THE JAPAN EARTHQUAKE & TSUNAMI AND WHAT THEY MEAN FOR THE U.S.

Written by Michael Mahoney, March 17, 2011

Geophysicist, FEMA, National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP)

Coordinating Committee Member, FEMA, National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP)



WHAT HAPPENED IN JAPAN

The Japan earthquake was on a subduction zone fault, where the Pacific tectonic plate is being

pushed underneath Japan. This type of fault is responsible for the largest earthquakes and often

generate large tsunamis. Interestingly, this earthquake was proceeded by a M7.2 and 3 M6+

foreshocks two days before. Fault modeling suggests a rupture zone of 350x150 km in size with

peak slips of 18+ meters. Aftershocks from this earthquake have included one M7, almost 50

M6, and hundreds of M5 and smaller. In addition, this event also triggered separate earthquakes

in western Honshu (M6.1) and offshore northwestern Honshu (M6.6).

The earthquake damage in Japan was limited, partly because of the epicenter was almost 100 km

from shore, but mostly due to the building codes that Japan has in force. Japanese building

codes are more restrictive than those in the US as they call for building designs that are stronger

and consequently more expensive. This philosophy appears to have paid off as we have not seen

the collapse of any engineered buildings. While ground motion values may have been

minimized by the distance of the epicenter, this was a very long duration earthquake, which is

common for subduction zone events. Long duration shaking is something we may not have fully

accounted for in our building codes and may have worked some building components to the

point of failure where shorter shaking duration would not have. The only building collapses we

have seen so far have generally been of older wood residential buildings. Japanese home

construction traditionally uses heavy tile roofs for protection from typhoon winds. However,

these heavy roofs can overtax a wood frame home if it is not properly built or maintained.

While Japanese structures performed very well in the earthquake, we have heard many reports of

damage to non-structural components, which are the building’s architectural elements, utilities,

contents, etc. This type of damage continues to be a problem that we have documented in every

earthquake, and is often responsible for greater dollar losses than actually structural damage.

This type of damage often also results in the loss of function of the facility. A common example

of this type of damage is damage to piping, such as fire sprinkler heads breaking from ceiling

impact. This type of damage to a critical facility such as a hospital, this can greatly impact a

community’s response and recovery. For residential buildings, this type of damage can include a

water heater falling over if not strapped to a wall or the collapse of shelving or cabinets.

The tsunami generated by this earthquake was measured as high as 33 feet (10 meters) and was

responsible for most of the damage and fatalities that we are now seeing. It was the first tsunami

to strike a modern, developed coastline, and it was devastating. While Japan generally

incorporates seawalls and other structural protection to protect most developed areas, this

tsunami overwhelmed all of these defenses. The tsunami reduced most of the wood frame homes

to kindling. However, there were also some examples of larger, heavier multi-story concrete

structures that survived the tsunami.

The emergency management philosophy in both countries is that it is impossible to reasonably

build residential structures that can withstand tsunami loads, and that the only way to protect the

population is to train them to evacuate to high ground when a warning is given. For a tsunami

whose source is far enough away, there are established warning systems that provide sufficient

time for evacuations. For a near source tsunami like the one that just occurred in Japan, the

warning is the earthquake itself. We have heard many reports of people evacuating to high

ground, but obviously many were not able to evacuate.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE U.S. - EARTHQUAKE

Our attention as both scientists and emergency managers can’t help but turn closer to home and

wonder what effects a similar earthquake might have on our country. The National Earthquake

Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) is responsible for the coordination and support of Federal

earthquake-related activities; see www.nehrp.gov. FEMA, along with NIST, NSF and USGS,

work to advance earthquake knowledge and awareness as well as reduce future losses. There are

several lessons from the Japan earthquake and tsunami for the U.S. that the NEHRP agencies

will try to capture.

The earthquake confirmed the importance of proper building codes and building construction.

The adoption and enforcement of an adequate building code is the most effective loss prevention

measure that a State or community can do. This was the single most important difference

between last year’s Haiti and Chile earthquakes, and it was proven again in Japan. Using

funding under the NEHRP, FEMA has a long history of working the nation’s model building

codes and consensus standards and continues to work with the industry to keep them current.

However, building codes only work when the data behind them is current and accurate.

Earthquakes are really the only true testing lab for our building codes and design standards. It is

imperative that the NEHRP agencies fund the investigation of building performance after every

major earthquake. By evaluating how buildings and their components perform in an earthquake

and by comparing that performance to actual ground motion data from recording instruments, we

can better assess their performance and better calibrate our building codes and standards. Often,

better knowledge has led to us being able to reduce conservatism in the code, making

earthquake-resistant construction more cost effective. Such specific building performance data

will also allow FEMA to better calibrate one of its newest products that is nearing completion;

Seismic Performance Assessment Methodology for Individual Buildings, which is currently being

developed for FEMA by the Applied Technology Council under their ATC-58 project and which

will eventually be published as FEMA P-58.

The issue of nonstructural damage continues to be a critical one that we have seen occur in every

earthquake. We have heard of at least one report of a hospital in Japan being rendered

inoperable. FEMA has just completed a major rewrite of their guidance document, Reducing the

Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage, FEMA E-74. It is now far more extensive and

provides protection criteria for many different components. This new publication can be found

at http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/earthquake/fema74/index.shtm.

The earthquake also confirmed the importance of individual preparedness. When an earthquake,

or any other major disaster strikes, it may take days for emergency services to be able to respond

to all of those in need and for necessities such as water, food and power to be restored. Every

family should plan for and be prepared to survive a major earthquake or other hazard. This

includes making and following a plan on what to do when an earthquake strikes, having an

earthquake supply kit stocked with water, food, medicines, and other supplies you and your

family will need to survive at least 3 days and preferably a week, and teaching each family

member what to do during and after an earthquake. There are several FEMA resources to help

you do this, including:



http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=1664



http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=1666



http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=1449

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE U.S. - TSUNAMI

The tsunami demonstrated the awesome power of water when it is unleashed in the form of a

tsunami. In the last 150 years, deadly tsunamis have struck Hawaii, Alaska, California, Oregon,

Washington, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. All US coastlines can

be impacted by tsunamis, but some are at much greater risk. The type of fault that ruptured in

Japan is almost identical to the Cascadia subduction fault that lies off the coast of Washington,

Oregon and northern California. The Cascadia zone fault last ruptured in 1700, and is capable of

unleashing a tsunami every bit as strong and as devastating as the one that struck Japan.

As described above, it is impossible to reasonably build residential structures that can withstand

tsunami loads, and that the only way to protect the population is to train them to evacuate to high

ground when a warning is given. For a near source tsunami like the one that just occurred in

Japan or the one that would occur on the Cascadia fault, the warning is the earthquake itself.

This only works when residents and visitors are properly trained and aware of what to do

immediately after an earthquake. Such training and awareness is an ongoing task for local

officials. This also only works when the population can reach high ground within the 15-30

minutes. For locations where high ground is not accessible, FEMA worked with NOAA to

develop and publish Guidelines for Design of Structures for Vertical Evacuation from Tsunamis,

FEMA P-646, which is a technical guide on the design and construction of vertical evacuation

shelters and can be found at http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3463 and Vertical

Evacuation from Tsunamis: A Guide for Community Officials, FEMA P-646a, which is a nontechnical

guide for community leaders on how to specify and use vertical evacuation shelters and

can be found at http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3808. The FEMA P-646

Guidelines document builds on early vertical evacuation work done in Japan.

FEMA is a partner agency of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP),

which is led by NOAA and includes all 29 U.S. coastal States, Territories and Commonwealths,

and the USGS. The community-focused partnership is designed to reduce the impact of tsunamis

on U.S. coastal communities, enabling all levels of government to work toward the common goal

of saving lives of people at tsunami risk along our Nation’s coastlines, and reducing damage to

property and the economy. For more information, see http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/.

FEMA is committed to not only preparing for tsunami and other disasters, but to mitigating

damage to those kinds of events when they do occur. Through the NTHMP, FEMA and its

partners work with high-risk communities on signage for awareness; developing evacuation

maps and inundation maps from inundation models; use of science and technology to identify

and assess the hazard; development and implementation of community education and outreach

programs; providing decision-makers with tools to develop tsunami hazard mitigation plans and

procedures; supporting land use planning to minimize tsunami risk whenever possible; support

improved building codes, standards and practices to ensure buildings which could potentially be

affected are as resilient as possible.

FEMA and its partners are helping the nation prepare for, and mitigate, tsunami hazards, but

there are also steps the public should take now:

• Be aware of your surroundings and which areas are most at risk (that includes home,

workplace, schools, etc.) You can find tsunami inundation maps for your state here:

o California --

http://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/geologic_hazards/Tsunami/Inundation_Maps

/Pages/Statewide_Maps.aspx

o Oregon –

http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/earthquakes/coastal/Tsumapsbycity.HTM

o Washington – http://www.emd.wa.gov/hazards/haz_tsunami.shtml

o Alaska – http://www.aeic.alaska.edu/tsunami/index.html

o Hawaii -- http://www5.hawaii.gov/tsunami/

• Know the hazard zones, evacuation routes, and locations of the nearest high ground,

tsunami shelter and/or assembly area where you live, work, and visit by contacting your

local or state emergency management agency. Practice the safe walking route to shelter

and assembly areas. Be sure you understand the evacuation plans of your child’s school.

• Visit http://www.ready.gov for more information on forming a family disaster plan,

building a family disaster supply kit, and staying informed.

• Sign up to receive Tsunami Warning Center email or text messages at

http://weather.gov/ptwc/subscribe.php or

http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov/watcher/tsunamiwatcher.phptsunami

• Learn more about tsunami science and what you can do to help at

http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/index.html

• Learn more about vertical evacuation and other ways you can stay safe during a tsunami

at: http://www.fema.gov/hazard/tsunami/index.shtm

FEMAs mission is to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we

work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against,

respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.

Earthquake Safety Guide for Homeowners, FEMA 530,Earthquake Home Hazard Hunt Poster, FEMA 528,Earthquake Safety Checklist, FEMA 526,

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the multi-agency National

Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) joins with the rest of the United States and

indeed the rest of the world in expressing our concern to the Japanese people as they recover

from their historic magnitude 9.0 earthquake and resulting tsunami. Our thoughts and prayers go

out to all who were affected by this ongoing tragedy.

Immediately after the earthquake, NOAA’s Pacific Tsunami Warning Center and West Coast

and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center both issued tsunami warnings for Hawaii, the U.S. West

Coast, Alaska and the island territories in the Pacific. Fortunately, the tsunami generated by this

earthquake which hit Hawaii and the West Coast caused relatively minor damage that was

generally limited to beach front and harbor facilities. However, past tsunamis have been far

worse, and the caution shown by Federal, State and local officials was certainly warranted. One

only has to look back to 1960, when an earthquake in Chile resulted in a 35 ft tsunami in Hilo,

Hawaii that killed 61 people to see that their caution was justified.

‎150° Anniversario Unità ITALIA ......

150th Anniversary Unity ITALY ......
L'unité du 150e anniversaire ITALIE ......
150 º Aniversário da Unidade ITÁLIA ......
חגיגות האחדות 150 איטליה ......

Unidad 150 aniversario Italia ......

Unitatea 150-a aniversare ITALIA ......

The CIA's Culture of Failure

“I never would have agreed to the formulation of the Central Intelligence Agency back in ‘47,” Harry Truman said, “if I had known it would become the American Gestapo.”

In 2010, the United States spent a whopping 80.1 billion dollars on intelligence- gathering. The spoils of this war were shared by, apart from the CIA, the Defence Intelligence Agency, which serves the Pentagon, the eavesdropping entity that is the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency which runs spy satellites. Yet this costly cloak-and-dagger, bullet-and-bomb stuff has done little to serve US intelligence objectives.





In his book Legacy of Ashes, Pulitzer prize-winning author Tim Weiner chronicles the numerous bunglings of the CIA, the United States’ “premier” spy agency. The book draws on 50,000 documents from CIA archives going as far back as 1947. It also relies on more than 300 interviews with staff members, including ten former CIA directors. Weiner brands the agency a gross failure, concluding that “the most powerful nation in the history of Western civilisation has failed to create a first-rate spy service.”

Narrating recorded facts, the book shows how since its inception the CIA has relied on low-level sources and ill-trained officers. It asserts that Allen Dulles, the agency’s most celebrated leader, judged the importance of intelligence reports by their weight rather than contents.

Frank Wisner, the first CIA head of covert operations (1948-1958) was diagnosed with psychotic mania and committed to a mental hospital. In 1962, Wisner’s files were reviewed by a successor, who destroyed them as “the ramblings of a madman.” In 1965, Wisner committed suicide. His son, Frank Wisner Jr, a former State Department official, and ambassador to Egypt and India and a former Enron director, is Washington’s special representative for the present Egypt crisis.

Declassified documents prove that the CIA “knowingly gave the White House and the Pentagon inside information on the Soviet Union from foreign agents it knew, or strongly suspected, were controlled by Moscow.” These reports were given to Presidents Reagan, George H W Bush and Clinton. Aldrich Ames, CIA chief of counterintelligence for the Soviet-East Europe division, had been working since 1985 for the Soviet Union and then for Russia until he was discovered, and the convicted in 1994. In effect the whole US policy towards Russia was being shaped by the Kremlin.

Many CIA covert actions resulting in apparent short-term successes were long-term strategic blunders. The Iranian democratic government fell to CIA Operation Ajax in 1953, but the development eventually led to the revolution of 1979, and the United States came to be branded as “the Great Satan” by Iran. The CIA-backed Ba’ath Party coup in Iraq facilitated the advent of Saddam Hussein. The CIA was unable to predict the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1972 declarations of martial laws in the Philippines and South Korea, the 1973 Middle East war, the 1974 Cyprus crisis, and the coup in Portugal and the nuclear explosion by India the same year, and the 9/11 attacks.

The present upheavals in the Middle East are another product of CIA failures. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Robert Gates, the defence secretary in the Obama administration who then headed the CIA, was at a family picnic. Asked by a surprised friend about his presence there during the invasion, Gates responded: “What invasion?” The Tunisian and Egypt revolutions took the White House by surprise. President Obama reportedly told National Intelligence director James Clapper that he was “disappointed with the intelligence community” about its failure to predict the unrest that led to the ouster of Tunisian president Zine El Abedine Ben Ali. This failure also dominated a recent Senate Intelligence Committee hearing. The committee’s chairperson, Dianne Feinstein, was confounded as to how ignorant the CIA was of the uprisings. “Was someone looking at what was going on on the Internet?” she quipped.

Inscribed on the CIA headquarters’ lobby wall is the second half of a Bible verse: “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” The first half conveniently left out is: “If ye abide in My word, [then] are ye truly my disciples...” The truth is that the CIA has been involved in drug trafficking in Burma, Bangkok, Thailand, Venezuela, Colombia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama and Haiti. Active involvement in the drug trade was justified because they helped and financed their covert actions. It had also been actively involved in assassinations, kidnappings, renditions, torture and overthrow of governments. Even President Ford accused the CIA of involvement in assassination attempts against foreign leaders.

Over the years many congressional committees and panels have investigated a plethora of accusations against the agency. There has been the Rockefeller Commission, Church Committee and Pike Committee. Otis Pike, now a former member of the US House of Representatives, believed the CIA was an out of control “rogue elephant,” Sen Church and historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr had the opinion. Angelo M Codevilla, a former senior staff member of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, commented that “the United States would have been better off not having an intelligence service at all.”

Defence analyst John Diamond encapsulates these fiascos in his book CIA and the Culture of Failure. He writes: “A steady stream of intelligence failures in the 1990s occurred in every facet of CIA activity, from intelligence collection to analysis to counterintelligence to covert action. These processes fed off and fuelled one another, leading to a fatal cycle of error, criticism, overcorrection, distraction, and politicisation.” This fatal cycle continues unabated. Unfazed by repeated intelligence failures from the Walker ring, Aldrich Ames, 9/11 to Raymond Davis, the reckless blundering continues.

Two thousand years ago, a Roman senator suggested that all slaves wear white armbands for people to better identify them. “No,” said a wiser senator, “if they see how many of them there are, they may revolt.” These white armbands are becoming evident the world over as reality sinks in. Here, too, the recent Davis episode was the trigger for years of suffered unbridled American arrogance, intrusion and highhandedness zealously facilitated by well placed assets. A handful here profess the indispensability of the White House and Langley, a multitude wants the riddance of the paid few and their paymasters.

‘No comment’ from MoD over SAS men captured in Libya

SAS special forces, whose motto '"Who Dares, Wins"



The Ministry of Defence says it will not comment on Sunday Times claims that eight members of the SAS have been seized by rebel forces in Libya.

Defence Secretary Liam Fox told the BBC a small diplomatic team was in Benghazi and “they were in touch with them”.

BBC correspondent Jon Leyne, in eastern Libya, said he had “strong suspicions” the reports were true.

The paper claims a unit was trying to put UK diplomats in touch with rebels trying to topple the Gaddafi regime.

It says eight SAS men, in plain clothes but armed, were captured.

The BBC’s Jon Leyne, who is in the main rebel stronghold city of Benghazi, said: “I have been speaking to people from the authorities here who’ve not denied it and have spoken in terms that it probably is true without actually saying as much.”

In a statement, the MoD said: “We do not comment on the special forces.”

The Sunday Times claims the SAS soldiers were taken to Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, where they are being interrogated.

The full statement from the MoD read: “We neither confirm nor deny the story and we do not comment on the special forces.”

UK silent on report Libyan rebels seize troops (Reuters):

A small British diplomatic team is in the Libyan city of Benghazi, Defence Secretary Liam Fox said on Sunday, but he declined comment on a report that Libyan rebels had captured a British special forces unit.

“I can confirm that a small British diplomatic team is in Benghazi. We are in touch with them, but it would be inappropriate for me to comment further on that for reasons I’m quite sure you understand,” Fox told the BBC.

Libya's former Justice Minister Mustafa Mohamed Abdel-Jalil, has formed an interim government.

Despite repeated questions, Fox refused to say whether the group was in danger or was being held captive.

Libya is in turmoil as rebels fight to end Muammar Gaddafi’s 41-year rule.

“It is a very difficult situation. There are a number of different opposition groups to Colonel Gaddafi in Libya. They do seem relatively disparate,” Fox said.

“We want to clearly understand what the dynamic is there because we want to be able to work with them to ensure the demise of the Gaddafi regime, to see a transition to greater stability in Libya and ultimately to more representative government,” he said.

Fox ruled out the use of British military ground forces in Libya but said a no-fly zone remained a possibility.

The Sunday Times reported that Libyan rebels had captured a British special forces unit in the east of the country after a secret diplomatic mission to make contact with opposition leaders backfired.

The team, understood to number up to eight SAS soldiers, were intercepted as they escorted a junior diplomat through rebel-held territory, the newspaper said.

Pakistani Intelligence and the CIA: Mutual Distrust and Suspicion.

On March 1, U.S. diplomatic sources reportedly told Dawn News that a proposed exchange with the Pakistani government of U.S. citizen Raymond Davis for Pakistani citizen Aafia Siddiqui was not going to happen. Davis is a contract security officer working for the CIA who was arrested by Pakistani police on Jan. 27 following an incident in which he shot two men who reportedly pointed a pistol at him in an apparent robbery attempt. Siddiqui was arrested by the Afghan National Police in Afghanistan in 2008 on suspicion of being linked to al Qaeda.

During Siddiqui’s interrogation at a police station, she reportedly grabbed a weapon from one of her interrogators and opened fire on the American team sent to debrief her. Siddiqui was wounded in the exchange of fire and taken to Bagram air base for treatment. After her recovery, she was transported to the United States and charged in U.S. District Court in New York with armed assault and the attempted murder of U.S. government employees. Siddique was convicted in February 2010 and sentenced in September 2010 to 86 years in prison.

Given the differences in circumstances between these two cases, it is not difficult to see why the U.S. government would not agree to such an exchange. Siddique had been arrested by the local authorities and was being questioned, while Davis was accosted on the street by armed men and thought he was being robbed. His case has served to exacerbate a growing rift between the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI).

Pakistan has proved to be a very dangerous country for both ISI and CIA officers. Because of this environment, it is necessary for intelligence officers to have security — especially when they are conducting meetings with terrorist sources — and for security officers to protect American officials. Due to the heavy security demands in high-threat countries like Pakistan, the U.S. government has been forced to rely on contract security officers like Davis. It is important to recognize, however, that the Davis case is not really the cause of the current tensions between the Americans and Pakistanis. There are far deeper issues causing the rift.

Operating in Pakistan

Pakistan has been a very dangerous place for American diplomats and intelligence officers for many years now. Since September 2001 there have been 13 attacks against U.S. diplomatic missions and motorcades as well as hotels and restaurants frequented by Americans who were in Pakistan on official business. Militants responsible for the attack on the Islamabad Marriott in September 2008 referred to the hotel as a “nest of spies.” At least 10 Americans in Pakistan on official business have been killed as a result of these attacks, and many more have been wounded.

Militants in Pakistan have also specifically targeted the CIA. This was clearly illustrated by a December 2009 attack against the CIA base in Khost, Afghanistan, in which the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led by Hakeemullah Mehsud, used a Jordanian suicide operative to devastating effect. The CIA thought the operative had been turned and was working for Jordanian intelligence to collect intelligence on al Qaeda leaders hiding in Pakistan. The attack killed four CIA officers and three CIA security contractors. Additionally, in March 2008, four FBI special agents were injured in a bomb attack as they ate at an Italian restaurant in Islamabad.

Pakistani intelligence and security agencies have been targeted with far more vigor than the Americans. This is due not only to the fact that they are seen as cooperating with the United States but also because there are more of them and their facilities are relatively soft targets compared to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Pakistan. Militants have conducted dozens of major attacks directed against Pakistani security and intelligence targets such as the headquarters of the Pakistani army in Rawalpindi, the ISI provincial headquarters in Lahore and the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) and police academies in Lahore.

In addition to these high-profile attacks against facilities, scores of military officers, frontier corps officers, ISI officers, senior policemen and FIA agents have been assassinated. Other government figures have also been targeted for assassination. As this analysis was being written, the Pakistani minorities minister was assassinated near his Islamabad home.

Because of this dangerous security environment, it is not at all surprising that American government officials living and working in Pakistan are provided with enhanced security to keep them safe. And enhanced security measures require a lot of security officers, especially when you have a large number of American officials traveling away from secure facilities to attend meetings and other functions. This demand for security officers is even greater when enhanced security is required in several countries at the same time and for a prolonged period of time.

This is what is happening today in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The demand for protective officers has far surpassed the personnel available to the organizations that provide security for American officials such as the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service and the CIA’s Office of Security. In order to provide adequate security for American officials in high-threat posts, these agencies have had to rely on contractors provided by large companies like Blackwater/Xe, Dyncorp and Triple Canopy and on individual contract security officers hired on personal-services contracts. This reliance on security contractors has been building over the past several years and is now a fact of life at many U.S. embassies.

Using contract security officers allows these agencies not only to quickly ramp up their capabilities without actually increasing their authorized headcount but also to quickly cut personnel when they hit the next lull in the security-funding cycle. It is far easier to terminate contractors than it is to fire full-time government employees.

CIA Operations in Pakistan

There is another factor at play: demographics. Most CIA case officers (like most foreign-service officers) are Caucasian products of very good universities. They tend to look like Bob Baer and Valerie Plame. They stick out when they walk down the street in places like Peshawar or Lahore. They do not blend into the crowd, are easily identified by hostile surveillance and are therefore vulnerable to attack. Because of this, they need trained professional security officers to watch out for them and keep them safe.

This is doubly true if the case officer is meeting with a source who has terrorist connections. As seen in the Khost attack discussed above, and reinforced by scores of incidents over the years, such sources can be treacherous and meeting such people can be highly dangerous. As a result, it is pretty much standard procedure for any intelligence officer meeting a terrorism source to have heavy security for the meeting. Even FBI and British MI5 officers meeting terrorism sources domestically employ heavy security for such meetings because of the potential danger to the agents.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the primary intelligence collection requirement for every CIA station and base in the world has been to hunt down Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership. This requirement has been emphasized even more for the CIA officers stationed in Pakistan, the country where bin Laden and company are believed to be hiding. This emphasis was redoubled with the change of U.S. administrations and President Barack Obama’s renewed focus on Pakistan and eliminating the al Qaeda leadership. The Obama administration’s approach of dramatically increasing strikes with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) required an increase in targeting intelligence, which comes mostly from human sources and not signals intelligence or imagery. Identifying and tracking an al Qaeda suspect amid the hostile population and unforgiving terrain of the Pakistani badlands also requires human sources to direct intelligence assets toward a target.

This increased human intelligence-gathering effort inside Pakistan has created friction between the CIA and the ISI. First, it is highly likely that much of the intelligence used to target militants with UAV strikes in the badlands comes from the ISI — especially intelligence pertaining to militant groups like the TTP that have attacked the ISI and the Pakistani government itself (though, as would be expected, the CIA is doing its best to develop independent sources as well). The ISI has a great deal to gain by strikes against groups it sees as posing a threat to Pakistan, and the fact that the U.S. government is conducting such strikes provides the ISI a degree of plausible deniability and political cover.

However, it is well known that the ISI has long had ties to militant groups. The ISI’s fostering of surrogate militants to serve its strategic interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan played a critical role in the rise of transnational jihadism (and this was even aided with U.S. funding in some cases). Indeed, as we’ve previously discussed, the ISI would like to retain control of its militant proxies in Afghanistan to ensure that Pakistan does not end up with a hostile regime in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal from the country. This is quite a rational desire when one considers Pakistan’s geopolitical situation.

Because of this, the ISI has been playing a kind of a double game with the CIA. It has been forthcoming with intelligence pertaining to militants it views as threats to the Pakistani regime while refusing to share information pertaining to groups it hopes to use as levers in Afghanistan (or against India). Of course, the ability of the ISI to control these groups and not get burned by them again is very much a subject of debate, but at least some ISI leaders appear to believe they can keep at least some of their surrogate militants under control.

There are many in Washington who believe the ISI knows the location of high-value al Qaeda targets and senior members of organizations like the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, which are responsible for many of the attacks against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. This belief that the ISI is holding back intelligence compels the CIA to run unilateral intelligence operations (meaning operations it does not tell the ISI about). Many of these unilateral operations likely involve the recruitment of Pakistani government officials, including members of the ISI. Naturally, the ISI is not happy with these intelligence operations, and the result is the mistrust and tension we see between the ISI and the CIA.

It is important to remember that in the intelligence world there is no such thing as a friendly intelligence service. While services will cooperate on issues of mutual interest, they will always serve their own national interests first, even when that places them at odds with an intelligence service they are coordinating with.

Such competing national interests are at the heart of the current tension between the CIA and the ISI. At present, the CIA is fixated on finding and destroying the last vestiges of al Qaeda and crippling militant groups in Pakistan that are attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The Americans can always leave Afghanistan; if anarchy and chaos take hold there, it is not likely have a huge impact on the United States. However, the ISI knows that after the United States withdraws from Afghanistan it will be stuck with the problem of Afghanistan. It is on the ISI’s doorstep, and it does not have the luxury of being able to withdraw from the region and the conflict. The ISI believes that it will be left to deal with the mess created by the United States. It is in Pakistan’s national interest to try to control the shape of Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal, and that means using militant proxies like Pakistan did after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.

This struggle between the CIA and ISI is a conundrum rooted in the conflict between the vital interests of two nations and it will not be solved easily. While the struggle has been brought to the public’s attention by the Davis case, this case is really just a minor symptom of a far deeper conflict.