Monday, April 30, 2012
Sunday, April 29, 2012
The Battle for Bahrain Continues
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More than a year after the "Arab spring" came to Bahrain
The popular uprising in Bahrain began soon after the start of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt , but in recent months, as a result of events in Syria Manama
The Iranian revolution did not leave a significant mark on Bahrain
Human rights organizations in the West and the February 14 Youth Movement, whose members last year clashed repeatedly with security forces, held three “days of rage” during the Grand Prix in protest at the decision to hold the race in spite of “the suppression of human rights in the country.” (Last year the event was not held because of the security situation.) The opposition did not attempt to prevent the Grand Prix – it has no power to do so – but it did exploit the event in order to draw attention to its demands: a constitutional monarchy, fair elections, separation of powers, and an equal distribution of resources.
Hamad bin Isa, who early in the previous decade rose from emir to king, announced his intention to implement changes in the constitution of 2002 in accordance with the principles laid down by the “national dialogue” and the commission of inquiry that he appointed. He noted that the changes would bring about greater balance between the executive branch and the legislative branch; and would also apply to appointments of members of the upper house of parliament (who will be appointed by him), parliament's role in determining the annual budget, and more. The opposition claims that these measures are lacking in substance.
The royal house is not monolithic – there are those, such as Khalifa bin Salman, the king’s uncle and the prime minister for the past forty-one years, who object to reforms, while others, such as Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad, are apparently seeking to promote national reconciliation. In the opposition as well there are those who will be content with political reforms, while others want the king removed.
The Iranian media continues to incite against the royal house, and Iran Saudi Arabia and Bahrain accused the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force of operating a terror cell that intended to blow up the King Fahd Bridge and the Saudi embassy in Bahrain Bahrain
The instability in Bahrain Iran Bahrain would produce a pro-Iranian parliament that would oppose US
Notwithstanding Bahrain Iran United States US embassy’s activities have been transferred to less sensitive areas, and if the situation in the country deteriorates, this is liable to threaten the continued presence of the Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain
In an attempt to assuage Western criticism somewhat, in June 2011 the king appointed an independent commission of inquiry, headed by a leading international jurist, Egyptian Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni. In November 2011 the commission published its conclusions, which were rife with unprecedented criticism. It was determined that the security forces, most of them Sunnis “imported” from countries such as Pakistan, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, made “excessive use of force” and that human rights violations were systematic and intentional. In spite of the criticism, implementation of the recommendations has been delayed.
The protest in Bahrain is enjoying a second wind courtesy of the Arab spring, but its roots are deep and draw from Sunni-Shiite tension and the fear of Iran
The stability of Bahrain Iran Iran will likely continue to exploit the complex relations of the Bahraini royal house with the Shiites in order to signal that it has the ability to undermine Bahrain
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Guzansky, Yoel
Thursday, April 26, 2012
Rising anger as fugitive Egypt minister 'roams free' in London
Sentenced to 30 years in absentia by a Cairo court, Youssef Boutros-Ghali is living free in the UK despite Interpol's call for his arrest. As Ahram Online discovers, legal complications could be stalling the extradition.
The British government is facing embarrassing questions over the continued presence in London of Egypt's ex-finance minister Youssef Boutrous-Ghali despite an outstanding Interpol request for his arrest.
Images of former finance minister Youssef Boutros Ghali as they appear on the Interpol website
The British government is facing embarrassing questions over the continued presence in London of Egypt's ex-finance minister Youssef Boutrous-Ghali despite an outstanding Interpol request for his arrest.
Boutros-Ghali, who fled Egypt in February 2011, has been seen at least twice in public over the last four months, stirring anger among the UK's Egyptian community.
The Mubarak-era finance minister was last year sentenced in absentia to 30 years in prison by a Cairo court on corruption charges.
Egyptian prosecutors have demanded Boutros-Ghali's arrest and extradition, backed by 13 British members of parliament and a notice from the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). But while Interpol's involvement seemed to promise a swift resolution to the issue, the reality has been more complex.
Boutros-Ghali's extradition depends on UK police making an arrest and there seems little indication of their willingness to do so. UK authorities -- including the Home Office which would sign-off on the extradition -- are refusing to comment on the case.
The former minister's details are prominently listed on Interpol's website, and the global body is understood to have officially informed the UK of its 'red note' which calls for Boutros-Ghali's apprehension.
However there are no agreements between Interpol and the UK that oblige the latter to make the arrest -- and the 'red notice' does not count as an international arrest order.
Interpol does not have the authority to directly issue such warrants, the organisation admitted to Ahram Online, adding that arresting someone is the sole domain of the sovereign member state.
As per procedure, Interpol's arrest warrant has been sent to UK Interpol, part of the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA). But speaking to Ahram Online, the SOCA said it had little authority either.
“We do not have the power to arrest anybody as we are only the conduit passing arrest requests to UK police [which is] responsible for implementing any arrest warrant,” a spokesman told Ahram Online.
He would neither confirm or deny whether his organisation had received a warrant to arrest Boutros-Ghali.
UK police authorites are similarly tight-lipped, with a spokesperson saying they cannot discuss any case until an arrest is made.
In the meantime, all enraged Egyptians in the UK can do is condemn the inaction, and grasp opportunities to berate Boutros-Ghali themselves.
In a recent statement, the UK's Egyptian Association said letting former Mubarak regime officials convicted of corruption live freely in London was unacceptable.
Last week an Egyptian resident of London saw Boutros-Ghali in the upscale neighbourhood of Knightsbridge and pursued him through the streets, branding him a "thief" and calling for his arrest. The exchange was filmed and uploaded on YouTube, with Boutros-Ghali's interlocutor saying he was going to report the ex-minister to the police.
In January, the UK Parliament's House of Commons expressed its "concern that Ghali resides and roams freely in London despite having been sentenced in absentia to a 30-year prison term by an Egyptian court".
Thirteen MPs called for the British government to respond to the Egyptian request for Boutros-Ghali's extradition. Ahram Online understands that the UK Home Office is still considering the request,
Friday, April 20, 2012
Secret Service still the best and the brightest
US Secret Service agent stands by President Obama's limousine at Fort McHenry in Baltimore in 2010
Editor's note: Jeffrey Robinson is the co-author of "Standing Next to History - An Agent's Life in the Secret Service," the autobiography of former United States Secret Service Special Agent, Joseph Petro. (St. Martins/Thomas Dunne Books. Available in both Kindle and Nook.)
Jeffrey Robinson
So a bunch of guys away from home, who should know better, take off their wedding rings, mix testosterone with alcohol and hookers --- an appalling combination --- argue over the price of a lady's company and, all of a sudden, the entire culture of the U.S. Secret Service is thrown into question.
All of a sudden, this is the worst disaster for the Secret Service, ever. All of a sudden, the Secret Service is out of control. All of a sudden, anything might have happened, like one of the 11 agents could have been blackmailed to open a door for a sniper or to look the other way as a bomb-carrying terrorist walks up to the president.
All of a sudden, the men and women of the Secret Service are no longer the best and the brightest. Especially the men.
All of a sudden... Stop!
It's time for a reality check.
The 11 agents who were sent home from Colombia in disgrace before the president even left Washington were there in a support role. Whether they were manning metal detectors or handling dogs that sweep rooms, whether they were part of a sniper team or standing post at 3 a.m. along a barricaded street, they were not members of the Presidential Protective Division (PPD). They were not on the president's shoulder. At no time was the president's security in danger.
What damage did their stupidity do? Obviously, a lot to their personal lives, their marriages and their careers. Obviously, also, a lot to the image and reputation of the Secret Service.
The legislation creating the Secret Service was sitting on Abraham Lincoln's desk, waiting to be signed, on April 15, 1865, the night he was assassinated. In those days, the Secret Service was housed inside the Treasury Department, and its job was to protect and defend the currency and monetary instruments of the United States. It didn't get the supplementary duty of protecting the president and vice president until after William McKinley was assassinated in 1901.
No agent I have ever met was hired for his sense of humor. These are very serious men and women who do their jobs very seriously.
They have always been the best and the brightest.
And they still are.
You can see it in the way they stand a little taller and walk with a different gait than others in law enforcement. You can see it in their pride. Frankly, I can't think of any other law enforcement agency where pride counts as much as it does with the Secret Service. It's the same pride that is always so visible with the U.S. Marines.
That's the reason why this scandal matters. Not because someone thinks the agency is out of control. It's not. Not because of wildly exaggerated threats of blackmail. No, Chicken Little, the sky is not falling. It matters because the idiotic actions of 11 agents who forgot who they are and what their badge stands for deeply affects every active duty agent and tens of thousands of retired agents. Pride has been dented. And agents are, rightly, furious.
These are men and women who have made -- and continue to make -- huge personal sacrifices for their share in that pride. The divorce rate among agents is high. That's not because they party with hookers, but because for the privilege of wearing that special five starred badge, they abandon any thoughts of their time being their own. They miss birthdays and Christmas, Little League games, graduations, school plays, first teeth, first steps, first words.
When the president travels, especially overseas, it's a flying circus with 800-1,000 people, limousines, helicopters, communications equipment, big guns, small guns, sometimes food, and often 20-30 planes.
As an integral part of this, Secret Service agents have two main concerns: To create and to maintain a tightly controlled environment in which the president can do his job safely and to bring everyone home at night.
Anything short of that is, the way the Secret Service defines the word, failure.
Just as those two things are true, so are these: What happened with those 11 agents is defined as stupidity. They will be dealt with quickly by the Secret Service. The president's opponents will pretend that there are political ramifications and invent whatever capital out of this that they can to embarrass the president. It will take a long time before pride is fully restored, and, if this ever happens again, it will definitely not be soon.
Thursday, April 19, 2012
Wednesday, April 18, 2012
NATO to Declare Missile Shield without Putin
BRUSSELS, Belgium — This is what years of development, revamp and acrimony have yielded: Starting in May, Europe will have the beginning of an operational shield against ballistic missiles, courtesy of NATO.
The system will be modest at first, not much more than SM-3 interceptor missiles aboard the U.S.S. Monterrey, a ship enabled with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system and stationed in the Mediterranean. It’ll be aided by an early-warning radar system Turkey’s hosting at its Kurecik base.
But together, they form what a senior NATO official told reporters on Wednesday was an “interim capability” to stop incoming missiles — the first, ever, in Europe. NATO will formally announce it in May at its big summit in Chicago, and when defense chiefs meet here on Thursday, they’ll get updated on its progress.
There’s a long, long way to go in what the Obama administration calls its “phased adaptive” approach to the Euro missile shield. The SM-3 interceptors aboard the Monterrey — the first of many such ships headed to the Med — can only stop short- to intermediate-range missiles. (NATO would not disclose the exact range for the “interim” shield.) It will take years to add even the entire easternmost parts of the continent to the shield — the “phased” part of “phased adaptive” — as its first ground-based anti-missile missiles, which will be hosted in Romania, won’t be operational until 2015. And the shield won’t be able to stop intercontinental ballistic missiles until 2020, if everything goes according to plan.
Still, it’s something. The Bush administration pushed for a ground-based missile shield on the continent early in its tenure, primarily aimed at blocking incoming Russian missiles. The Obama administration transformed the plan into one based, at first, at sea, maneuverable to address missile threats from different countries as they emerged — the “adaptive” part of “phased adaptive.” It was based on the idea that Iran is the greatest missile threat to Europe right now, not Russia, but it got Obama slammed for allegedly selling out Eastern Europe to Moscow while failing to secure Russia’s acquiescence to the shield.
And it also might not work. NATO officials here are big on portraying the SM-3 as a proven technology. (It’s the weapon that shot down a rogue satellite in 2008, for example.) But an inquiry by two MIT and Cornell scientists found that “in eight or nine of the 10 SM-3 intercept tests from 2002 to 2009,” the interceptor failed to destroy an oncoming warhead. The Pentagon has rejected this claim.
NATO also wouldn’t discuss how Iran would react to an announcement of an infant missile shield. “It’s aimed at incoming missiles, not a [specific] country,” said the senior NATO official, who would not brief reporters on the record. But the White House explicitly predicated its entire phased-adaptive approach on blocking Iranian missiles — and Iran, which last week got hit with a European oil embargo, is still making threats to close a crucial waterway.
But announcing the shield is less about immediately defeating specific threats than a “political declaration,” says Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary general. In other words, it ends a debate, one focused as much on alliance members as those who threaten it. NATO argued internally for over a decade about whether such a system would even be desirable. But now, it’s sending the message that a European missile shield is an irreversible fact that missile-wielding adversaries have to adjust to.
Tuesday, April 17, 2012
Possible Russian Responses to an Attack on Iran
By Majid Asgaripour, Mehr News Agency, via AP
Iran defies international pressure: A worker rides a bike in front
of the reactor building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant Oct. 26
As international activity surrounding the Iranian nuclear program intensifies, it seems that the question of a possible war on Iran is taking center stage on Russia's agenda as well. There is evidence of heightened diplomatic activity, along with military preparations and an expanded public debate reflecting differences of opinion within the Russian establishment.
On the diplomatic and political levels, there has been extensive Russian activity for quite some time, but the pace is accelerating to match the heightened international pressure. Amidst this, the Russian stance on the Iranian nuclear program has undergone several changes, in particular since the publication of the most recent IAEA report. If before the report was published Russia refused to recognize the existence of the Iranian program, the current stance is as follows: Russia views the nuclear program in a negative light and sees it as a threat to the international system and Russia itself, but there is still no unequivocal evidence on the existence of such a program (although some say that Iran is well on its way to becoming a threshold state or has in fact already become one); the international community must act to contain the program, but not by means of sanctions, which are in any case ineffective and will not achieve their goal; and of course, there should be no military action, which is deemed catastrophic and harboring the seeds of destruction, both for the region and on the global level. The only solution is the diplomatic one, and Russia currently supports holding negotiations between the international community and Iran, with Russia and the West cooperating in this endeavor. Russia believes that it has a definite capacity to influence Iran, and it is likely that Russia expects to translate this into bonus points on the international arena. Indeed, Russia is expected to take an active part in the upcoming P5+1 talks.
Thus for the diplomatic level. In tandem, there are Russian voices – fairly authoritative ones, it should be said – averring that an attack on Iran is already a done deal and will take place within the next few months. Some identify an American intention to start an all-out war against Iran, even if the attack is carried out by Israel. This is understood as a threat to Russian interests because it is an attack on a Russian ally and a member of the political axis headed by Russia. Moreover, such a war can be expected to spill across Iran’s borders into the sphere of Russia’s geopolitical interests, especially the Caucasus, and to draw regional states into the conflict. At issue specifically are Azerbaijan and Georgia, together representing one component of a Western strategic axis (it is customary to mention Israel too in this context) blocking Russia’s access to the south, as well as the Iranian border. Armenia is further south and is presented as a member of the Russian-Iranian axis; Russian army units are currently deployed there. In this setting one also hears of a scenario in which a conflict between these Caucasus states can be expected (several reasons for this have accumulated in recent years), in which Russia would be forced to become involved and make its way south, through their territories, in order to extend help to its allies – Armenia and Iran. Beyond this, dire warnings about a large influx of refugees that would for some reason flee northwards from an Iran under attack towards the Caucasus and eventually Russia itself have been sounded from many quarters for quite some time. Even if this last scenario is highly dubious, it has become a major (propaganda) justification in Russia's regional military preparations.
Nor has the subject remained entirely theoretical, and in recent months Russia has prepared in practical terms for just such a war. This includes formulating operational and logistical solutions to prepare Russia's southern regional district, via staff and troop exercises and including ABC warfare, for a possible confrontation. The forces deployed across from the likely arena of conflict – supposed to encompass regions beyond the Caucasus, including the areas of the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean – are being beefed up. The current Russian-Turkish tension is also relevant in this context, as Turkey is liable to become an active enemy of Russia. Also noteworthy is the activity of the Russian Navy in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, which involves friction with the Turks in the waters of Cyprus, and the constant presence across the coast of Syria, Russia’s ally in the same axis (and Russia’s conduct on the Syrian issue over the past year figures in this calculation as well).
All of the above has recently begun to surface in the media, and at the same time there seems to be a kind of debate in Russia about the Iranian issue among senior politicians, military personnel, and academics. Generally speaking, one may discern two camps in this debate: the camp supporting a war, spouting anti-Western slogans, and calling for violent action to advance Russian regional and global interests while exploiting the situation to solve ancillary geopolitical issues both in the Caucasus and the Middle East. Some are calling to remove the threat from Iran, Russia’s ally, by undercutting the sanctions, consolidating an anti-Western coalition, and even threatening the use of strategic weapons. A few even view Iran’s desire for nuclear weapons in a positive light – as a means of increasing regional stability.
On the other hand, there are academic and public figures vehemently opposed to these drums of war. Discerning elements that are interested in seeing a war erupt in Iran that involves Russia, this camp warns of the destructive ramifications of this scenario and calls for more modest Russian international aspirations, with Russia taking a firm stand within the international community and acting in concert with the other nations to contain Iran’s nuclear program, whether through dialogue or through the application of coordinated international pressure.
The impression has thus been created that Russia as yet has no clear, unequivocal stance, at least externally, on how it would react if and when Iran comes under attack. Internal disagreement reflects both indecisiveness and various ambitions. Nonetheless, the preparations for a military response to an attack on Iran seem genuine enough. At the same time, it appears that Russia is not keen on direct military intervention on Iranian soil, but would rather deal with one of the following scenarios:
a. One scenario would be meant to display power, perhaps by moving military units to the Iranian border or by flying the flag around the Caspian, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, while making use of bold rhetoric in order to gain points on the international arena (suffice it to remember Russia’s need to recover from damages incurred due to the Arab Spring).
b. In a second scenario, Russia could exploit an attack on Iran – should the proper circumstances present themselves – to promote its geopolitical interests in the Caucasus, while moving forces towards Azerbaijan and Georgia to help its allies, solve humanitarian problems (such as the flood of refugees), and engage in similar activities.
In any case, it seems that Russia is facing a dilemma over which there is now a charged debate with implications for all sides involved.
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US to investigate secret service scandal
Pentagon says alleged misconduct by Obama's security personnel and military at hotel in Colombia has "embarrassed" army.
General Martin Dempsey, right, said the service members had let President Obama down [Reuters]
The US Secret Service has revoked the security clearances of 11 agents accused of hiring prostitutes on the eve of President Barack Obama's weekend trip to the Americas summit in Colombia.
The agency in charge of providing protection for the president confirmed on Monday that it was investigating the allegations that its members brought prostitutes to their Cartagena hotel on Wednesday, near where the president was to stay.
Colombian police said five US military service members were also involved in the incident.
But Army Colonel Scott Malcom, a spokesman for US Southern Command, said an interim investigating officer who began working to collect evidence in the case found information indicating more than five service members may have been involved.
The top US military officer, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, said that the service members had let Obama down by distracting attention from his meeting with Latin American leaders in Cartagena.
The alleged incident occurred before Obama arrived in Cartagena, but the news broke while he was there.
"We let the boss down because nobody's talking about what went on in Colombia other than this incident," Dempsey said at a news conference with Leon Panetta, the US defence secretary.
"I can speak for myself and my fellow chiefs, we're embarrassed by what occurred in Colombia."
Panetta said General Douglas Fraser, the head of Southern Command, had begun an investigation to determine the facts of the incident.
'Rigorous investigation'
Obama said on Sunday that he expected a "rigorous" investigation into the alleged misconduct.
"If it turns out that some of the allegations that have been made in the press are confirmed, then of course I'll be angry," Obama said.
"We are representing the people of the United States, and when we travel to another country, I expect us to observe the highest standards."
In the US capital, legislators said they were shocked and upset by the allegations, pointing to the security risks involved.
"I am having a call this evening with the director of the Secret Service, because I find this to be so appalling," said Senator Susan Collins, the top Republican on the senate homeland security and governmental affairs committee, which shares jurisdiction over the Secret Service with the judiciary committee.
"I can't help but think what if the women involved had been spies, what if they had been members of a drug cartel, what if
they had planted equipment or eavesdropping devices?"
General Fraser said he was "disappointed by the entire incident and that this behaviour is not in keeping with the professional standards expected of members of the United States military".
Source: Agencies
Sunday, April 15, 2012
Foreign Spies Stealing Economic Sectres
Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
October 2011, pp. 31
http://dni.gov/reports/20111103_report_fecie.pdf
Document produced by the office of Director of National Intelligence dedicated to the threat of industrial espionage against the economic interests and security of the United States of America. The cyber security is a high priority for the U.S. intelligence community, and the study aims to highlight the risk component related to the economic threat.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
October 2011, pp. 31
http://dni.gov/reports/20111103_report_fecie.pdf
Document produced by the office of Director of National Intelligence dedicated to the threat of industrial espionage against the economic interests and security of the United States of America. The cyber security is a high priority for the U.S. intelligence community, and the study aims to highlight the risk component related to the economic threat.
Wednesday, April 11, 2012
Violated one of the most protected buildings in Italy.
Ministry of Defence Palace
The March 19 has been breached the security of a building no longer protected in Italy (at least so it should be) some "intruders" are entered at the Palazzo Baracchini on Via XX Settembre in Rome headquarters of the Ministry of Defence.
The police guard (MP) have noticed that someone has been introduced in the offices and ransacked the rooms.
Sparse press release from the Ministry of Defense released a few days later:
"This morning (on May 19, 2011) - it says - the policemen on duty noted the commission of a robbery in one of the offices of the Department. Investigations are underway. "
Since the early findings of investigators has discovered the theft of a reasonable amount (not quantified) of money and some ornaments. The office of the intrusion object is not close to that of the Ministry, but the police are checking if the "thief" was interested in other goals.
Still to clarify the time of '' intrusion 'men of the Police Department Operating Via Selci In the police have heard of the "military police" who perform security service to the Ministry, investigators are investigations on the "theft". But given the sensitivity of the documents held within the building are also checking with the office computer hacked and checks are being conducted on the numbering of the copiers.
Palace Baracchini besides being the headquarters of the Ministry of Defence houses the offices of AISE (The Military Intelligence).
Coat of arms of the A. I.S.E. - External Security and Information Agency
The Ministry of Defense closes the door to the 10 p.m., except in special needs. On Saturdays and Sundays only opens the side door for the passage of pedestrians. Passage that is filtered by the Police present at the door and a metal detector door that allows access into the palace itself.
Most windows have locks and armored glass, and then seemingly inviolable. The building next door, Caprara Palace houses the Joint Chiefs of Staff, elsewhere 'armored', opposite to where the Palace Army Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
Not to mention that during this period, a few tens of meters there is a permanent monitoring and strengthened law enforcement officers at the Embassy of India, the scene of events because of the affair that sees two Marò of San Marco 'confiscated' by police of that state.
Basically the area is considered a kind of Fort Knox, but someone managed to get to Palazzo Baracchini, violate the security systems and the Military Police in charge: it was introduced in the building has reached the office where he kept money too cash and has seen fit to take away some souvenirs: ornaments in the same office.
Honestly, it looks like a "joke" to enter a building, which in theory should be super secure, remember that also houses the offices of the Military Intelligence Service, was released without being noticed and leave obvious traces of its passage ....
What was really looking for?
Did you find the information you were looking?
And if they have stolen documents vitality of Homeland Security, what risks we're going against?
And the staging was used to distract or send a signal to someone?
The Police Department's operation are controlled with the staff of the department if there were any "visits" in other rooms of the building, but I doubt you can find something, surely it is professional.
But all this leads to another problem, we are so vulnerable in our security sensitive buildings? How is it that the Palace of the Ministry of Defense and offices AISE there is manned 24 hours a day, we have dozens of missions abroad and the services should be operational 24 hours a day, given that "should have staff around the world. "
But as written offices close at 10 p.m. .... Closed Saturday and Sunday ... day of rest, we see that even the vigilance rests.
India reinstated as naval superpower with induction of nuclear sub
India has inducted a nuclear-powered submarine into its Navy after a lease agreement with Russia for the Chakra became official today.
Defence Minister A.K. Anthony unveiled the new vessel, which is to be operated by the Indian Navy for 20 years, at the Visakhapatnam shipyard.
The move signifies a significant step in India’s naval capability as it becomes only the sixth Navy in the world to have a nuclear sub. Importantly, one of those other five is China.
India is increasingly building up its land, sea and air defences as the threat from China continues to pervade in the region.
To protect against the threat from China Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma, Chief of the Naval Staff for the Indian Navy, explained to India Today in January that strategic outposts in the surrounding region must be established.
“We are creating infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar, Lakshadweep and Minicoy islands which form our country's strategic outposts," Admiral Verma told IT. "They enhance our country's forward operating capability.”
Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Eastern Naval Command, told IBN at the same time that India must not only increase its naval presence in the region, but that it must build the infrastructure and ships to go with it.
“49 ships and submarines, which are under construction, would be inducted in the next five years. Out of these, 45 are being built indigenously at the Indian shipyards, while four are being built outside India,” Chopra said.
In support of this strategy, later this year the INS Chakra is expected to be joined by the induction of the Indian-build INS Arihant, another nuclear submarine the government revealed in 2009.
The Terror Attack in Toulouse: Aberration or Symptom?
The events in Toulouse shone a spotlight on the threat posed by global jihadism to Europe and on several problems that for some time have been on the French and European Union agenda, first and foremost the difficulties of integrating the Muslim immigrant community and the issue of anti-Semitism. From an analysis of the events in Toulouse – both the practical aspect, manifested in the cold-blooded murder of French soldiers and Jewish citizens, including children, and the ideological aspect, which the murderer took pains to expound during the siege on his place of refuge – it is clear that Mohamed Merah was a classic product of the global jihad industry, similar to many other young men around the world trained by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. As such, the reason for his acts was ostensibly his desire to take revenge on the French for France’s military involvement in Muslim countries, for France's ban on Muslim women wearing full-face veils in public, and for the suffering of Palestinian children as a result of the Israeli occupation.
The case of Merah, a second generation member of an immigrant family of Algerian origin who failed to adapt to French society and together with his brother was exposed to extremist jihadist Salafist indoctrination, is not one of a kind. The ideas espoused by al-Qaeda and its affiliates threatened to explode in Europe long before 9/11, when France, the Netherlands, and Belgium uncovered terrorist cells whose members had trained in Afghanistan and were sent back to their native countries to murder and wreak havoc in the name of the same worldview presented by the murderer in Toulouse. After the attack on the United States in 2001 it became clear that many European nations are home to networks actively supporting the spread of global jihadist ideology, while recruiting new supporters and activists via extremist preachers who work out of mosques, through the internet, and through recruiters working on behalf of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. They induce new volunteers to visit arenas of conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in order to experience firsthand an active jihad against the enemies of Islam. When they arrive at the training camps they receive not only training in terrorist techniques and guerilla fighting but also intensive, aggressive indoctrination that results in many of them returning to Europe and pursing terrorism in order to avenge the citizens of the nations that support what they consider to be aggression against Muslims.
Even if the number of those turning to terrorism is not large, the story of Merah and the general phenomenon throughout Europe demonstrate the failure of the immigrants' host countries to persuade Merah and others like him that a better future awaits them if they adapt to their new society. While there are Muslim immigrants who have integrated successfully in West European society in various professions and in the academic world, a considerable portion have failed to adjust to their new societies. A study published in 2011 by the Council on Foreign Relations on the issue of Muslim integration in Europe points to a number of challenges – poverty, self-segregation, religious difference related to questions of identity, cultural differences, and more – as the primary causes making the process of integration (and adaptation) of the Muslim community on the continent so difficult. According to the study, the discussion of the integration of Muslims focuses on the fears of Islamic radicalism, with an emphasis on terrorist activity. In addition, according to the Pew Research Center, the number of Muslim immigrants is expected to rise from 44.1 million in 2010 to approximately 58 million in 2030, an increase from 6 percent to 8 percent of the general population on the continent. This increase should force EU nations to confront the various challenges, though the process can be expected to be long and full of pitfalls, and one of its results is liable to be a change in what constitutes European identity. Along with the radicalization in portions of the Muslim population, radicalization in EU nations has begun to emerge in recent years: the rise in the power of political parties promoting a xenophobic, anti-immigrant (and anti-Semitic) agenda and placing limits on immigration, especially of Muslims. In addition to this trend, one should consider statements made by leaders such as Cameron, Sarkozy, and Merkel about the failure of the multicultural model.
It may be that the investigation of Merah’s brother, currently in French police custody, will show that the murderer from Toulouse acted as a lone wolf (even if he received help or emotional support from his brother) rather than on behalf of a terrorist organization, but the act may still inspire copycat crimes, as it is clear that many European nations are ripe for violence on the part of young people from similar backgrounds who seek revenge via a range of horrific acts against anyone seen as an enemy of Islam. Learning the right lessons in France in particular and in Europe in general for immediately confronting the phenomenon in terms of legislation, security, and intelligence gathering is relatively easy compared to the long term challenges involved in integrating Muslim immigrants on the one hand and dulling the motivation of the minority that chooses terrorism on the other. At the same time, it is precisely the demographic forecasts and the various economic and social constraints involved in immigrant absorption that obligate the European political leadership to view the most recent terrorist acts as another wake-up call for taking long term steps with significant and extensive social implications, before the next disaster.
For Israel, the Merah case may contain future ramifications for Diaspora Jews liable to result from Israeli government decisions and actions. However, even if Merah is to be believed that the Jewish school was not at the top of his list of targets, by attacking the pupils at the Otzar Hatorah school he expressed an entire worldview that sees Jews and Israel as one seamless entity, a mortal enemy of Islam that must be destroyed everywhere and by every means. In this case, it is doubtful that the call by an official Israeli figure to the Jews of France to “come home” is useful to the Jewish community.
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Our thanks to Einav Yogev, research assistant in the Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict Program at INSS, for her assistance in writing and editing this essay.
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