a deadline for this is set, with the threat of military action if the conditions are not met, this could be considered a reasonable red line. The deadline should not be too far in the future, so as not to enable an Iranian breakout and the production of a first nuclear weapon; it is verifiable; the threat is serious enough; especially if issued by the US; and it will be well known to all Iranians. This red line has another advantage: it could be the first stage in a longer process, without demanding at first a total surrender of Iran to the demands of the Security Council and the IAEA (and even these are not the final stage in a possible settlement).

Is this doable? Probably not, at least at the present time, before the upcoming US elections. On the apparent down side, setting a time limit forces the hands of both sides, forcing Iran to make a decision, if it believes the red line, and driving those who set it to action. At present, Iran is comfortable not having to deal with an ultimatum, and the US is not in a position to be forced to take action.

Thus, the talk of setting red lines seems to be little more than a method of dousing the public disagreements between the governments of Israel and the US, at least until after the elections. The Iran issue, however, will only grow more and more serious – and less reversible – as time goes on

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

Friday, September 7, 2012

Was Yasser Arafat Poisoned?

The mysterious circumstances of Yasser Arafat's death are now the subject of a criminal investigation in France. But if it is true that the Palestinian leader was poisoned, then who might have been behind his killing?

 
 
Suha Arafat says she knew it all along. Someone like Yasser Arafat doesn't die so easily because his body suddenly gives up, even if he was 75 years old. Someone like him had to have been killed, poisoned or exposed to radiation, whether from enemies or rivals. Though many have suspected the same thing, there has never been any proof. Eight years after the death of the legendary Palestinian leader, it looked like things would stay that way.
But then, two months ago, the Institute of Radiation Physics based in Lausanne, Switzerland, announced that it had found a potential contamination with a fatal amount of polonium-210 on Arafat's underwear, toothbrush and hat. The radioactive heavy-metal isotope is tasteless and almost undetectable. A dose of 0.1 micrograms is already fatal.

Suha Arafat, his now 49-year-old widow, had submitted the test samples with the assistance of al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based television network. Since then, what had been for years merely a conspiracy theory has become a bona fide criminal case -- especially since Suha Arafat lodged a criminal complaint and French prosecutors launched a murder investigation last week.


'We Will Finally Learn the Truth'
The women who put this all in motion is hard to locate. It even took the taxi driver a long time to arrive via winding roads at Suha Arafat's home in Malta, a half-hour by car from the capital city of Valletta. The unimposing house on a hillside has a front garden which is too small for parties. A compact Korean-made car is parked out front.

Suha Arafat has lived here with her mother for over two years. Her 17-year-old daughter, Zahwa, attends a boarding school in France.

The widow opens the door wearing a dress and flat shoes. She looks much more like a housewife than the supposed she-devil the Palestinians have hated since her husband, who they think should have only been wed to the Palestinian cause, married her -- a Muslim convert who was born a Palestinian Christian in Jerusalem and raised Catholic -- in 1990. But, more than anything, she has been hated since 1995, when she moved from the Gaza Strip to Paris because she found life there more comfortable.

Suha Arafat talks about the suspicion she has carried with her since Oct. 12, 2004. That was the day when Arafat's illness reportedly began, when he had diarrhea and complained of stomach pains and dizziness. The symptoms quickly worsened and left him as thin as a rail. Finally, wearing a training outfit and a wool cap, Arafat was taken from the West Bank town of Ramallah to a military hospital near Paris, where he died on Nov. 11. Already then, many thought that the death seemed unnatural.
During a recent studio interview with al-Jazeera, a choked-up Suha Arafat demanded an investigation. Now, sitting in her living room, where a portrait of Arafat hangs on the wall, she feels she is finally approaching her goal. "I am very confident," she says, "that the entire case will reach a positive end in very little time and that we will finally learn the truth." This is not wishful thinking, she adds, noting that there are reasons for being so optimistic.

Since polonium-210 has a half-life of 138 days, things need to proceed quickly. Therefore, Arafat's body will be examined in the coming weeks, believes Saad Djebbar, one of Suha Arafat's lawyers in Paris. In a television interview, he said that the French legal system has jurisdiction because the murder began in the Palestinian territories and ended in France. He then added the curious sentence that Suha Arafat wants to prevent the Palestinian Authority from obstructing the investigation.


The Missing Piece of the Puzzle
This is a charge that enrages Tawfik Tirawi, Arafat's former intelligence chief, because it is also directed against him. For the last two years, Tirawi has headed the official Palestinian commission charged with investigating the cause of Arafat's death. Since the scandal involving possible polonium poisoning erupted, he has been repeatedly forced to explain why it was al-Jazeera, rather than him, that came up with the idea of taking a closer look at Arafat's underwear.

During the three years leading up to his death, the Israeli siege prevented Arafat from leaving the Mukataa, his government headquarters in Ramallah. In that period, Tirawi encountered Arafat on an almost daily basis. "I saw very clearly how things got increasingly worse with him," he says. "At first, he had spots on his face. Then, he was constantly throwing up, he lost weight, and the skin on his feet dissolved so that he could only wear sandals." Then he adds: "We were always certain that the Israelis had poisoned Arafat."

As Tirawi sees it, it was just an accident that al-Jazeera discovered the last missing piece of the puzzle. He claims that his commission has tirelessly investigated the case, but that its activities have been secret because such things are obviously kept out of the public gaze. Although he is either unwilling or unable to discuss the commission's findings, he will say that it has been quite successful.
Not only Suha Arafat, but also many Palestinians in Ramallah see things differently. They believe that Palestinian Authority officials never made any real effort to solve the mystery surrounding his death. The first investigative commission was dissolved six months after Arafat's death and only reappointed in 2010.

In all of this, the Palestinians had good cause for looking into things more closely. After all, the French clinic's 558-page report on the death of their national hero raises more questions than it provides answers. For example, why did Suha Arafat refuse to allow a liver biopsy to be taken? Why didn't anyone demand that an autopsy be conducted? How can it be that even the best doctors in France didn't find the cause of this strange infection, which caused blood to coagulate and led to a stroke? Could it be that the French government wants to keep the cause of death secret?

Moreover, why is there so much missing in the report, and why does it seem like "someone has played around with it," as Avi Issacharoff, a reporter with the Israeli daily Haaretz, says? Likewise, he also finds it somewhat odd that he, an Israeli journalist, was the only one to publish the secret French medical report, rather than Suha Arafat or the Palestinian Authority.


Inconsistencies and Rumors
There are many inconsistencies and many rumors. They start with the allegation that Arafat died of AIDS or that Arafat's rivals poisoned him, and there are many more. Still, in the search for a motive to murder Arafat, it is hard to ignore Israel.

In 2002, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv that he regretted not having killed Arafat when Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in 1982. In 2003, then-Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that murder was an option for getting rid of Arafat. But is that any proof?

When asked about this, Israeli officials say: "It has nothing to do with us." For example, Dov Weissglass, who was the bureau chief of then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, says: "We didn't kill Arafat when the terror had reached its high point, so why would we kill him in 2004, when he was sitting isolated in the Mukataa and his political influence was already waning?"

Still, polonium-210 is not something one finds at the grocery store. There are only a few countries that can make it, and doing so requires a nuclear reactor. What's more, Israel reportedly had some polonium in the past.

Another question is: Why is all of this coming out now, eight years after Arafat's death and six years after the death of Alexander Litvinenko, the former KGB agent and Kremlin opponent, who became the first well-known victim of a polonium poisoning attack?


The Search for the Truth
Suha Arafat says she is driven by the search for the truth. But it might also have something to do with the fact that, in addition to being widely despised in Ramallah, she has also fallen into disfavor in France and Tunisia, where she is under investigation for suspicious cash flows and corruption. There is also the persistent rumor that she had a hand in the disappearance of $300 million (€240 million) after Arafat's death. In any case, it would certainly seem opportune for her to now assume the role of the widow avenging her husband's death in the name of the Palestinian people.

Enthusiasm for the investigation is more tempered in Ramallah, partly because some people there suspect al-Jazeera of wanting to help topple Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. But, of course, Palestinian officials also realize that they can take advantage of the search for Arafat's alleged murderer. At the moment, there are no peace talks with Israel, the economy is in a slump and there continue to be deep divisions between Hamas and Fatah, the rival Palestinian groupings ruling the Gaza Strip and West Bank, respectively. Under these circumstances, it would be a perfect time to have news of a poisoned martyr to deflect from the political deadlock and disorientation.

For these reasons, the debate might say more about the Palestinians' situation today than about Arafat's death. "To this day, we have avoided accusing Israel of being responsible for Arafat's death," says Nimr Hamad, Abbas' political adviser. "But if we find polonium in his body, it is 99.9 percent certain that it was Israel. That would help us because it proves that Israel doesn't want peace." He adds that they would demand the appointment of a special tribunal "like the one that was supposed to explain the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. But the evidence is clearer in Arafat's case than it was in Hariri's."
When asked what the situation for Palestinians would be like if Arafat were still alive, General Tirawi guardedly says: "The situation would presumably be more difficult." Nimr Hamad, on the other hand, only smiles. There is hardly anyone these days who would want Arafat to still be president. Indeed, most of the formerly ubiquitous images of Arafat's face on the streets have disappeared.
 

Full of Rubble
These days, one can't even visit Arafat's mausoleum on the edge of the Mukataa. The entrance is full of rubble and men are pushing wheelbarrows. This is the last work going on in the effort to transform Arafat's formerly bullet-riddled headquarters into a smart-looking official seat of government.

"Not finished," says a security guard, shooing visitors away. The wreaths have been cleared away, and the honor guard is somewhere else. Within the cube-shaped mausoleum, there is just a single memorial stone above a burial vault housing a coffin. That coffin holds not only Arafat's body, but also the secret behind his death -- though perhaps not for much longer.

Font: The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 36/2012 (September 03, 2012) of DER SPIEGEL.

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Inside story: The 15-year march to the bomb.

The Iranians are almost there. This is how they did it.
Enrichment is accelerating, the warhead is taking shape, a nuclear trigger is deep in development, and the Shahab-3 missile has Israel in range and can detonate in an airburst 600 meters above ground — just like the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

A military exhibition displays the Shahab-3 missile under a picture of the Iranian
supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in Tehran, in 2008
(photo credit: AP photo/Hasan Sarbakhshian)

Since the last century, Iran has been methodically pursuing the in-house capability of developing a missile-delivered nuclear bomb. The regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now closer than ever — probably in the latter stages of perfecting an atomic bomb with a multipoint detonation mechanism, compact enough to insert into a Shahab-3 missile nosecone.

For years, the Obama administration, Western governments, the United Nations, and the International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) have been fully aware of the specific details of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, down to the blueprints and names of the engineers. Whether or not Iran will complete the last leg of its decades-long journey toward a deliverable atomic bomb is still unknown. The difference in viewing the cannon is whether you are staring down the muzzle or observing it through a telescope from a perch 6,000 miles away. Israel is peering into the muzzle, hence its assessment is different than Washington’s.
 
Protracted multilateral negotiations, crippling international sanctions, and even elaborate programs of sabotage have delayed but not derailed the nearly autarkic program. Now the world teeters at the brink of a regional war with profound global ramifications because the threat may have been ignored too long.
 
Here are the four determining factors, the dynamics of which will govern whether Israel launches a preemptive attack against Tehran’s massive nuclear infrastructure.
 
Four technological achievements are key to completing Tehran’s nuclear weapon: 1) accretion of enough nuclear materials, highly enriched to 90 percent, to make the bomb; 2) machining that highly-enriched material into metal for a spheroid warhead so it can fit into a missile nosecone for detonation; 3) a trigger mechanism to initiate the atomic explosion at the precise moment of missile reentry; and, of course, 4) a reliable rocket delivery system to carry such a weapon.
 

Pakistan helped Iran start

In many ways, one of the key precursors to Iran’s nuclear push was India’s May 1974 nuclear bomb test, code-named “Smiling Buddha.” Twenty years in the making, New Delhi claimed its 1974 underground explosion was a “peaceful test.” But rival Pakistan saw it as a clear threat. Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto quickly declared that his country would fight back against “nuclear blackmail.” The sleepy Pakistani nuclear program roared into action.
 
A pivotal decision was to call upon Abdul Qadeer Khan, often referred to as “AQ Khan,” revered as the father of Pakistan’s atomic weaponry. Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist and nuclear engineer, had worked in the nuclear programs of Holland and other Western countries. He was brought home to fast-track the building of Pakistan’s bomb. Quickly, Khan set up uranium-enrichment labs and ballistic-missile operations, mainly in and around the city of Kahuta, in the Rawalpindi district of Pakistan. In 1998, after India’s second nuclear test, Pakistan was ready. Within weeks, Pakistan followed suit, demonstrating it, too, possessed nuclear weapons and could deploy them rapidly.
 
As Pakistan barged into the nuclear age, Khan spearheaded the proliferation of the technology into other countries. In a 2009 TV interview, Khan admitted that working with Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, his country developed a mutual working relationship with North Korea. After India’s detonation, Pakistan realized it needed missiles. Long the world’s biggest missile and rocket power, North Korea was the logical partner. Khan admitted in his TV interview, “We needed to have long-range missiles to reach the far-flung cities of India and to ensure our deterrence. I discussed the issue with Benazir Bhutto as well. She said … we could cooperate with North Korea.”

Benazir Bhutto, prime minister of Pakistan,
visits North Korea in December 1993
and meets with leader Kim Il Sung.
(photo credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP Images)


Khan said Benazir Bhutto visited North Korea, adding, “I [also] had a visit to North Korea to discuss missile technology. Then the North Koreans came to Pakistan and received money from Benazir Bhutto so that we could start the missile program … It was not that costly; I think it was hardly worth $50 million.”
 
He continued, “I have only been to North Korea twice — in 1994 and 1999. In 1999, General [Pervez] Musharraf sent me along with General Iftikhar [Ali Khan], who was then the chief of the Air Defense Command. We were fighting India at Kargil, and we were in dire need of antiaircraft missiles … We went to North Korea and purchased 200 missiles from them.”
 
Khan added, “A North Korean team would visit the Kahuta plant during the same period as our missile deal was taking place, and it was no secret … Everyone knew about it. They would stay at a guest house in the vicinity of Kahuta plant.” He continued, “The North Korean engineers would visit our director generals in their departments to observe different operations.”
 
In that 2009 TV interview, Khan also recalled, “Iran was interested in acquiring nuclear technology. Since Iran was an important Muslim country, we wished Iran to acquire this technology … Iran’s nuclear capability will neutralize Israel’s power. We had advised Iran to contact the suppliers and purchase equipment from them.” Khan identified those initial suppliers as “a company with which we had established links when we could not receive the material from Europe. They were Sri Lankan Muslims.”
 
Step by step, initially with Pakistan’s assistance, and then as a self-driven engine, Iran embarked on assembling the four key elements needed to wield a nuclear bomb.
 

The rush to enrich

One foundation of a common atomic bomb design requires a sufficient quantity of uranium enriched to weapons-grade, or 90 percent. If missile-delivered, this material can then be converted into a metal that can be shaped into a dense spheroid — the warhead — small enough to fit into a nosecone. It is all a matter of weights and measures.
 
A basic method of enriching nuclear material is to whirl it around in centrifuges at a high rate of speed, thus separating out or purifying the desired uranium isotopes. Compare the process to distillation. The enrichment yield can be multiplied by acquiring more and more basic nuclear material, and then subjecting it to ever more cascades of linked centrifuges for longer processing.
 
Even operating at varying rates of efficiency, fast and slow, the ceaseless, metronomic output of Iranian centrifuges will eventually yield the quantity needed for several bombs. Experts estimate that a single bomb would require approximately 25 kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium, or HEU, that has been boosted to at least higher concentrations of 90 percent.
 
Iran is now operating at least 10,000 centrifuges, probably many more, in its slow-motion dash to acquire the vital nuclear weight it requires. The startling number of more than 10,000 centrifuges is about ten times the known arrays Iran admitted to just a few years ago in 2007. Indeed, the country has been adding centrifuges at a dazzling rate — not incrementally but in great leaps of thousands of additional machines at a time. True, some are old-fashioned centrifuges, some wear down after ten years of operation, and some are working inefficiently. But some possess newer technology. Together, efficiently or inefficiently, these thousands of machines are conjointly increasing the stock of basic nuclear material, month by month.
 
File photo of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
visiting the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.
(photo credit: AP/Iranian President’s office, File)



After years of centrifugal processing, Iran already has accumulated enough low enriched uranium, or LEU, to create five or six bombs — that is, if the LEU material would be boosted to weapons-grade, or 90 percent. With each passing day, that LEU stock expands in volume and potency. Much of Iran’s nuclear enrichment remains at 3.5 percent level. But Iran has admitted and inspectors have verified that the country has already reached the 20 percent threshold (actually 19.75 percent), producing by now about 300 kilograms — enough to move to the next steps of weapons-grade. Those steps must first enrich to the next level, say the 60 percent level, and from there to 90 percent, which is bomb quality.
 
Enriching to 3.5 percent is 75 percent of the task of reaching weapons-grade. Once Iran has reached 20 percent, it gone 90 percent of the distance to making weapons-grade uranium. In other words, once the process has been mastered to 20 percent, it is only a matter of time before 90 percent bomb-quality HEU can be created. Depending upon the number of cascades and centrifuges acting in concert, Iran could amass some 25 kilograms of bomb-ready 90 percent HEU in six months to a year. Within a year, at its current rate of exponential growth, Iran could have enough HEU to arm several bombs.
 
To fortify its unstoppable enrichment process, Tehran has constructed numerous redundant facilities, some underground, perhaps some operating in secret outside the sightlines of IAEA monitors. Some are in hospitals. Iran agreed to permit IAEA inspectors when, in 1974, it signed the “Safeguards Agreement.” The Safeguards Agreement is an adjunct to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that Tehran adopted in 1968 when it took its first baby steps toward the “Nuclear Club.”
 
Each Iranian enrichment facility — known or unknown — is crammed with those iconic cascades of tall and shiny aluminum centrifuges. Each cascade is comprised of dozens of centrifuges like long hands with many fingers. The march is almost unstoppable. If one cascade goes down, if a complete multi-cascade “production hall” stops operating, indeed if an entire plant is destroyed, others elsewhere in Iran will pick up the pace. Hour by hour, day by day, those centrifuges incrementally crank out the nuclear material needed to create the kilograms of HEU needed for a bomb. Despite international sanctions and global pressure, the centrifuges spin nonstop. The centrifugal forces have only accelerated. The clock is ticking.
 
But the lethality of Iran’s weapons program cannot be assessed merely by measuring the size and enrichment level of its nuclear material. That is one measure — but only one — of four indispensable measurements. All the gunpowder in the world will not make a bullet. It must be manufactured. That bullet needs a rifle before it can be shot. Finally, it needs a marksman in position.
 
The next step requires Iran’s growing stock of enriched uranium to be shaped into a weaponized spheroid object — the warhead. That process has been underway for many years.
 

Spherodization of uranium metal into a warhead

For the past 15 years, Iran has been on a quest to master the machining and engineering skills needed to transform Highly Enriched Uranium into a spheroidal or hemispherical mass that could be loaded into a missile cone to constitute the warhead.
 
Tehran long ago acknowledged to the IAEA that it indeed established “contacts with intermediaries of a clandestine nuclear-supply network in 1987 and the early 1990s, and that, in 1987, it had received … a 15-page document (hereafter referred to as the ‘uranium metal document’), which outlines the conversion of uranium fluoride compounds into uranium metal and the production of hemispherical enriched uranium metallic components.”
 
The campaign to build and detonate a nuclear spheroid payload has been years in the making. Iranian scientists who contacted Khan and his circles were particularly eager to learn more about “neutron cross-section calculations … and shock-wave interactions with metals,” according to a November 8, 2011 IAEA report compiled by the agency’s director general to its Board of Governors. Later, Iranian scientists sought “complex calculations relating to the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives,” that same IAEA report attributes to a Member State. Such calculations are essential to test the potency of any spheroid warhead Iran would load into a missile nosecone. The IAEA admits it has known about this aspect of the Iranian weaponization effort since 2005.
 
As early as 2003, Iran undertook, “to initiate a high-explosive charge in the form of a hemispherical shell,” as detailed in a November 2011 IAEA report that features a special extended Annex labeled “Possible Military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Program.” The Annex, published by the IAEA, laid out the details obtained through its Member States.
 
“During that experiment,” the Annex explained, “the internal hemispherical curved surface of the high-explosive charge was monitored using a large number of optical-fiber cables, and the light output of the explosive upon detonation was recorded with a high-speed streak camera. It should be noted that the dimensions of the initiation system and the explosives used with it were consistent with the dimensions for the new payload, which … were given to the engineers who were studying how to integrate the new payload into the chamber of the Shahab-3 missile reentry vehicle.” Then, in 2005, the IAEA’s November 2011 military annex asserts, Iran sought the expertise to assemble “the complex calculations relating to the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.”
 
To better perfect the weaponization of a HEU spheroid warhead, Iran must test and measure the metal ball’s reaction to those high explosives. These studies are known as hydrodynamics because they measure when material is so massively compressed and heated that it begins to flow and function like a fluid. This brings into play an understanding of fluid dynamics.
 
The IAEA’s November 2011 military annex makes clear that “throughout the entire timeline,” inspectors have documented Iran’s acquisition of items that “would be useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device.” The Annex enumerates with extreme specificity that these items include “high-speed electronic switches and spark gaps (useful for triggering and firing detonators); high-speed cameras (useful in experimental diagnostics); neutron sources (useful for calibrating neutron-measuring equipment); radiation detection and measuring equipment (useful in a nuclear-material production environment); and training courses on topics relevant to nuclear-explosives development (such as neutron cross-section calculations and shock-wave interactions/hydrodynamics).”
Indeed, that November 2011 Annex devotes an entire section, Section C.7., entitled “Hydrodynamic Experiments,” to detailing the steps Iran has taken to test the detonation of spheroidal metals. The section states that “Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear-explosive components using high-density materials such as tungsten.” It also speaks of databanks of modeling and calculations “to monitor the symmetry of the compressive shock of the simulated core of a nuclear device.”
Most alarming, states the Annex, is the discovery of a unique “large-explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments.” The vessel has been in the Parchin complex for over a decade, according to the IAEA report. So well authenticated is this massive cylindrical containment vessel, with its characteristic external piping to siphon off and register explosive results, that the Associated Press felt sure enough to syndicate a sketch of the chamber. The AP sketch of the explosion testing chamber with its distinctive yellow piping was published worldwide earlier this year.

Sketch of a large-explosives containment vessel in which to conduct
 hydrodynamic experiments believed to be situated
inside Iran’s Parchin military site. (photo credit: AP)



The IAEA military annex concludes, “Hydrodynamic experiments such as those described above, which involve high explosives in conjunction with nuclear material or nuclear-material surrogates, are strong indicators of possible weapon development.”
How far along the path of perfecting the metallurgy, spheroidization, and the control of that spheroid under intense detonation is unknown. But the real question is can a warhead be detonated?
 

Nuclear warhead detonation

A super-precise, multipoint detonating trigger would be needed to initiate the atomic chain reaction that will produce the bomb with its mushroom cloud. The deadly spheroid cannot just be match-lit with a fuse or beat with a hammer. Such a device must be detonated with a super-sophisticated nuclear trigger engineered with the extraordinary precision and synchrony requisite to initiate the implosion.
 
The nuclear trigger now in the latter stages of development in Iran is the R265 system. Specifically, the R265 employs a multipoint shock generator that causes a simultaneous implosion from all sides surrounding the spheroidal weaponized material, according to the IAEA intelligence distributed to all Western governments. It must be compact. The Shahab-3 tri-conic nosecone features a diameter of 600 millimeters, according to missile weapons experts. The outer radius of the R265 system offers a “diameter of 550 millimeters, less than the estimated diameter of about 600 millimeters available inside the payload chamber of a Shahab-3,” according to a recent report by the nuclear experts at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), nuclear armament experts who have access to IAEA reports and monitor all developments in Iran’s nuclear program.
 
The hemispherical aluminum of the R265 shell that will host the implosion sequence is 265 millimeter thick, leaving a 10 millimeter distance for the sequence. According to a November 2011 ISIS report released in tandem to the IAEA military annex, the design appears simple, even if making it work with microsecond synchrony is a prodigious task of engineering. “Outer channels are cut into the outer surface of the shell,” explains the ISIS report, “each channel one by one millimeter.” The report adds, “Each channel terminates in a cylindrical hole, 5 mm in diameter, that is drilled though the shell and contains an explosive pellet.” The explosive pellets, the November 2011 ISIS report continues, will be made of PETN. The powerful explosive PETN is the one many terrorists have chosen.
 
“The geometrical pattern formed by channels and holes is arranged in quadrants on the outer hemispheric surface, which allows a single central point of initiation and the simultaneous detonation of explosives in all the holes on the hemisphere,” according to the November 2011 ISIS report. That outer detonation constitutes merely stage one.
 
The simultaneous initiation of a high explosive in the outer hemisphere impacts a second interior device known as “exploding bridgewire” (EBW). The timing will not be measured in seconds, or even milliseconds—which are one-thousandths of a second—but in microseconds. A microsecond is one-millionth of a second.
 
As far back as May 2008, an IAEA report stated, “Iran acknowledged that it had conducted simultaneous testing with two to three EBW detonators with a time precision of about one microsecond.” Indeed, the IAEA confirmed that such testing of EBW detonators has been underway at least since February 2004 and probably since 2003 utilizing “as many as 500 EBW detonators.” ISIS states, “Iran would need only two EBWs to initiate a nuclear explosion.”
 
In a February 2008 weaponization briefing obtained ISIS, the IAEA described some Iranian research graphics it had discovered. “Several sketches for a missile head integrating the chamber described above were shown,” the IAEA briefing notes detail, “indicating the electronic mechanism and the spherical warhead. They do not, however, give an explicit indication that it’s a nuclear weapon. The following stages of the project are mentioned in the slides: configuration of the structure, design of material, connections, tightness of chamber seal, test of design, [and] tolerance of surface states. Mathematical simulations appear to have been done to define the centers of mass, the equilibrium of the charges, the whole coinciding with the parameters for a Shahab-3 warhead.”
 
Some of the EBW testing was done in what a 2008 IAEA briefing describes as “a 400m deep shaft located 10 km from a firing control point,” which “shows the placement of various electronic systems such as a control unit and a high-voltage power generator.”
 
With the R265 and EBWs operational, Tehran’s device would require the final ingredient to make it a working nuclear bomb: the neutron initiator. Iran has it.
 
IAEA inspectors have identified the foreign expert who gave Iran the expertise to operate at split-microsecond speed. His name is Vycheslav V. Danilenko, a Ukrainian engineer employed for three decades in the Soviet Union’s nuclear-weapon complex at Chelyabinsk-70. In the early 1960s, Danilenko worked as “a member of the gas dynamics group” says an ISIS summary of IAEA documents. His specialty was precision photography and measurement of high-explosive detonation and shock compression. The high-explosive by-products were nanodiamonds, also known as UDD (ultra-dispersed diamonds).
 
The ISIS summary states that after falling on hard economic times in the early 1990s, Danilenko “contacted the Iranian embassy in mid-1995, offering his expertise on UDD. At the end of the year, he was contacted by Dr. Seyed Abbas Shahmoradi,” a top controller at the Iran’s nuclear establishment. Ultimately, says the ISIS summary, “Danilenko signed a contract with Shahmoradi.” ISIS adds, “The IAEA has reviewed publications by Danilenko and has met with him. It has been able to verify through three separate sources, including the expert himself, that he was in Iran during that time.”
 
In December 2009, ISIS published a further report on Iran’s nuclear-weapon progress that described the vital role of the neutron initiator in activating the chain reaction that makes the warhead explode as a nuclear bomb. That report describes, “a neutron initiator made out of uranium deuteride (UD3), which, when finished (and subsequently manufactured), would most likely be placed at the center of a fission bomb made from weapons-grade uranium. This type of initiator works by the high explosives compressing the nuclear core and [then] the initiator producing a spurt of neutrons as a result of fusion … The neutrons flood the core of weapons-grade uranium and initiate the chain reaction.”
 
The December 2009 ISIS report indicates work on a neutron initiator might have occurred even before 2003, adding, “Although Iran might claim that this work is for civil purposes, it has no civil application.” That ISIS report also makes clear that getting the neutron initiator operable “would be the hardest measurement Iran would need to make in developing a nuclear weapon … The timing of the explosion and resulting shock waves would need to be perfect in order to get enough fusion to create a spurt of neutrons in a reliable manner at exactly the right instant.” The report adds, “This approach was followed by Pakistan in the early 1980s.”
 
Indeed, a Pakistani neutron initiator can be seen at on the cover of the book, Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and Education. The book shows AQ Khan standing in front of a green chalkboard with his design for a multipoint nuclear-bomb trigger featuring a neutron initiator distinctly labeled in the middle of the warhead.

The book, Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and Education,
 shows Khan standing in front of a green chalkboard with his design for a
multipoint nuclear-bomb trigger featuring a neutron initiator distinctly
labeled in the middle of the warhead. (photo credit: Courtesy)



With 25 kilograms of enough highly enrichment uranium converted into a deadly metallic sphere compact enough to be inserted inside a 600-millimeter tri-conic nosecone and encased in a two-stage R265 shock generator working in tandem with an EBW to ignite a neutron initiator, Iran would still need a reliable delivery vehicle.
 
Iran has it: the Shabab-3.
 
Iran’s main nuclear warhead-ready missile is the Shahab-3, the renamed North Korean No-Dong 1, which is based on a Russian Scud-C design. In Farsi, Shahab means Meteor. While Iran possesses various North Korean missiles relabeled with Farsi names such as the Shabab-1 and Shabab-2, the Shahab-3 is uniquely suited to deliver a nuclear bomb to Israel. The Shahab-3 is designed to carry a warhead of approximately 800-1000 kilograms, and boasts a range of some 1200 kilometers — far enough to reach Israel.
 

Shahab-3 missile delivery — airburst at 600 meters

Iran’s main nuclear warhead-ready missile is the Shahab-3, the renamed North Korean No-Dong 1, which is based on a Russian Scud-C design. In Farsi, Shahab means Meteor. While Iran possesses various North Korean missiles relabeled with Farsi names such as the Shabab-1 and Shabab-2, the Shahab-3 is uniquely suited to deliver a nuclear bomb to Israel. The Shahab-3 is designed to carry a warhead of approximately 800-1000 kilograms, and boasts a range of some 1200 kilometers — far enough to reach Israel.
 
Most importantly, it can detonate not only upon impact, but in an airburst above ground. The lethal Shahab-3 missiles are truck-mobile, so they can shoot from a parking lot or a pistachio grove. No one can be sure how many Shahab-3s are held in Tehran’s inventory, but certainly it is scores, if not hundreds. Videos show Iran shooting several at once. This particular missile is the one that IAEA inspectors and governments most closely associate with Iran’s nuclear weapon program. They have been worried about it for years.
 
ISIS notes from a February 2008 IAEA weaponization briefing state: “The information presented, which included multimedia files, describes several aspects of what could be nuclear-weapons development [including] instructions on … missile-reentry vehicle research including the chronology of events-separation of the missile, loss-of-tracking, switching on of altitude detectors, and timing of firing devices leading to an explosion at an altitude of about 600 meters. The IAEA notes that the altitude described in the documents excludes the possibility that the warhead was designed to accommodate conventional explosives or chemical and biological charges.”
 
A 2008 IAEA report recounts a discussion with the Iranians about “parameters and development work related to the Shahab-3 missile, in particular technical aspects of a reentry vehicle.” IAEA inspectors “made available to Iran for examination a computer image … showing a schematic layout of the contents of the inner cone of a reentry vehicle. This layout has been assessed by the agency as quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device.” Iran denied the authenticity of the schematic.
The November 2011 IAEA military annex reflects alarm regarding “high explosives (including the development of exploding bridgewire detonators) and re-engineering of the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile reentry vehicle.” When the November 2011 IAEA report cited its concern over “at least one large-scale experiment in 2003 to initiate a high-explosive charge in the form of a hemispherical shell,” the agency specified in the same paragraph that “the explosives used with it were consistent with the dimensions for the new payload, which, according to the alleged studies documentation, were given to the engineers who were studying how to integrate the new payload into the chamber of the Shahab 3 missile reentry vehicle.”
 
Later, in a subsequent section of that November 2011 IAEA military annex entitled “Fusing, Arming and Firing system,” the inspectors report that they asked the Tehran authorities about design graphics that reflect efforts to “integrate the new payload into the reentry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile [and] … the development of a prototype firing system that would enable the payload to explode both in the air above a target or upon impact of the reentry vehicle.” Iran formally replied that the graphics were a mere “animation game.” In other words, Iran dismissed the nuclear-bomb graphics as a sort of doodle.
The matter came up again last year in a section of the November 2011 IAEA military annex entitled “Integration into a Missile Delivery Vehicle.” The IAEA Board of Governors repeated, “The project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive program of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber, which would be mounted in the reentry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.”
 
The reason Iran’s pursuit of an airburst detonation of approximately 600 meters is so troubling to IAEA inspector is because the inspectors know their history. The atomic bombs dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki were designed to detonate as an airburst—at 600 meters.
 

How sure is sure?

Just how sure is the IAEA about its findings. The agency certainly tends to liberally sprinkle the word “alleged” and “alleged documentation” throughout its reportage. That is the pro forma language of such international bodies. But to address any reservation on the authenticity of the information assembled, the IAEA in its 2011 military annex took the rare opportunity of including a full section entitled “Credibility of Information.”
 
The Credibility of Information section assured the authenticity of the data, certifying that it relied upon “a large volume of documentation (including correspondence, reports, graphs from presentations, videos, and engineering drawings), amounting to over a thousand pages. The information reflected in that documentation is of a technically complex and interconnected nature, showing research, development, and testing activities over time. It also contains working-level correspondence consistent with the day-to-day implementation of a formal programme. Consistent with the Agency’s practice, that information has been carefully and critically examined. The Agency has also had several meetings with the Member State [Iran] to clarify the information it had provided, to question the Member State [Iran] about the forensics it had carried out on the documentation and the information reflected in it, and to obtain more information on the underlying sources.”
 
The Credibility of Information section added that the IAEA information was obtained from diverse sources and vetted by official bodies in numerous countries. “In addition to the alleged studies documentation,” the IAEA November 2011 military annex states, “the Agency has received information from more than ten Member States. This has included procurement information, information on international travel by individuals said to have been involved in the alleged activities, financial records, documents reflecting health and safety arrangements, and other documents demonstrating manufacturing techniques for certain high-explosive components. This information reinforces and tends to corroborate the information reflected in the alleged studies documentation and relates to activities substantially beyond those identified in that documentation.”
 
Driving home the degree of certitude, the IAEA annex averred, “In addition to the information referred to … the Agency has acquired information as a result of its own efforts, including publications and articles acquired through open-source research, satellite imagery, the results of Agency verification activities, and information provided by Iran in the context of those verification activities. Importantly, the Agency has also had direct discussions with a number of individuals who were involved in relevant activities in Iran, including, for example, an interview with a leading figure in the clandestine nuclear-supply network. The information obtained by the Agency from the discussions with these individuals is consistent with the information provided by Member States, and that acquired through its own efforts, in terms of time frames and technical content.”
 
That IAEA military annex complains of Iran’s obstruction. While “Iran has acknowledged certain information reflected in the alleged studies documentation … many of the answers given by Iran to questions posed by the Agency in connection with efforts to resolve the Agency’s concerns have been imprecise and/or incomplete, and the information has been slow in coming and sometimes contradictory.” In addition, the IAEA complains of secret activities, saying, “The existence of previously undeclared parts of Iran’s nuclear programme, have tended to increase the Agency’s concerns, rather than dispel them.”
 
In a final statement, the agency make the blanket statement: “Based on these considerations, and in light of the Agency’s general knowledge of the Iranian nuclear programme and its historical evolution, the Agency finds the information upon which Part C of this Annex is based to be, overall, credible.”
In summation, based on voluminous data, the IAEA reiterates its concern: “Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”
 
Just days ago, on August 30, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a statement with Restricted Distribution reiterating its long-held conclusion: “Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.” The August 30 statement emphasizes once again, “Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts, and from information provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible.”
 
In its August 30, 2012 report summary, the IAEA concluded that it was more or less giving up: “As Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation,” the IAEA stated, “the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”
 

News and revelations

The point of these revelations about Iran’s advanced warhead design is that they are not revelations at all. The news is that these revelations are old news. They have been known to Western governments for many months and in some cases several years. This information was not given to this writer in a Georgetown briefing by a defense official or in a Tel Aviv café by a Mossad operative. Everything quoted here is robustly searchable on the Internet. Almost none of it is taken from media reports, but rather from governmental, official or quasi-official sources publically available. For some 15 years, Iran has been building a bomb. Government leaders know this.



Herman Nackaerts, Deputy Director General and Head of the
Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA,
left, and Iran’s Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA,
Ali Asghar Soltanieh speak to journalists after their talks at the
 permanent mission of Iran in Vienna on Aug. 24, 2012.
(photo credit: AP Photo/Hans Punz)

Israel will wait until the last moment, diplomatic sources say, allowing every nonmilitary lever to work. Ultimately, Israel will rely upon itself as it did when it destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 in Operation Babylon and, according to foreign reports, the budding Syrian-North Korean reactor in 2007 in Operation Orchard.
 
To the question of when any such attack on Iran might occur, the best minds say, “He who knows does not speak; he who speaks does not know.” But the best sense is that when and if it happens, the noise will be deafening and reverberate for a long time.
 
———–
Font: Edwin Black is the author of the international best sellers IBM and the Holocaust,
Banking on Baghdad, and The Farhud. He can be found at www.edwinblack.com.
© Copyright 2012 Edwin Black
All Rights Reserved



The Obama Administration and the Civil War in Syria

Rebel activity against Bashar Assad’s regime, which began in March 2011, was initially limited to certain areas, while Syria’s large cities remained more or less undisturbed. During the first months, there was noted hesitancy on Washington's part regarding the best course of action for the United States in this crisis. While avoiding making a decision, the administration repeatedly called on President Assad to institute democratic reforms in Syria. When Assad consistently refused to do so, the administration heightened its demands, and on August 18, 2011, President Obama called on President Assad to give up his position “for the sake of the Syrian people.”

At the same time, the administration worked intensively on the international arena, especially in various UN institutions, to formulate an international course of action against Assad’s regime, and it also took a series of economic steps against Syria. It has been reported that the American administration is almost certainly working with Saudi Arabia and Turkey to help the rebels against Assad. According to one such report, American intelligence personnel are stationed on the Turkish-Syrian border and are assisting in training the rebels and supplying them with information, and perhaps with weapons as well.

On October 4, 2011, the Security Council convened to discuss the situation in Syria. A proposed resolution was presented condemning the “continued grave and systematic human right violations and use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities.” The proposal called for a political process in a violence-free atmosphere, “effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s population.” China and Russia voted against the resolution. Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained. The resolution, although it won the requisite number of nine votes, was rejected because of the Chinese and Russian vetoes.

A few months later, on February 4, 2012, the Security Council met again to discuss the situation, and again, on the basis of a proposed resolution, the Syrian regime was called on to refrain from violence against civilians and withdraw the army from the cities, take down roadblocks, and allow legal demonstrations by civilians. Syria was also asked to “allow unhindered access for all Arab League institutions to determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents taking place.”

Consequently, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon and Arab League Secretary Nabil al-Arabi decided on February 23, 2012 to appoint former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as special envoy to Syria. After a few weeks, Annan submitted a program for resolving the Syrian crisis to Ban Ki Moon. On April 5, 2012, the Security Council president called on the Syrian regime to adopt the program. Furthermore, both the government and the opposition were asked to hold their fire until April 12, 2012. This call remained unheeded.

On April 21, 2012, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), consisting of 300 observers who would remain in Syria for 90 days. In mid June 2012, the commanding officer of UNSMIS announced the suspension of activities given the rising incidence of violence there. On July 19, 2012, the Security Council was asked to pressure Syria with sanctions should it fail to stop the violence. The proposal was again rejected because of Chinese and Russian opposition. In early August 2012, Annan announced his resignation as special envoy, and Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed in his stead. A few weeks later, the observer force ended its assignment.

Some voices in the United States administration have called for more active American involvement in Syria, including the pursuit of military measures. Various proposals to limit the Syrian air force’s freedom of action have been made by creating safe havens.

At least until the presidential elections in November 2012, the Obama administration will likely avoid any military action in Syria. The civil war in Syria at its current level does not seem to appear to the administration as a high risk to critical United States interests. As a state hostile to the United States, Syria's weakening in the civil war is a clear American interest. Conversely, as Iran's ally, Syria's weakening means the undermining of the Iranian-Syrian axis, which is likewise a welcome development for the United States. Syria is also a close ally of Russia and China, rivals of the US on the international arena. The current reality in Syria is embarrassing as well as alarming to Russia and China. From America’s perspective, this is by no means an undesirable situation.

Syria’s enemies in the region, also allies of the United StatesIsrael, Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan – share an essential interest in seeing Syria weakened. These states view Syria as hostile and as endangering their interests at varying levels of intensity. The civil war is causing tremendous damage to Syria’s economy and Syrian military power. For Syria’s neighbors, this is a welcome outcome, especially since in the current reality, there is no clear immediate danger that Syria’s civil war will spread to neighboring countries. Thus, the United States does not see the need to heighten its involvement in Syria at this time.

The coming elections in the United States are also a significant constraint for President Obama’s administration. Although no administration official will admit it, the Obama administration currently appears driven by a zero-friction policy, at least until the elections. The relative peace and quiet of the present – the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and the intention to withdraw also from Afghanistan – serves the administration well and improves the chances of Obama winning a second term in office. Any military involvement, even if minimal, is liable to drag the United States into a bloody struggle whose results are impossible to predict, and this in turn could have severe ramifications for America’s economy and the elections results.

Finally, the American administration is well aware that the blood-soaked civil war raging in Syria is not a confrontation between the "good guys" and the "bad guys." Both sides operate with brutality and harbor few inhibitions, even if the media presents the Syrian regime in dark colors and the rebels in positive terms. The rebel forces are far from unified and it is hard to control them. The American administration rightly worries about massacres that the rebels could perpetrate during the war. Even if American forces were not to be directly involved, they would almost certainly be tainted by association. Should the rebels win, they will likely seek serious revenge from the Alawites. Here too the United States would not be able to evade responsibility should it step up its involvement now. All of these considerations are almost certainly deterring the administration from intensifying its involvement in Syria at this time.

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ 

Saturday, September 1, 2012

IRGC Navy's Communication Systems Impenetrable

TEHRAN (FNA)- Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi said his forces have adopted the necessary measures to confront enemies' spying operations against Iran's military communication tools and systems.
 
 
Addressing a group of the IRGC Navy personnel in Iran's Southern port city of Bandar Abbas on Saturday, Fadavi said the communication systems which have been developed by the aliens are means of control against other nations since they have been designed to be vulnerable to their makers' hacking efforts.

This means that communication systems and devices should all be indigenized to have better security, he added.

"Creation of a safe and secure contact system is on our agenda, and we have taken great and good steps to that end," the commander said.

Western military analysts say they are stunned by Iranian experts' high capability of cyber defense and cyber attacks.

In July, Iran's Minister of Communication and Information Technology Reza Taqipour announced that Iran has successfully confronted sophisticated spy malwares and thwarted all cyber attacks against the country's infrastructures.