Responsibility and Authority (or lack thereof) on the Israeli.

Among the many issues raised at the sixth annual INSS conference on the preparedness of the home front on July 25, 2013 was the lack of a clear, normative definition of authority and responsibility for management of the Israeli home front. The full severity of this lapse arose seven years ago, following the exposure of failures on the civilian front during the Second Lebanon War, and it has since been discussed repeatedly in various forums and committees. It has generated the design of several systemic models and was the basis for the drafts of the Home Front Law, which though drafted years ago is still on legislative hold. This lapse was also the focus of a series of critical reports by the state comptroller (most recently in July 2013), and it is scheduled to be addressed and resolved by the Prime Minister in the near future.

 

The organizational framework of the military front is based on normative clarity regarding the questions of hierarchy, authority, and responsibility, which enables coordinated operation of the systems in the face of serious challenges. In contrast, the home front, which is much more complex and faces complicated challenges, has no actual arrangement. All the relevant answers to questions of responsibility and authority on the civilian front are a patchwork, creating ambiguity (intentional, according to some cynics) and constant confusion and tension, well beyond what is expected between bureaucratic systems. This makes emergency preparedness management, as well as the crisis management itself, very difficult. However, a proper arrangement – normative and organizational – would enhance preparedness vis-à-vis the growing threats to the civilian front.

 

Where then is the crux of the problem, and why has it not been solved?

 

The root of the problem is that by definition, the challenge to the home front is directed mainly against civilians and civilian systems, and thus it (primarily) requires inherently civilian responses. On the other hand, in Israel there is still a common assumption – and consequently, norm – that the defense establishment and the IDF are the ultimate response providers to the challenges, certainly those that originate with an external enemy. Hence there is an almost natural tendency to see them as the main element that will and should address the problem. The reality of the past few years has further bolstered this inclination, as the existence (since 1992) of a strong, professional, and increasingly sophisticated body such as the IDF Home Front Command further enhances the leading role of the Command and the IDF in the entire system.

 

Coping with the increasingly complicated threats to the civilian front requires an integrated and coordinated response by numerous bodies, most of them civilian: the government ministries, the municipalities, the industrial-business sector, the not for profit sector, and the civilians themselves, including those with special needs. Behind this issue stands a fundamental, important question: to what extent should the IDF and the defense establishment set priorities, plan responses, and guide the civilian institutions, which have distinctive civilian needs, on how to prepare for and act during an emergency? This question has only become more complicated in recent years, especially since the establishment in 2007 of the National Emergency Authority, and later, the Home Front Ministry in 2011, both of which were formed from the outset as part of the Ministry of Defense.

 

There are three main approaches to the regulation of this issue:

a.       The approach of the defense establishment, which is primarily interested in maintaining the current situation, with the Defense Minister positioned to be the primary authority at the top of the pyramid engaged with the civilian front, and the Home Front Command as the leading agency in whatever is associated with preparing for and managing emergencies. This approach contends that this setup has proven itself to be adequate so far, and that it allows reasonable cooperation with the various organs while relying on the undisputed robustness of the defense establishment, especially as the threat is essentially a security one.

b.       The approach of the National Security Council (NSC), which was asked to prepare the material and recommendations for the government's deliberation, holds that the normative and systemic formation should be fundamentally changed, with the Ministry of Internal Security positioned at the top. This proposal, which originated in past recommendations of the NSC, argues that the defense establishment should be released from the onerous burden of the home front and allowed to focus on managing offensive and defensive campaigns on the military front. Their proposal is also based on existing laws and governmental decisions, which grant the Israel Police (conditional) authority and responsibility during serious disturbances and mass disasters, and also on the transfer of responsibility to the firefighting and rescue service to the Internal Security Ministry (2011/12). 

c.       The Home Front Ministry argues that the issue of authority and responsibility for the civilian front is the core of its existence, and that only a government office whose exclusive mission is to protect the home front can and should hold all the regulatory powers and needs to be the one to set national policy and priorities in whatever is related to the civilian front. According to this approach, the Home Front Ministry does not need to serve as the “commander” of the different first responders, but should determine how they will operate in the process of preparing for an emergency, according to the reference scenario it draws. As such, the Home Front Ministry must also coordinate between the relevant organs and make sure the necessary cooperation among them prevails.

 

The heated debate between the various approaches is now underway, and it is doubtful that it will end anytime soon, even if a clear decision is taken in the near future. The debate, however, should seriously take into consideration the following main points:

a.       A clear decision should be taken as soon as possible, one that will allow the proper setup that also commands the legislative normative backing.

b.       In any case, the challenging issue of integration, coordination, and cooperation between the first responders will remain critical. In any future structure, this should be a leading priority, and be perceived as a major benchmark for the efficacy of the restructured system. .

c.       Subsequent consideration should be given to a comprehensive, second-order organizational change that would lead to the establishment of a combined staff for the first responders, based on the model of a gendarmerie in several Western countries that is responsible for enforcing civil public order in general, and the systemic response to mass disasters in particular.

d.       It is imperative that any arrangement take into account the implications of the capacity of the local authorities to fulfill their roles adequately as the keystone of the local response to large scale emergencies. There are several powerful municipalities that have already established worthy models of municipal frameworks for responding to emergencies. Many others, weaker socio-economically and in terms of their political leadership, could learn from these models while accepting support from the government, so that they will also be able to organize themselves properly for future emergencies.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Pope says 'gay scandal' at Vatican Bank unfounded.

'We checked out prelate and found nothing'

Rome, July 29 - Pope Francis on Monday discredited reports of there being a gay prelate with "a scandalous past" at the Vatican Bank.
"With regard to Monsignor Battista Ricca, I followed canon law and performed (an investigation known as) investigatio previa, and it uncovered nothing for which he's accused, we haven't found anything," the pontiff told journalists en route to Rome after a week-long visit in Brazil.
Earlier this month the Italian weekly L'Espresso reported that Ricca, who was recently appointed to an office at the bank by Pope Francis, scandalized priests and nuns at the Vatican embassy in Uruguay with his amorous conduct involving a Swiss army captain from 1999 to 2001.
Before his promotion to the Vatican Bank, which is formally known as the Institute for Religious Works, Ricca was in charge of Saint Martha's House, the Vatican dormitory used by staff and visitors and, since his election in March, the pope, who has eschewed the papal apartments.


Font: © Copyright ANSA

Europe vs. Hizbollah's Military Wing.

On July 22, 2013, during a ministerial meeting on Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Council of the European Union decided to designate Hizbollah’s "military wing" as a terrorist organization. This means that the 28 countries of the European Union unanimously agreed to add Hizbollah’s military wing to the list of “groups and entities” classified as "terrorist" on the basis of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (CP931) “on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism,” itself based on UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001.

The political process that led the EU to adopt this stance was rather tortuous and involved extensive internal bargaining. Indeed, following the July 2012 terrorist attack in Burgas, Bulgaria, there was a heated debate within the EU on whether there was decisive evidence that the Lebanese Shiite organization was indeed behind the attack, and if so, how to respond to such involvement.

The movement to designate Hizbollah as a terrorist organization, led by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and backed by the US, gained momentum after the Bulgarian government declared in February 2013 that Hizbollah was indeed behind the Burgas attack. Even though that initial claim was partially retracted by the current Bulgarian government, it decidedly influenced the EU decision to change its policy on Hizbollah. In addition, growing reports of the group’s activities in Europe, as well as  the March 2013 conviction of a Lebanese-Swedish dual national arrested in Cyprus in July 2012 on charges of collecting information on Israeli flights and tourists on behalf of Hizbollah contributed to the case against Nasrallah’s group. Hizbollah’s growing military involvement in Syria also helped Europe overcome its reluctance, while internationally, the recent Gulf Cooperation Council decision to designate Hizbollah as a "terrorist organization" and strong American and Israeli pressure also prompted the EU to bridge its internal divisions over this issue.

The debate on the matter was long and heated, as until this decision neither the EU nor individual member states included Hizbollah on their lists of terrorist organizations. The exception was the Netherlands, where Hizbollah has been classified as a terrorist organization since 2004. (Outside of the EU, Bahrain, Canada, Israel, and the United States have adopted the same position.) For several EU member countries, adopting this approach appeared too confrontational, with experts worrying about the broader impact on Lebanon, and especially the risk of destabilizing it further by labeling Hizbollah a terrorist group. Moreover, countries like Italy, Spain, or Ireland, whose troops are part of the UNIFIL contingent, feared that antagonizing Hizbollah would increase direct risks to their deployed personnel in Lebanon. Finally, designating Hizbollah as a terrorist organization risked creating problems in dealing with the Lebanese government, of which Hizbollah is a member.

To bypass these concerns and create the necessary consensus, the EU decided to adopt the United Kingdom’s approach (shared by Australia and New Zealand), distinguishing between Hizbollah’s military and political wings, blacklisting the former while recognizing the latter. From here emerged the EU's largely fictitious yet politically convenient division between the Hizbollah’s "political" and "military" branches.

From an organizational standpoint, attempting to separate between the military and the political core in a group so well-integrated and with such strong internal command and control makes little sense. Yet from a political point of view, the only way to get the 28 EU members to agree on the designation of Hizbollah was to “soften the blow” and adopt the UK approach. The desire to reconcile the need to send a strong political signal against Hizbollah while falling short of creating a radical change in EU policy with respect to Lebanon was voiced clearly by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton: “Due to concerns over the role of Hizbollah, we have agreed to designate its Military Wing on the list of terrorist organizations. That does not prevent the continuation of dialogue with all political parties in Lebanon.”

What are the practical implications of the cautious EU formulation? The designation of Hizbollah should be read as a strong political statement against Hizbollah’s growing regional activism, and specifically against its role in Syria. In this sense, labeling Hizbollah as a terrorist organization helps weaken the group’s political legitimacy and international standing, both of which are highly valued by the organization.

And indeed, not surprisingly Hizbollah’s reaction has been extremely antagonistic. Over the years the group has emphasized on numerous occasions that it considers itself radically different from terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, reiterating both that its military activities are only focused against Israel, while systematically denying involvement in international terrorism, including the Burgas attack. Hizbollah declared its firm rejection of the EU move, adding that it was "unjust" and "aggressive" and the result of the EU surrendering to Israeli and American pressure. In the months preceding the EU vote, the group had also spent significant political capital lobbying against the measure. For example, in a notoriously over-dramatic statement released in August 2012, Hizbollah Secretary General Nasrallah declared that designating Hizbollah “would dry up the sources of finance, end moral, political and material support” for the group.

Does the decision do more than simply "naming and shaming" Hizbollah? The answer is mixed. Technically the EU will be able to freeze assets and ban money transfers to individuals, groups, and entities deemed affiliated with Hizbollah’s armed wing. Also, under CP931 EU, members will be bound to engage in judicial and police cooperation to target individuals and entities connected to the group’s military apparatus, and banks and other financial institutions are similarly bound to cooperate. However, the devil here is in the details: in order for the EU to implement any asset freezes or transfer bans, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the suspect funds are designated specifically for Hizbollah’s military wing and not its social or political services. This creates substantial practical obstacles to the operational implementation of the decision. Furthermore, designating Hizbollah’s military wing should not have any negative effect on the EU’s capacity to meet and interact with Hizbollah members (CP931 does not prohibit such exchanges), nor should it affect the organization’s members freedom of travel.

Even though more details are needed (for example, the EU’s official motivation for designating Hizbollah has not yet been published), the EU’s labeling of Hizbollah’s military wing does not constitute a watershed event for either the EU or Hizbollah. Still, for Nasrallah’s organization and for its Iranian partners, this decision sends a strong political signal regarding the EU’s growing impatience toward Hizbollah's international terror activities of recent years, and even more so, its blatant involvement in Syria in support of the Assad regime.

 

 

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Global Arms Markets as Seen Through the Syrian Lens.

 

 

The many and diverse efforts to arm the various actors in the Syrian civil war are really quite amazing to watch. These efforts are also quite hard to decipher -- and intentionally so -- since many of the arms transfers occur on the murky gray and black arms markets. Indeed, it is quite doubtful that anyone, whether Syrian intelligence, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service or the CIA really has a complete picture of all the channels used to funnel arms into the conflict. Certainly, I cannot hope to catalogue all of them here. However, the efforts to arm all of the factions fighting in Syria do provide a great opportunity to discuss the global arms trade and its various facets.

The Nature of Weapons

To understand the global arms markets we must first understand some critical things about the nature of weapons. First of all, it is important to realize that weapons are durable goods. While certain types of weapons and weapon components have a limited shelf life -- such as battery-coolant units for the FIM-92A Stinger missile -- numerous other weapons remain functional for many decades. It is not unusual to find a militant or a soldier carrying an AK-47 assault rifle manufactured before he was born -- and in many cases even before his father was born.

Because of this durability, weapons provided to the anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan in the 1980s are still being used against coalition troops in Afghanistan. But 1980s-era weapons are not the only durable weapons in the theater: The Taliban is also attacking coalition forces in Afghanistan with British Lee-Enfield rifles sent to South Asia during the Victorian era. These antique main battle rifles with their larger cartridges and longer barrels have a demonstrated ability to engage targets at longer distances than the more modern AK-47.

But Afghanistan is not the only place where the durability of weapons is seen. Weapons provided by the United States and the Soviet Union to rebels and governments during Central America's civil wars are still making their way into the arsenals of Mexican drug cartels, and M-40 recoilless rifles provided by the United States to the government of Libya before Moammar Gadhafi's 1969 coup proved to be a very effective weapons system in the battle of Misurata, and today are being shipped from Libya to the rebels in Syria.

Sometimes, weapons can even outlast the countries that manufactured them. East German MPiKMS and MPiKM assault rifles are still floating around the world's arms markets more than two decades after the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist.

It is important to recognize that ammunition is also an important facet of the global arms trade. Ammunition tends to be less durable than weapons, and is also consumed at high rates. This means that while weapons are durable, they can only remain functional if sufficient supplies of the appropriate ammunition are available. One of the reasons weapons like the AK-47 have proliferated so widely is the ease and low cost of finding compatible ammunition for the rifles. In the case of Syria, the rebels can both purchase ammunition for weapons like the AK-47 and seize it from the government.

Weapons are also fungible, or interchangeable. An AK-47-style rifle manufactured in Russia is essentially the same as one manufactured in Pakistan or Egypt, and an M16-style rifle manufactured in China can easily replace an M16 manufactured in the United States. Indeed, in a place like Afghanistan or Syria, it is not unusual to find AK-47-style rifles manufactured in various countries and decades being carried within the same rebel group. Journalist C.J. Chivers has done a wonderful job chronicling the proliferation of the AK-47 in his book The Gun and in his blog.

Weapons are also goods that tend to retain their value and are easily converted to cash. Combined with their durability and fungibility, this explains why they so readily flow to conflict zones where there is an increased demand for them. Buying weapons from a place where there is an oversupply and then selling them in a place where there is a heavy demand can be highly lucrative. After the fall of the Soviet Union, arms merchants like Viktor Bout became incredibly rich buying excess Soviet weapons for very low prices in places like Ukraine and selling them for much higher prices in places like Liberia. In addition to cash, guns can also be exchanged for commodities such as diamonds, drugs and even sugar.

Arms Markets

There are three general types of markets for arms. The first is the legal arms market, where weapons are bought and sold in accordance with national and international law. The legal arms market also includes military aid sent by one government to another in accordance with international law. The parties in a legal arms deal will file the proper paperwork, including end-user certificates, noting what is being sold, who is selling it and to whom it is being sold. There is a clear understanding of who is getting what and under what conditions.

The second arms market is that involving illicit, or gray arms. Gray arms transactions involve a deceptive legal arms transaction in which legally purchased arms are shifted into the hands of someone other than the purported, legal recipient. One of the classic ways to do this is to either falsify an end-user certificate, deceiving the seller, or to bribe an official in the purported destination country to sign an end-user certificate but then allow the shipment of arms to pass through his country to a third location. This type of transaction is frequently used in cases where there are international arms embargoes against a particular country (like Liberia) or where it is illegal to sell arms to a militant group such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

In one example of a gray arms deal, Ukrainian small arms were sold to Ivory Coast on paper but were then transferred in violation of U.N. arms embargoes to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Another example occurred when the government of Peru purchased thousands of surplus East German assault rifles from Jordan on the legal arms market ostensibly for the Peruvian military. Those rifles then slipped into the gray arms world and were dropped at airstrips in the jungles of Colombia for use by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

The third market is the illegal, or black arms market. In this market, the weapons are clearly transferred in violation of national and international law and there is no attempt to cover the impropriety with devices such as forged end-user certificates. Black arms transfers can involve regimes, such as when the Gadhafi regime in Libya furnished weapons to terrorist groups like the Abu Nidal Organization or the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Nation-states will often use the gray and black arms markets in order to deniably support allies, undermine opponents or otherwise pursue their national interests. This was clearly revealed in the Iran-Contra scandal of the mid-1980s, though Iran-Contra only scratched the surface of the untold tons of arms that were smuggled during the Cold War. But other times, the black arms market can involve non-state actors or even organized crime groups. The transfer of Libyan weapons from militia groups to Tuareg rebels in Mali or of weapons from the conflicts in the Balkans to criminals in Europe exemplify this.

Some weapons are also made in an unregulated manner, such as the homemade rockets and mortars made by Palestinian militant groups or the Syrian resistance. The cottage industry of illicit arms manufacture in Darra Adam Khel Pakistan has long supplied militants and tribesmen on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Weapons Flows to Syria

Currently, Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime is being supplied through the legal arms market by Russia. At the same time, they are being supplied by Iran, but since Iran is forbidden from exporting weapons under U.N. Resolution 1747, these transactions are illegal or occurring on the black arms market.

Similarly, the Iranian and Syrian weapons provided to the al Assad regime's ally, Hezbollah, are illegal under U.N. Resolution 1701. Advanced Chinese weapons have also found their way into Hezbollah's arsenal, such as the C-802 anti-ship missile used in a July 2006 attack on the Israeli corvette Hanit. It appears Hezbollah received these weapons from Iran, which has purchased some of the missiles from China and manufactured its own copies of the missile.

The rebel groups in Syria are quite fractured. The weapon flows to these groups reflect this diversity, as do the number of different actors arming them. To date, the United States and EU countries have resisted directly arming the rebels, but covert efforts facilitate the flow of arms from other parties to the rebels have been going on for well over a year now.

One of the functions of the U.S. presence in Benghazi, Libya, was to help facilitate the flow of Libyan arms to Syrian rebels. From the American point of view, sending weapons to Syria not only helps the rebels there, but every SA-7b shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile sent to Syria to be fired at a regime helicopter or MiG fighter is one less missile that can find its way into the hands of militants in the region. Promoting the flow of weapons out of Libya to Syria also makes weapons in Libya much more expensive, and can therefore reduce the ability of local militia groups -- or regional militant groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or Boko Haram -- to procure weapons from Libya.

Even though the U.S. and Turkish governments are involved in the process of passing arms from Libya to Syria, it is nonetheless a black arms channel. The Austrian Steyr Aug rifles and Swiss-made hand grenades in rebel hands were purchased by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through legal channels but then diverted to the Syrian rebels several years later via black market channels. I have not seen any of the documentation pertaining to the Croatian weapons sold to Saudi Arabia and then channeled to the Syrian rebels via Jordan, so it is difficult to judge if they were arms sold legally to the Saudis and then diverted via an illicit gray arms transaction or if the entire transfer was clandestine and hidden in black arms channels.

Obviously, the weapons supplied by the Islamic State of Iraq to Jabhat al-Nusra and other jihadist rebel groups is another case of black arms transfers. But some rebel groups have purchased weapons with cash on the black market in Lebanon and Turkey while other rebel groups have even purchased weapons from corrupt officials in the Syrian regime. Of course, the rebels have also captured some sizable arms depots from the government.

As one steps back and looks at the big picture, it becomes clear that as these diverse channels move instruments of war into Syria, their individual themes are being woven together to orchestrate a terrible symphony of death. It may be years before the symphony is over in Syria, but rest assured that shortly after its final crescendo, economic forces will work to ensure that the durable and fungible weapons from this theater of war begin to make their way to the next global hotspot.


Font: Stratfor

Mexico: Will Los Zetas Unravel Without Their Leader?

Summary

The arrest of Los Zetas leader Miguel "Z-40" Trevino Morales marks the most significant capture involving a Mexican organized crime leader since 2008. On July 15, Stratfor sources confirmed Mexican and U.S. media reports saying that Trevino was arrested in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, and that he was being transferred to Mexico City. Reports indicate that he was arrested late July 14, though that has not been confirmed. At least one source claims Trevino's nephew was also arrested.

Trevino became the leader of Los Zetas, one of Mexico's most prolific and most territorial organized crime groups, sometime in 2012 shortly before then-leader Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano was killed by the Mexican navy. Trevino's arrest could change Mexico's criminal landscape substantially if Los Zetas begin to unravel in his absence. 

Analysis

One reason behind Los Zetas' success is the group's ability to replace its leadership, even its senior-most leaders, relatively easily. In fact, Trevino succeeded Lazcano without any noticeable internal strife -- a rare occurrence among Mexican criminal groups.

This ability stems from the founding members, several of whom deserted from the highly trained Special Forces Airmobile Group unit of the Mexican army. Because ex-military personnel formed Los Zetas, members tend to move up in the group's hierarchy through merit rather than through familial connections. This contrasts starkly with the culture of other cartels, including the Sinaloa Federation. However, Trevino did not originate from the Mexican military like his predecessor, so it is possible that the group's culture may have changed somewhat.

It is unclear who will now try to keep the group together. Trevino's brother, Omar "Z-42" Trevino, will likely continue to maintain his role in criminal operations but it remains to be seen whether he has the capability or respect within the organization to replace his brother.

The places where cartel-related violence could rise as a result of Trevino's capture will depend on the ability of Los Zetas to replace their top leader as well as the strategies of Los Zetas' rivals. Should Trevino's arrest spark an internal struggle for succession, violence could rise in the states in which Los Zetas hold a substantial presence, including Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Coahuila, Veracruz, Hidalgo, and Tabasco states.

Los Zetas' rivals, such as the Sinaloa Federation, the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, the Knights Templar and factions of the Gulf cartel, probably see this transition as a moment of weakness. They could attack Los Zetas in their strongholds or otherwise try to expel Los Zetas from their own home territories.  

The intelligence from Trevino's arrest could be a boon to U.S. and Mexican officials. Unlike Lazcano, who was killed during his attempted apprehension, Trevino survived his arrest and thus could provide valuable intelligence either through interrogation or through the seizure of his personal belongings, including mobile phones, computers and paper records. These in turn could lead to the arrests of other high-ranking organized crime leaders.

Font: Stratfor

The Debate on a Military Option against Iran Revisited: When and By Whom?

 

 

Countering the sense that given the dramatic events underway in Egypt and Syria there is little urgency regarding the Iranian issue, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu underscored in a July 14 interview to CBS television that the Iranian nuclear threat remains the most urgent and important issue for Israel and the world at large. In the interview Netanyahu directed veiled criticism at the international community's response to the Iranian nuclear challenge on a number of levels. The Prime Minister stressed that Israel does not share the prevailing opinion in the West, including the US administration, that the new Iranian leadership signals moderation in its nuclear ambitions. Rather, the present Iranian leadership continues to forge ahead toward a nuclear capability, and is in fact "a wolf in sheep's clothing" that seeks to elude the West while it continues to "smile and build a bomb." In addition, Netanyahu contended that given that the United States agrees with Israel on the need to prevent Iran's nuclearization, the United States ought to "demonstrate that by action." The Iranians must be persuaded that a credible military option "is truly on the table."

 

The bottom line is that according to Netanyahu, the Israeli and American "clocks are clicking at a different pace." Moreover, Israel is "closer than the United States [and] more vulnerable and therefore [it will] have to address this question of how to stop Iran, perhaps before the United States does." Therefore, Israel "won't wait until it's too late."

 

Netanyahu's remarks raise anew the question of possible independent Israeli military action against Iran versus an alternative that appears preferable to Israel, should military action be deemed necessary – an American strike against Iran's nuclear program.

 

From Israel’s point of view, the possibility that the United States will initiate military action against Iran offers several advantages:

a.   US military action against Iran would presumably receive more international legitimacy than would an independent Israeli strike, even if actions are not carried out under the auspices of the United Nations.

b.   The United States has a greater chance of success of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities than does Israel.

c.   US action might lessen the severity of Iran’s response against Israel.

 

On the other hand, US military action against Iran may also pose questions regarding Israel’s ability to protect itself. Since Israel gained its independence, its security doctrine has been based on the belief that Israel can and should defend itself by the force of its own arms. Prime Minister Netanyahu emphasized this point at a March 20, 2013 press conference with President Obama: “I know that you appreciate that Israel can never cede the right to defend ourselves to others, even to the greatest of our friends. And Israel has no better friend than the United States of America."           

 

Discussion of the Iranian issue seems to have created the impression that to a certain degree this principle is less valid than in the past. This is reflected in the prevailing belief within various circles in the United States, particularly those traditionally less friendly toward Israel, that Israel expects the United States to lead the struggle against Iran, and that it will be the one to act against it, if necessary.

 

If the US launches a military operation against Iran, American public perception will presumably be that the action was primarily intended to defend Israel. This perception will likely intensify the greater the damage to American interests in the region. As a result, Israel’s deterrence against regional states and non-state actors will likely be reduced. In addition, this activity would likely strengthen the position of circles in the United States that for some time have claimed that Israel and its special relationship with the US are a burden to the United States and hurt its international standing on the one hand and its relationship with the Arab world on the other. Finally, the US may ask for something in return for its willingness to protect Israel. American pressure on Israel to adopt difficult positions regarding the peace process could very well increase.

 

Supporters of the "American option" claim that only the United States has the concrete ability to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, while Israel will merely be able to inflict temporary damage on these facilities. While it is hard to dispute this argument, Israel may estimate that in order to stop Iran’s nuclear activity, or at least drastically limit it, there is no need necessarily to physically destroy Iran's entire nuclear program. If Israel succeeds in causing major damage to Iran's nuclear facilities, this may significantly strengthen elements in the Iranian government that are uncomfortable with their country’s nuclear policy and could lead to a resolution of the nuclear issue, specifically as regarding the program's military dimensions, i.e., containing its scope, if not discontinuing it entirely.

 

At the same time, an American operation against Iran could fail – completely or partially. If this happens, pressure on the Israeli government, both internal and external, to avoid attacking Iran would spiral. The main argument would be that if the US can’t do it, then Israel certainly can’t. This means limiting Israel’s freedom of maneuver.

 

Supporters of the "American option" contend that if Israel attacks Iran alone, it must expect a massive response by Iran and its regional allies, particularly Hizbollah, whereas if the United States strikes, Iran might decide to direct its response against the US rather than against Israel. This belief, however, might reflect wishful thinking rather than a balanced assessment of the situation. Iran has excellent reason to focus its response on Israel, even if the source of the attack is the United States. First, Iran may assess that Israel, unlike the United States, has political and operational constraints that will limit its use of force against Iran. Second, Israel is considered a “legitimate” target for response in the eyes of many countries, particularly in the region. Third, the deterring repercussion that would accompany a major strike on Israel’s central cities and its civilians will be much larger than any attack, even a precise one, on US targets in the Gulf.

 

Conclusion

From statements by senior Israeli officials on the Iranian nuclear program, some explicit and others implicit, it can be understood that if and when it becomes clear that no choice exists other than military action against Iran, Israel believes that such action would be better carried out by the US and not by Israel. This “America first” approach has a logic of its own, and undoubtedly as far as Israel is concerned has many advantages over independent Israeli action. At the same time, Israel must take into account the possible negative results of this course of action. Awareness of these potential consequences will allow it to contain the damage if and when this option is realized.

 

 

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Keeping the NSA in Perspective

In June 1942, the bulk of the Japanese fleet sailed to seize the Island of Midway. Had Midway fallen, Pearl Harbor would have been at risk and U.S. submarines, unable to refuel at Midway, would have been much less effective. Most of all, the Japanese wanted to surprise the Americans and draw them into a naval battle they couldn't win.

The Japanese fleet was vast. The Americans had two carriers intact in addition to one that was badly damaged. The United States had only one advantage: It had broken Japan's naval code and thus knew a great deal of the country's battle plan. In large part because of this cryptologic advantage, a handful of American ships devastated the Japanese fleet and changed the balance of power in the Pacific permanently.

This -- and the advantage given to the allies by penetrating German codes -- taught the Americans about the centrality of communications code breaking. It is reasonable to argue that World War II would have ended much less satisfactorily for the United States had its military not broken German and Japanese codes. Where the Americans had previously been guided to a great extent by Henry Stimson's famous principle that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail," by the end of World War II they were obsessed with stealing and reading all relevant communications.

The National Security Agency evolved out of various post-war organizations charged with this task. In 1951, all of these disparate efforts were organized under the NSA to capture and decrypt communications of other governments around the world -- particularly those of the Soviet Union, which was ruled by Josef Stalin, and of China, which the United States was fighting in 1951. How far the NSA could go in pursuing this was governed only by the extent to which such communications were electronic and the extent to which the NSA could intercept and decrypt them.

The amount of communications other countries sent electronically surged after World War II yet represented only a fraction of their communications. Resources were limited, and given that the primary threat to the United States was posed by nation-states, the NSA focused on state communications. But the principle on which the NSA was founded has remained, and as the world has come to rely more heavily on electronic and digital communication, the scope of the NSA's commission has expanded.

What drove all of this was Pearl Harbor. The United States knew that the Japanese were going to attack. They did not know where or when. The result was disaster. All American strategic thinking during the Cold War was built around Pearl Harbor -- the deep fear that the Soviets would launch a first strike that the United States did not know about. The fear of an unforeseen nuclear attack gave the NSA leave to be as aggressive as possible in penetrating not only Soviet codes but also the codes of other nations. You don't know what you don't know, and given the stakes, the United States became obsessed with knowing everything it possibly could.

In order to collect data about nuclear attacks, you must also collect vast amounts of data that have nothing to do with nuclear attacks. The Cold War with the Soviet Union had to do with more than just nuclear exchanges, and the information on what the Soviets were doing -- what governments they had penetrated, who was working for them -- was a global issue. But you couldn't judge what was important and what was unimportant until after you read it. Thus the mechanics of assuaging fears about a "nuclear Pearl Harbor" rapidly devolved into a global collection system, whereby vast amounts of information were collected regardless of their pertinence to the Cold War.

There was nothing that was not potentially important, and a highly focused collection strategy could miss vital things. So the focus grew, the technology advanced and the penetration of private communications logically followed. This was not confined to the United States. The Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, India and any country with foreign policy interests spent a great deal on collecting electronic information. Much of what was collected on all sides was not read because far more was collected than could possibly be absorbed by the staff. Still, it was collected. It became a vast intrusion mitigated only by inherent inefficiency or the strength of the target's encryption.

Justified Fear

The Pearl Harbor dread declined with the end of the Cold War -- until Sept. 11, 2001. In order to understand 9/11's impact, a clear memory of our own fears must be recalled. As individuals, Americans were stunned by 9/11 not only because of its size and daring but also because it was unexpected. Terrorist attacks were not uncommon, but this one raised another question: What comes next? Unlike Timothy McVeigh, it appeared that al Qaeda was capable of other, perhaps greater acts of terrorism. Fear gripped the land. It was a justified fear, and while it resonated across the world, it struck the United States particularly hard.

Part of the fear was that U.S. intelligence had failed again to predict the attack.  The public did not know what would come next, nor did it believe that U.S. intelligence had any idea. A federal commission on 9/11 was created to study the defense failure. It charged that the president had ignored warnings. The focus in those days was on intelligence failure. The CIA admitted it lacked the human sources inside al Qaeda. By default the only way to track al Qaeda was via their communications. It was to be the NSA's job.

As we have written, al Qaeda was a global, sparse and dispersed network. It appeared to be tied together by burying itself in a vast new communications network: the Internet. At one point, al Qaeda had communicated by embedding messages in pictures transmitted via the Internet. They appeared to be using free and anonymous Hotmail accounts. To find Japanese communications, you looked in the electronic ether. To find al Qaeda's message, you looked on the Internet.

But with a global, sparse and dispersed network you are looking for at most a few hundred men in the midst of billions of people, and a few dozen messages among hundreds of billions. And given the architecture of the Internet, the messages did not have to originate where the sender was located or be read where the reader was located. It was like looking for a needle in a haystack. The needle can be found only if you are willing to sift the entire haystack. That led to PRISM and other NSA programs.

The mission was to stop any further al Qaeda attacks. The means was to break into their communications and read their plans and orders. To find their plans and orders, it was necessary to examine all communications. The anonymity of the Internet and the uncertainties built into its system meant that any message could be one of a tiny handful of messages. Nothing could be ruled out. Everything was suspect. This was reality, not paranoia.

It also meant that the NSA could not exclude the communications of American citizens because some al Qaeda members were citizens. This was an attack on the civil rights of Americans, but it was not an unprecedented attack. During World War II, the United States imposed postal censorship on military personnel, and the FBI intercepted selected letters sent in the United States and from overseas. The government created a system of voluntary media censorship that was less than voluntary in many ways. Most famously, the United States abrogated the civil rights of citizens of Japanese origin by seizing property and transporting them to other locations. Members of pro-German organizations were harassed and arrested even prior to Pearl Harbor. Decades earlier, Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War, effectively allowing the arrest and isolation of citizens without due process.

There are two major differences between the war on terror and the aforementioned wars. First, there was a declaration of war in World War II. Second, there is a provision in the Constitution that allows the president to suspend habeas corpus in the event of a rebellion. The declaration of war imbues the president with certain powers as commander in chief -- as does rebellion. Neither of these conditions was put in place to justify NSA programs such as PRISM.

Moreover, partly because of the constitutional basis of the actions and partly because of the nature of the conflicts, World War II and the Civil War had a clear end, a point at which civil rights had to be restored or a process had to be created for their restoration. No such terminal point exists for the war on terror. As was witnessed at the Boston Marathon -- and in many instances over the past several centuries -- the ease with which improvised explosive devices can be assembled makes it possible for simple terrorist acts to be carried out cheaply and effectively. Some plots might be detectable by intercepting all communications, but obviously the Boston Marathon attack could not be predicted.

The problem with the war on terror is that it has no criteria of success that is potentially obtainable. It defines no level of terrorism that is tolerable but has as its goal the elimination of all terrorism, not just from Islamic sources but from all sources. That is simply never going to happen and therefore, PRISM and its attendant programs will never end. These intrusions, unlike all prior ones, have set a condition for success that is unattainable, and therefore the suspension of civil rights is permanent. Without a constitutional amendment, formal declaration of war or declaration of a state of emergency, the executive branch has overridden fundamental limits on its powers and protections for citizens.

Since World War II, the constitutional requirements for waging war have fallen by the wayside. President Harry S. Truman used a U.N resolution to justify the Korean War. President Lyndon Johnson justified an extended large-scale war with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, equating it to a declaration of war. The conceptual chaos of the war on terror left out any declaration, and it also included North Korea in the axis of evil the United States was fighting against. Former NSA contractor Edward Snowden is charged with aiding an enemy that has never been legally designated. Anyone who might contemplate terrorism is therefore an enemy. The enemy in this case was clear. It was the organization of al Qaeda but since that was not a rigid nation but an evolving group, the definition spread well beyond them to include any person contemplating an infinite number of actions. After all, how do you define terrorism, and how do you distinguish it from crime?

Three thousand people died in the 9/11 attacks, and we know that al Qaeda wished to kill more because it has said that it intended to do so. Al Qaeda and other jihadist movements -- and indeed those unaffiliated with Islamic movements -- pose threats. Some of their members are American citizens, others are citizens of foreign nations. Preventing these attacks, rather than prosecuting in the aftermath, is important. I do not know enough about PRISM to even try to guess how useful it is.

At the same time, the threat that PRISM is fighting must be kept in perspective. Some terrorist threats are dangerous, but you simply cannot stop every nut who wants to pop off a pipe bomb for a political cause. So the critical question is whether the danger posed by terrorism is sufficient to justify indifference to the spirit of the Constitution, despite the current state of the law. If it is, then formally declare war or declare a state of emergency. The danger of PRISM and other programs is that the decision to build it was not made after the Congress and the president were required to make a clear finding on war and peace. That was the point where they undermined the Constitution, and the American public is responsible for allowing them to do so.

Defensible Origins, Dangerous Futures

The emergence of programs such as PRISM was not the result of despots seeking to control the world. It had a much more clear, logical and defensible origin in our experiences of war and in legitimate fears of real dangers. The NSA was charged with stopping terrorism, and it devised a plan that was not nearly as secret as some claim. Obviously it was not as effective as hoped, or the Boston Marathon attack wouldn't have happened. If the program was meant to suppress dissent it has certainly failed, as the polls and the media of the past weeks show.

The revelations about PRISM are far from new or interesting in themselves. The NSA was created with a charter to do these things, and given the state of technology it was inevitable that the NSA would be capturing communications around the world. Many leaks prior to Snowden's showed that the NSA was doing this. It would have been more newsworthy if the leak revealed the NSA had not been capturing all communications. But this does give us an opportunity to consider what has happened and to consider whether it is tolerable.

The threat posed by PRISM and other programs is not what has been done with them but rather what could happen if they are permitted to survive. But this is not simply about the United States ending this program. The United States certainly is not the only country with such a program. But a reasonable start is for the country that claims to be most dedicated to its Constitution to adhere to it meticulously above and beyond the narrowest interpretation. This is not a path without danger. As Benjamin Franklin said, "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."


Font: Stratfor - By George Friedman

The Use of Code Mutation to Produce Multi-use Cyber Weapons.

The increasing use of cyber weapons is creating the inevitable situation in which sophisticated versions of cyber weapons capable of generating strategic damage will fall into the hands of states that support terrorism, terrorist organizations, and criminal organizations. Cyber weapons will no longer be the exclusive province of the few.  The Stuxnet virus attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities is one such example. For years it operated undetected, but the moment it was discovered the virus code was subjected to in-depth analysis. The results of this research can immediately be put to use to develop new viruses operating similarly to the Stuxnet virus. In other words, once a secret is out, weapons spread.

 

In biology, the term genetic mutation is used to describe an error in DNA reproduction. Mutations cause differences between organisms; thanks to mutations, organisms can adapt to the environment. When a virus mutates, the virus has had its genes altered in some way, and this change affects some of its features, perhaps making it more resistant to the human immune system, or deadlier, or able to spread more easily. Every flu season there are new mutations in familiar viruses.

 

A common misconception about cyberspace is that once a computer virus or other malware used in an attack is discovered by the security companies, it is rendered useless for future use, because the anti-virus software has identified it and developed immunity against it, depriving it of its ability to cause damage. In other words, computer viruses are disposables, meant for one-time use. But this is not the case. Similar to biological viruses, malicious code can also evolve, making it more resistant to anti-virus software. This kind of code is known as code mutation. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that although it has similar functional features to the parent code from which it was created (to the point of being identical), the difference is syntactic (structural) rather than semantic, in order to elude the radar of software detecting malware.

 

How is code mutation created? Similar to a genetic mutation, the mutant code does not have to differ greatly from the original code. Computer code, including virus code, usually consists of several software components that communicate in order to carry out tasks. Sometimes, a small change in the way the components communicate with one another or in one of the components itself is enough to create a code mutation undetectable by the computer's immune system – the security and anti-virus software. At times more significant changes are necessary, processes that will cause the malicious code to look very different than the original code that was the basis for its creation. But these changes are for the sake of appearance only. After the virus passes the computer’s firewalls and other defensive measures, it reverts to its original form and starts to function like the original virus. Two known methods to alter computer code are called, in the world of computer software, obfuscation and packing. These will change the code (make it look like a picture, text, or a string of meaningless keystrokes) but will not impact its functionality.

 

The strategic environment of the cyber battlefield includes the use of cyber weapons to penetrate the enemy’s systems for espionage, psychological warfare, deterrence, or damage to telecommunications or physical systems. Cyberspace offers wide-ranging warfare opportunities for many players who can operate in it according to their specific interests using their particular capabilities. The weapons arsenal includes advanced capabilities, usually found in just a few countries, and includes the ability to penetrate enemy systems without detection, gather intelligence, disrupt activity without arousing suspicion, and even cause physical damage to systems connected to cyberspace. The arsenal also includes simpler, less expensive weapons – used by other players such as criminal organizations, terrorist organizations, and commercial institutions – that are generally used to achieve temporary network damage (denial of service attacks), penetrate computer networks lacking a high level of security, steal information, and cause disruption. Capabilities such as these are for sale on the internet, increasing the proliferation of cyber weapons and making them accessible also for those lacking technological capabilities but equipped with the money to buy them.

 

The ability to create code mutation has reduced the technological gap between cyberspace actors. While state capabilities are required to create a sophisticated cyber weapon, all that is needed to duplicate it or create mutations is a group of talented civilian hackers that can use it to their own ends or sell it and operate it for others in exchange for payment.

 

At present, the internet and other communications networks based on similar protocols are insufficiently secured against a motivated attacker. The state’s dependence on the internet and the reliance of a variety of sectors on cyberspace make the cyber realm highly attractive, both to terrorist organizations seeking to penetrate the public's consciousness and change an existing political reality, and to criminal organizations interested in financial profit. Both can achieve their goals through an attack in cyberspace, which is often cheaper and simpler than kinetic terrorism and crime but capable of attaining a similar effect.

 

The features of the cyber battlefield place the attacker before dilemmas stemming from the fact that cyber weapons are multi-use weapons. Their use informs the victim of their characteristics, allowing the victim to use them as well, even as a retaliatory measure against the attacker (the boomerang effect). Weapons with strategic destruction capabilities (such as Stuxnet) are liable to fall (or have already fallen) into the hands of states supporting terrorist and criminal organizations and provide them with a basis for cyber attacks.

 

The decreasing costs and increasing availability of cyber weapons to terrorist and criminal organizations are a threat to state security in general, and the State of Israel in particular. As states make increasing use of cyber weaponry, their proliferation at the hands of other nations and non-state entities is to be expected. Therefore, when analyzing cyber threats, cyber weapons must be regarded as multi-use weapons that can be exploited for future Attacks.

 

 

 

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Morsi’s Ouster and the Struggle to Revive the Egyptian Revolution.

 

 

Over the past year, a recurrent argument has been sounded that in Egypt, the Arab Spring has turned into an Islamic winter. Those making this claim cited the victories by religious party candidates in free and fair elections to government institutions and the process of Islamization promoted by President Mohamed Morsi. However, proponents of this view have focused on one side of the political spectrum, and have tended to dismiss the existence of a significant opposing camp that includes the sectors that led to the civil uprising that toppled the Mubarak regime, as well as the profound influence of the security forces and the judicial system. In fact, the dramatic events now marking Egypt should be examined in the political and social context that characterizes the revolutionary transitional phase underway since the fall of the Mubarak regime.

 

The Mubarak regime was another link in the authoritarian order established in Egypt with the July Revolution of 1952. The military coup carried out by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his colleagues 61 years ago strove to replace the monarchy with a governmental system based on democracy and social justice. Along with gaining prominent social and political achievements, the Officers regime laid the foundations for the establishment of an authoritarian regime that continued for decades. The constitution was annulled and the parties and parliament dispersed. The short honeymoon between the Free Officers regime and the Muslim Brotherhood ended with the movement being banned and thousands of its activists imprisoned. The security forces sowed fear among the general public, which opted to keep its distance from any political activity.

 

Under the leadership of Presidents Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak, controlled party activity was gradually permitted, and the opposition resumed public activity, even though authorities made it difficult for the opposition to function, including by prohibiting the Muslim Brotherhood from operating as a party. Nevertheless, the growing criticism of the regime was evident in the public sphere, and government authorities had a particularly difficult time thwarting the extensive public activity of the Muslim Brotherhood. The constitution permitted independent candidates to run for office, and the achievements of Muslim Brotherhood candidates in elections to the parliament and trade unions established the organization’s position as the leading opposition group in Egypt.

 

The civil uprising that took place in Egypt in early 2011 reshuffled the cards politically, and symbolized the power of civil society. Military intervention forced the President to relinquish his position, but only after millions of Egyptians fought with determination to topple the regime. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took it upon itself to run the affairs of state, but the goals it sought to promote were substantially different from those of the forces that had led the civil uprising. The steps taken by General Hussein Tantawi and his colleagues disturbed many of leaders of the civil uprising, and the dispute sharpened when SCAF published a roadmap for the transition period which called for elections for the parliament and the presidency before the drafting of a new constitution was completed. The plan received critical support from the Muslim Brotherhood, which saw it as an opportunity to gain power in the elections and shape the new governmental order. The Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership benefited from an efficient organizational apparatus and far greater financial resources than the other parties. Most of the non-religious parties and the groups identified with the young generation movement demanded that elections be held only after the approval of the constitution, which among other things was to define the powers of the government, the status of Islamic law (sharia), and the extent of the civil liberties. Opposition to the continued rule of the military grew, but it was determined to enforce the framework it had designed.

 

In free and fair elections to both upper and lower (parliament) houses, Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist candidates scored unprecedented achievements. Nonetheless, it quickly became clear that taking over the government was far easier than governing. In the presidential election campaign, Muslim Brotherhood leaders promised to fulfill the objectives of the January revolution, include different groups in managing the affairs of state, and protect the interests of all citizens – in short, to lead as an inclusive governmental movement. In practice, the massive majority they enjoyed in the legislative and executive branches and in the constitutional drafting committee put into a test the Islamists' commitment to serve the entire Egyptian public, not just the religious.

 

In the year of his presidency, Morsi's conduct underscored the gap between these commitments and the policy he promoted. It quickly became evident that he adopted a governing style that more than anything was reminiscent of Mubarak. His plans to save the economy from the grave crisis and to restore internal security failed to bear fruit, and the economic distress grew worse. Various opposition parties and movements contended that Morsi, a former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, failed in his handling of domestic problems because his policy sought to serve the interests of the movement. The issue of the Islamization of governmental and social institutions became the center of the dispute between the President’s supporters and opponents. Critics pointed to hundreds of appointments of individuals identified with political Islam to the most senior positions in the government, the local administration, and the media. There was also sharp criticism of the manner in which the President intervened in the work of the constitutional committee and in particular, his hasty decision to hold a referendum on the constitution in spite of broad public opposition to the move, which was referred to as underhanded opportunism. Criticism of steps taken by the President has also been evident among the security establishment and the top ranks of the judiciary.

 

However, the process that led to President Morsi’s ouster was begun by a group of young people who in late April launched a campaign called tamarud (rebellion). This initiative gained unprecedented public support, and within a few weeks the signatures were collected of more than 20 million citizens, calling to move up the presidential elections. Organizers of the campaign also initiated the huge anti-Morsi demonstrations on June 30, 2013 and declared their intention of launching a civilian rebellion if the President did not resign immediately. Morsi categorically rejected these demands, and the Muslim Brotherhood launched a campaign in support of the President. The military’s call to the opposing sides to reach understandings within a few days failed to bear fruit. More than 20 million citizens demonstrated around the country, and the fear of paralysis and of an outbreak of violence grew. The ultimatum published by the military clearly favored the President’s opponents, and in fact, Morsi was deposed forty-eight hours later.

 

Although stunned by the President’s ouster, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership quickly recovered and decided to fight back. It called upon its millions of supporters to demonstrate until Morsi was returned to the presidential palace, and defiantly declared that it would fearlessly oppose the perpetrators of the military coup that it claimed had taken place. Its political rivals were described as serving the interests of the Mubarak regime, and army commanders were presented as traitors who had betrayed the trust of President Morsi.

 

Thus far government and military leaders have taken limited steps against supporters of the deposed President. The authorities ordered the shut down of Islamist-run television channels, and arrested dozens of activists and leaders of both the Muslim Brotherhood movement and Salafist radical groups. The civil and military leadership that now holds the reins of power has declared its resilient intention to put the January revolution back on its original track, and to ensure civil liberties as well as law and order. However, these objectives can be achieved only if the current leadership acts sincerely to heal the unprecedented rift in Egyptian society.

 

The process that characterized President Morsi’s ouster indicates that there is little basis to the common claim that post-Mubarak Egypt has entered an Islamic winter. However, it is incorrect to assume that establishment of a governmental order based on values of freedom and social justice will be possible without the inclusion of the Islamists in the Land of the Nile.

 

 

 

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Professor Yoram Meital is Chairman of the Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy, Ben-Gurion University.