Pakistan's Fazlullah re-emerges as a security threat

(Reuters) - Shortly after sneaking across the Afghan border this week, more than 100 militants loyal to Pakistani Taliban leader Fazlullah waited patiently on a mountain for Pakistani troops to approach.



By Michael Georgy and Jibran Ahmad

ISLAMABAD/PESHAWAR



Several days later, the fighters released a video of what they said were the heads of 17 ambushed soldiers, along with their identification cards.

Laid across a white sheet, they were a chilling reminder of the major security threat the man once known as FM Mullah still poses to U.S. ally Pakistan, three years after the army pushed him out of the Swat Valley, a former tourist spot he terrorised.

"He is a very big problem for Pakistan," said a Western diplomat.

During his heyday, Fazlullah, who like many senior Taliban members is known as a mullah, or preacher, organised thousands of fighters who roamed picturesque Swat, imposing his radical version of Islam.

Opponents, and those deemed immoral, were publicly flogged, or even beheaded and hung in squares and at intersections. Girls' schools and government buildings were burned down.

Nowadays, Fazlullah's men control a 20-km (12-mile) stretch of the rugged and largely unpatrolled border with Pakistan from areas in Afghanistan's forbidding Nuristan province, described by nearby U.S. troops as "the dark side of the moon".

From there, Fazlullah, a burly man in his thirties with a heavy black beard, plots cross-border raids that don't kill many soldiers but agitate Pakistan's military, which thought it had defeated him during a Swat offensive in 2009.

His activities in the border area, described by U.S. President Barack Obama as the world's most dangerous place, could complicate efforts to stabilise the region before most foreign combat troops leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

BIG AMBITIONS

Fazlullah is a distraction for Pakistan's military, which is also fighting Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistan Taliban umbrella group blamed for many of the suicide bombings across the South Asian country.

Sirajuddin Ahmad, Fazlullah's spokesman and cousin, said the group's aim was to recapture Swat, and take control of Pakistan.

"The establishment of sharia (Islamic law) is our goal, and we will not rest until we achieve it. We will fight whoever stands in our way," he told Reuters by telephone from an undisclosed location in Afghanistan.

Fazlullah has slowly rebuilt his militia by securing shelter and support from Afghan militants in an area where groups form loose alliances against the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"He is extremely dangerous," said a Pakistani security official. "Fazlullah has 150 men, rocket-propelled grenades and light machine guns. You just need a small amount of men to carry out effective operations. This is a big number."

Fazlullah, once known for fiery radio sermons, was the first Taliban leader that took control of an area in Pakistan outside the unruly ethnic Pashtun tribal belt along the Afghan border.

There are no signs that he will be able to penetrate deep inside towns or cities. His men usually arrive in a big wave, attack and retreat back into Afghanistan.

But his operations have prompted Pakistan's military - one of the world's largest - to repeatedly urge the Afghan government and NATO forces to go after the militant leader.

On Monday, Pakistan protested to NATO and the Afghan military, accusing them of failing to act against militant havens in Afghanistan after the cross-border attack in which the Pakistani soldiers were killed.

Nuristan police chief Ghulamullah Nooristani says there are no signs that anyone intends to eliminate Fazlullah, even though he was creating havoc for people there, charging illegal taxes, stealing supplies from trucks and sometimes killing drivers.

"We can't attack them because they are armed with light and heavy weapons which are much better than ours," he said. "If we get support from the central government or coalition forces we will be able to destroy their strongholds."

Fazlullah's fighters usually slip across the border into Pakistan at night and take positions on high ground.

"We have patrols and vehicles moving in the area to guard the border, so they wait and try to ambush them," said a Pakistani intelligence official.

Intelligence officials say Fazlullah's men operate in the Afghan provinces of Nuristan and Kunar, and enjoy the support of hundreds of militants there.

Support goes both ways when it comes to fighting the U.S.-backed governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Some militants have long-standing bonds.

"Many of us know each other from before, as we studied in the same madrassas (religious seminaries)," said a commander of a militant group in Kunar.

"When we need to conduct an operation in Afghanistan, we request help and they give us fighters. When they need to conduct an operation, we provide them with assistance as well."

Few experts expect Fazlullah to make the kind of gains he seems determined to achieve. But he is making a big impact.

"Their aim is to carry out these cross-border attacks which don't just take a toll in terms of casualties, but also have a psychological impact," said Mansur Mehsud, a director at the FATA Research Centre, an independent think tank in Islamabad.

"They reinforce the fear of the Taliban in the local population there. The people that help the government and the army would be very worried because of this, fearing revenge."

Font: (Additional reporting by Saud Mehsud in DERA ISMAIL KHAN, and Rob Taylor and Mirwais Harooni in KABUL; Editing by Robert Birsel)

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File

Top Secret CIA Documents on Osama bin Laden Declassified

More than 120 CIA documents related to 9/11, Osama bin Laden, and U.S. counterterrorism operations have been declassified and released to the National Security Archive (NSA). The NSA said the documents were released as a result of  "a series of FOIA requests by National Security Archive staff based on a painstaking review of references in the 9/11 Commission Report."

The documents include new details about al-Qaeda's plot against the U.S., as well as CIA attempts to counter the rising terrorist threat. Other information includes early attempts to apprehend bin Laden, the beginning of the U.S. Predator UAV program in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and al-Qaeda's ties to Pakistan before 9/11. Like the 9/11 Commission Report, the collection also details repeated CIA warnings of the bin Laden terrorist threat prior to 9/11.

The NSA outlines and catalogues several highlights of what it is calling the "CIA 9/11 Document Collection:"

■The 1998 Raw Intelligence Report on UBL's Plans to Hijack an Airplane that Became an Item in the December 4, 1998 President's Daily Brief

■Internal CIA E-mails on Osama bin Laden

■Two Definitive CIA Reports on the September 11, 2001 Attacks

■A Series of CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs (SEIBS) from June-September 2001 Warning of "Imminent" Al-Qaeda Attacks

■Detailed Reports on Al-Qaeda Organization

■Bin Laden's Attempts to Acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction

■A Positive CIA Assessment of CIA Counterterrorism Capabilities in August 2001

The NSA posting, highlights, and full collection of the documents can be accessed here.

India Developing Unmanned Stealth Bomber 'IUSAV'

India has been secretly developing its own unmanned stealth bomber which is officially designated as the Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (IUSAV).

India has been secretly developing its own unmanned stealth bomber which is officially designated as the Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (IUSAV).

Development of IUSAV would give India an entry to an exclusive club of countries which are engaged in building unmanned stealth bomber aircraft. The Indian IUSAV will be highly intelligent, autonomous and built to kill.

This stealth bomber is being designed to fly discreetly over enemy territory, pick up high value targets and unleash hell from above. The futuristic stealth bomber draws inspiration from the American B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. Such similar projects are currently being pursued in the United States and Europe. A specialised Indian team at aerospace laboratories across the country, led by a secret core team in Bangalore is heading the IUSAV project.

The government of India has officially acknowledged the IUSAV project but has been silent about its details as it is not only ambitious but also more controversial than anything that India has ever attempted.

The scientists building the bomber plan to begin flight tests in three years and hope to deliver a fully operational platform by 2020.

The IUSAV would be controlled from a remote station by a ground crew just like any other UAV. The bombers most potent weapon would be it's inherent invisibility to enemy radar.

Its unique shape will be built using radar absorbent materials and paint, that would contribute to low visibility and stealth. The bomber will be able to fly deep into enemy airspace and back without being detected. The bomber would be armed with precision guided munitions that would be deployed to destroy locked targets.

The IUSAV project might be phenomenally complex, but its mission profile is fairly straightforward. In a war time scenario the IUSAV would be expected to conduct bombing runs into any part of Pakistan and China and fly back to Indian soil without a scratch.

The IUSAV is currently only a concept. Similar aircrafts like the European Neuron and Boeing Phantom Ray are already in flight test. China too is known to have two parallel stealth bomber projects on.

The only operational flying wing bomber in the world today is the iconic American B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. The aircraft has been used to devastate Iraq, Afghanistan and the Bosnia during wars.

There's every hope now that the Indian aerospace establishment has not aimed too high with the IUSAV and would deliver on time.

Pentagon Lists 110 Potential Drone Bases in U.S.

The Department of Defense has identified 110 sites in the United States that could serve as bases for military unmanned aerial systems (UAS), or drones.  A new report to Congress lists each of the 110 sites “and the UAS likely to fly at that location.”  See “Report to Congress on Future Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training, Operations, and Sustainability,” Department of Defense, April 2012 (pp. 9-12).

The newly disclosed DoD report was first reported by InsideDefense.com.

The actual or potential drone bases are located in 39 of the 50 states, from Fort McClellan in Alabama to Camp Guernsey in Wyoming, as well as Guam and Puerto Rico.

Currently, the DoD and the military have “88 active certificates of authorization (COAs) at various locations around the country” that permit them to fly UASs outside of restricted military zones, the report to Congress said.  COAs are issued by the Federal Aviation Administration.

But “The rapid increase in fielded UAS has created a strong demand for access within the NAS [National Airspace System] and international airspace. The demand for airspace to test new systems and train UAS operators has quickly exceeded the current airspace available for these activities,” the report said.
The Senate Armed Services Committee, evidently receptive to this demand, said in its report on the FY2013 defense authorization act that integration of drones into domestic airspace should be accelerated.  See “Senate: Drones Need to Operate ‘Freely and Routinely’ in U.S.,” Secrecy News, June 8, 2012.

The website Public Intelligence previously identified 64 U.S. drone site locations.  See also “Revealed: 64 Drone Bases on American Soil” by Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Wired Danger Room, June 13:
“UAS will not achieve their full potential military utility unless they can go where manned aircraft go with the same freedom of navigation, responsiveness, and flexibility,” the new DoD report to Congress said.

A bill “to protect individual privacy against unwarranted governmental intrusion through the use of the unmanned aerial vehicles” (HR 5925) was introduced in the House of Representatives on June 7 by Rep. Austin Scott.  A companion bill (S.3287) has been introduced in the Senate by Sen. Rand Paul.

Why NATO Is a Pacific Power | Atlantic Council

Why NATO Is a Pacific Power | Atlantic Council

From Barry Pavel and Jeffrey Reynolds, the New Atlanticist:  Amid angst over the euro and a resurgent Russia, the west coast of North America may be the most overlooked piece of NATO’s real estate. Yet by virtue of its geography, the Pacific coast furnishes the alliance with a vital springboard into—and enduring interest in—Asian security. . . .

Alliance engagement with Japan begins with America. Japan's relationship with the United States is paramount: the Japanese will not enter a security relationship that even remotely jeopardizes the Japan-U.S. defense alliance. The best way to achieve NATO-Japan cooperation is through bilateral meetings, with the United States ambassador to NATO leading the effort informally. A NATO-Japan partnership would be much more effective when coordinated with the U.S. Departments of Defense and State along with the Japanese Government.

NATO would find willingness to cooperate on both sides. Japan wants to engage with the alliance. Despite domestic constraints, Tokyo recognizes that its position relative to the region, and the world, is changing. It sees NATO as a natural complement to its relationship with the United States: NATO is democratic, consultative, supportive of the U.N. and perceived as a “force for good” in the world. According to one Japanese security expert, Japan's aims toward the alliance are fourfold: to gain “a political partner, operational partner, another means of co-operation with the U.S., and . . . a multilateral school.” Furthermore, Washington has shown a keen interest in assisting the alliance if it were to seek greater cooperation with Tokyo.

The culmination of an invigorated NATO-Japan relationship should be the establishment of a liaison office in Tokyo. A small staff in such a global capital would allow the alliance to cultivate the long-term relationships it needs if it is to be viewed as a major actor in the pan-Pacific region.


NATO’s Pacific Moment

Alliance engagement in Asia will create controversy. No matter how NATO chooses to pursue an Asia-Pacific strategy, doing so will be a source of concern for other actors in the area and for some in Europe. Pushback from other nations in the region will be a natural response, but the alliance should be prepared for that outcome and nevertheless stride ahead, always mindful that building a meaningful partnership takes time, effort, and investment. . . .

America’s pivot is a significant opportunity for NATO. The trans-Atlantic community has partners around the world, but Japan is the alliance’s strongest friend in Asia. In short, to navigate the challenges of a changing security environment effectively, NATO must be regional in character, global in stature and Pacific in direction.

Barry Pavel is director of the International Security Program and director-designate of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Jeffrey Reynolds is part of the Strategic Engagement team at NATO HQ Supreme Allied Command Transformation and member of the Atlantic Council Young Atlanticist Working Group. This blog was originally posted in the National Interest. Photo Credit: AP.

Poland Looks to Update Missile Defenses

Poland is looking to overhaul its outdated missile defense infrastructure, the Polish Press Agency reported on Wednesday.

Defense Minister Tomasz Siemonak said in an interview with the Gazeta Wyborcza that Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Bronislaw Komorowski last November highlighted the importance of protections against airborne threats within the program to update the military over the next few years.

Plans are to be set in the fall on the project, which is expected to cost between $4.4 billion and $5.9 billion.
The report did not provide details of the anticipated modernization. Poland is to be among the host countries for U.S. missile interceptors under a European shield being developed by NATO

The Syrian Uprising: Syrian Discourse on the Social Networks.

Background

Since the start of the uprising in Syria, more than 15,000 Syrian citizens have been murdered, and the bloodshed has no end in sight. The intra-Syrian discourse on the various social networks is marked by despair with Bashar Assad’s continued rule and the uncertain future.

Some 10 percent of the Syrian population – for the most part secular, liberal, and from Sunni Muslim backgrounds – use Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and YouTube. At the same time, Kurds and senior members of the military and political opposition are active on the social networks, and one can also find quite a few Syrian exiles (including Alawites) among users.

What follows is a look at some key political issues currently debated on the Syrian social networks.

The Divisions within the Military and Political Opposition

There is much dissatisfaction and frustration over the divisions within the military and political opposition, reflected in the power struggles, the lack of consensus regarding a leader, and the lack of agreement regarding the desired end state – what Syria should like following the fall of the Assad regime.

The Free Syrian Army (FSA), composed of deserters from the regular Syrian army, comprises the primary military opposition. Although it l received full backing from the rebels for a long time, network users have lately criticized the fact that the FSA is beset by internal struggles over command and hierarchy and is failing as a counterweight to the Syrian military and other security establishments.

The Syrian National Council (SNC), the umbrella organization of all the opposition groups, is situated in Istanbul rather than in Syria. Its main objectives are enlisting international economic and political support for toppling Assad’s regime and creating an alternative coalition that would represent each of Syria’s ethnic communities with a mutually acceptable platform.

The Local Coordination Committee (LCC) activists have gained greater acceptance and popularity because they are involved in practical affairs, engage in non-violent activities (e.g., demonstrations), document the events in writing and photographs, ensure that civilians receive humanitarian assistance, and see to proper burials for those killed in the violence.

The Tension between Civil War (حرب أهلية) and Ethnic Conflict (حرب طائفية)

On the networs, the situation is described as the development of a civil war in which Syrian forces are killing other Syrian forces as well as civilians. However, the discourse stresses that this is not an ethnic conflict, and there are no calls for vengeance against the Alawite community. Rather, the focus is on toppling the Assad family regime. Indeed, it is the sources that are interested in hindering international intervention in Syria, as a result of fears of an ethnic conflict and bloodshed breaking out the day after Assad’s fall from power, that have been responsible for casting the situation as an ethnic conflict. Similarly, Alawite sources on the web claim that the Alawite community is not in lockstep with President Assad and that the Alawite majority is intentionally silent.

The Muslim Brotherhood: From Secondary Role to Center Stage

The deepening split within the leadership of the secular-liberal opposition movements is inversely proportionate to the rising strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. As in other Arab states, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is seen as the most organized and well-financed nongovernmental operation. The movement’s growth is particularly noticeable in two key areas:

a.       Recruiting Muslim clerics and scholars in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan, and issuing fatwas allowing the use of force against Bashar Assad, even offering generous sums for his capture (i.e., death), and helping to finance and arm the opposition in Syria.

b.       As the depth of the division and ineffectiveness of the Syrian National Council becomes apparent, people on the social networks feel it is better that the Muslim Brotherhood take center stage and become the most important player as soon as possible.

The War of the Proxies

The social network users are concerned that the longer the struggle lasts and the chaos spreads, the more fertile the ground grows for the penetration of jihadists and other extremists who will only boost the sense of anarchy that provides Assad’s regime with the pretext that it is merely cracking down on terrorism. The networks reflect concern that Syria is becoming a battlefield where foreign elements play out their enmity and have proxies fight other proxies. The concerns seem to focus on two groups in particular:

a.       Radical Sunni Islam: jihadists and al-Qaeda, who enter from Jordan and – primarily – from Iraq. There is concern about the rising number of terrorist acts that cause heavy losses of life and massive property damage.

b.       Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force units, backed by Hizbollah operatives. In addition to weapons and financing, Iran has also dispatched many Quds Force officers to Syria. These men, who helped suppress the 2009 Iranian demonstrations, are now training their Syrian counterparts to do the same.

Bashar Assad: Beheading the Lion

President Bashar Assad’s June 3 speech sparked much revulsion and criticism on the social networks. The dominant assessment is that Assad is trying to gain time and divert the discussion away from Syria’s internal problems and his loss of relevance and steer it toward the issue of terrorism. The reforms policy he presented is seen as a cynical ploy designed both to buy time and keep foreign involvements at bay.

The prevailing sentiment is that President Assad has lost legitimacy and that until the "Lion" and the Syrian army leave the cities the battle will not end. No other solution is acceptable to the rebels. It is obvious to all that Assad’s regime relies on Iranian and Russian aid.

There is a sense that Israel may act to topple Assad, thereby generating the collapse of the radical Iran-Syria-Hizbollah axis. This surprising expectation stands in stark contrast to the complete distrust that aid will come from Arab countries and the lack of expectations that they will help the Syrian people.

A further sentiment is that prospects of any type of arrangement with the regime are growing dimmer, be it the arrangement proposed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan or political asylum for Assad granted by other Arab leaders (the Tunisian/Yemeni model). Consequently there is talk of killing Assad in Syria.

Lack of Western Intervention

Syrians active on the social networks reason that the international community’s avoidance of military intervention in Syria stems from the following:

a.       Uncertainty over Syria’s future: Lacking a plan and national consensus among the various factions, because of the divisiveness within the opposition, there is a real concern in the West that Syria will fall into the hands of political Islam or, alternately, fall into complete chaos.

b.       The domino effect: There is a clear understanding that toppling the Syrian regime will have direct implications for the stability of neighboring regimes. The West fears a destabilization of King Abdullah’s regime in Jordan and a civil war in Lebanon (the first signs are already emerging in Tripoli). Similarly, some on the networks think that escalation between Hizbollah and Israel is likely.

c.       The Kurdish question: The discourse among the Syrian social network users attributes great importance to Turkey's fear that the fall of the Syrian regime may boost the Kurds' desire for autonomy. The networks note that the Turkish government, which at the start of the Syrian uprising openly called for toppling Assad, has recently moderated its sentiments, realizing the implications for a national awakening and the demand for political rights on the part of the Kurds.

Conclusion

The discourse on the social networks in Syria reflects a realistic and shrewd assessment about the difficulties of the current situation, as well as the understanding that the long struggle will not be resolved by external intervention

The liberal, secular elements face a number of – poor – options. They understand that there is not chance of reform that will include Bashar Assad's departure. They are aware that political Islam, i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood, has gained more influence and assumed key positions in the struggle to oust Assad – especially given the weakness of the secular opposition. Most of all, they fear that extreme jihad elements will assume positions of power, and chaos and anarchy will dominate. Consequently, the rebels are eager to see foreign, especially Western intervention that will bring about Bashar's downfall – even if this intervention involves Israel.

As in its prior days, Assad’s regime can still inflict damage and cause regional destabilization. The prevalent sense on the networks is that Syria’s neighbors are concerned about the negative ramifications for their own regimes once Bashar Assad is gone. Therefore, Syria’s neighbors, including Israel, are choosing to maintain the lowest profile possible while making preparations for the day after Bashar.

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

Taliban arrested for Afghan school poisonings

Government says Taliban members among 15 people arrested over spate of girls' school poisonings in Takhar province.

The Afghan intelligence service said a girl accused of poisoning her school was among those arrested [Al Jazeera]

The Afghan government has arrested 15 people in connection with a spate of poisoning at girls' schools in the northeast of the country.

Girls from six schools in northern Takhar province have suffered from mass fainting episodes in as many weeks.

The National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan intelligence service, has accused the Taliban of bribing school officials and at least one young girl of introducing the poison into the schools' drinking water.

NDS officials say the poisonings are part of an effort by the Taliban to scare families from sending their children to school, an accusation the group has refuted.

"We had directions from the president of Afghanistan to investigate. NDS was able to arrest 15 people, 12 of them Taliban" among those detained, said Lotfullah Mashal, NDS spokesman.

At a press conference on Wednesday, Mashal said among those arrested were the so-called Taliban shadow deputy governor of the salt-rich province, senior Taliban military commanders, a teacher, a school treasurer and his wife.

A school girl, paid 50,000 Afghanis, roughly $14,000 dollars, to poison her school's drinking water was also among the arrested, the NDS said.

'No security'

Noorjahan Akbar, co-founder of the Kabul-based organisation Young Women for Change, says the claims of infiltration by school officials highlights the need for security in the schools.

"In Afghanistan there is not just a single group that would carry out such attacks, more important than who actually conducted the attacks is the fact that there is no security in the schools," Akbar said.

"There needs to be a system in place so the girls and their parents are not pressured to give up their education to these groups" she told Al Jazeera.

Along with the Taliban, the intelligence service also accused the Jandullah and Mahazullah fronts of the "inhuman acts," which he said were motivated by foreign spy agencies.

'Mass hysteria'

Though the Taliban have issued two statements in as many weeks denying responsibility for the poisonings, Mashal said the NDS has proven documentation of the group's role.

"Because Taliban will have less credibility in the face of society, they don't claim responsibility ... Their aim is to promote fear among the people of Afghanistan; their main motivators are regional spy agencies", Mashal told reporters.

The Taliban have said they will punish any parties responsible for the poisonings.

Though the northern province has been at the centre of the wave of outbreaks in school sicknesses, there have also been recent reported cases in eastern Ghazni and Khost provinces.

The mid-May incident in Khost province saw nearly 400 schoolboys suffer from a similar poisoning attempt.

Prior to Wendesday's arrests, some Afghan officials had said the incidents could have been a case of mass hysteria.

Source: Agencies

Senior Chinese official detained over spy allegations

Strained relations: US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, and Chinese president, Hu Jintao, in Beijing last month.

Photograph: Mark Ralston/AFP/Getty Images

In another sign of political divisions inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), an aide to a vice minister of the Ministry of State Security has reportedly been detained as a spy for the CIA.

Details of the detention remain scanty. The man’s identity is unknown and he was detained sometime between January and March. The case was only recently exposed in a Chinese-language journal in New York, probably to undermine Zhou Yongkang—the man in charge of state security in the CCP’s top body—the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee.

Unnamed Chinese officials told Reuters on June 1 that the aide had provided “political, economic and strategic intelligence” to the CIA in return for hundreds of thousands of dollars. The sources said that the “destruction has been massive” to Chinese interests, as the man had provided information on China’s international intelligence networks and secret diplomatic negotiations.

So far the Chinese and US governments have played down the spy case which is the most serious espionage scandal since 1985, when Chinese intelligence official Yu Qiangshen defected to the US and exposed a Chinese double agent inside the CIA.

The detained man was apparently a senior official—a secretary to former vice minister Gao Yichen, who left his post in March. Gao’s responsibilities included the deputy directorship of a group responsible for “maintaining stability.” This includes responsibility for the 610 Office, which is notorious for its repression of the banned Falun Gong movement.

Zhou heads the 610 Office, which is closely identified with former President Jiang Zemin’s policy of “nipping in the bud” any opposition. Zhou is a key representative of Jiang’s so-called Shanghai gang faction within the CCP leadership. Any scandal involving state security, especially the 610 Office, will also tarnish Zhou’s standing. He is already under fire for supporting sacked Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai.

The CCP’s dominant Communist Youth League faction headed by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao exploited a corruption scandal to oust Bo last March, in order to consolidate its position prior to the party congress later this year. At the congress, seven of the nine Politburo Standing Committee members will retire, with only Wen’s likely successor, Vice Premier Li Keqiang, and Vice President Xi Jinping remaining.

Bo had been a likely candidate to fill one of the vacant positions. According to the British-based Sunday Times, the spy scandal has now affected the prospects of “another candidate for the committee, the Shanghai party leader, Yu Zhengsheng.” Yu is also connected to Jiang’s Shanghai gang.

The leaked details of the alleged spy comes after the strange case of the blind dissident lawyer Chen Guangcheng who fled to the US embassy in Beijing in April. How a blind man was able to escape house arrest, let alone travel the hundreds of kilometres to Beijing undetected, remains unanswered. What is clear, however, is that Chen’s high-profile escape was an acute embarrassment to the regime, especially the security forces headed by Zhou.

In another move that weakens Zhou’s position, the Guangdong party leadership headed by Wang Yang issued a directive on Monday to 21 municipalities, forcing the secretaries of the local CCP political and legal affairs committee to quit their posts as local police chief. Previously the secretary automatically became the local police chief. If this directive becomes national policy, it would seriously undermine the influence of Zhou, who controlled local police forces through these secretaries. Wang is an ally of Hu and Wen.
The factional struggle inside the CCP is being driven by the deepening global economic crisis and signs of emerging working-class unrest in China since late last year. Zhou was directly responsible for the wave of state repression that followed online appeals last year for a “Jasmine Revolution” in China in line with the political upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt.

Hu and Wen, however, appear to have drawn the conclusion that police-state measures are not enough to deal with potential unrest—new political mechanisms had to be developed to widen the party’s base of support. Their faction has very cautiously promoted “democratic reform” as a means of appealing to sections of the middle class.

When announcing Bo’s removal in March, Wen declared that “the demand for democracy by the Arab people must be respected and truly responded to.” He warned that without “political reform” China would be unable to deal with mounting social tensions, and there could be a “repeat of a historic tragedy” like the upheavals during Cultural Revolution in the 1960s.

Wen’s faction has used the Bo scandal and the illegal house arrest of the activist Chen to highlight the lawlessness of the state security apparatus and to promote calls for “the rule of law.” This campaign has nothing to do with protecting the basic democratic rights of the working people, but is to justify legal protection for private property and promote a vast expansion of the role of private capital in the Chinese economy.

The new privatisations of remaining state-controlled sectors of the economy to foreign investors is to appease the US and other Western powers that have criticised China’s “state-led” capitalist policy and its protection of state-owned “national champions.” Bo represented a rival faction of the CCP that advocated a strengthening of the state-controlled monopolies, on which its power and wealth rested.

All of the CCP factions are deeply hostile to the working class. If a widespread movement of workers erupted in opposition to destruction of jobs and living standards, these factions would not hesitate to come together and deploy the army and security forces to suppress the challenge to the regime.

The latest spy scandal provides another glimpse into the factional power struggle going on behind the scenes in the lead up to the 18th CCP congress. This infighting could well erupt to the surface of political life in the coming months, leading to even greater instability.



Font: By John Chan

Will Foreign Interests Drag Lebanon into a Military Conflict?

The recent threats by Ali Larijani, chairman of the Iranian parliament and a member of the Iranian leader’s innermost circle, that a military attack by the West, headed by the United States, against its Syrian ally would lead to an attack on Israel are another stage in Iran’s efforts to deter the US and Israel from undertaking military action against it. Although Iran’s actual willingness to come to the help of its allies and protégés cannot be assessed, it seems that the key tools available to it are its proxies, especially the Lebanese Hizbollah. Hizbollah, which under Iran’s watchful eye maintains close strategic cooperation with President Bashar Assad, now subject to sharp inter-Arab and international criticism for his brutal repression of the Syrian people, publicly announced its support for the Syrian regime and, implicitly, for its acts of repression as well. Therefore, should its patron Iran decide to act on Larijani’s threat, Hizbollah will be directed to act on behalf of Iran and Syria against its enemies, including Israel. This supposition has gained credence in recent days due to threats made by Nasrallah against Syrian opposition elements, following the abduction of several Shiites in Damascus. Even earlier, in speeches in May 2012 marking the reconstruction of the Dahiya neighborhood and the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon 12 years ago, Nasrallah boasted of Hizbollah’s rocket stockpile and the organization’s ability to reach every point in Israel, including Tel Aviv.

According to the assessment of Israeli security officials, Hizbollah currently has an organized army of more than 10,000 soldiers and some 60,000 rockets of various ranges, capable of causing more damage and greater precision than the rockets it possessed during the Second Lebanon War. Moreover, the organization has deployed its forces in towns and some 160 Shiite village in southern Lebanon, north of the Litani River, and in the Beqaa Valley, while making use of residents’ homes as battle fortifications. Rockets are stored in the basement; a family lives above the rockets, the third level serves as a command post, and the fourth level houses another family.

Despite Hizbollah’s aggressive rhetoric and its ongoing preparations for a military conflict with Israel, most Lebanese are loath to engage in another round of violence, because of Israel’s full and internationally recognized withdrawal from Lebanon and because of the heavy economic and physical cost they had to pay as a result of the Second Lebanon War into which they were dragged by Hizbollah against their wishes. Another confrontation between Hizbollah and Israel where the organization taps its extensive missile arsenal would likely cause much damage in Israel. However, the Israeli response would entail much greater damage to Lebanon, including the destruction not only of targets directly associated with Hizbollah. Senior Israeli officials have publicly made this clear to the Lebanese government, in which Hizbollah is a central element. The Lebanese know that another round of fighting would also inflict a severe blow to its economy, based chiefly on a developed banking system, foreign investments, and tourism, and would undermine the country’s already shaky political stability.

In addition to existing differences of opinion between the various political factions, including within the unstable coalition comprising the current Lebanese government, the intra-Syrian fighting has sparked tension between the Sunnis, who identify with the opposition, and Hizbollah and the Shiites supporting Assad’s regime. This was evident in the recent riots in Tripoli after two Sunni clergymen were killed by Lebanese forces. Representatives of the Sunni community made harsh accusations against the Lebanese army for having allowed Hizbollah operatives into its ranks.

In addition, despite Hizbollah’s growing political and military strength, the organization suffers from a serious image problem in Lebanon: the unequivocal findings by the international Special Tribunal for Lebanon that senior Hizbollah agents were directly responsible for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, and other attempts by the organization to assassinate political rivals in Lebanon have tainted its image. Furthermore, the organization’s support for and cooperation with the Assad regime are, in the Lebanese street, proof of the organization’s hypocrisy: an organization that supported and encouraged the Arab Spring is now publicly unmasked as a subcontractor for foreign interests, opposed to the interests of both Lebanese and Arabs alike. These and other factors underpin the Lebanese fears of another round of violence, liable to drag the country into a devastating war because of interests of the Iranian Shiite regime and the Syrian Alawite regime, engaged in slaughtering its own citizens. It is clear that given the nature of Hizbollah deployment in populated areas, in case of a military conflict civilians will sustain much of the fire from Israel; this was reiterated recently GOC Northern Command Maj. Gen. Yair Golan in a speech at a conference marking the sixth anniversary of the Second Lebanon War.

Despite the Lebanese civilians' reservations and the prevailing assessment in Israel that Hizbollah is not eager to put its military strength to the test because of the expected cost in casualties, infrastructures, and assets, it may be that because of the organization’s great dependence on Iran and the direct involvement of Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon in Hizbollah activities Nasrallah may not have much room to maneuver and will be forced to heed Tehran’s instructions to act against Israel for the sake of Iranian or Syrian interests. Thus, although Nasrallah admitted after the Second Lebanon War that he had not foreseen Israel’s severe reaction, he may again drag the entire region into a military conflict whose results, as is underscored by senior Israeli officials, may be expected to be far more destructive to Lebanon and the Lebanese. Therefore, the question remains whether this time Nasrallah, who erred previously in his assessment, will knowingly drag Lebanon and his organization into political and economic suicide. The answer may be that the fate of the Lebanese people is no longer in the organization's control, and its national interests may have already been sacrificed to those of foreign nations.

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

Gadhafi's spy chief goes on trial in Libya

Deposed dictator Moammar Gadhafi's foreign spy chief, Buzeid Dorda, went on trial Tuesday

Tripoli, Libya (CNN) -- Deposed dictator Moammar Gadhafi's foreign spy chief went on trial Tuesday, the first former regime official to be put before prosecutors in post-revolutionary Libya.

Looking resigned to his fate and sounding hoarse when he spoke, Buzeid Dorda denied charges including responsibility for the killing of protesters.

"I not only deny the charges, I am saying they are made up and they are the opposite of what I did," he said.

Dorda is also charged with trying to use his tribesmen to take action against the country, abusing his position to deny people their rights and using his authority to suppress the people.

He appeared in a blue jumpsuit and carried crutches as two security officers assisted him into court, where he sat behind a wire mesh. He was not cuffed or otherwise restrained.

The former intelligence chief stood as the charges were read, holding the wire mesh for support, and asked if he could respond to each accusation in turn.

His lawyer objected, saying that it was the first time Dorda was hearing the charges. The lawyer asked for an adjournment of a month to prepare his case.

Prosecutors countered that Dorda had been told the charges when his detention was extended.

Judges retired to deliberate, then announced the trial would continue on June 26.

Libyan ex-spy chief Dorda charged over protester deaths

Abu Zeid Omar Dorda is also charged with arming his ethnic group

The first senior official from the former Libyan regime has been charged in court in connection with the conflict that toppled Muammar Gaddafi.

Abu Zeid Omar Dorda, who was the head of external intelligence, appeared in the Tripoli court behind a metal cage.

He denied all six charges, which included ordering the fatal shooting of protesters last year.
The case has been adjourned until 26 June as his lawyer asked for more time to review the case.

Mr Dorda was arrested in September 2011, the month before Col Gaddafi was killed.

The BBC's Rana Jawad in the capital, Tripoli, says his trial is seen as a test case for Libya's judiciary and its capacity to deal with high-profile cases.

'Steadfast supporter'

Mr Dorda is charged with "mobilising security forces to fire bullets at the heads and chests of civilians" and "preventing, through the use of force and intimidation, the staging of peaceful protests", the Libya's state-run news agency Wal reports.

He is also charged with arming his ethnic group with the purpose of inciting civil strife during Libya's seven-month rebellion last year.

Mr Dorda arrived in court wearing a blue prison uniform - looking slightly weary and using crutches to walk, our correspondent says.

His doctor told the BBC the former head of foreign intelligence was recovering from a broken hip.
His younger brother, Abdullah, was in the court house and told the BBC that he was confident of his brother's innocence, adding that the family was coping with a stressful situation.

"All these things they're saying about him are not true... my brother is one of the Libyan people who looks out for his country, for its people and its safety," he said.

Defence lawyer, Daw al-Mansouri, told reporters that he had faith that his client would receive a fair trial.
Mr Dorda, 68, once served as Libya's prime minister and as an envoy to the UN.

He took over as external intelligence chief in 2009 from Moussa Koussa, the foreign minister who defected in March 2011 from the regime and fled Libya, initially to the UK.

Mr Dorda was one of Gaddafi's most loyal supporters - even calling in to state TV in April last year to deny reports that he was defecting.

"It is impossible for Abu Zeid Dorda to think, not only when awake but even when dreaming, of leaving Libya or the Libyan people or the revolution, or betraying its leader Muammar al-Gaddafi," he said.

"I am in Libya and am going to stay in it, and I am steadfast in the victorious revolution's trench."

Two other key figures in former regime are wanted for alleged war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) - Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam, who is in custody in Libya, and his brother-in-law Abdullah al-Senussi, the former head of military intelligence.

Libya has insisted they should both be tried by a Libyan court.

Mr Senussi, who was captured in Mauritania last November, has been charged with illegally entering the West African country.

Font: By Nic Robertson, CNN