The United States and Pakistan: Partnership in Crisis

The killing of Osama Bin Laden by American Navy SEALs forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan in early May represents a new peak in the ongoing tension between the United States and Pakistan regarding the issue of combating terror in general, and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas within Pakistan's sovereign territory in particular. Nevertheless, at this stage, the two sides are avoiding an irreparable divide based on their clear mutual interests: Pakistan needs the economic support of the United States and aims to prevent unilateral American backing for India, Pakistan's bitter rival, and the United States needs comprehensive Pakistani assistance in the war against regional and international terrorist elements – the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and al-Qaeda – whose ability to act against the interests of the United States is dependent, to a large extent, on Pakistan's policy toward them.

The flagrant violation of Pakistan's sovereignty by American commando forces who operated in the heart of a large city without coordinating with the authorities in Islamabad resulted in vigorous public and political criticism in Pakistan. The Pakistani parliament held a special session on the military-security establishment’s failure in not knowing and preventing either the American military action or the presence of Bin Laden in the heart of the country. According to information published after the killing, Bin Laden lived in a compound in the heart of the country for at least five years, and even hosted visitors there. This raised questions in the West concerning the possibility that Bin Laden enjoyed cooperation and assistance from elements in the local security forces. This in turn further increased American frustration with the unsatisfactory level of security cooperation with Pakistan in the war on terror – especially with what was seen as a lack of willingness on Pakistan's part to allocate sufficient forces for the war in the tribal region in Waziristan (FATA) –and with Pakistan’s request to limit attacks by American drones. These attacks are the main effective means of action for the United States in the war against the terror organizations mentioned above; the principal targets were the senior leadership of these organizations who concentrate in the tribal regions. Therefore, although on occasion they caused harm to unarmed civilians – either because they were used by terrorists as human shields or were killed accidentally – a restriction on these attacks by the Pakistani government would impede the war on terror.

A previous point of friction in the complex relations between the two countries centered on an incident that occurred three months ago, when Ray Davis, a CIA contractor, shot two local intelligence agents to death in Lahore in broad daylight because he suspected they intended to rob him. Davis was imprisoned immediately after the incident, and although he had diplomatic immunity, the Pakistani public demanded that he be tried on the charge of premeditated murder, a crime for which the punishment is the death penalty. After about a month of contacts, Davis was smuggled out of the country following a compromise agreement that involved the United States government paying blood money to the families of those killed, as is allowed in certain circumstances by Islamic law. The incident sparked heightened public discussion on the breadth and depth of American clandestine intelligence activity in Pakistan and became a cause célèbre for local political elements that oppose all American activity in the country.

For example, members of the Islamist opposition in Pakistan used the incident in their domestic political game to attack the secular government headed by President Zardari, calling the deal to free Davis “a national tragedy.” Zardari’s government has coped with frequent coalition crises and is working against the attempt to weaken the secular political forces in the country. This trend was particularly evident in two political assassinations, in January, Salman Taseer, the governor of the Punjab region and a prominent spokesman against Islamic religious extremism and attempts to apply the blasphemy laws[1] against minorities in Pakistan, was murdered by his bodyguard, and two months later, Shahbaz Bhatti, the Christian federal minister for minorities, was assassinated as well.

In the face of public allegations in the United States about Pakistan’s impotence, as manifested in the Bin Laden affair, and in light of President Obama's recent promise that he would launch more unilateral raids into Pakistan whenever he felt they were required, senior officials of the Pakistani military and security establishment made serious statements in the Pakistani parliament. At the end of the debate, the government of Pakistan announced officially that it criticized the flagrant violation of its sovereignty by the United States; firmly denied any involvement or operational or logistical assistance to the operation; and claimed that such actions harm the two countries' joint efforts in the war on terror. This announcement was also intended as a clear warning to the United States against carrying out future similar actions on its sovereign territory. Likewise, the Pakistani parliament adopted a resolution to take a number of steps restricting American freedom of action in Pakistan, such as in the supply and transfer of equipment on Pakistani territory if the American aerial attacks continue. At the same time, it was decided that a comprehensive internal examination will be carried out to review the related intelligence and security failures.

While the friction between the two countries is real, it appears that there are mutual attempts to cool the atmosphere, mainly through conciliatory announcements and official visits. Examples of this are President Zardari’s conciliatory letter in the Washington Post, which was published immediately after Bin Laden’s killing and was intended to minimize the serious criticism of Zardari in American public opinion; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s tempered comments to the effect that there is no proof of Pakistani government involvement or assistance in hiding Bin Laden on its territory; and Clinton's recent visit to Pakistan with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen. Thus in spite of the increasing tension, the two governments are interested in preserving their ties, in view of their shared interests and the benefits in maintaining security and economic cooperation. The United States sees Pakistan as an essential partner in stabilizing Afghanistan and an important aid in the war on terror underway within Pakistan. Furthermore, geo-strategic considerations regarding Pakistan's status as a nuclear state with a key role in preserving regional stability in the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India, and the signals from Pakistan that it intends to strengthen its ties with China as a possible alternative to its pro-Western policy, discourage the United States from taking strong measures against it.

Pakistan, which suffers from a difficult economic situation, has enjoyed generous American economic and security aid since 2002 as a result of its pro-Western policy, to the tune of approximately $20 billion. A reduction or an end to this aid is liable to cause serious damage to the local economic system and paralyze state institutions. Furthermore, Pakistan is coping with a complicated security challenge within the country and is continues to feel under constant threat from India. Pakistan is very well aware of the price of a rift in relations with the United States, which would likely serve India's interests, and this factor encourages it to maintain strong ties with the United States and sanction its presence as a stabilizing element in the region.

It is still too early to say how the current crisis between the two states will evolve and whether it will lead to a strategic turning point and a change in the entire regional system of power. However, it appears that the advantages inherent in preserving the partnership are likely to urge their leaders to curbing this current deterioration in relations and prevent an irreparable divide.

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Dueling Speeches and Israeli-American Relations: The Storm before the Calm before the Storm?

Because two previous confrontations between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama had left both a bit bloodied and bowed, it is unlikely that either was seeking a third round during Netanyahu’s recent visit to the United States. Yet that is precisely what happened – largely because of a phrase that was both superfluous and misunderstood.

Since the outbreak of the anti-regime protests in Tunisia in late December 2010, and especially after the United States joined a French-led initiative to provide military support to the anti-Qaddafi opposition movement in Libya, Obama has come under growing criticism for pursuing a course that struck many as hesitant, inconsistent, and even contradictory. On May 19, Obama therefore delivered a speech at the State Department, 80 percent of which was devoted to an effort to provide more coherent framing and guidance for US policy on the "Arab spring." This address was described by some as Cairo II – a follow-up to Obama’s initiative almost immediately after taking office to engage more positively with the Muslim world. With Netanyahu literally on his way to the United States, Obama found it impossible not to make at least some reference to the principles underlying America’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a neuralgic issue in US-Muslim and especially US-Arab relations. The Palestinian threat to request United Nations recognition of Palestinian statehood at the General Assembly in September gave added urgency to this need. While the United States might well be prepared to oppose this initiative on its own, it would much prefer to preempt it by encouraging the restart of negotiations, or at least to mobilize a “moral majority” of like-minded states, especially in Europe, to stand against the automatic mathematical majority against Israel in the General Assembly.

Consequently, Obama reaffirmed the traditional essentials of American policy, including the commitment to Israeli security and the insistence that any resolution of the conflict could not be imposed but had to be negotiated between the parties. But he also tried to sharpen some terms of reference for negotiations in the hope that Israeli endorsement of his formulation would persuade some Europeans to vote against the expected draft resolution or, even more ambitiously, persuade the Palestinians to shelve their plan and return to the negotiating table. On the territorial question, the term of reference for negotiation that Obama proposed was: “The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps.”

There is no reason to suspect that, Obama, by invoking 1967, intended to provoke a firestorm of controversy and a clash with Netanyahu. This was a carefully crafted speech that accommodated most Israeli sensitivities: the reference to borders was located in a brief paragraph that stipulated “negotiations” or “negotiated” three times, the point of reference used was “1967 lines” rather than the tendentious and inaccurate term “1967 borders” to which most Israelis are allergic, and the coupling of this point of reference with mutually agreed swaps clearly implied that it was meant to be the starting point of negotiations rather than their outcome. Moreover, Obama could legitimately claim that this formulation was no more than a rephrasing of the US approach to the territorial issue stretching back at least to 1969, when Secretary of State William P. Rogers declared that recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, but that any change in the preexisting lines "should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security."

On the other hand, “1967” has such a highly charged symbolic value in the discourse about the conflict that Obama and his political advisers should have expected headline writers, pundits, and Israeli politicians to simplify and sensationalize his speech and focus on that one phrase to the exclusion of almost everything else – which they did. Moreover, the growth of settlement blocs in the intervening years has created a demographic reality that other US presidents, especially Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, acknowledged explicitly – which Obama did not do. Consequently, Netanyahu, perhaps caught off guard and concerned about a political backlash at home, did not reaffirm his own previous endorsement of a two-state solution or focus his attention on settlement blocs, but instead felt compelled to stress his refusal to do what he had not actually been asked to do: return to the 1967 lines. And Obama then felt compelled, three days later, to remove ambiguity and lower the flames of this controversy by telling the AIPAC Policy Conference that his term of reference had been misreported or misinterpreted and that what he meant was that the parties themselves will negotiate a border that is, by definition, "different than the one existing on June 4, 1967." On the same occasion, he reiterated that no vote at the United Nations would ever create an independent Palestinian state and that the US would continue to stand up against efforts to single Israel out at the UN or in any international forum.

What many breathless analysts described as a crisis in US-Israeli relations therefore turned out to be a tempest in a teapot, extinguished even before Netanyahu arrived at Capitol Hill on May 24 to address, for the second time in his life, a joint meeting of the Congress. Even before he stepped up to the dais, Netanyahu had already achieved the objective of ensuring that the United States would not stand with those that might vote in the General Assembly in favor of recognizing Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza, and his rapturous bipartisan reception on Capitol Hill probably serves as warrant against a reversal of American policy on this question.

However, that does not mean that what he said or didn't say in Congress was insignificant. For as he spoke, Obama was setting out on a five-day trip to Europe, where there is much more of what Obama delicately called "impatience" with the peace process and where the Middle East, including the question of what to do at the United Nations in September, would be the topic of intense discussion. It remains to be seen whether the words that Netanyahu used to conquer hearts and minds in Congress will also help Obama conquer hearts and mind in Europe. If they do, it means that Obama will also have achieved his main objective during the Netanyahu's visit. If they do not, the US-Israeli relationship will remain solidly entrenched, but the Obama-Netanyahu relationship may once again be reduced to what is sometimes euphemistically called a "frank and constructive" exchange of views.

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IDF Israel female soldiers נשים לוחמות.

Egypt–Israel–United States: Problems on the Horizon?

From Egypt's signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 to the recent mass demonstrations in Cairo’s

Tahrir Square

, there has never been a question as to Egypt’s commitment to the agreement. In spite of difficult tests over the years, including Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Baghdad (1981); the invasion of Lebanon and the IDF’s continued presence there (1982-2000); two intifadas; and various operations in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza, Egypt observed most of the articles in the military part of the treaty and helped lower the heat in the Arab discourse on subjects related to Israel, especially the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The exception to this general rule was Egypt’s position on the Israeli nuclear issue.

Public opinion polls conducted in Egypt since the start of the recent demonstrations have addressed the question of Egypt’s continued commitment to the peace treaty with Israel. In a telephone poll conducted among 615 respondents for the International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York, 46 percent of respondents stated that they would be "much more likely" to vote for a party that supports keeping the treaty with Israel, the Arab peace initiative, and the two-state solution. Another 17 percent said they would be "somewhat more likely" to prefer such a party. That is, 63 percent expressed willingness to support Egypt’s continued commitment to the treaty (even though it is impossible to tell from the poll whether the support is conditional, for example, on achieving a solution on the basis of two states for two peoples).[1]

Another poll conducted for the Pew Research Center in March-April 2011 among one thousand respondents presented more disturbing results.[2] Fifty-four percent of those polled stated that Egypt should cancel the agreement, while 36 percent replied that it should maintain it. Support for maintaining the treaty was greater among those with higher incomes and higher levels of education. (Since the IPI poll was conducted by telephone, the positive result is presumably misleading because of the greater weight given to those in possession of a telephone and capable of answering the questions without a face-to-face connection).

Along with other surveys, these two polls have pointed to former Foreign Minister and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa as the leading candidate in the Egyptian presidential elections. Moussa’s views on relations with Israel are important, as are the opinions of the current foreign minister, Nabil el-Araby. In a comprehensive interview with the German newspaper Der Spiegel on March 16, Moussa, responding to a question about his critical position towards Israel, stated, “Egypt fully supports the joint Arab position toward Israel. The Palestinians need their own, viable state, and Israel has to withdraw from the occupied territories. And as a very first step, the blockade of the Gaza Strip has to be lifted, immediately and in full.” As to whether he could have a discussion with Netanyahu, Moussa stated, “First of all, Netanyahu would have to show that he is interested in a just peace. That would reduce the tensions in the region.”[3]

In response to a question by Lally Weymouth of the Washington Post whether, if he became president of Egypt, he would keep the treaty with Israel, Amr Moussa replied: “The treaty is a treaty. For us, the treaty has been signed and it is for peace, but it depends also on the other side. If you asked me what kind of relations between the Arab world and Israel I would like, I would say that the Arab position – of which Egypt is a party – rests on the Arab initiative of 2002.”[4]

Current Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabli el-Araby, a seasoned diplomat who has a reasonable chance of keeping his position in a future Egyptian government, stated unequivocally (also in an interview to Lally Weymouth), “Egypt is going to comply with every agreement and abide by every treaty it has entered into. That is the goal of treaties…Once it is done and everything is signed, both sides abide and comply faithfully.”[5]

The responses from el-Araby, a professional lawyer who worked as a lawyer during most of his years in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, and the statements by Amr Moussa show that in spite of the results of the PEW poll, a sweeping Egyptian decision to cancel the peace treaty with Israel is not expected. It is clear to both Egypt and to its future leaders that this would cause severe damage to Egypt and to its economy. However, on at least two subjects, deterioration is likely if Moussa and el-Araby continue to play a central role in Egypt’s foreign policy after September 2011. These two subjects are the Palestinian issue and the nuclear issue.

It comes as no surprise that Amr Moussa, who until recently was the Arab League secretary general, speaks about the Arab initiative of 2002. For his part, El-Araby has made no secret of the fact that Egypt wholeheartedly supports a UN General Assembly decision to recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with territorial exchanges, according to the Clinton parameters of December 2000, and that Egypt is pressuring Europe to support such a decision.

The convergence in September 2011of elections in Egypt and the General Assembly discussion is likely to give rise to fiery statements from Egyptian presidential candidates. Israel has an interest in preserving the treaty with Egypt and therefore should refrain from hasty responses to the comments by the presidential candidates. These events may also become entangled in the issue of American aid to Egypt, and in this discussion too, Israel and its friends in Congress are liable to deliver hasty responses. The discussions in Congress about the 2012 budget will be most heated in September (the American fiscal year starts on 1 October). The administration’s desire to aid Egypt was clear already at the start of the uprising in Cairo. Secretary of State Clinton raised the issue in her meeting with the Republican Speaker of the House on February 14,[6] and four days later, Clinton announced aid totaling $150 million to address the economic problems that resulted from the demonstrations in Egypt.[7] In talks with President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu will likely and justifiably raise Israel's concern over changes in the Egyptian position, but it is important that his comments do not send any signals on the subject of American aid to Egypt. Against the backdrop of expected cuts in the overall American aid budget, there are a number of American legislators who would be happy to identify such signals, and therefore it is critical that Israel not involve itself in this discussion.

Indeed, Israel’s hasty decision in the wake of the agreement between Fatah and Hamas to stop the transfer of tax money collected for the Palestinian Authority provides a negative example of potential fallout. The European Union responded immediately with a decision to transfer monies to the Palestinian Authority, which as such damaged Israel's position.

Relations between Egypt and Hamas will presumably thaw, even if the Muslim Brotherhood does not play a role in the Egyptian government after September 2011. If the hopes expressed by the Washington Post editorial[8] – that Egypt will moderate Hamas positions – are realized, tension in the United States-Israeli-Egyptian triangle is likely to arise over disagreements regarding the extent to which Hamas has actually moderated its positions. Prime Minister Netanyahu should anchor this issue in the framework of the three Quartet conditions – recognition of Israel, acceptance of the agreements between Israel and the PLO, and renunciation of terrorism – and avoid reactions and chain reactions that will damage Israel's relations with Egypt in the post-Mubarak period.

This suggestion also applies to the Egyptian attempt to convene a  conference on a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East in 2012, as was decided in the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. It was Amr Moussa who turned the struggle against Israeli nuclearization into the flagship of Egyptian diplomacy. In the interview with Lally Weymouth, Amr Moussa says that “the nuclear issue in the Middle East means Israel and then Iran.” Nabil Fahmy, who served as Egypt’s ambassador to the United States between 1999 and 2008, reiterated his call to establish a nuclear free zone in the Middle East that will include Iran and Israel, with practical steps by Israel in this direction and a clear and defined timetable.[9] The United States indeed supported the decision last year, but it is doubtful that President Obama, whose high ranking officials – in spite of the American vote – repudiated the decision even then, will lend a hand, at the height of the US presidential election campaign and against the background of the developments in the Middle East, to a conference that will only add fuel to the regional fire. Thus it is preferable that Israel tackle this issue as well behind the scenes, and not be dragged into threats and drastic actions that will damage the delicate relations in the Israeli-Egyptian-United States triangle.

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1] http://www.ipacademy.org/images/pdfs/egypt-poll-results-april2011.pdf; Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703992704576305423166596598.html?KEYWORDS=poll+egypt.

[2] www.pewglobal.org.

[3] http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,750969-2,00.html.

[4] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/amr-moussas-vision-for-egypt/2011/05/09/AF36AxbG_story.html.

[5] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-foreign-minister-on-the-way-forward-after-mubarak/2011/05/05/AFRI3BCG_story.html.

[6] U.S. State Department announcement, February 14, 2011.

[7] See also Clinton’s comments at the Brookings Institution on April 12, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/04/160642.htm.

[8] Washington Post, May 11, 2011.

[9] Spring issue of the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=26.

The Death of Bin Laden and the Future of al-Qaeda.

Since the assassination of Osama bin Laden, experts in intelligence, academia, and the media have labored to understand the operation's practical implications, both short term and for the more distant future. Although the global jihad movement comprises various components, without a doubt the element that dominates and sets the tone is the al-Qaeda organization. In contrast to its affiliates, in recent years a great deal of information has been received on al-Qaeda, including authentic documents on the organization's structure, modes of operation, decision making, and daily operational and logistical routines. These can help shed light on how al-Qaeda stands to function in the face of its leader's removal, as familiarity with al-Qaeda's organized structure and formal code is imperative for understanding the recent operation's implications for the organization's future activity.

 

Figure 1. Al-Qaeda Organizational Structure

 

 

Contrary to the popular view, al-Qaeda is an organized body with a structured hierarchy and clear lines of management and control that have been preserved through its years of activity (figure 1). This fact greatly assisted al-Qaeda in its struggle to survive following the terror attack in the US and the war on terrorism declared in its wake. It has enabled the organization to recover rapidly and fill its ranks after each blow and continue to constitute the number one terror threat in the international arena. Alongside its hierarchal structure, the organization has a code of regulations and protocol that define the various authorities of its offices, methods of appointment, and the personal characteristics required of each official. In principle, the organization has operated for years via a command and advisory council known as the Majlis al-Shura. The council has functioned as a quasi government or cabinet (proportional to the structure of a terror organization) under which various committees have operated to oversee military, administrative, financial, religious, propaganda, political, and security matters. The committees functioned as ministries and were responsible for managing al-Qaeda's daily routine. Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were the senior figures of the command council.

 

One can anticipate developments in the organization on three levels: operational, organizational, and symbolic. On the operational level, the dominant force in al-Qaeda is the Special Operations Unit, which is subordinate to the Military Committee and responsible for executing al-Qaeda attacks in the international arena. Following the death of Bin Laden, the activity of this unit (reportedly headed by Adnan al- Shukrijumah, a.k.a. "Jafar the Pilot," due to his flight training) will likely not be affected, and the unit can be expected to continue to fulfill its original purpose. It is even likely to intensify its efforts to execute high profile attacks in the near future so as to prove that its capability was not harmed as a result of its leader's death. Naturally, revenge for his death is also a motivating factor.

 

Over the past year and a half this unit was responsible for attempting at least three thwarted attacks in the US, Britain, and Norway. In addition, amid the wealth of information recently publicized via WikiLeaks were documents related to the interrogation of the Military Committee's most senior activists. The documents reveal that al-Qaeda had prepared a concrete contingency plan for a dramatic attack in the US through the use of a nuclear bomb in the event Bin Laden would be caught or killed. According to this information, the bomb has been at the organization's disposal since 2004 and was placed in Europe, with vigorous efforts at that time to transfer it to the US. It is unclear whether this scenario is merely an effort by the organization's senior activists to deceive or deter the opposition or whether this information has some authentiucity. In any event, the conventional assessment is that if al-Qaeda indeed possessed such a weapon, it would have already used it, or at the very least, publicly threatened to use it in certain scenarios.

 

As to organizational function, it appears that the effect of Bin Laden's assassination will be relatively minimal due al-Qaeda's structured hierarchy and clear division of functions. The code of regulations explicitly states that the deputy leader shall immediately replace the leader should he be apprehended or killed; this means the rapid appointment of Ayman al-Zawahiri as Bin Laden's replacement to prevent the disruption of continuous control over the organization and allow al-Qaeda to continue to manage its routine activity. It seems that the more burning question is who will be appointed as the new leader's deputy. The question is relevant mainly since the US and its allies also seek to remove Zawahiri himself. Among al-Qaeda's veteran activists are a number of leading candidates for the position of deputy. The most senior of them is Saif al-Adel who in recent years stayed in Iran and in the past year returned to the organization's ranks in Pakistan along with Bin Laden's son and protégé, Saad.

 

It is on a symbolic level, however, that the assassination of Bin Laden is likely to be extremely effective. The previous failure of the Americans to trap or kill him was a key element in al-Qaeda's propaganda and its efforts to persuade new activists to join the organization, promoting the belief that the path to victory was assured by God. The information campaign of al-Qaeda propagandists more than once ascended into the mystical realm – similar to the organization's battle lore in the days of the war against the Russians in Afghanistan, which featured a sequence of miraculous actions. Thus the survival of Bin Laden in the face of a world manhunt was perceived as belonging to the supernatural. Activists in the organization attributed singular qualities to Bin Laden similar to those of the prophet Mohammad and thus believed he could not be captured. Therefore, the physical extermination of Bin Laden and his exposure in captured video footage as a solitary old man – without the makeup and background scenery that bestowed him in a resplendent and messianic aura in the eyes of his followers – is telling. It is likely to return the dimensions of the conflict, in al-Qaeda's version between the decadent and collapsing West and the insurgent global jihad camp, to the solid ground of reality. In this way, perhaps, it will be possible to neutralize the vibrancy and influence of al-Qaeda's messianic and murderous ideology on its supporters. If Bin Laden's removal is indeed exploited to expose the distorted face of his doctrine, it will be possible to view this as the beginning of the end of the global jihad movement – or at the very least, the waning of its influence on the young people of the Muslim world.

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Initial Thoughts upon the Assassination of Bin Laden.

FBI Most Wanted: The FBI has updated its Most Wanted

list to reflect Monday's attack and killing of Osama bin Laden.

Previously, bin Laden was the FBI's most wanted terrorist.

The news that the most wanted terrorist in the world, certainly in the last decade – a title that Bin Laden himself said he was proud to bear – was eliminated prompts an initial sigh of relief and perhaps even a sense of satisfaction that a person who was directly responsible for the deliberate murder of thousands of innocent people has finally met his due. Still, even at this early stage it is appropriate to consider some issues the assassination raises: its effect on future al-Qaeda activities, the response we may expect from Bin Laden’s operatives and associates in the global jihad movement, the future of the global war on terrorism, and even moral questions about the use of targeted assassination as a tool in that war.

In order to examine the possible effects of Bin Laden’s elimination, it is necessary first to understand his importance to al-Qaeda. Bin Laden was the organization's undisputed leader and sole arbiter, though this does not mean that organization members never questioned his decisions, including the decision to carry out the 9/11 attacks. Bin Laden built and ran al-Qaeda according to his own approach, backed by an extreme Salafist ideology that purported to represent the purest version of Islam, in the spirit of the prophet Mohammad. At times he was personally involved in organizing al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. His involvement in running the organization continued through the first years after 9/11, as was made clear by recently published Wikileaks documents. However, in recent years, the hypothesis was that because of the intense hunt for Bin Laden and the stepped-up activities of the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which put him at risk, Bin Laden reduced his practical involvement in the organization, stopped commanding it, and turned into its symbolic figurehead. In addition, items were published to the effect that Bin Laden was very ill; some of them even stated that he was dead. With his death it may be possible to learn more about his whereabouts and doings in the last few years – either from information that al-Qaeda may release, as the organization makes a habit of glorifying the exploits of its senior personnel after their death, or from American sources that apparently had detailed information about Bin Laden’s doings in recent months and likely acquired more information from what was seized in the raid on his compound.

The fact that almost a decade passed from when Bin Laden became a wanted man until the Americans managed to locate and eliminate him has given rise to scathing criticism for what has been called an intelligence and operational failure. This was joined by expressions of incredulity about the ineffectiveness of those in the United States charged with prosecuting the war on terrorism. Indeed, in the past there were statements to the effect that more than once Bin Laden’s hiding place had been identified but that he always managed to escape at the last minute thanks to loyal helpers, perhaps even with the assistance of interested intelligence agencies, and his own good luck.

Without a doubt too much time passed until Bin Laden met his due punishment. Still, in the war against terrorism extended time is usually needed to capture and punish wanted high profile arch-terrorists, such as Hizbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh (25 years), Wadiya Hadad of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (10 years), and Carlos "the Jackal" (some 20 years). Operations to capture or kill wanted personalities, certainly senior level figures who have taken great pains in their hiding and are well guarded, are not what are depicted in Hollywood movies. They require Sisyphean groundwork based on human intelligence ("humint") and signal intelligence ("signit") combined with singular operational capabilities of elite units, and often entail decisions with high political significance and risk. In recent years, the United States has exhibited very high intelligence gathering and operational capabilities, leading to the elimination or apprehension of many al-Qaeda operatives, especially in the Af-Pak arena. There is no doubt that although belated, the successful elimination of Bin Laden demonstrated impressive capabilities and determination, the fruit of longstanding efforts to find the man responsible for the largest terrorist attack in history.

However, it is almost certain that in the short term the elimination of the organization’s leader, despite the symbolic and perhaps even operational significance, will not spell an end to al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities. Although it has sustained severe blows, al-Qaeda for more than two decades has shown itself to be an orderly bureaucratic hierarchy with excellent survival skills, capable of filling the void left by senior commanders and operatives who were killed or apprehended. Moreover, the desire for vengeance and the clear need to prove that despite the blow al-Qaeda maintains organizational morale and assault capabilities are likely to lead to more high profile spectacular attacks. This may come from al-Qaeda itself, joined by its close allies bearing the al-Qaeda brand name in Hijaz, in the Maghreb, and in Iraq, and from more distant organizations allied with global jihad, or even from enterprising individuals known as “lone wolves” who have already proven their ability to act in the United States and Europe.

The question of the cost effectiveness of eliminating terrorist leaders and the risk this entails, as well as the question of this type of operation's legitimacy in the context of the war against terrorism, are also expected to be debated in public, especially in light of the probability of further terrorist attacks and the ensuing bloodshed of innocent civilians. Even if at the moment it is impossible to state definitively what the profit-loss balance of the operation in Pakistan will ultimately be like, it is thus far enjoying support and sympathy from politicians in the West and in some Arab states. For it to be of strategic significance, however, the United States and its allies must continue their sequence of similar operations to apprehend or eliminate senior al-Qaeda operatives; only further similar operations can constitute a lethal blow to the organization and cause its eventual complete paralysis.

In a frontal confrontation like the one taking place against an ideological, zealous, and radical organization such as al-Qaeda, there is no limit to the escalation and destruction within its desire and capability. Thus, the war against it is to the death and there is no telling how long it may take. As for the legitimacy of assassinating Bin Laden, it seems that the vast majority of world leaders and global public opinion, including in many Muslim countries, share the consensus that it was justified, though in the past targeted assassination as a necessary tool in the war against terrorism lacked such sweeping support. Apparently the resentment of the indiscriminate murderousness of Bin Laden and his henchmen and the fear of the organization's continued existence pushed aside, if only temporarily, the rigid moral considerations whereby nations that engage in targeted killings, like Israel, are judged. Either way, the debate on these issues is likely to flare up anew if and when the West must deal with the price of the revenge anticipated from Bin Laden’s operatives and supporters.

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