Israel and its Strategic Environment: Opportunities for Political Initiative

Although the upheavals gripping the Arab world are not directly related to Israel or its ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, they intensify existing crises between Israel and the Arab and Muslim worlds. In turn, the deterioration in relations between Israel and the Palestinians as a result of the deadlocked negotiations and the Palestinians’ statehood bid to the UN are liable to further aggravate Israel’s situation with regard to its Middle East environment. Israel’s response to this situation has for the most part been passive and defensive, and there has been no attempt to identify opportunities for proactive policies that could have a positive impact on Israel’s position.

Such opportunities, however, do in fact exist, and Israel should attempt to maximize them. This essay examines the likely regional reality following the Palestinians’ move in the UN in the context of opportunities for an Israeli political initiative in the Palestinian, Egyptian, Turkish, and Saudi arenas.

The Palestinians’ appeal to the international forum has created a new dynamic. According to a reasonable scenario, after the Palestinian request is turned down by the Security Council – whether because it has no majority or because of an American veto – a proposed resolution to grant the Palestinian state observer status in the UN will be presented to the General Assembly, where it will pass with a large majority. Such a resolution would allow the Palestinian state to join other international organizations and treaties. For example, joining the International Court of Justice would allow the Palestinian state to file claims against Israel for its behavior in the territories and file suits against politicians and military personnel for bearing personal responsibility for war crimes and violations of international law. Developments of this sort would expand what in Israel is seen as delegitimization of the state, and overall, the resolution, against the background of crises with Turkey and Egypt and the tension with Jordan, will increase Israel’s isolation and the political pressure leveled against it.

There is a serious risk in the convergence of the deadlocked negotiations with the Palestinians, the bid in the UN, and the Arab spring. The day after the drama in the UN the Palestinian public along with the public in other Arab nations will understand that nothing on the ground has in fact changed and that reality in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continues as before. Thereafter the question arises, what then? How does one realize the idea of a Palestinian state that has been recognized by the UN? The Arab spring suggests that these aims are achievable via massive peaceful demonstrations. However, in the reality in the territories, where two hostile camps are pitted against one another, it is difficult to imagine that demonstrations would remain peaceful over time. The Jewish residents of the West Bank and the security forces guarding them will view oncoming demonstrators as a real threat, and it would be difficult to control ensuing demonstrations with anti-riot measures. The likely result is demonstrators being fired upon and a return thereby to the cycle of violence. Thus the concern is not of the decision by one side or another to provoke violence, rather a loss of control of the situation by the respective sides and the consequent slide into violence. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of such violent outbursts on the Arabs and Muslims, whose influence over governments has grown, and on Israel’s image in the West, given its increasing isolation.

Thus it will become clear that the situation remains what it was, yet Israel will face a Palestinian state recognized by the UN. Herein lies an opportunity to propose to the Palestinian side to engage in dialogue about the meaning of their new status and what is required for Israel to recognize it and make it a reality. Such a dialogue would constitute the renewal of the negotiations in a somewhat different manner. In certain ways, Israel would be in a better position because it is more convenient for a state to conduct negotiations with another state rather than with an organization. In other ways, Israel’s position would be less convenient because the Palestinians would be entering negotiations with wide international support (though there is little new about that). Yet in any event, Israel must suppress any notion of punishing the Palestinians by stopping to transfer the funds it collects for them or by annexing the settlement blocs. Such actions would only exacerbate the crisis and make a difficult political situation worse given the anticipated international response. The expected damage to the Palestinian Authority’s stability would also have a devastating effect on Israeli interests.

Despite its problematic internal situation, Egypt is seeking to reposition itself as a central player in regional foreign policy, both because of the effect this would have on domestic public opinion and because it would symbolize a break with the Mubarak era, when Egypt was seen as a state that had lost its standing as leader of the Arab world. Today there is also greater willingness on the part of Arab publics to let Egypt play the leading role, evidenced in Egypt’s successful mediation between Fatah and Hamas. All the while, public opinion in Egypt is greatly affected by developments in the Palestinian arena. Israel can take advantage of this situation in order to coordinate moves quietly in the Israeli-Palestinian arena with Egypt. At the same time, the shared interest in restoring law and order to the Sinai Peninsula represents an opportunity to establish a strategic dialogue that would focus on the changes that are required in the military appendix to the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement.

The bridges between Israel and Turkey have seemingly been burned, and common wisdom in Israel argues this is a result of Ankara's decision to turn its back on Europe and focus instead on the Middle East and expand Turkey’s influence in the region. While there has indeed been a fundamental change in Turkey’s foreign relations, Erdoğan’s government initially tried to effect this change together with Israel – not against it – by positioning Turkey as an arbitrator and mediator between Israel and various Arab elements. The assumption that Turkey decided to adopt an anti-Israel policy without regard for Israel’s conduct is highly questionable. Should Israel manage to find a solution to Turkey’s demands for an apology, there would be a range of opportunities to improve relations with Turkey through Israeli willingness to cooperate with Turkey desire to fulfill some key roles. Such steps are of great importance to Turkey, especially now as its “zero problems with neighbors” policy is collapsing vis-à-vis the Syrians, the Kurds, Cyprus, Greece, and Armenia. For example, it could be possible to enter into negotiations with Turkey about letting some boats sail to Gaza after a thorough security check in which the Turks would play a role in cooperation with Israel.

For its part, Saudi Arabia is very concerned by developments in the Arab world and by Iran’s ability both to exploit the situation and promote its nuclear program. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has adopted a more assertive policy. On the face of it, there seems to be a foundation for extensive cooperation and strategic understandings between Israel and Saudi Arabia, but there is a limited possibility of realizing such intentions as long as the conflict between Israel and the Arab world, and especially the Palestinians, escalates. Israel has the ability to change this reality, first by adopting the Saudi-formulated Arab Peace Initiative as a foundation for negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, using the language of Prince Turki Bin Faisal's recent article, and also by extending an opportunity for the renewal of negotiations with the Palestinians. The repercussions of such actions would not be limited to the Saudi arena but would also be the foundation for an Israeli initiative that could have regional implications as well.

It is doubtful if the current passive Israeli policy, with regard both to developments in the region and to relations with the Palestinians, serves Israel’s best interests. In any event, internal considerations (such as preserving the coalition) should not dictate the need to adopt a policy that is essentially reactive. Rather, Israel must take advantage of the windows of opportunity created by regional developments without compromising its security interests.

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The Arab Spring and Russian Policy in the Middle East

In what perhaps can be heralded as a turning point in Russia's Middle East policy, seemingly coordinated statements have recently been sounded in important settings and the media by senior Russian figures (leading experts on the Middle East, politicians, and even the president himself). These statements have included criticism of the revolutionary process underway in the Middle East, portrayed as fundamentally negative and rife with risks for both regional and global stability. According to these pronouncements, the Arab spring gradually evolved into an Islamic summer by paving the way for the rise to power of forces from the radical Islamic camp in an essentially irreversible process.

In the view of these figures, while these unforeseen revolutions were jumpstarted among the younger generation by socioeconomic reasons and demands for political freedom, the younger generation does not have the power to maintain the revolutions’ achievements. The reins of government will be assumed by organized systems that joined the opposition to existing regimes, including many Islamic elements that are already poised to take advantage of the situation and are soon expected to reach influential positions in the respective countries. According to the Russians, democracy does not stand a chance in Middle Eastern countries, characterized as they are by archaic societies. Future regimes can be expected to be anti-democratic and primarily Islamic in nature. Thus, these figures predict doom and gloom for most of the region’s states, and the process underway is one that in their opinion cannot be stopped. There is a wistful longing for the previous regimes, as corrupt and authoritarian as they were, particularly for their stability and anti-Islamic stances. Likely future regimes will at best follow the Turkish model, or in a worst case scenario, the Iranian.

According to the Russians, this reality has dire consequences for regional and even global orders. The situation is likely to be influenced by the negative changes in Turkey, portrayed as striving relentlessly to reconstruct the Ottoman Empire, and the Iranian nuclear program, which apparently cannot be stopped and may be expected to be complete in 2-3 years. This has serious implications for international stability, especially since additional nations in the region will work to attain nuclear power. In turn the international arms control regime is likely to collapse – a potential development that incurs major ramifications. In such a reality, the Islamic forces likely to assume power will not be partners to a dialogue with the international community, rather will strive to realize their own geopolitical ambitions.

In this context the international system emerges as inefficient, if not impotent. International organizations such as the UN and NATO have failed to confront the evolving risk and therefore enjoy less importance. The United States is portrayed as losing its influence both in the Middle East and in the international arena. Europe too is retreating under Islamic attack, and sooner or later Islam will overpower it from within. With the West declining both in the Middle East and in the world at large, Islam is set to prevail over the West.

This new apocalyptic Russian scenario is surprising, given that until recently Russia appeared as a friend and defender of the nations of the Middle East, including those with Islamic regimes, and various radical organizations (including, for example, members of the axis of evil). Russia has displayed evident support for the collapsing regimes of the Middle East and has labored to preserve the status quo, including its attempt to impede Western involvement in Libya and even more so in Syria. In addition, it enjoys positive relations with Turkey and special relations with Iran. Its warm relations with the Palestinians include support in the United Nations and support for Hamas.

At the same time, already from the start of the revolutionary process in the Middle East, Russia has, in its ambivalent way, worked to establish cooperation with the new regimes and elements of the opposition, by laying the groundwork for relations with what will likely be the region's future regimes. For example, alongside sweeping support for Asad's regime, Moscow hosted a delegation of the Syrian opposition.

Although one mustn’t dismiss the possibility that the pessimistic assessment is an accurate reflection of prevalent opinion among Russia’s political echelon, the notion that the statements reflect a coherent policy program should also be questioned. Indeed, it seems that in Russia there is no unanimity of opinion regarding Middle East policy. One can cite the dispute of some months ago, which spilled over into the media, between Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin (an unusual event in and of itself) regarding sanctions against Libya – an  example of differences of opinion on the question of Russia’s foreign policy. Therefore, the picture presented above may reflect a rift in the Russian establishment and is not the result of a national assessment that obligates specific operational conclusions, and is rather supported by only some of the elements within the establishment or elements with a political axe to grind. A different explanation is also possible, whereby we are witnessing the making of a new reality, and the picture broadcast by the Russian spokespeople reflects true concern that Russian interests in the region might be damaged.

Overall, then, the situation assessment presented raises the following question: given the complex reality emerging in the Middle East, is Russia really harboring a sense of reduced prospects for rebuilding itself as a superpower with influence in the region?

It seems that the opposite is the case. In place of the foothold it is losing in the Middle East, Russia is working to consolidate a new camp of supporters. The road to that end goes through anti-Western rhetoric; all of Russia’s new visions and perspectives presented above amount to little more than a challenge to the West. By way of an apocalyptic scenario unfolding in the Middle East, the West is portrayed as the entity that failed to curb the Islamic threat because of its botched regional policy and its current weakening on the international scene. If so, the theory holds, it is time to allow the one remaining “responsible adult,” i.e., Russia, to handle the attempt to stabilize the region.

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Never Forget - - - 09-11-2001 -- 09-11-2011

CHRONOLOGY OF ATTACKS OF Sept. 11, 2001

 8:55 am: The first plane, a Boeing 767 of American Airlines, hit the north tower of the WTC.

 9.16 am: Another plane, a Boeing 737 of the same company, hit the south tower of the WTC.

 9.30 am: President Bush said on TV, in Florida, "there is a terrorist attack against America." Then he embarked on Air Force One.

 9.40 am: A third hijacked airliner, United Airlines, it hits the Pentagon, in Washington. Evacuated the White House, the Capitol, the Treasury.

 9.45 am: The Abu Dhabi TV is about a Palestinian claim of the attack. Immediately denied.

 10.00 am: Collapse of the south tower of the WTC crash, a huge cloud of dust and smoke covering the whole southern part of Manhattan.

 10.05 am: It crashed in Pennsylvania, uninhabited area, a fourth hijacked airliner, American Airlines. According to rumors, was directed to hit Camp David.

 10.27 am: the second tower collapses of the WTC, and drag with him a third building. Total chaos in New York.

 10:37 am: wing of the Pentagon collapses, there is talk of a second explosion in the immediate vicinity.

 10.55 am: Conviction of Arafat. Rumors about other hijacked aircraft in flight on the U.S..

Victims list

NEVER FORGET...

September 11, 2001
-
September 11, 2011

We shall never forget
We shall keep this day,
We shall keep the events and the tears
In our minds, our memory and our hearts
and take them with us as we carry on.


Dr. Roberto Polastro

NATO Requests Cyber Security Cooperation From India

In the absence of international cyber crimes treaty and international cyber security treaty, the next best thing is to have mutual cooperation between various countries. However, nothing can benefit more than an international cyber security cooperation that is urgently required.

In the absence of international harmonisation, the concept like cyber warfare still haunts the international community. This is also the main reason for blame game for various cyber attacks. However, mere suspicion or blame without actual authorship attribution for cyber attacks can produce only insignificantly beneficial results.

Recently India and US had signed a cyber security cooperation agreement. Now North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has sought stronger cooperation with India to counter growing cyber threats, particularly emanating from China. Top NATO officials listed cyber security very high on the list of possible areas of cooperation, which included counter-terrorism, missile defence and anti-piracy operations.

"The cyber world does not recognise alignments. It only understands switches," said a top NATO official during a briefing to visiting Indian journalists, while making a strong pitch for joint efforts to combat cyber threats.

The NATO official made this remark in context of India's sensitivity against military alliances and its commitment to non-alignment. He suggested this could be a functional alignment in which both sides could give and take.

"India has an advanced cyber and IT industry and is very strong in cyber issues", he said, hinting that India and NATO can cooperate in this field. Democracies face challenges that are common. As democracies we can have a dialogue, as we deal with issues differently... We need to work together, because individually we cannot. It is better to deal with such issues commonly than deal with them individually."

He added that even though the threats were different, the nature of our responses could be similar, while seeing India as a strong partner with NATO on various issues. Though he did not mention any of India's neighbours from where the cyber attack challenge came, he hinted at China from where such threats had come in the recent past.

Seeking a partnership on matters relating to cyber security, the official pointed out that India and NATO had already reached at a tactical level understanding in dealing with piracy and shared a strategic level understanding in countering terrorism. Incidentally, in July this year some anonymous hackers had targeted NATO in a cyber attack and it decided recently to create a special task force to detect and respond to such attacks by beefing up its cyber defence network. While the United States has already signed a cyber security collaboration with India this July, the 28-nation political and military alliance is of the view that it can collaborate with it in protecting its cyber systems. NATO's 2010 Summit in Lisbon also recognised the growing threat of cyber attacks and sought to ally with partner nations to step its cyber security.

Saturday, September 10, 2011

Holder, Napolitano, Clapper: We're safer post-9/11

The following Op-Ed by Attorney General Holder, Secretary Napolitano and Director of National Intelligence Clapper, was published on the website of USA Today on Thursday, September 8, 2011

Holder, Napolitano, Clapper: We're safer post-9/11

By Eric Holder, Janet Napolitano and James Clapper

Thursday, September 8, 2011 - USA Today

All of us who are old enough remember exactly where we were on September 11, 2001, at the moment we first learned that terrorists had taken control of commercial jetliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center in Manhattan, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pa.

On that day, our lives, our country, and our world fundamentally changed.

Today, a decade later, we remember the loss of the nearly 3,000 innocent victims of the attacks, honor the firefighters, police, and many other first responders, who showed such courage and conviction on that tragic day, and take stock of the fundamental changes that have reshaped our country and improved security for all Americans. While there are no guarantees — and there never will be — we have accomplished much to minimize the risk that a successful terror attack like 9/11 will ever occur on American soil.

Ten years ago, our intelligence and law enforcement communities were aware of potential threats to the homeland from terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, but we lacked the focus necessary to anticipate and prevent the attack. Sharing essential information to confront this threat was impeded by long-standing cultural, legal and institutional barriers, stove-piped government organizations, and a lack of coordination and cooperation.

In the decade since 9/11, an unprecedented international partnership has emerged. Together, the United States and our allies have captured or killed most of those responsible for the events of 9/11; we continue to pursue those who remain at large; and the organization that orchestrated these attacks, while still a serious threat, has been significantly weakened.

Today, we are working together as never before to share information, tactics, and training to fight terrorists and prevent them from putting their plans into practice, while affirming our support for security, prosperity and universal rights around the globe. We owe a great debt to our men and women in uniform who are working tirelessly and effectively in many places around the world to protect us from harm.

At home, we have made equally important strides to build the capacity to protect our country and the American people in an age of rapidly evolving threats, and we have made critical enhancements to our nation's counterterrorism capabilities.

New federal agencies like the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center, and a robust information-sharing environment, have strengthened analysis, improved terrorist watch lists and databases, and created a "need to share" culture, leading to enhanced coordination, tools, and capabilities. Indeed, the entire Intelligence Community is producing better intelligence than at any time in history.

In 2009 and 2010, as a result of investigations by the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, more defendants were charged in federal court with the most serious terrorism violations than in any two-year period in our history. And the Department of Homeland Security, created in 2003 as part of the largest reorganization of the federal government since the start of the Cold War, is working daily with its federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners to enhance the security of communities across the country. One recent study found that between 1999 and 2009, 86 terrorist plots against Americans have been foiled.

Our nation has continued to strengthen and expand information sharing, intelligence, and public awareness efforts since 9/11. We have supported the creation of 72 state and local fusion centers, where information about threats can be gathered, analyzed, and shared among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners. We have expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) around the country from 35 to 104 and increased the number of JTTF personnel from roughly 1,000 to nearly 4,500. In addition, the Justice Department has implemented a series of far-reaching legal, structural and cultural changes over the past decade, including the creation of the Department's National Security Division and the FBI's National Security Branch, to more effectively combat national security threats through intelligence.

We have established a new Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which trains law enforcement across our country to recognize behaviors and indicators related to terrorism-related crime. It also standardizes how those observations are documented, analyzed and shared.

We have worked to engage the broadest possible set of partners in security by expanding the "If You See Something, Say Something™" campaign, a nationwide effort originally implemented by New York City's Metropolitan Transportation Authority, to increase public awareness and the reporting of suspicious activity to the authorities.

In short, we have created a much stronger framework for managing threats to our nation. The capabilities that we have today are far greater than what existed 10 years ago, and they have helped us thwart numerous terrorist plots, from the attempt to bomb New York City subways to the foiled attacks against air cargo, Times Square, and a parade in Seattle. And these capabilities continue to contribute to the security of the American people every day.

Make no mistake: Our nation is stronger and more secure than it was on 9/11, better prepared to confront the challenges we face, and more resilient than ever before. But despite these improvements, we do not have the luxury to rest on our laurels. There are still terrorist groups around the world who wish us ill, and are plotting attacks against us.

Our success in confronting these threats in the future will depend on those who work on the frontlines, day and night, at home and abroad, to keep us safe. As important, it will depend on the American people and our collective determination to stand firm against threats, united in our resolve, free from fear, and resilient should we be attacked again.

Eric Holder is the U.S. Attorney General. Janet Napolitano is the Secretary of Homeland Security. James Clapper is the Director of National Intelligence.