Redlines and the Problems of Intervention in Syria

The civil war in Syria, one of the few lasting legacies of the Arab Spring, has been under way for more than two years. There has been substantial outside intervention in the war. The Iranians in particular, and the Russians to a lesser extent, have supported the Alawites under Bashar al Assad. The Saudis and some of the Gulf States have supported the Sunni insurgents in various ways. The Americans, Europeans and Israelis, however, have for the most part avoided involvement.

Last week the possibility of intervention increased. The Americans and Europeans have had no appetite for intervention after their experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. At the same time, they have not wanted to be in a position where intervention was simply ruled out. Therefore, they identified a redline that, if crossed, would force them to reconsider intervention: the use of chemical weapons.

There were two reasons for this particular boundary. The first was that the United States and European states have a systemic aversion to the possession and usage of weapons of mass destruction in other countries. They see this ultimately as a threat to them, particularly if such weapons are in the hands of non-state users. But there was a more particular reason in Syria. No one thought that al Assad was reckless enough to use chemical weapons because they felt that his entire strategy depended on avoiding U.S. and European intervention, and that therefore he would never cross the redline. This was comforting to the Americans and Europeans because it allowed them to appear decisive while avoiding the risk of having to do anything.

However, in recent weeks, first the United Kingdom and France and then Israel and the United States asserted that the al Assad regime had used chemical weapons. No one could point to an incidence of massive deaths in Syria, and the evidence of usage was vague enough that no one was required to act immediately.

In Iraq, it turned out there was not a nuclear program or the clandestine chemical and biological weapons programs that intelligence had indicated. Had there been, the U.S. invasion might have had more international support, but it is doubtful it would have had a better outcome. The United States would have still forced the Sunnis into a desperate position, the Iranians would have still supported Shiite militias and the Kurds would have still tried to use the chaos to build an autonomous Kurdish region. The conflict would have still been fought and its final outcome would not have looked very different from how it does now.

What the United States learned in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya is that it is relatively easy for a conventional force to destroy a government. It is much harder  -- if not impossible -- to use the same force to impose a new type of government. The government that follows might be in some moral sense better than what preceded it -- it is difficult to imagine a more vile regime than Saddam Hussein's -- but the regime that replaces it will first be called chaos, followed by another regime that survives to the extent that it holds the United States at arm's length. Therefore, redline or not, few want to get involved in another intervention pivoting on weapons of mass destruction.

Interventionist Arguments and Illusions

However, there are those who want to intervene for moral reasons. In Syria, there is the same moral issue that there was in Iraq. The existing regime is corrupt and vicious. It should not be forgotten that the al Assad regime conducted a massacre in the city of Hama in 1982 in which tens of thousands of Sunnis were killed for opposing the regime. The regime carried out constant violations of human rights and endless brutality. There was nothing new in this, and the world was able to act fairly indifferent to the events, since it was still possible to create media blackouts in those days. Syria's patron, the Soviet Union, protected it, and challenging the Syrian regime would be a challenge to the Soviet Union. It was a fight that few wanted to wage because the risks were seen as too high.

The situation is different today. Syria's major patron is Iran, which had (until its reversal in Syria) been moving toward a reshaping of the balance of power in the region. Thus, from the point of view of the American right, an intervention is morally required to confront evil regimes. There are those on the left who also want intervention. In the 1980s, the primary concern of the left was the threat of nuclear war, and they saw any intervention as destabilizing a precarious balance. That concern is gone, and advocacy for military intervention to protect human rights is a significant if not universal theme on the left.

The difference between right-wing and left-wing interventionists is the illusions they harbor. In spite of experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, right-wing interventionists continue to believe that the United States and Europe have the power not only to depose regimes but also to pacify the affected countries and create Western-style democracies. The left believes that there is such a thing as a neutral intervention -- one in which the United States and Europe intervene to end a particular evil, and with that evil gone, the country will now freely select a Western-style constitutional democracy. Where the right-wing interventionists cannot absorb the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, the left-wing interventionists cannot absorb the lessons of Libya.

Everyone loved the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. What was not to like? The Evil Empire was collapsing for the right; respect for human rights was universally embraced for the left. But Eastern Europe was occupied by Josef Stalin in 1945 following domination and occupation by Adolf Hitler. Eastern Europeans had never truly embraced either, and for the most part loathed both. The collapse freed them to be what they by nature were. What was lurking under the surface had always been there, suppressed but still the native political culture and aspiration.

That is not what was under the surface in Afghanistan or Iraq. These countries were not Europe and did not want to be. One of the reasons that Hussein was despised was that he was secular -- that he violated fundamental norms of Islam both in his personal life and in the way he governed the country. There were many who benefited from his regime and supported him, but if you lopped off the regime, what was left was a Muslim country wanting to return to its political culture, much as Eastern Europe returned to its.

In Syria, there are two main factions fighting. The al Assad regime is Alawite, a heterodox offshoot of Shi'ism. But its more important characteristic is that it is a secular regime, not guided by either liberal democracy or Islam but with withering roots in secular Arab Socialism. Lop it off and what is left is not another secular movement, this time liberal and democratic, but the underlying Muslim forces that had been suppressed but never eradicated. A New York Times article this week pointed out that there are no organized secular forces in areas held by the Sunni insurgents. The religious forces are in control. In Syria, secularism belonged to the Baath Party and the Alawites, and it was brutal. But get rid of it, and you do not get liberal democracy.

This is what many observers missed in the Arab Spring. They thought that under the surface of the oppressive Hosni Mubarak regime, which was secular and brutal, was a secular liberal democratic force. Such a force was present in Egypt, more than in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya, but still did not represent the clear alternative to Mubarak. The alternative -- not as clearly as elsewhere, but still the alternative -- was the Muslim Brotherhood, and no secular alternative was viable without the Egyptian army.

The Difficulties of an Intervention

There are tremendous military challenges to dealing with Syria. Immaculate interventions will not work. A surgical strike on chemical facilities is a nice idea, but the intelligence on locations is never perfect, Syria has an air defense system that cannot be destroyed without substantial civilian casualties, and blowing up buildings containing chemical weapons could release the chemicals before they burn. Sending troops deep into Syria would not be a matter of making a few trips by helicopter. The country is an armed camp, and destroying or seizing stockpiles of chemical weapons is complicated and requires manpower. To destroy the stockpiles, you must first secure ports, airports and roads to get to them, and then you have to defend the roads, of which there are many.

Eradicating chemical weapons from Syria -- assuming that they are all in al Assad's territory -- would require occupying that territory, and the precise outlines of that territory change from day to day. It is also likely, given the dynamism of a civil war, that some chemical weapons would fall into the hands of the Sunni insurgents. There are no airstrikes or surgical raids by special operations troops that would solve the problem. Like Iraq, the United States would have to occupy the country.

If al Assad and the leadership are removed, his followers -- a substantial minority -- will continue to resist, much as the Sunnis did in Iraq. They have gained much from the al Assad regime and, in their minds, they face disaster if the Sunnis win. The Sunnis have much brutality to repay. On the Sunni side, there may be a secular liberal democratic group, but if so it is poorly organized and control is in the hands of Islamists and other more radical Islamists, some with ties to al Qaeda. The civil war will continue unless the United States intervenes on behalf of the Islamists, uses its power to crush the Alawites and hands power to the Islamists. A variant of this happened in Iraq when the United States sought to crush the Sunnis but did not want to give power to the Shia. The result was that everyone turned on the Americans.

That will be the result of a neutral intervention or an intervention designed to create a constitutional democracy. Those who intervene will find themselves trapped between the reality of Syria and the assorted fantasies that occasionally drive U.S. and European foreign policy. No great harm will come in any strategic sense. The United States and Europe have huge populations and enormous wealth. They can, in that sense, afford such interventions. But the United States cannot afford continual defeats as a result of intervening in countries of marginal national interest, where it sets for itself irrational political goals for the war. In some sense, power has to do with perception, and not learning from mistakes undermines power.

Many things are beyond the military power of the United States. Creating constitutional democracies by invasion is one of those things. There will be those who say intervention is to stop the bloodshed, not to impose Western values. Others will say intervention that does not impose Western values is pointless. Both miss the point. You cannot stop a civil war by adding another faction to the war unless that faction brings overwhelming power to bear. The United States has a great deal of power, but not overwhelming power, and overwhelming power's use means overwhelming casualties. And you cannot transform the political culture of a country from the outside unless you are prepared to devastate it as was done with Germany and Japan.

The United States, with its European allies, does not have the force needed to end Syria's bloodshed. If it tried, it would merely be held responsible for the bloodshed without achieving any strategic goal. There are places to go to war, but they should be few and of supreme importance. The bloodshed in Syria is not more important to the United States than it is to the Syrians.


Font: By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman

ITALY: Terrorism: Islamic cell identified six arrests.

Operation of the ROS, the arrested showed a fierce anti-Semitism and hatred for the countries 'infidels' including the United States and Italy.

ROS special operations group of the Carabinieri

A cell of Islamic based in Italy (Puglia, Lombardy and Sicily) and in Belgium and close contacts with prominent personalities of international terrorism was wiped out by the Carabinieri of Ros who performed 6 custody orders issued by prosecutors in Bari are an association of international terrorism and incitement to racial hatred.

  Those arrested, it has been known for now, would be of Moroccan nationality and Tunisia. The survey is conducted by Deputy Public Prosecutor of Bari Renato Nitti and was launched in 2007, through the monitoring of certain activities of migrants and holding an eye on their call center and internet corner.

  The six arrested inciting jihad and suicide bombings in the West and in war zones. The investigation has revealed a widespread proselytizing and indoctrination to new affiliates in which it was carried out also with audio and video urging to take suicidal actions.

  According to surveys of members of the cell had very close relations with important personages of international terrorism and on several occasions had shown a rabid anti-and an aversion to the countries 'infidels' including the United States and Italy..

Chemical Weapons in Syria: Has a Red Line Been Crossed?

On April 23, 2013, at the INSS annual conference "Security Challenges of the 21^st Century," Brig. Gen. Itai Brun, head of the Research Division of IDF Military Intelligence, said that Israel has information indicating that Assad’s forces used a lethal chemical weapon several times against the rebels, likely sarin, along with incapacitating chemical agents. This statement, the first time such an assertion was made by a senior official Israeli source, made waves in Israel and internationally. The following day, senior American sources confirmed that there is preliminary evidence that Assad used chemical weapons, though absolute verification is still needed.

 

Several questions emerge from the announcement. What evidence is there of chemical weapons use? How extensive was it? What kinds of attacks were launched, and by whom? Who was targeted?
 

 For the past year the topic of Syria’s chemical weapons has made frequent headlines. Syria has an arsenal of chemical weapons, including all its components, as well as a full array of operational capabilities, including artillery shells, aerial bombs, and missiles. The main substance of the chemical weapons arsenal is sarin, a lethal nerve gas. In light of events in Syria, various sources have speculated about the possible use of this arsenal, be it through use by Assad’s forces against the rebels, transfer to terrorist groups such as Hizbollah, use by Assad against Israel in a move of desperation, and other scenarios. This past year, there were several reports of Syria moving chemical weapons components from base to base, along with talk of operational preparations and states of high alert. These reports motivated several nations, first and foremost the United States but also Russia, to issue stern warnings to Assad not to use his chemical arsenal. Moreover, President Obama and other senior administration officials declared that changes in the chemical arsenal would be tantamount to crossing a red line and constitute a "game changer," and therefore prompt actual measures. No clear definition of this red line was issued, nor were the steps spelled out that the United States would take in response. In the meantime, there were reports of the United States, together with friendly nations in the region, making plans for a military takeover of the chemical weapons and securing them or even bombing them from the air should certain dangerous conditions emerge on the ground.

 

In recent months several reports asserted that chemical weapons had been used in practice. The most significant allegation concerned the attack in Aleppo on March 19, with reportedly about 25 civilians killed along with other casualties. There were mutual recriminations over the incident: the Assad government accused the rebels of using chemical weapons and the rebels made identical counter-accusations against the regime.

To verify with absolute certainty what happened in Aleppo and whether chemical weapons were used, several types of data are needed:

1. Reliable, first-hand testimony from the time of the attack and immediately thereafter from people or survivors who were there concerning how the attack was carried out, how the chemical material was dispersed, its shape and characteristic odor, the size of the affected area, and a description of the victims and their clinical symptoms. Sarin is exceedingly fast acting and lethal. Symptoms appear within minutes and death occurs quickly, usually within a few hours of exposure.
2. Discovery and identification in real time by means of automatic or manual detection and identification devices of the attack and the type of material scattered. The window of opportunity for this is very narrow (at most a few hours in the case of sarin, a highly volatile chemical).
3. A description of the victims seeking medical treatment in clinics and hospitals, the clinical symptoms, and the required antidotes. The window of opportunity for this is days to a few weeks.
4. Lab analysis of soil, water, and surface samples. Chemical analysis requires sophisticated equipment and a great deal of knowledge and experience in the field. In the case of a chemical as volatile as sarin, the window of opportunity for positive, direct identification by means of environmental samples is quite narrow. Sarin derivatives can be identified later, providing either full or partial verification.
5. Lab analysis of victims’ bodily fluids (blood, urine) or hair, biopsies, etc. Such sampling within hours, days, or possibly more could reveal changes in biological markers or traces of chemical weapons and/or degradation products indicating exposure to the toxin.
6. Autopsies.

The closer the testing and assessments to the time of the attack, the higher the chances of collecting reliable data in all of the six categories described above, resulting in verification and assessment of the attack.

 

Non-classified information published by the various media seems to have been based primarily on eyewitness accounts from the scene of the event, as well as film clips on television depicting victims being treated in clinics and hospitals. Descriptions from the scene do not provide clear testimony that chemical weapons were involved. One cannot rule out the possibility that these descriptions pertain to industrial chemicals or other toxins associated with the battlefield. One hypothesis is that the event involved poisoning using industrial chlorine, but this idea lacks credibility. The film clips showing victims treated in hospitals are not unequivocal evidence of chemical weapons. Surprisingly, those around the victims were protecting themselves with mouth and nose breathing masks only, rather than NBC respirators. One would have expected that this would cause secondary casualties, yet there was no evidence this occurred. Similarly, myosis (constricted pupils) and foam from victims’ mouth that were observed are not conclusive evidence of sarin, as other chemicals can cause similar phenomena.

 

If Assad’s forces did indeed use chemical weapons, it is hard to understand the motivation, as this was an isolated small scale strike with a relatively small number of victims and could not have made a major impact on the fighting from an operational perspective. It could have been a warning or signal issued by Assad to the rebels, or an attempt on Assad’s part to push the envelope in order to test local and international response

 

A recent report stated that professional labs in the UK and France had discovered significant findings using samplings from the scene (no details of the types of samples or the findings were reported) indicating the use of chemical weapons, apparently sarin. While Brig. Gen. Brun claimed that the IDF has further evidence (beyond what was published in the media), it is not known what this evidence is or if it indicates with absolute certainty that sarin was used.

 

The current official American stance is that there is preliminary evidence that must be verified to determine conclusively that chemical weapons were used, and there are efforts afoot to collect more data. Is this the American position because, technically speaking, there is still no conclusive evidence for the use of chemical weapons, or is it the American position because of political considerations? An American admission that there is conclusive proof of the use of chemical weapons would require the United States to respond, as not doing so would damage the President’s credibility.

 

The response options open to the administration are not simple; some of them require "boots on the ground," a situation the Americans are keen to avoid. When speaking of the chemical weapons alone, plans have been made for the forcible seizure of sites and stockpiles. These plans are complex and apparently require the deployment of many forces in Syria, a risky endeavor fraught with possibilities of unforeseen developments. Aerial bombing and the destruction of chemical weapons sites is operationally and technically possible and could result in high rates of destruction of Assad’s chemical array, but is unlikely to provide complete neutralization of the threat. There is also a certain risk to the civilian population near these sites.

 

Last but not least, one should remember that Assad’s massive chemical (and biological?) weapons arsenal was built over many decades to serve as a strategic balance to Syria’s conception of Israel’s conventional and nonconventional weapons. But this structure was under the complete control of Assad and his inner circle. Now the future of Syria as a state is unclear. There is certainly a risk that in the end, and regardless of whether the chemical weapons are used or not, the whole structure of the chemical weapons or significant parts thereof will be seized by radical elements liable to win control of Syria or large parts of it. Therefore, the international community, led by the United States, must make comprehensive plans for the destruction of Syria’s entire chemical and biological weapons array as part of stabilizing the situation in Syria. Otherwise, this array of nonconventional weapons will continue to represent a continuous potential threat both to the world at large and especially to the region, including Israel.

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The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Lessons for the Iranian

 

 

 

North Korea is well known for its repeated provocations of South Korea and the United States in the context of efforts over the past decade to negotiate a deal in the Six-Party framework that would result in North Korean nuclear disarmament. North Korea's provocations, including missile tests and nuclear advances such as three nuclear tests since 2006, have a regional and international dimension. According to the established pattern, North Korea makes blatant brinkmanship moves in order to summon the US to the negotiating table and press for better terms – namely, to secure more economic assistance. This has been the linchpin of every deal it has made so far in the nuclear realm.

 

The last time North Korea negotiated in the framework of the Six-Party talks was in December 2008. In 2009, North Korea declared the Six-Party talks over, and conducted its second nuclear test. In 2010, it took provocative action against South Korea – sinking the corvette Cheonan, an act that killed 46 sailors, and conducting an artillery attack on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong (a region subject to dispute between the two Koreas), killing two South Korean marines and two civilians. In late 2010 North Korea also revealed a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon.

 

Over the course of 2011, Pyongyang once again expressed willingness to explore a return to nuclear negotiations, and in the summer held brief bilateral talks with the US. Before any agreement was reached, however, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il died and was succeeded by his son Kim Jong-Un. A surprise development in February 2012 fostered short lived hope that the new leader had adopted a positive approach: the US and North Korea announced – through simultaneous unilateral declarations – that they had reached an understanding in the nuclear realm. North Korea announced its willingness to suspend uranium enrichment and place a moratorium on nuclear and long range missile tests, and the US pledged 240,000 tons of food aid. But the deal never materialized – instead the new leader decided to launch a satellite in mid-April 2012 (which failed), and since that time has demonstrated increased defiance, with a successful missile test later that year and a nuclear test in February 2013.

 

The past few weeks have witnessed a sharp escalation in North Korean nuclear and conventional threats directed primarily against South Korea and the United States, but also against Japan. For the first time, North Korea issued an explicit threat of a nuclear attack to the United States. The frequency, intensity, and content of these threats – unfolding in rapid succession – are unprecedented in the near-decade of negotiations with North Korea in the nuclear realm.

 

What is North Korea trying to achieve? The immediate backdrop to the escalation were the sanctions following North Korea's third nuclear test in February, and the annual US-South Korean joint military exercise that North Korea protests every year. Neither of these developments, however, was unexpected, and neither explains the dramatic rise in intensity of the North Korean threats. Moreover, the threats themselves are basically toothless: evidence is lacking that North Korea has the capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and place it atop a long range missile, which renders the nuclear threat to the US dubious. For its part, a significant conventional attack would surely elicit a strong military response that North Korea could probably not sustain. With the Six-Party talks suspended, the new escalation also did not initially seem to adhere to the familiar pattern that North Korea had established in the past; however, a new US-South Korean offer of negotiations – on condition that North Korea is serious about denuclearization – could signal that this is indeed what North Korea was once again seeking.

 

While North Korea's motivation is unclear, Pyongyang succeeded in capturing the world's attention through its belligerent nuclear rhetoric. Specters of pending nuclear war raised by the media ignored the fact that North Korea's current capabilities cannot support its threats. Thus the bluster is ultimately likely to fizzle out, and at most find expression in the test-fire of a long range missile.

 

At the same time, however, North Korea is indeed advancing its nuclear and missile programs, and if no deal is reached in the nuclear realm, it will eventually succeed in developing a warhead that it can place on a long range missile, and thus become a full-fledged nuclear state that can pose a threat to the US backed up by capabilities. This crisis has demonstrated how North Korea – a state not averse to issuing nuclear threats – will be able to place the region on immediate hair-trigger alert.

 

What does this crisis imply for the Iranian nuclear crisis? North Korea's crisis-making behavior actually provides little insight into Iran's possible next move, because Iran has developed its own particular style of dealing with the international community. While no less determined and defiant than North Korea, Iran is guided by the principle of crisis-avoidance, and it has tapped this strategy to considerable effect. The regional context of each proliferator is also quite different: North Korea has used the nuclear issue as a bargaining chip for economic assistance from the US and its regional neighbors. Oil-rich Iran is not in need of such assistance, and is using its nuclear program rather as a means to strengthen its regional position and hegemonic ambitions. Significantly, South Koreans remained relatively calm in the face of the barrage of North Korean threats, but this would not be expected in the face of similar threats from Iran, especially for Saudi Arabia and Israel. North Korea – although nuclear – is a weak state surrounded by much stronger neighbors that seem to regard their aggressive neighbor almost like a provocative child that must be treated firmly but not spurned. By contrast, Iran is a strong state in a region where it is regarded by some as a rival for regional influence, and by others as a formidable and dangerous adversary.

 

Predictably, the international approaches to the proliferators have been influenced by the leading states' perceptions of the proliferators and their regional contexts. The US has long avoided a forceful approach toward North Korea because Pyongyang can cause massive destruction to Seoul with conventional missiles, while China has protected North Korea due to its fears of implosion and ensuing adverse consequences for China. Amid continued efforts to press North Korea to negotiate a deal, the states confronting Pyongyang are in effect following a policy of containment, and the recent crisis could be construed as demonstrating that even in the face of blatant nuclear threats containment is working. However, the different strategic realities in the Middle East should caution against simplistic comparisons. If Iran issued threats similar to those of North Korea, they would be regarded very differently due to different regional conditions. Moreover, Iran could advance its interests without posing such blatant threats; as a nuclear state it would be able to exploit its immunity to counterattack in order to incrementally advance aggressive regional hegemonic goals. In this scenario, classic nuclear deterrence will be rendered irrelevant.

 

Thus the fact that North Korea and Iran both present a nuclear proliferation challenge does not neutralize the many differences between the two cases. Developments regarding one determined proliferator do not necessarily have immediate implications for the other. Each case should be considered on its own terms, including: the nature and motivation of the proliferator, its strategy and tactics when facing regional and global powers, and the calculations of the specific group of states that confront it, as a function of the regional conditions that prevail in each case.

        

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The tigress is tired?

Boston Marathon Blasts Kill 3

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/explosions-reported-at-site-of-boston-marathon.html?_r=0

Are more than three weeks, that "Intelligence Analysts" and men of various agencies requesting an increase in the levels of security.

But exactly how September 11th, bureaucrats with the brain full of shit, did not respond to the notices.

Dear friends and colleagues, how can we work when heads of Government Agencies are incompetent, head of departments there are people who do not seek the brain ....

I'm sick and tired of seeing people suffering and death .... this is a "WAR" vile without rules, these people do not respect the rules of engagement or the Geneva Convention ... it's time to fight with their own weapons.

Enough with the moralizing .... many calls to close Guantanamo or special prisons where detainees are dangerous terrorists ... want to give rights to those beasts .. no, must be detained and interrogated in order to prevent more deaths.

The threats continue, we all know that the next attacks may still be in the U.S. and EU ... but also of a possible attack on the Vatican directly to Pope Francesco.

As many know on my head there are more than a fatwa, but that I have never stopped to do my duty ...

You have to step up intelligence networks, increase border controls, you have to stop the flow of money, you have to hit those states that indirectly finance terrorism, paying large ransoms to free citizens abducted by terrorist groups in high-risk areas ...

MUST NOT NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS.

We need to stop thinking like the Cold War, where there were unwritten rules, or a conventional war, this must be fought with intelligence and without respite, never let your guard down ....

dr. Roberto polastro

the anniversary of Independence of Israel

היום לפני יום השנה של עצמאות ישראל, שחוגג מחר יום ההולדה 65 שלו, את כבוד מדינת הזיכרון של אלה - יותר מ 25.00 אנשים, כולל חיילים ואזרחים-קורבנות הטרור הפך לידה האפשרית ו עצמאותה.



The day before the anniversary of Independence of Israel, who celebrates his 65th birthday tomorrow, the country honors the memory of those - more than 25.00 people including soldiers and citizens-victims of terrorism have made possible the birth and the its Independence.



Nel giorno che precede l'anniversario dell'Indipendenza d'Israele, che celebra domani il suo 65esimo compleanno, il Paese onora la memoria di quanti - più di 25.00 persone tra soldati e cittadini vittime del terrorismo- hanno reso possibile la sua nascita e la sua indipendenza.