HAPPY 2014 FULL OF HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS...

Happy New Year my friends !!!

Merry Christmas ......

Affettuosi Auguri di sereno Santo Natale e Prospero Nuovo Anno 2014

 

Affectionate greetings peaceful Christmas and a Happy New Year 2014

 

Recuerdos para una Feliz Navidad y Feliz Año Nuevo 2014

 

 

 

 

Russia confirms missile border Europe....

Russia confirms missile border Europe
Ministry of Defense, does not violate international law ...
 
<December 16, 14:29>

  Russia confirms missile border Europe ...
  - MOSCOW, DECEMBER 16 - The installation of Iskander missiles in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, between Poland and Lithuania, Baltic and along the border "is not in contradiction to the agreements International ": affirms the Russian Defense Ministry, after the revelation the German newspaper Bild's move against the Kremlin NATO shield in Europe.

"The Iskander operational-tactical missile complexes are envelope of the missile troops and artillery of the district Western military, "said the spokesman.

ESPLODE IL CASO DELLA SPIA AMERICANA CATTURATA IN IRAN, SPARITA DAL 2007...

QUANDO LA REALTÀ È (PEGGIO) DI “HOMELAND” - ESPLODE IL CASO DELLA SPIA AMERICANA CATTURATA IN IRAN, SPARITA DAL 2007

Robert Levinson, ex agente Fbi, è stato infiltrato in Iran da agenti Cia che operavano senza autorizzazione - Viene catturato, ma i servizi Usa versano 2,5 mln $ alla moglie per stare zitta, e per anni parleranno di un “turista” rapito - Ora l’Associated Press ha rivelato la (presunta) vera storia…

ROBERT LEVINSON

Per quasi sette anni ci hanno raccontato che era un turista distratto. Al massimo un investigatore privato un po' goffo, che si era messo nei guai facendo un giro sopra un'isola iraniana, a caccia di contrabbandieri di sigarette. Ora, proprio mentre Washington e Teheran sono impegnate nel negoziato più serio dell'ultimo trentennio, scopriamo invece che Robert Levinson era in missione per conto della Cia. Una missione balorda, non autorizzata, ma comunque un'operazione originata nelle stanze più segrete di Langley, che ha prodotto l'ostaggio americano detenuto all'estero più a lungo, e una serie di licenziamenti.

Questa storia vera, che batte qualunque romanzo, comincia nel 2006. Levinson è un ex agente dell'Fbi, basato in Florida e specializzato nei traffici della mafia russa. Diversi anni prima aveva conosciuto Anne Jablonski, un'analista Cia dello stesso settore, ma nel frattempo il clima è cambiato.
Gli attentati dell'11 settembre 2001 hanno imposto ai servizi di allargare le operazioni, e Anne è diventata un pezzo grosso dell'Illicit Finance Group, che segue i traffici di denaro. Raccomanda l'amico Bob al suo capo, Timothy Sampson, che lo assume con un contratto esterno.

Levinson, che aveva lasciato l'Fbi per guadagnare nel settore privato i soldi necessari a crescere i suoi sette figli, è entusiasta: «Oggi - scrive alla collega che chiama amichevolmente Toots - è il trentaduesimo anniversario del mio matrimonio con Christine: festeggeremo le due cose insieme. È troppo bello per essere vero, hai davvero fatto la mia giornata».

Bob ha la reputazione di essere molto bravo a sviluppare le fonti, ma la Cia è interessata a Paesi che non conosce bene, come l'Iran: vuole sapere come reagirebbe alle sanzioni, cosa fa per aggirarle, e magari ricevere segreti imbarazzanti sui suoi leader. Levinson si mette al lavoro e attraverso Ira Silverman, un ex giornalista investigativo della «Nbc», riesce a contattare Dawud Salahuddin, un americano fuggito in Iran dopo aver ucciso a Bethesda un ex assistente dello Shah nel 1980.

Bob pensa che possa dargli informazioni buone, e ottiene un appuntamento. Vola a Dubai, e l'8 marzo 2007 va sull'isola iraniana di Kish: la sua nuova fonte lo aspetta nella lobby dell'hotel Maryam, indossando un berretto nero per farsi riconoscere. «Mi domando perché - scrive Levinson a un amico prima di partire - a questo punto della mia vita, con sette figli e una grande moglie, io mi metta in un simile pericolo».

La conversazione con Salahuddin dura diverse ore, e poi i due si lasciano. Silverman manda una mail a Bob per avere notizie, ma non riceve risposta. Prova ancora il 10 marzo, e quando l'amico resta in silenzio, capisce che qualcosa è andata storta: è il 59esimo compleanno di Levinson, e lui neppure si fa vivo. Il rapimento diventa in breve ovvio, ma da parte di chi? E per farne cosa?

Alla Cia scatta un'inchiesta interna, e presto si scopre che Jablonski e Sampson, con l'aiuto di un terzo funzionario, hanno mandato Bob a condurre una missione non autorizzata. Ai tre funzionari vengono date due opzioni: dimettersi, o essere licenziati. La Cia però non dice nulla neppure all'Fbi, e la famiglia di Bob non sa come cercarlo.

Si rivolge all'ex procuratore della Florida David McGee, vecchio amico di Levinson, che riesce ad aprire le sue mail e scopre la verità. È il marzo del 2008 quando finalmente la moglie Christine viene chiamata negli uffici dell'Fbi, dove la Cia ammette tutto. McGee minaccia di fare causa, e allora l'agenzia offre alla famiglia quasi due milioni e mezzo di dollari di ricompensa. La verità però deve restare nascosta, per non ostacolare le ricerche.

Passano due anni, finisce l'amministrazione Bush e comincia quella di Obama. Il presidente iraniano Ahmadinejad dice di non sapere nulla della sorte di Levinson, ma offre il suo aiuto. Nel novembre del 2010 un video di 54 secondi arriva alla famiglia: «Per favore - implora Bob - aiutatemi a tornare a casa. Trentatre anni di servizio per gli Usa devono meritare qualcosa».

Dopo altri sei mesi, in aprile, arrivano foto di Levinson vestito come i carcerati di Guantanamo. Sarà l'ultima prova che è ancora vivo. Il segretario di Stato Hillary Clinton dice che è in Asia sud occidentale, sperando così di dare agli iraniani la copertura per rilasciarlo in Pakistan o in Afghanistan, ma non accade nulla. Entra in campo il trafficante di armi Sarkis Soghanalian, che si offre di mediare e dice che Bob è nelle mani di Hezbollah: gli emissari della famiglia vanno a Cipro per incontrare un intermediario, ma non è vero nulla.

Vengono coinvolti anche i russi, per favorire la trattativa: il ricco uomo d'affari Oleg Deripaska e il trafficante Birshtein. Un'altra illusione. Pure il nuovo presidente Rohani dice di non sapere nulla, e a novembre Bob diventa l'ostaggio americano detenuto più a lungo: 2.454 giorni, peggio di Terry Anderson in Libano.

L'«Associated Press» scopre il suo rapporto con la Cia, che altri media avevano tenuto nascosto, e nonostante la Casa Bianca intervenga per bloccarla, la notizia esce. Il portavoce di Obama, Carney, rimprovera l'«Ap»: «Irresponsabili. Quando è scomparso, non lavorava per il governo». Usa e Iran stanno cercando di superare uno scontro durato oltre trent'anni, ma intanto nessuno sa neppure se Bob è ancora vivo.

Font: Paolo Mastrolilli per "La Stampa"

India: Massimiliano Latorre e Salvatore Girone rischiano la pena di morte.

"I marò rischiano la pena di morte" http://bit.ly/17XpMdg

Massimiliano Latorre e Salvatore Girone rischiano la pena di morte.

Il nostro Governo balneare non ha mosso un dito, grazie a Monti e Letta (Governo dei Buffoni) ma nemmeno Napolitano si è preoccupato, essendo il presidente dello Stato non fa certamente una bella figura.

Ma il Ministro degli Esteri Emma Bonino cosa sta facendo ?
Cosa sta facendo Staffan de Mistura (INCOMPETENTE), inviato del "Governo Italiano" per la vicenda Marò ?

UN BEL NIENTE!!!!

Si sarebbe risolto tutto se avessero mandato gente competente, o almeno avessero ascoltato i consigli di alcune Agenzie e di Ministeri e Dipartimenti di Stato amici... ma l'arroganza di questo governo  non ha limiti...

Domanda: se al posto di due Marò ci fossero due giornalisti o membri di qualche organizzazione non governativa di sinistra, la questione sarebbe già stata risolta?
"SI"
Pagando .... come hanno sempre fatto, i nostri "Governanti" ....
Ma quelli erano di sinistra e non dei "Militari" che rischiano la vita per proteggere e difendere il nostro paese...

Is Turkey Swerving Eastward? The Air Defense System Deal with China and the Crisis with NATO

Turkey’s announcement that the Chinese company CPMIEC had won the tender for the purchase of a long range air defense system came as a surprise to Turkey’s NATO partners – even though prior rumors had indicated this would be the decision – and was met with much disapproval. While Turkish President Abdullah Gul said that the decision was not final and the deal had yet to be finalized and signed, the terms of the tender obligate Turkey to move ahead with China. Thus, it seems that it will take more than the current level of condemnation by NATO members to persuade Turkey to change its mind. At the same time, the deal, along with previous examples of Turkey-China military cooperation, should not be viewed as proof that Turkey and China are establishing strategic relations, as they have fundamental political and strategic differences of opinion that prevent any real partnership.

Turkey’s September 26, 2013 announcement that the Chinese company CPMIEC had won the tender for the purchase of a long range air defense system came as a surprise to Turkey’s NATO partners – even though prior rumors had indicated this would be the decision – and was met with much disapproval. The Chinese manufacturer outbid American companies (the makers of the Patriot system), a Russian company (the maker of the S-300 and S-400), and an Italian-French consortium (the maker of the SAMP/T Aster-30). While Turkish President Abdullah Gul said that the decision was not final and the deal had yet to be finalized and signed, the terms of the tender obligate Turkey to move ahead with China. Thus, it seems that it will take more than the current level of condemnation by NATO members to persuade Turkey to change its mind. Moreover, the decision was made at the Defense Industry Executive Committee, chaired by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and this indicates his full support for the decision.

CPMIEC HQ-9 (FD-2000),
 winner of Turkey's tender for
long range air defense
 system; Photo: Jian Kang/ Wikipedia

According to Turkey, three main reasons led it to opt for the Chinese bid. First of all, finances: the price quoted by the Chinese company was some $1 billion less than the others (the Turks stipulated a maximum of $4 billion for the deal; the Chinese bid came in at $3.4 billion). Second, China is willing to include the transfer of technology and some of the production to Turkey as part of the deal, something Turkey has been very keen on in recent years, given its desire to strengthen its self-reliance in the defense realm. Finally, expected delivery: Turkey estimates that China will supply the systems in a relatively short period.

Critics of the Turkish decision are concerned about several issues. Buying the system from China means that Turkey will be limited in its interoperability with the defense systems of other NATO members, which is liable to affect Turkey’s defensive capabilities; it also raises the concern about friendly fire due to the lack of synchronization with the alliance’s friend-or-foe identification systems. Second, the Chinese system has reportedly not been tested under real conditions and is inferior to the Russian S-400 proposed to the Turks. Third, NATO officials are worried not only that the systems, once in place, could serve for intelligence gathering by the Chinese espionage, but that even at the stage of joint development the Chinese would have access to information and data NATO members would rather not reveal. Furthermore, CPMIEC is subject to American sanctions for violations of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. In response to some of these reservations, Turkey claims it is planning to develop an independent friend-or-foe identification system, and that there is no comprehensive requirement that NATO members purchase defensive systems compatible with those of other alliance members. In fact, the proponents of the deal point to Greece, also a NATO member, which bought the S-300 from Russia (note, however, that this was a compromise purchase after Turkey vetoed the intention of the Republic of Cyprus to buy the system, which instead was placed on Greek soil).

 

At the broader political level, Ankara is criticized for its willingness to cooperate in a sensitive strategic field with one of the biggest competitors of Turkey’s longstanding close ally, the United States. In practice, the possibility of Turkey working with China in the military realm as a counterweight to or substitute for the United States is not new. In the late 1990s Turkey bought rockets and imported rocket technology from China (known in Turkey as the T-300 Kasirga and J-600T Yildirim) after talks with the United States on purchasing an advanced rocket launcher system fell through. In 2010, Turkey held joint aerial maneuvers with China after Washington canceled its participation in an exercise with Turkey in response to Ankara’s rejection of Israel’s participation. The upgrading of the Turkish army’s armored vehicles (FNSS ACV) was also a joint Turkish-Chinese project.

 

At the same time these moves, including the newest deal, should not be viewed as proof that Turkey and China are establishing strategic relations, as they have fundamental political and strategic differences of opinion preventing any real partnership. Among these are China’s efforts to subvert international steps against the Assad regime; Turkey’s enormous trade deficit with China (currently about $18 billion annually); and Turkey’s critique vis-à-vis China’s policy with regard to its Uyghur minority (a population of some 10 million, according to Chinese official statistics), which shares ethnic, cultural, and historical ties with the Turkish people. In the background are also the complex historical relations between the nations that for decades cast China’s image in Turkey in a negative light. In addition, recent developments, especially the escalating tension between Turkey and Syria, have highlighted Turkey’s dependence on NATO. Despite some cooling in the relationship with the United States, partly due to Turkey’s disappointment with America’s decision not to intervene militarily in Syria and a chill between Erdogan and President Obama, NATO nations hurried to deploy Patriot missile batteries near the Turkish-Syrian border after it seemed that relations were deteriorating. It is also clear to Turkey that until it makes progress in the long process of developing independent anti-missile defenses it will remain highly dependent on NATO members on this issue.

 

Therefore the explanation for the deal must be found in the particular current circumstances and complementary interests of Turkey and China. First, there is Turkey’s desire to develop an independent technologically-advanced defense industry, which is probably Ankara’s main reason for choosing China as its defense system supplier. This goal is entirely comprehensible to Beijing, which has been driven by similar considerations since the founding of the modern Chinese state. Both nations view the American and European refusal to transfer to Turkey manufacturing technology connected to anti-missile defense systems as a way to perpetuate the superiority of the developed nations over the developing nations and leave the latter’s dependence on the former firmly in place. Second, given Turkey’s complicated relationship with the United States and the West – for example, Turkey’s anger over the US refusal to act in Syria, the hurdles the European Union has set for Turkey’s acceptance into the EU, and the suspicion that NATO members are exploiting Turkey’s dependence on them in the realm of air defense – it is convenient for Ankara to show that it has an alternative of sorts to its alliance with the West. As for China, even if it is aware of the limits to its relations with Turkey, the current deal serves its interests well by creating an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Middle East weapons market, widen the split between Turkey and the United States, and strengthen its ties with an important regional power.

 

This development has some implications for Israel. Despite the difficulties Turkey has raised in recent years regarding the relationship between NATO and Israel, Israel would like to see Turkey continue being a loyal NATO member. Thus, the current development will likely arouse concern in Jerusalem. Additional evidence of the difficult state of Turkish-Israeli relations is that Turkey has currently chosen to pursue procurement independence via a partnership with problematic actors such as China instead of cooperation with Israel. Finally, the Turkish choice of the Chinese defense system shows that even if the system’s quality and performance are inferior to those of its competitors, it is still good enough so that a nation that sees itself as threatened would choose it. This implies improvements in the Chinese defense industry and the possibility of it entering the Middle East military arena as an important player.

 

Font: Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss is a research fellow at INSS. Dr. Yoram Evron is a research fellow at INSS and a lecturer in the Department of Asian Studies at the University of Haifa. This paper was written within the framework of the INSS-Israel Institute China Program.

Where Is the Israeli Military Heading?

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The army’s new multi-year plan shows that the IDF is reorganizing its priorities for the coming decade. Military priorities include the attainment of intelligence superiority, development of knockout fire delivery capability, active defense systems, cyber warfare, and border protection systems, while the ground forces are to be downgraded in importance and priority.

The recent announcement regarding future cuts in the defense budget, as well as the launching of the new multi-year plan for the IDF (“Te’uza”), prompt the question: where is the Israeli military heading?

The IDF formulated several principles of warfare in recent years: keeping the campaign as short as possible, allowing minimum damage to the home front (assuming that the home front will have a hard time facing a prolonged missile attack), and achieving a clear and definite image of victory. The Israeli military is not interested in another confrontation whose outcome is less than unequivocal, like the 2006 Lebanon war.

In order to uphold these principles, several objectives must be met. At the top of the list stands the attainment of intelligence superiority, followed by the development of a knockout fire delivery capability, mainly from the air. A high priority is also assigned to active defense systems, cyber warfare, and protecting borders (specifically those with Syria and Egypt).

These objectives were formulated at a workshop attended by the most senior officers of the IDF in the summer of 2013, in which participants were divided into work teams. One team, led by the head of the IDF Operations Directorate, Maj. Gen. Yoav Har-Even, addressed the operational concept. A second team,

led by the head of the IDF Planning Directorate, Maj. Gen. Nimrod Shefer, addressed the reorganization of the various IDF branches. A third team, led by the head of the IDF C4I Directorate (responsible for telecommunications), Maj. Gen. Uzi Moscovitch, addressed the advancement of ideas for improving firepower and command and control (C2) through the computer network. The fourth team, led by head of the IDF Manpower Directorate, Maj. Gen. Orna Barbivai, addressed the feasibility of revising the model of the standing army in view of the expected cuts in army personnel.

According to the army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, Israel is a world power in three major fields: unmanned vehicles (mainly in the air), precision fire, and C2. The main question going forward is whether to place the emphasis on fields regarded as relative weaknesses of the IDF – such as the maneuvering capabilities of the ground forces – or to further strengthen the fields in which the army excels anyway. Gantz ruled for the latter option.

 

Continued Spending for R&D and Platform Procurement

Many of the ideas currently on the agenda were in fact included in a previous multi-year plan (“Kela”), led primarily by Gantz, Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, and then Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon, who is currently Defense Minister.

As part of the battle over the defense budget, the army recently created the impression that the cuts annulled much of the procurement and R&D projects designed to significantly strengthen the IDF. This is not exactly the case. The Israeli defense industries and the army itself currently have more than 100 different development projects in the pipeline, most of which are secret.

At the same time, the procurement budgets of the IDF for submarines and fighter planes remain untouched. By the end of the decade the IDF will have six Dolphin-class submarines, with the cost of each submarine touching the billion dollar mark. The army will also receive two squadrons (of 24 aircraft each) of the F-35 future fighter, a deal to be covered by US aid. One squadron has already been ordered, and the actual aircraft delivery will begin in late 2016. The second squadron will be requisitioned in the following years.

 

Investment in UAVs, Satellites, and Missiles

 

 

Over the last decade the Israeli military has invested a fortune in the procurement of unmanned airborne vehicles (UAVs). This trend will continue; in the coming years, new tactical UAVs, as well as larger Hermes- 900 UAVs, will be delivered to the IDF. IAI will supply additional super-

UAVs, like the Boeing 737-sized “Eitan” (Heron TP) UAV, as well as an abundance of miniature drones.

By the year 2025, the army’s UAVs will probably be executing all missions, from intelligence gathering – capable of detecting any minor suspect movement on land or at sea – to strike missions. Even today, the operational range of the UAVs employed by the IDF easily covers long-range destinations, such as Iran. It is for this purpose that satellite-based C2 systems were developed for the IDF. These systems render irrelevant the limitation regarding the radio communication required to operate these vehicles at extreme ranges.

In the coming decades, the IDF will continue to invest in satellites as well, though at a somewhat slower pace than the Ministry of Defense would have preferred. Some satellite projects are in real danger in view of the expected cuts (such as the development of “mini satellites”). The major projects in this field will not be interrupted, and the IDF will continue to employ satellites as a primary tool for intelligence gathering and communication.

Moreover, in the foreseeable future, outer space is expected to evolve into an actual battlefield. Various countries are preparing to intercept one another’s satellites using long-range missiles. One of the options discussed in this context involved the employment of fighter aircraft during wartime to launch miniature satellites that will promptly begin to orbit the earth, so that the enemy would not have sufficient time to study their orbits and intercept them.

Only minimal details have been released regarding a recent secret test of a rocket propulsion system for long-range missiles. According to foreign publications, this test was a part of a major project associated with the development of an advanced surface-to-surface missile, the Jericho-4, which has a range of thousands of kilometers.

Within the shorter ranges, the IDF is regarded as the world’s most advanced military organization in the field of precision fire delivery using missiles launched from the air, ground, sea, and submarines. The world media has even claimed that precision-guided missiles of these types were responsible for the attacks staged in recent months against strategic weapon stores in Syria. In order to hit a target that emerges and becomes visible for only a number of seconds, a state-of-the-art intelligence gathering network is required, along with a permanent link between the intelligence gathering resources and the various types of fire delivery elements.

In order to meet this challenge, new fields of activity have been launched by the IDF, with such impressive definitions as NCW (Network Concentric Warfare) and IBW (Intelligence-Based Warfare). Through the contribution of NCW and IBW systems, the army’s fire delivery capacity has increased several times, in comparison to the 2006 Lebanon war. By 2025, the fire delivery capability of the IDF is expected to be more similar to a computer game than to the battlefields of old.

According to the decisions of the IDF General Staff, only projects led by the General Staff – and not those led by the military branches – will be authorized henceforth. The prerequisite to be met by each project is that it must make a contribution to the entire operational capability of the IDF, rather to the capability of a specific branch (such as the air force, navy, or the ground forces). As a rule, the Intelligence Branch and IAF will enjoy total precedence within the IDF until the middle of the next decade, with the Intelligence Branch enjoying a higher priority than the IAF. While all the other arms and service branches, including the IAF, will be closing down units, the intelligence budget will not be reduced. Up until now, the IDF assigned top-quality personnel to the pilot training course of the IAF. Now, however, the cyber warfare teams get top priority.

Until the year 2025, substantial investments will be made in anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense systems (including the new systems Arrow-III and David’s Sling, which cannot be “frozen,” as these are joint Israeli-American projects). Substantial funds will also be invested in radar systems designed to spot sources of enemy fire and in active protection systems for vehicles, capable of identifying incoming missiles and destroy them in mid-air. In the coming years, IAI will complete a major project, Barak-8, involving a state-of-the-art naval missile defense system.

 

Reduction in the Ground Forces

The ground forces of the IDF will take the most substantial cut. Between 2002 and 2006, the ground forces budget was cut by no less than 25 percent. This trend was suspended pursuant to the 2006 war, but will be resumed soon. The development of fast, continuous maneuvering capabilities is an issue that is disputed within the military and political echelon.

IDF authorities do not believe that the ground forces will become obsolete because of drastic reductions in training activities, but its order of battle will be reduced. The demobilized armored formations will be replaced by less-expensive formations, equipped with light, agile vehicles, wheels instead of

tracks, and by regional formations that would be assigned to cope with the ever-increasing number of terror incidents along the borders.

The IDF is expected to announce a substantial reduction in the manufacture of the newest Merkava tanks – whose rate of production has been slow anyway – and the complete halting of the production of Namer APCs (armored personnel carriers). This decision will require a $15 million compensation to the General Dynamics Corporation, which had developed a production line for this APC in the US – in view of the Israeli commitment to requisition a guaranteed minimum amount, a commitment the army will not uphold.

 

Conclusion

The army’s plans look excellent. The main problem is that certain scenarios – such as the collapse of the Hashemite regime in Jordan, the demise of the peace agreement with Egypt, a third Intifada, or a nuclear threat from Iran – can no longer be regarded as unreasonably fanciful. Such developments, or other unforeseeable ones, could render all of these plans irrelevant.

Amir Rapaport is a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He is also editor of Israel Defense magazine, defense analyst for Maariv, and a former military correspondent for Yediot Ahronot.

  Font: Amir Rapaport  Published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family

  

China's Hopes for Bridging the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwanese missile boats patrol the Taiwan Strait during a military

drill in May. (SAM YEH/AFP/Getty Images)

Summary

More than six decades after Taiwan's estrangement from mainland China, the Taiwan Strait still represents the most physically formidable and symbolically inaccessible barrier to Beijing's objective of eventual reunification with the island. Over the course of its history, Taiwan switched hands from European and Japanese colonial occupiers before becoming the prospective battleground between China and Taiwan in the second half of the 20th century. In recent years, military tensions between China and Taiwan have eased, and Beijing hopes that enhanced economic integration and the physical infrastructure it wants to build one day across the Taiwan Strait could bring the country a step closer to fulfilling a core geopolitical imperative by reuniting with the island.

Analysis

The South China Morning Post reported Aug. 5 that in its recently approved National Highway Network Plan for 2013-2030, the State Council included two highway projects linking Taiwan to the mainland. One involves the long-proposed Beijing-Taipei Expressway, which would start in Beijing and pass through Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang and Fujian's Fuzhou before crossing the strait and reaching Taipei. Another inland route would start in Chengdu and pass through Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian's Xiamen, and cross the Taipei-administered Kinmen archipelago before eventually ending at Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan.

 

The plan does not specify what kind of infrastructure -- a bridge or a tunnel, for example -- would be used to connect the mainland to Taiwan over the 180-kilometer (111-mile) strait, but since 1996, if not earlier, Beijing has publicly called for such infrastructure to be built. One proposal involved a 122-kilometer undersea tunnel, which was deemed preferable because of its relative seismic stability and its location in shallower water. This tunnel would connect Fujian province's Pingtan Island to Hsinchu in northern Taiwan -- a distance nearly three times that of Channel Tunnel, which connects the United Kingdom and France -- and would cost an estimated 400 billion-500 billion yuan ($65 billion-$81 billion) to build. Another proposal involves linking Taiwan's southern Chiayi county to the outlying island of Kinmen via tunnel or bridge, where it would connect with envisaged infrastructure that would eventually link it to Xiamen, Fujian province. 

Besides the massive economic costs associated with building a bridge or tunnel across the Taiwan Strait, security concerns, geologic vulnerabilities (due to earthquakes) and the sheer width of the strait present technical challenges to its construction. Even if the infrastructure were built, it is not clear that they would be economically justifiable given that airliners and ships are now allowed to travel across the strait frequently.

For decades, China and Taiwan had no official interaction at all, and infrastructure linking the two was something only Beijing wanted. Taipei viewed any bridge or tunnel link as a potential security liability, since it could enable easier access to the island by mainland military forces in times of crisis. While tensions have thawed in recent years, talks between the two sides still only involve economic and cultural issues, not political issues. Combined with logistical challenges, the absence of direct relations between the two makes it extremely unlikely that the infrastructure will built any time soon.

Though a bridge or tunnel link remains largely illusory, Beijing's hope to bridge the gap -- both physically and symbolically -- across the Taiwan Strait was brought a bit closer to reality in early July, when Beijing and Taipei finalized a plan to supply water from the mainland to Kinmen, an outlying Taiwanese island less than 3 kilometers from the coast at Fujian. Under the plan, which was long opposed by Taipei and took 10 years of negotiations to resolve, water would be sent from Fujian province to Kinmen at its narrowest point.

To alleviate the island's lingering water shortage, two possible pipeline routes were proposed, one involving a 26.8-kilometer pipeline directing water from Jinji reservoir in Fujian's Jinjiang to Kinmen, and one involving a 30 kilometer-long pipeline, nearly 9 kilometers of which would be undersea, connecting the Jiulong River in Xiamen and the city's Tingxi reservoir. (The latter was the preferred route.) This water pipeline would be the first cross-strait infrastructure link. Significantly, China has pursued the project even though Fujian province itself is suffering from a lingering water shortage, making clear how strategically important Beijing views a physical link with Taiwan. During negotiations, discussions resurfaced of constructing a bridge between Kinmen and Xiamen.

Compared to the much more ambitious proposal to link the mainland to Taiwan via bridge or tunnel, the pipeline with Kinmen is not in itself very significant. However, it does offer an example of Beijing sacrificing what is superficially pragmatic for the sake of its strategic goals. In particular, Kinmen had once been the leading military frontier until the end of cross-strait military standoff in 1992, and Beijing believes that assisting the island can offer an example of cross-strait integration. Beijing also believes it could allow more Taiwanese residents to benefit from growing economic interaction with China without undermining Taipei's political independence.

Symbolic Steps

Warming cross-strait ties have coincided, and indeed complemented, China's attempt to project economic influence externally, including with Taiwan. Coupled with Beijing's vastly superior military capabilities, the economic incentives for cross-strait cooperation have formed the backbone of its less overtly aggressive stance toward the island in the past decade. While reunification remains the ultimate goal, it has been widely acknowledged among Beijing's political elites that, as long as the possibility of peaceful reunification remains, there is little urgency or strategic necessity in forcing a final resolution unless a serious crisis emerges between Taiwan and China.

Instead, Beijing is focusing on a more conciliatory approach to reinforce the concept of interdependence and prevent Taiwan from distancing itself from the mainland economically and politically. At least for now, Taipei appears to have reconciled this approach with its own so-called "economic first, politics later" strategy toward the mainland. This strategy allows it to benefit from economic cooperation with China and create a relatively calm environment that would benefit Taipei's development without threatening its independent identity.

Beijing's emphasis on interdependence has some merit, too. Over the years, China has benefited from easing restrictions on commerce and cultural exchanges with Taiwan, along with Taiwanese investment that has helped it upgrade its industrial sector. A less hostile government in Taipei has also been important for Beijing's political legitimacy internationally. Moreover, China allowed a much more open market and more preferential trade and investment policies to Taiwan than the island nation would find elsewhere. Currently, trade with China and Hong Kong accounts for nearly a third of Taiwan's economy, in part helping the island avoid further decline amid the global slowdown.

Since reunification is always going to be an imperative for Beijing until it actually takes place, the proposed infrastructure is an important step symbolically for its integration strategy. Trade patterns can change rapidly, and interests there can shift -- especially now that the Chinese economy itself is undergoing massive internal changes. Consequently, a pipeline or tunnel may not be especially important in themselves and may even be unrealistic and impractical, but taken with the other developments, they point to a new type of strategic thinking in Beijing.

Font: Stratfor

Egypt’s Economic Options: The Need for an Outward Strategy.

The Egyptian economy, currently in dire straits, is vital to the country's stability, and stability in Israel is a central interest of Israel. While in the long term, future governments can adopt and implement policies to improve Egypt’s economy, the short term impact of the recent political revolution exacerbates the current conditions. Adopting an outward strategy and reconnecting the Egyptian economy with the global economy is the only way to encourage growth and build a long term sustainable recovery.

The reality speaks for itself. Political instability, fiscal deficits (13 percent of GDP), and shortage of foreign exchange reserves limit the spending ability of the Egyptian government. The spending power is critical in an economic environment where fuel and food (mainly bread) subsidies are an important pillar of the economy. Recent aid packages from the Gulf states provide some breathing space for the next six months, but it is unclear what will follow. Egypt’s labor market is weak, unemployment is 13 percent, including among one third of the young people, and wages are low. Food prices have risen 50 percent since 2010, and services in the public sector are poor.

 

This reality puts much pressure on the government to focus on internal economic policies and provide subsidies and employment opportunities. However, neglecting the external front may not bring Egypt to economic independence. The new interim government, with its strong regulatory and economic background, can pursue several tracks within an outward strategy, which can provide more sustainable growth. Egypt's low growth rate, around 2 percent for 2012, is one of the factors behind the high unemployment rate, and sustainable growth can address this crisis. 

First, the government must strategically increase foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2013 Investment Report from June 2013 shows a modest increase in 2012 in North Africa and the Levant, with Egypt receiving in absolute terms the largest share due to its large GDP. Yet Egypt's inward FDI is shrinking quickly due to political and economic instability. The inward FDI in the nine months to March 2013 was $1.4 billion, compared to annual levels of $10 billion a few years ago. According to many studies, higher FDI will provide jobs, increase salaries, and strengthen stability. 

Several initiatives can help increase inward FDI. The interim government should signal the market that it will not adopt game-changing policies that may be reversed by the next permanent government. Foreign investors seek stability, and another six months of inconsistency is not helpful. In addition, the ongoing political instability calls for improving the political risk insurance market. Egypt is desperately looking to finance sizable energy projects designed to reduce its power shortage. Many of these projects can be insured against political risk by multinational institutions, such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Securing an IMF loan can improve the relationships between Egypt and many multilateral institutions and increase the volume of political risk insurance policies with lower premium rates. 

Furthermore, the rule of law principle and regulatory clarity and stability are important components of any FDI framework. Denouncing international agreements may send a signal that Egypt cannot promise foreign investors the commercial environment they seek. While a regulatory stabilization clause is common in international agreements in developing markets, the government can and should do more to protect investor interests. Egypt's decision to suspend its agreement to supply gas to East Mediterranean Gas, which supplied gas to the Israel Electric Corporation, may present a risk to other state-to-state financial agreements and energy deals. While in Israel the market follows this story from a geopolitical view, for most investors it is a case study of the ability to meet commercial terms and contractual obligations. Similarly, Egypt should avoid discriminatory actions against foreign investors, or the perception thereof, as in the recent alleged tax evasion cases. 

The second track for Egypt is to change the international trade bias that traditionally – and naturally – has favored the Gulf states. In light of its unique nexus with the Gulf, Egypt's current trade map does not reflect recent changes in the global economy. The government, for example, can open commercial offices in new and less traditional markets. 

Third, bilateral trade and investment agreements have been quite instrumental in building sustainable trade and investment relations around the world. Egypt can continue to negotiate these agreements, making sure that the new agreements open Egypt to new markets. The proposed Egypt-China Free Trade Agreement, which also includes an investment chapter, is a case in point. The parties negotiated the agreement in 2012 but the process is not moving forward. The government should expedite the negotiations process in 2013 since many of its competitors in competitive products already have such agreements in place. While some analysts question the effectiveness of trade and investment agreements, the cumulative effect of these agreements on the economy as a whole and the region is significant. 

These agreements should follow macro economic trends. Egypt-China bilateral trade, for example, sees a year-on-year increase of 18.8 percent and reached nearly $7 billion in 2010. Egypt is China's fifth largest trade partner in Africa, and Chinese cumulative investment in Egypt reached $335 million. 

Fourth, the government needs to educate the street better on the role of the IMF and other multilateral institutions in the Egyptian economy. The perception that the IMF conditionality will lead to unnecessary structural reforms should be replaced by conveying the role of IMF financing in stabilizing markets, inducing other institutions to finance the Egyptian government (such as the European Union), and providing legitimacy for internal economic policies. The proposed IMF loans will force Egypt to address its fiscal crisis seriously by reducing local spending and subsidies, a move that would require a shift in public opinion. 

Fifth, Egypt should leverage the large sovereign funds in the Arab world and convince them to increase their asset allocation to the region's private companies in general, and Egypt's companies in particular. The current situation whereby these funds invest globally and leave some of its neighbors behind is not sustainable. Recent improvements in the Egyptian stock market are promising. Aid packages provided by the Gulf states should be replaced by direct Greenfield investments. The International Finance Corporation's shift toward direct investments in developing markets by private funds, which are financed partially by sovereign governments, can be a role model. 

Finally, Egypt should reorient the national economic dialogue from a culture of aid to a culture of regional and global economic integration. Indeed, the IMF loans and the US and EU civil and military aid are critical to Egypt's operations, and Israel, which has an interest in Egypt's economic and political stability, should continue to support foreign aid of this sort from its allies in the US and Europe. Yet this aid should not become a goal in and of itself, and prompt the neglect of private sector initiatives. The coming months are critical. For instance, Egypt needs to roll over about $5 billion in dollar-dominated Treasury bills matured by the end of 2013. Adopting long term strategies that look externally and not internally will help Egypt to position itself better to deal with the serious challenges in the months ahead.

 

 

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

 

With Embassy Closures, the U.S. Errs on the Side of Caution.

Yemeni soldiers search a car at a checkpoint on a street leading to
 the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa on Aug. 4. (MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP/Getty Images)

Summary

Global, nonspecific threats such as those that prompted recent U.S. embassy closures and travel warnings have rarely proved credible. These precautionary measures appear to be the result of two separate threats, one attack against an unspecified U.S. embassy and another against travel infrastructure -- presumably an airliner. In response to the embassy threat, the U.S. government announced Aug. 4 that it had extended the closure of several embassies in the Middle East until Aug. 10 and that African posts would now be among the embassies closed. In response to the airline threat, Washington issued a global travel alert running from Aug. 2 to Aug. 31. The travel warning and the closures have commanded the media's attention and have led to much speculation about the source and the credibility of the threats, but more often than not these threats fail to materialize.

Analysis

Most attacks against embassies have involved a large vehicle bomb, an armed assault or a combination of a vehicle bomb and armed assault. Such was the case with the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen, in September 2008. To mitigate the impact of a perceived threat, the United States will close an embassy, increase security and request that the host country bolster its security presence at the compound.

 

Many of the posts that were closed in response to the August threats happen to have very good physical security measures in place due to their locations in the Middle East, which poses higher threat levels to U.S. facilities. For example, the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa was built in accordance with the security standards established by the Inman Commission. Therefore, it is designed to withstand bomb attacks and armed assaults. Still, even well constructed buildings are vulnerable to mob attacks like the one directed against the U.S. Embassy in Tunis in September 2012. Only the host country security forces can provide protection against such threats.

 

The threat to embassies has been a persistent feature of the age of modern terrorism, and so has the threat to airliners and travelers. As for the threat to aviation, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has a history of failed attacks against commercial and cargo airliners using cleverly disguised explosive devices. While these devices have failed in the past, it is likely that the group's bombmaker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, has been able to solve the problems that afflicted his past designs. In fact, in a thwarted underwear bomb plot in May 2012, the alleged suicide bomber turned his device over to Saudi officials, and the device was reportedly of a different design from the one used in the failed Christmas 2009 attempt.

 

Threats to embassy buildings and airliners have been a persistent feature of the age of modern terrorism. While the tactics and tradecraft used to attack these targets have changed in response to evolving security procedures, diplomatic facilities and airliners have nonetheless remained desirable targets. Jihadists will continue to be drawn to them even as the jihadist threat continues to shift from one posed by the al Qaeda core to one centered on regional militant groups that have adopted the al Qaeda brand name, such as al Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

 

 

Not Another Benghazi

As the threat persists, however, that fact remains that many warnings are issued for threats that never actually materialize. Warnings can be invalidated by bad information, deliberate disinformation or postponed or canceled plots. This is especially true of global, non-specific warnings, such as those against U.S. embassies in the Middle East and Asia in mid-2001.

  

In the post-Benghazi political environment, warnings issued by the U.S. government are likely evidence that Washington is acting out of an overabundance of caution -- no politician or bureaucrat wants to experience another Benghazi. Overreacting is seen as preferable to the risks of failing to warn at all. It is also important to remember that practically, the threat is more acute in places where al Qaeda franchise groups are active, such as Yemen and Libya, than it is globally.

Terrorism is an enduring reality. There were people planning attacks against U.S. embassies and international aviation before these alerts were issued, and there will continue to be people planning attacks well after the warning expires on August 31. The U.S. State Department has maintained a "worldwide caution" since 2001 that is updated every six months or so. This means that people must not allow themselves to be caught up in the hype that surrounds such warnings. Rather they should keep terrorism in perspective and practice prudent situational awareness.

Font: Stratfor

Responsibility and Authority (or lack thereof) on the Israeli.

Among the many issues raised at the sixth annual INSS conference on the preparedness of the home front on July 25, 2013 was the lack of a clear, normative definition of authority and responsibility for management of the Israeli home front. The full severity of this lapse arose seven years ago, following the exposure of failures on the civilian front during the Second Lebanon War, and it has since been discussed repeatedly in various forums and committees. It has generated the design of several systemic models and was the basis for the drafts of the Home Front Law, which though drafted years ago is still on legislative hold. This lapse was also the focus of a series of critical reports by the state comptroller (most recently in July 2013), and it is scheduled to be addressed and resolved by the Prime Minister in the near future.

 

The organizational framework of the military front is based on normative clarity regarding the questions of hierarchy, authority, and responsibility, which enables coordinated operation of the systems in the face of serious challenges. In contrast, the home front, which is much more complex and faces complicated challenges, has no actual arrangement. All the relevant answers to questions of responsibility and authority on the civilian front are a patchwork, creating ambiguity (intentional, according to some cynics) and constant confusion and tension, well beyond what is expected between bureaucratic systems. This makes emergency preparedness management, as well as the crisis management itself, very difficult. However, a proper arrangement – normative and organizational – would enhance preparedness vis-à-vis the growing threats to the civilian front.

 

Where then is the crux of the problem, and why has it not been solved?

 

The root of the problem is that by definition, the challenge to the home front is directed mainly against civilians and civilian systems, and thus it (primarily) requires inherently civilian responses. On the other hand, in Israel there is still a common assumption – and consequently, norm – that the defense establishment and the IDF are the ultimate response providers to the challenges, certainly those that originate with an external enemy. Hence there is an almost natural tendency to see them as the main element that will and should address the problem. The reality of the past few years has further bolstered this inclination, as the existence (since 1992) of a strong, professional, and increasingly sophisticated body such as the IDF Home Front Command further enhances the leading role of the Command and the IDF in the entire system.

 

Coping with the increasingly complicated threats to the civilian front requires an integrated and coordinated response by numerous bodies, most of them civilian: the government ministries, the municipalities, the industrial-business sector, the not for profit sector, and the civilians themselves, including those with special needs. Behind this issue stands a fundamental, important question: to what extent should the IDF and the defense establishment set priorities, plan responses, and guide the civilian institutions, which have distinctive civilian needs, on how to prepare for and act during an emergency? This question has only become more complicated in recent years, especially since the establishment in 2007 of the National Emergency Authority, and later, the Home Front Ministry in 2011, both of which were formed from the outset as part of the Ministry of Defense.

 

There are three main approaches to the regulation of this issue:

a.       The approach of the defense establishment, which is primarily interested in maintaining the current situation, with the Defense Minister positioned to be the primary authority at the top of the pyramid engaged with the civilian front, and the Home Front Command as the leading agency in whatever is associated with preparing for and managing emergencies. This approach contends that this setup has proven itself to be adequate so far, and that it allows reasonable cooperation with the various organs while relying on the undisputed robustness of the defense establishment, especially as the threat is essentially a security one.

b.       The approach of the National Security Council (NSC), which was asked to prepare the material and recommendations for the government's deliberation, holds that the normative and systemic formation should be fundamentally changed, with the Ministry of Internal Security positioned at the top. This proposal, which originated in past recommendations of the NSC, argues that the defense establishment should be released from the onerous burden of the home front and allowed to focus on managing offensive and defensive campaigns on the military front. Their proposal is also based on existing laws and governmental decisions, which grant the Israel Police (conditional) authority and responsibility during serious disturbances and mass disasters, and also on the transfer of responsibility to the firefighting and rescue service to the Internal Security Ministry (2011/12). 

c.       The Home Front Ministry argues that the issue of authority and responsibility for the civilian front is the core of its existence, and that only a government office whose exclusive mission is to protect the home front can and should hold all the regulatory powers and needs to be the one to set national policy and priorities in whatever is related to the civilian front. According to this approach, the Home Front Ministry does not need to serve as the “commander” of the different first responders, but should determine how they will operate in the process of preparing for an emergency, according to the reference scenario it draws. As such, the Home Front Ministry must also coordinate between the relevant organs and make sure the necessary cooperation among them prevails.

 

The heated debate between the various approaches is now underway, and it is doubtful that it will end anytime soon, even if a clear decision is taken in the near future. The debate, however, should seriously take into consideration the following main points:

a.       A clear decision should be taken as soon as possible, one that will allow the proper setup that also commands the legislative normative backing.

b.       In any case, the challenging issue of integration, coordination, and cooperation between the first responders will remain critical. In any future structure, this should be a leading priority, and be perceived as a major benchmark for the efficacy of the restructured system. .

c.       Subsequent consideration should be given to a comprehensive, second-order organizational change that would lead to the establishment of a combined staff for the first responders, based on the model of a gendarmerie in several Western countries that is responsible for enforcing civil public order in general, and the systemic response to mass disasters in particular.

d.       It is imperative that any arrangement take into account the implications of the capacity of the local authorities to fulfill their roles adequately as the keystone of the local response to large scale emergencies. There are several powerful municipalities that have already established worthy models of municipal frameworks for responding to emergencies. Many others, weaker socio-economically and in terms of their political leadership, could learn from these models while accepting support from the government, so that they will also be able to organize themselves properly for future emergencies.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

 

 

Pope says 'gay scandal' at Vatican Bank unfounded.

'We checked out prelate and found nothing'

Rome, July 29 - Pope Francis on Monday discredited reports of there being a gay prelate with "a scandalous past" at the Vatican Bank.
"With regard to Monsignor Battista Ricca, I followed canon law and performed (an investigation known as) investigatio previa, and it uncovered nothing for which he's accused, we haven't found anything," the pontiff told journalists en route to Rome after a week-long visit in Brazil.
Earlier this month the Italian weekly L'Espresso reported that Ricca, who was recently appointed to an office at the bank by Pope Francis, scandalized priests and nuns at the Vatican embassy in Uruguay with his amorous conduct involving a Swiss army captain from 1999 to 2001.
Before his promotion to the Vatican Bank, which is formally known as the Institute for Religious Works, Ricca was in charge of Saint Martha's House, the Vatican dormitory used by staff and visitors and, since his election in March, the pope, who has eschewed the papal apartments.


Font: © Copyright ANSA