Ucraina e Isis: il vice di Obama rivela (per sbaglio) la verità...

Questo è un esempio di come certe informazioni non circolino sui media occidentali. Un amico che pesca molto bene online mi ha inviato la segnalazione di alcuni articoli che recavano un titolo forte: “Il vicepresidente americano Joe Biden ammette di aver obbligato i Paesi europei ad adottare le sanzioni contro la Russia”.

Come mio dovere, verifico le fonti. E scopro che a dare questa notizia sono Russia Today e altre agenzie di stampa russe. Da esperto di spin mi sorge il dubbio che si tratti di una strumentalizzazione da parte di Mosca. E verifico ulteriormente. In pochi minuti.

Sì, Biden ha tenuto un lungo discorso sulla politica estera all’università di Harvard, discorso a cui i media americani hanno dato ampio spazio ma per evidenziare una battuta, anzi una gaffe su quanto sia frustrante fare il vicepresidente, espressa con un linguaggio molto colorito. Negli articoli, però, nessun riferimento alla frase sull’Europa.

Allora indago ulteriormente, vado sul sito della Casa Bianca dove è pubblicata la trascrizione integrale del discorso di Biden. E, come potete verificare voi stessi, la frase riportata dai media russi è corretta e l’indifferenza con cui è stata accolta dai media occidentali, ma anche europei significativa. Praticamente nessun giornalista ha saputo valutare la portata delle dichiarazioni di Biden. Il che è grave professionalmente, ma non sorprendente: a dare il tono sono state le agenzie di stampa e le tv all news che si sono soffermate sull’aspetto più leggero e sensazionale ovvero la gaffe di Biden; tutto il resto è passato in secondo piano. Anche sulla stampa più autorevole. Perché Biden poteva reggere un titolo, non due. E quelle dichiarazioni formulate nell’ambito di un lungo discorso in cui Biden ha toccato molti aspetti. Gli spin doctor della Casa Bianca si sono ben guardati dall’evidenziarle e sono scivolate via assieme ad altre.

Nessuna manipolazione, nessuna censura: se conosci le logiche e le debolezze dei media puoi orientarli a piacimento, Negli Stati Uniti, ma anche in Europa.
In realtà le dichiarazioni di Biden sono davvero sensazionali,una gaffe in termini diplomatici:

“Abbiamo dato a Putin una scelta semplice: rispetta la sovranità ucraina o avrai di fronte gravi conseguenze. E questo ci ha indotto a mobilitare i maggiori Paesi più sviluppati al mondo affinché imponessero un costo reale alla Russia.   “E’ vero che non volevano farlo. E’ stata la leadership americana e il presidente americano ad insistere, tante di quelle volte da dover mettere in imbarazzo l’Europa per reagire e decidere per le sanzioni economiche, nonostante i costi”.

L’ammissione è fortissima: è stata l’America a costringere l’Europa a punire Putin, contro la sua volontà.
Poi un’altra strabiliante ammissione, sull’Isis, che l’America combatte con toni accorati salvo poi ammettere che il pericolo per gli stessi americani non è così rilevante:

“Non stiamo affrontando un pericolo esistenziale per il nostro stile di vita o la nostra sicurezza. Hai due volte più possibilità di essere colpito da un fulmine per strada che di essere vittima di un evento terroristico negli Stati Uniti”.

Dunque l’Isis non è una minaccia seria, così come non lo è più il terrorismo negli Stati Uniti.

Quando qualcuno dice la verità – e chi più di un vicepresidente americano? – il mondo appare molto diverso rispetto alla propaganda ufficiale. In Ucraina e sul terrorismo.

Ma se i media non ne parlano, la propaganda diventa, anzi resta apparente verità. E la vera verità limitata ai pochi che la sanno davvero cogliere e trasmettere.

Font: Marcello Foa su ilGiornale.it

As Caliphates Compete, Radical Islam Will Eventually Weaken...

A still from a video released by Nigerian militant group Boko
 Haram in February shows leader A
bubakar Shekau surrounded by numerous armed militants.

Summary

The rise of the Islamic State will inspire other jihadist groups to claim their own caliphates and emirates. In the long run, the extremism of these contrived dominions and the competition among them will undermine the jihadist movement. However, before that happens, the world will witness much upheaval.

Analysis

In a 52-minute video that surfaced in late August, Abubakar Shekau, the head of Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram, spoke of an Islamic State in northeastern Nigeria. The statement came two months after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the chief of the transnational jihadist movement in Syria and Iraq, declared the re-establishment of the caliphate, renaming the group the Islamic State. Though likely inspired by the Islamic State, Boko Haram is not simply mimicking its more powerful Syrian-Iraqi counterpart; it is taking its cue from the Nigeria-based Sokoto Caliphate, which was established in the early 1800s and existed for almost a century until Britain gained control of the region.

The Caliphate's Role in History

According to classical Muslim political theorists, there can be only one caliphate for the entire Muslim global community, or ummah. In practice, though, there have been rival claimants to authority and even competing caliphates throughout the history of Islam. In our July 1 analysis on the subject, Stratfor explained not only how multiple emirates and sultanates emerged independently of the caliphate but also that there were rival caliphates -- for example, the Abbasid in Baghdad (749-1258), Umayyad in the Iberian Peninsula (929-1031) and Fatimid in Cairo (909-1171).

These medieval-era caliphates were not just the byproduct of geographical constraints facing the original caliphate but also heavily shaped by political and religious rivalries and political evolution. These dynastic empires were the building blocks of the Muslim world, not unlike the wider international system of the time. For this reason, they endured for centuries until Europe's geopolitical push into the Muslim world in the 18th century.

I

n the past two centuries, the medieval caliphates, emirates and sultanates have been replaced by nation-states. Though artificially created and weak, these modern Muslim polities are unlikely to be swept away by radical Islamists seeking to re-establish caliphates and emirates. Although nationalism was initially a European import into the Arab/Muslim world and continues to face competition from religious and tribal identities, it is well established in the public psyche.
This can be seen in the organization of most Islamists along national lines. Most Islamists, who are aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood or some variant of it, embrace the nation-state and should not be conflated with the minority of radical Islamists and jihadists who seek to eliminate national boundaries and return to a romanticized notion of the past. Still, caliphates and emirates have emerged because of the failures of the modern Muslim nation-states to create democratic systems and, more broadly, to provide a viable political economy for their citizens -- a failure that radical Islamist forces have deftly exploited.

Deficiencies in Modern Caliphates

Radical Islamists are able to capture the imagination of the economically disadvantaged youth who understand neither politics nor Islam. The most successful jihadist entity in terms of capturing territory, the Islamic State, rose in part because of rare circumstances related to the regional geopolitical struggle between the Shiite and Sunni camps in the Middle East. However, as is evident from the international alignment of forces against the Islamic State, the transnational jihadist movement faces severe challenges moving forward.
In addition, its ultra-extremist policies and behavior are further alienating the Islamic State from the Muslim world. Al Qaeda's denunciation of the Islamic State as a deviant force underscores the competition it faces from within the jihadist movement. Furthermore, there is an entire constellation of radical Islamists beyond al Qaeda that does not accept the Islamic State's claim to a caliphate. These Islamists will seek to form their own caliphates or emirates in the same battle spaces. Meanwhile, other groups operating in different parts of the Muslim world seek to form their own caliphates.
An important concept in this context is that of the leader of the faithful, or emir al-momineen, which was the title given to the second caliph of Islam, Omar bin al-Khattab (579-644). Since then, this title has become synonymous with that of the caliph. In the contemporary age, Afghan Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar assumed the title in the 1990s, when the movement ruled most of Afghanistan. Decades earlier, Morocco's constitution conferred this title upon the country's monarch.
Morocco's king only claims leadership of the country's Muslim majority. Likewise, the Afghan Taliban's status as a nationalist jihadist force meant that Mullah Omar only claimed leadership of the Muslims of Afghanistan. Al-Baghdadi's move to declare himself caliph of all the Muslims of the world therefore challenges the authority of the emirates and dynastical or republican regimes in the Islamic world.

The Fate of Jihadists and Caliphates

In the distant future, radical Islamism will likely lose its appeal because of two broad factors. First, the attempt to create caliphates and the associated difficulties of governance will force many radical Islamists to opt for pragmatism and become relatively moderate. Second, opposition from fellow Muslims also learning about politics and governance will give them less room to operate.
Yet, while this modern phenomenon of competing caliphates, emirates or Islamic states will only further weaken jihadist groups, the idea of the caliphate remains an unresolved matter. Muslims have long accepted that the notion does not connote a single state for the ummah; instead it symbolizes pan-Muslim cooperation in the form of a supra-national regime such as the European Union. This remains a desirable goal, as is evident from the Organization of Islamic Conference which, though anemic, remains intact.
Still, these developments will be the outcome of a multigenerational struggle. Until then, the social, political and economic problems of the Arab/Muslim world, along with sectarian strife, geopolitical rivalries and the interests of outside powers (especially the United States and the West), will sustain the conditions in which violent extremists thrive. Thus, radical Islamism will remain a threat globally -- and especially for Muslims themselves -- for decades.

 Font: Stratfor

I DRONI VANNO BENE E GL’INTERROGATORI CON TORTURA INVECE NO?



Barack Obama - Drone

John Rizzo, legale della Cia dopo l’11 settembre: “I terroristi catturati ci hanno fornito informazioni per prevenire attentati. Ora si spara dal cielo, ma i morti non parlano”.
Del resto i sondaggi dicono che il 71% degli americani accetta senza problemi le 2.500 vittime dei droni in Asia, mentre vive con rimorso Abu Grahib e Guantanamo…
Solo con la cattura e il sequestro del materiale in possesso  di gruppi "Terroristici" si possono avere informazioni utili all'Intelligence per sventare attacchi terroristici.
La nuova politica di ucciderli con i Droni, non permette all'Intelligence di avere materiale da analizzare e nemmeno di poter interrogare il "terrorista"...

IN MORTE DEL POLITICAMENTE CORRETTO – I DRONI VANNO BENE E GL’INTERROGATORI CON TORTURA INVECE NO? – L’EX AVVOCATO DELLA CIA ACCUSA: “L’IPOCRISIA DI OBAMA CI ESPONE A UN ATTACCO”


I terroristi vanno semplicemente uccisi o catturati e torturati per strappargli tutte le informazioni utili a salvare altre vite? Il quesito può sembrare tremendo e immorale, ma è brutalmente attuale. Soprattutto alla vigilia di un tredicesimo anniversario dell'11 settembre segnato dalla paura di un nuovo attacco. Soprattutto all'indomani della decapitazione di due cittadini americani che né la Cia, né le Forze Speciali sono riuscite a salvare. A riportare in auge parole come waterboarding e rendition sono le critiche a un'intelligence Usa accusata di non aver previsto l'ascesa dello Stato Islamico. E dietro le critiche si fa strada, negli Stati Uniti, la rivalutazione delle strategie adottate dall'amministrazione George W. Bush a fronte di un diffuso scetticismo nei confronti dei metodi adottati invece da Barack Obama.



Guantanamo: ecco le celle.
I prigionieri sono da considerare ad alto rischio,
in quanto composta da personaggi
sicuramente legati alle reti "TERRORISTICHE"
 qaedista e isis ect.

Il presidente democratico già all'indomani della sua prima elezione prese nettamente le distanze dalla strategia del predecessore. «Ritengo - disse allora Obama - che il waterbording sia una tortura e che sia stato un errore qualunque siano state le motivazioni legali e razionali». Il primo a riconoscere le inadeguatezze di un'intelligence incapace di prevedere la nascita di un Califfato del terrore tra Irak e Siria è però lo stesso Obama.

«Non c'è dubbio che la loro avanzata e i loro movimenti nel corso degli ultimi mesi - ammetteva ai primi d'agosto il presidente - sono stati molto più rapidi di quanto stimato dalla nostra intelligence». Alla base di questa impreparazione non vi sarebbe - secondo i critici dell'amministrazione Obama - solo la scelta di abbandonare l'Irak, ma anche quella di rinunciare agli «interrogatori intensificati» ovvero a vere e proprie tecniche di tortura capaci di far confessare i terroristi costringendoli a rivelare dettagli e connessioni impossibili da ottenere con altri metodi.

L'anno scorso l'avvocato John Rizzo, principale consulente legale della Cia dopo l'11 settembre, ricordava in un'intervista a Der Spiegel che la ragione per cui non si oppose all'adozione di tecniche d'interrogatorio molto prossime alla tortura fu la paura di un «nuovo attacco all'America». E soprattutto la paura di privilegiare i propri scrupoli morali a discapito di pratiche forse riprovevoli, ma capaci di salvare la vita di migliaia di americani. «Non avrei mai potuto convivere con l'idea che ...(dopo un nuovo attentato)... potesse saltar fuori che la Cia aveva preso in considerazione queste tecniche, ma io le avevo bloccate perché ritenevo troppo rischioso adottarle».

Interno del carcere di Guantanamo a Cuba

Alle certezze di Rizzo si contrappongono le analisi degli esperti d'intelligence che sottolineano da anni l'inaffidabilità delle confessioni estorte con la violenza per la tendenza di chi le subisce a soddisfare aspettative e richieste degli aguzzini. John Rizzo risponde ricordando, però, i successi ottenuti dopo l'11 settembre. «Grazie a quel programma - sostiene l'avvocato della Cia - non c'è stato un secondo attacco sul suolo americano e Bin Laden è stato ucciso. Stando comodamente seduti qui, tanti anni dopo, è troppo facile dire che lo si poteva ottenere anche senza ricorrere a quelle tecniche d'interrogatorio e senza il danno d'immagine pagato dagli Stati Uniti».

Proprio l'eccessiva considerazione per l'immagine esteriore e la maniacale attenzione ai canoni del «politicamente corretto» avrebbero spinto l'amministrazione Obama, secondo i suoi detrattori, ad adottare strategie non solo inefficaci dal punto di vista dei risultati, ma anche intrinsecamente immorale quanto le tecniche dell'era Bush. Al centro di questo dibattito c'è anche stavolta l'opzione «droni», ovvero la decisione di trasformare gli aerei senza pilota della Cia nella principale arma anti-terrorismo. Mentre il 71 per cento degli americani accetta senza problemi le 2500 vittime, tra terroristi e perdite collaterali, causate dai droni soltanto in Pakistan, gran parte dell'America continua a provare un senso di auto-riprovazione per le uscite da Abu Ghraib o Guantanamo.

La giornata trascorre così:
Colazione con possibilità di doccia
Visite mediche
Pranzo
Ora d'aria
Possibilità di scrivere lettere sotto la supervisione dei soldati,
con penne e carta fornite dai soldati, che vengono raccolte al termine
Pasto serale

«Questo perché l'immagine di un veicolo incenerito o di una casa distrutta non è sufficiente a farci realizzare - spiega Abu Bruce Hoffman, direttore del Centro per gli studi sulla Sicurezza dell'Università di Georgetown - che quella cosa capita a un esser umano come noi. In questi casi - spiega ancora Hoffman - non disponiamo degli stessi dettagli fornitici dagli articoli che ci spiegano con dovizia di particolari come Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, la mente dell'11 settembre, abbia subito il waterboarding per 183 volte di fila». Con una differenza. I terroristi uccisi dai droni non parlano. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, invece, contribuì con le sue rivelazioni alla sconfitta di Al Qaida e - nel lungo termine - all'uccisione di Bin Laden.

Found: The Islamic State's Terror Laptop of Doom...

Buried in a Dell computer captured in Syria are lessons for making bubonic plague bombs and missives on using weapons of mass destruction.

ANTAKYA, Turkey —
Abu Ali, a commander of a moderate Syrian rebel group in northern Syria, proudly shows a black laptop partly covered in dust. "We took it this year from an ISIS hideout," he says.
Abu Ali says the fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which have since rebranded themselves as the Islamic State, all fled before he and his men attacked the building. The attack occurred in January in a village in the Syrian province of Idlib, close to the border with Turkey, as part of a larger anti-ISIS offensive occurring at the time. "We found the laptop and the power cord in a room," he continued, "I took it with me. But I have no clue if it still works or if it contains anything interesting."

As we switched on the Dell laptop, it indeed still worked. Nor was it password-protected. But then came a huge disappointment: After we clicked on "My Computer," all the drives appeared empty.

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Upon closer inspection, the ISIS laptop wasn't empty at all: Buried in the "hidden files" section of the computer were 146 gigabytes of material, containing a total of 35,347 files in 2,367 folders. Abu Ali allowed us to copy all these files -- which included documents in French, English, and Arabic -- onto an external hard drive.

A screenshot of material found on the computer. The files appear to be videos of speeches by jihadist clerics.

The laptop's contents turn out to be a treasure trove of documents that provide ideological justifications for jihadi organizations -- and practical training on how to carry out the Islamic State's deadly campaigns. They include videos of Osama bin Laden, manuals on how to make bombs, instructions for stealing cars, and lessons on how to use disguises in order to avoid getting arrested while traveling from one jihadi hot spot to another.

But after hours upon hours of scrolling through the documents, it became clear that the ISIS laptop contains more than the typical propaganda and instruction manuals used by jihadists. The documents also suggest that the laptop's owner was teaching himself about the use of biological weaponry, in preparation for a potential attack that would have shocked the world.

The information on the laptop makes clear that its owner is a Tunisian national named Muhammed S. who joined ISIS in Syria and who studied chemistry and physics at two universities in Tunisia's northeast. Even more disturbing is how he planned to use that education:
The ISIS laptop contains a 19-page document in Arabic on how to develop biological weapons and how to weaponize the bubonic plague from infected animals.
                 "The advantage of biological weapons is that they do not cost a lot of money, while the human casualties can be huge," the document states.

The document includes instructions for how to test the weaponized disease safely, before it is used in a terrorist attack. "When the microbe is injected in small mice, the symptoms of the disease should start to appear within 24 hours," the document says.

The laptop also includes a 26-page fatwa, or Islamic ruling, on the usage of weapons of mass destruction. "If Muslims cannot defeat the kafir [unbelievers] in a different way, it is permissible to use weapons of mass destruction," states the fatwa by Saudi jihadi cleric Nasir al-Fahd, who is currently imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. "Even if it kills all of them and wipes them and their descendants off the face of the Earth."

When contacted by phone, a staff member at a Tunisian university listed on Muhammed's exam papers confirmed that he indeed studied chemistry and physics there. She said the university lost track of him after 2011, however.

A photo of Muhammed S. found on his laptop.
This image has been digitally altered. 

Out of the blue, she asked: “Did you find his papers inside Syria?” Asked why she would think that Muhammed’s belongings would have ended up in Syria, she answered, “For further questions about him, you better ask state security.”

An astonishing number of Tunisians have flocked to the Syrian battlefield since the revolt began. In June, Tunisia’s interior minister estimated that at least 2,400 Tunisians were fighting in the country, mostly as members of the Islamic State.

This isn't the first time that jihadists have attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even before the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda had experimented with a chemical weapons program in Afghanistan. In 2002, CNN obtained a tape showing al Qaeda members testing poison gas on three dogs, all of which died.

Nothing on the ISIS laptop, of course, suggests that the jihadists already possess these dangerous weapons. And any jihadi organization contemplating a bioterrorist attack will face many difficulties: Al Qaeda tried unsuccessfully for years to get its hands on such weapons, and the United States has devoted massive resources to preventing terrorists from making just this sort of breakthrough. The material on this laptop, however, is a reminder that jihadists are also hard at work at acquiring the weapons that could allow them to kill thousands of people with one blow.

"The real difficulty in all of these weapons ... [is] to actually have a workable distribution system that will kill a lot of people," said Magnus Ranstorp, research director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College. "But to produce quite scary weapons is certainly within [the Islamic State's] capabilities."

The Islamic State's sweeping gains in recent months may have provided it with the capacity to develop such new and dangerous weapons. Members of the jihadi group are not solely fighting on the front lines these days -- they also control substantial parts of Syria and Iraq. The fear now is that men like Muhammed could be quietly working behind the front lines -- for instance, in the Islamic State-controlled University of Mosul or in some laboratory in the Syrian city of Raqqa, the group's de facto capital -- to develop chemical or biological weapons.

In short, the longer the caliphate exists, the more likely it is that members with a science background will come up with something horrible. The documents found on the laptop of the Tunisian jihadist, meanwhile, leave no room for doubt about the group's deadly ambitions.

"Use small grenades with the virus, and throw them in closed areas like metros, soccer stadiums, or entertainment centers," the 19-page document on biological weapons advises. "Best to do it next to the air-conditioning. It also can be used during suicide operations."

Weapons of mass destruction are the holy grail for terrorist groups, and over the years a number of organizations have announced their intentions to acquire chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. But the discovery of a laptop purportedly belonging to a member of the Islamic State is raising new questions about whether the terrorist group, which U.S. officials say is more dangerous than al Qaeda, is poised to launch a WMD attack.
 
U.S. officials and terrorism experts said that the discovery of the laptop raises troubling questions about the Islamic State's intentions and its ability to conduct a WMD strike. But they urged caution, noting that the presence of documents on building biological weapons does not necessarily add up to an actual capability to use them.
 
"I wouldn't dismiss the idea of a WMD attack by terrorists," said Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "It's something we should guard against. But in terms of something I worry about, it's far down the list."
 
Still, the laptop and its more than 35,000 files provide a rare and unsettling window into the Islamist State's inner workings. One U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss developing intelligence, said the files on the laptop offer some of the most precise information to date on the Islamic State's WMD aspirations. The information indicates that the Islamic State likely now has the ability to build at least some form of biological or chemical weapon, the official said.
 
The laptop, which was examined by correspondents for Foreign Policy, contains thousands of files related to planning and launching terrorist attacks. Most troubling is a document that discusses how to weaponize bubonic plague. But turning that knowledge into a working weapon requires particular expertise, and it's not clear that the Islamic State has it.
 
"That they have the capabilities and intentions [to build some WMD] is beyond dispute," Gartenstein-Ross said. But the Islamic State would still face considerable obstacles if it actually attempted to build a weapon with bubonic plague. "It's a very dangerous thing to try to harness as an offensive weapon, in part because you might kill all your own guys in the process," Gartenstein-Ross said.
 
But the risk of building WMD hasn't blunted terrorists' ambition. Only last year, Iraqi officials broke up an al Qaeda cell in Iraq that attempted to build chemical weapons for attacks in the West. Chemical weapons are potentially less dangerous than weaponized biological agents, which is what makes the files on the Islamic State's laptop so concerning.

Terrorists will always make mistakes...

Il rapper jihadista Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary

Terrorists will always make mistakes...
... and it's usually those mistakes that bring them down.

When the ISIS terrorist who murdered James Foley went on video, he managed to give away enough clues that may lead to his identity, even though he was clad in black with his face almost entirely masked.

His accent indicates that he was from south/east London and his eyes may even narrow down the hunt. Authorities can scan tons of audio recordings in the UK and match eye features to those recorded in passport photos. They've determined his age to be around 30 and that he's probably left handed.

When Palestinian terrorists killed 11 Israeli athletes in the 1972 Olympics, the Mossad set out to identify, hunt down and kill those who committed the crime or had anything to do with it. Even though their faces were also masked, the Mossad identified who they were and managed to kill all but one of them, who is still alive till this day.

It will be interesting to see whether America's FBI or the UK's MI6 can accomplish the same thing. More likely, this terrorist will meet his doom either among the Iraqis or a missile attack by the US.


http://us.cnn.com/2014/08/22/world/europe/british-jihadi-hunt/index.html?hpt=hp_t1

ISIS: The Real Threat...

In recent months the Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has managed to position itself as the most significant threat to regional stability in the Middle East. The mass executions in Iraq and Syria reflect the shock and awe strategy used by the organization in the areas it has captured. In addition, its threats to conquer other Middle East states have resounded widely, giving it the media status of a global power in the making. Indeed, the Islamic State has made itself the de facto replacement of al-Qaeda as the jihadist terror organization endangering world peace. • This article examines whether the Islamic State is indeed a rising Islamic jihadist force about to seize control of several countries in this region as part of its plan to establish an Islamic caliphate, or whether it is an organization with limited means and abilities, whose pretensions exceed its real strength and are derived from the world view of its leader.

In recent months the Islamic State (IS; formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS) has managed to position itself as the most significant threat to regional stability in the Middle East. The organization has become a reviled global term, a synonym for extremism and a symbol of unbridled slaughter. The mass executions carried out by IS in Iraq and Syria, documented and distributed en masse for all to see, reflect the shock and awe strategy used by IS in the areas it has captured. In addition, its threats to conquer other Middle East states have resounded widely, giving it the media status of a global power in the making. In this way, IS has made itself the de facto replacement of al-Qaeda as the jihadist terror organization endangering world peace.

In light of these developments, this article examines whether IS is indeed a rising Islamic jihadist force about to seize control of several countries in this region as part of its plan to establish an Islamic caliphate, or whether it is an organization with limited means and abilities, whose pretensions exceed its real strength and are derived from the world view of its leader.

The brutal actions of IS in Syria and Iraq are nothing new for those following its evil deeds since it announced its establishment some eighteen months ago. However, for the last two months the organization’s name has been mentioned repeatedly by world leaders as a significant threat, particularly since in recent months ISIS has conquered large swathes of Iraq and also threatened to attack and capture Baghdad, on its way to taking control of all of Iraq. These moves were accompanied by killing sprees that were extraordinary in their scope and cruelty, and that in recent weeks reached new depths with the mass slaughter of the defenseless Yazidi minority.

 

 

Without minimizing the achievements of IS, it appears that the secret of its power rests primarily on the weakness of its enemies. So far, IS has made territorial gains only in Iraq and in limited areas of Syria, two failed states whose central governments suffer from a lack of legitimacy among their citizens and ineffective control of large parts of their territory. The Iraqi army has proven a spiritless failure, while in Syria the army is mainly engaged in maintaining the survival of the regime in the country’s principal cities. This power vacuum lets IS operate with relative freedom in outlying regions and towns. Yet while in the areas it has conquered IS has apparently encountered so little opposition due to its policy of coercion and terror against the local populations, in the long run it is actually this policy that could spur many to resist it. Most Sunni Muslims are not interested in the extreme interpretations of IS, but at this stage have no choice but to obey the organization, if only for the sake of appearances. Should IS try to extend its conquests to areas of Iraq where there is an established Shiite population, such as the capital Baghdad or the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, it may well encounter a fighting population protected by an Iranian military force and deeper involvement of Western countries, as happened when it threatened to penetrate the heart of the Kurdish region of Iraq. A similar response is expected to happen if IS dares to confront Jordan or Turkey. For that reason, its threats to make similar advances against other countries of the region – Jordan, Lebanon, and certainly Iran and Turkey – are weak.

In fact, the main danger posed by IS does not concern the integrity of countries in the region, but its ability both to channel money and advanced weapons to terror organizations active in the region, and to make the territory it controls, which connects western Iraq with northern and eastern Syria, an impervious haven. This could serve as a base for promoting subversive activity and spreading terror, which in turn would increase regional instability. An area of this sort controlled by an extremist, messianic organization such as IS will enable jihadist Salafist terror groups from all over the world to find refuge, and use it as their base for further terror activity. It will provide training, with people and weapons moving freely in and out, and will turn the al-Qaeda dream of two decades ago into the nightmare reality of this decade.

ISIS has managed to distinguish itself from other global jihadist movements that still support al-Qaeda in the bitter conflict between al-Zawahiri and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. By crowning himself caliph, Baghdadi labels anyone who does not recognize his new title and fails to obey him as a heretic. Thus it appears that in its ongoing activity in areas it has captured, IS has given new meaning to the term extremism, and this – ironically – casts al-Qaeda, the IS former patron and current enemy, in a relatively pragmatic light. IS fighters have crossed red lines and raised the already high threshold of brutality formerly pitched by al-Qaeda and its affiliates to new heights. This could become the norm in future conflicts, not only with IS but also with other terrorist organizations inspired by its methods, which at this stage appear to be successful. The thousands of young Muslims from all over the world, including Western citizens, who are present in war-torn areas in Syria and move between Syria and Iraq and participate in horrific acts in both these arenas are being indoctrinated and are acquiring battle experience and skills in terrorist and guerilla warfare, which could be translated into terrorist activity in their countries of origin. Therefore, special attention should be paid to the “evil spirit” and message that IS is spreading among its actual and potential supporters. They could continue causing harm even after the organization is ultimately blocked by stronger forces.

It appears that the fears recently expressed by the leaders of Britain, the US, and France about the export of terror from the Middle East to their own countries has a solid base. Even if IS, as expected, is confronted effectively in Iraq and Syria by stronger and better organized forces, the phenomenon of global jihad, whose main proponents until now were al-Qaeda and its affiliates and are now IS and its affiliates, will presumably continue to be strengthened by a new generation of jihadis. Their goal is to revive the international terror system that was to a large extent thwarted over the years since the September 11 attacks in the United States. It is inconceivable that thousands of young people from Western countries who are participating in the battles in Syria and Iraq will not return to their countries of origin and try to spread the militant jihadist Salafist indoctrination they have received. They stand to use their experience in terror attacks in Western cities, whether as part of IS or al-Qaeda, or by setting up independent terror networks or even acting alone. Therefore, the broad international coalition of countries that were called on belatedly to take action against the terror of al-Qaeda and its affiliates following the shock of 9/11 should now wake up in time to stop the IS phenomenon in its infancy, before they are obliged to do so under the threat of terror in their own cities.

 

 

Font: INSS Yoram Schweitzer

Is ISIS a Threat to the UK?

The murder of American journalist James Foley brought global attention to the menace of ISIS. But what kind of a threat does the group actually pose beyond the Levant?

The cruel beheading by a possibly British ISIS fighter of American journalist James Foley is the latest act of brutality by a group whose willingness to use such violence continues to reach new depths.

However, in the understandable consternation around the group and its activity, care should be taken to understand better the exact nature of the threat that this group poses. ISIS is working hard to try to overturn the current Westphalian order with its repeated invocations of destroying the Sykes-Picot borders of the Middle East and has quite successfully taken over an ever-expanding chunk of the Levant. The question is whether the group remains principally a regional threat or an international one.

The best answer is to look more closely at the group’s history. ISIS (or Islamic State as they refer to themselves) is a group that has waxed and waned over the years. Borne out of Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s group that he founded in Herat, Afghanistan in the late 1990s, it came to more international prominence in in August 2003 when they attacked the Jordanian Embassy and UN Headquarters in Baghdad and a Shia shrine in Najaf. In the process they killed hundreds including UN Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello and Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the SCIRI Party and one of the leaders of Shia Iraq. In time, the group, which in 2006 changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) to make it sound more Iraqi, suffered public blowback at its unremitting and brutal violence with the Sahwa ‘awakening’ movement as Sunni’s grew tired of the unremitting murder and sectarian tensions that ISI was stirring up.

But for all its brutality within Iraq, the group did not much stretch beyond its domestic borders. Under Zarqawi’s watch in November 2005 they launched a series of three coordinated attacks on Western hotels in Amman, Jordan, killing 60 and injuring over 100. It was possibly linked to some attempts to attack Israel, but these amounted to little. This notwithstanding the fact that the group had the technical expertise, contacts, and fighters to use as tools to launch attacks against the West or elsewhere.

 

The Threat Today

Cut to today and we have a group that has formally severed its links with Al Qa’ida and established a dominion of sorts over chunks of Iraq and Syria. A decade on, it is still resorting to sending political messages through the brutal and public beheading of American hostages. We have yet, however, to see confirmed evidence of the group actually launching attacks outside its immediate territory (beyond possible links to incidents elsewhere in the Levant). This is not to say that we have not seen plots emanate from foreign fighter networks linked to the group. Mehdi Nemmouche, a French national, had allegedly fought alongside ISIS for some time prior to returning to Europe where he took it upon himself to murder four people at the Jewish museum in Brussels. And while his was the only successful attack, at least four other plots have been disrupted within European borders in which individuals fought in Syria (and possibly Iraq) before coming back home and undertaking plotting clearly in the direction of trying to do something within Europe rather than back in the Levant.

But absent from these reported plots is much evidence of direction by ISIS. There have been suggestions of directed plots linked to Jabhat al Nusrah, but the information around these has been sketchy. Rather, it seems as though these plots for the most part seem to be undertaken by individuals who have battlefield experience and decide to come back and do something under their own steam. In many ways, this actually reflects the historical experience with foreigners who fight or train alongside groups in Iraq: Bilal Abdulla and Taimour Abdulwahab al Abdaly both spent some time in Iraq alongside the insurgency before heading back to the UK and Sweden respectively to try to carry out attacks. In neither case was their evidence produced of direction off the battlefield, though their cases illustrate clear examples of individuals that a group like ISIS could have used had it wanted to launch attacks against Europe.

 

A Menace, Yes. But is ISIS a Threat to the West?

It is clear that ISIS is a menace that leaders rightly focus on. It has the potential to upend the Middle East and cause death and misery to thousands. But it is not as of yet clear that it is a group with the desire and intent to launch itself against the West and Europe in particular. It has the means at its disposal to launch such attacks and has rhetorically threatened such attacks, but so far we have not seen these clearly materialise.

This is of course not to say that they might not take place. Clearly, ISIS is a group that has evolved over time, and it might yet evolve in a strategic direction that leads to a concerted effort to launch attacks against the West. But as we can see from the fact that in a decade of unleashing brutality, its approach to attracting publicity has little changed, it is possible that its aims and goals have equally shifted little and it continues to be more interested in regional ambitions. 

The significance of this distinction lies in the subsequent official reaction in Western capitals to the group. Foley’s brutal murder, like the group’s earlier gains in Iraq, were predictable, but were greeted with shock which mandated major response – a product of the relative inattention that was being paid to what was happening in Syria and Iraq. The danger is that in the absence of a clear plot linked to the group, attention might fade and the group will be seen as a regional irritation that can be managed, rather than an organisation that requires focused extrication and where possible eradication.

This difficult conclusion is one that will only be achieved over a lengthy and committed timeline involving a complicated array of bolstering local forces, cutting deals with tribes to undermine the group, as well as focused counter-terrorism efforts to eliminate leaders and cut off supply routes. More strategically, an inclusive government needs to be fostered in Iraq and the civil war in Syria needs to be brought to some resolution. None of these are easy solutions, but they are long-term solutions to what is necessary to finally bring some peace to the brutalised Levant.

Font: RUSI Analysis, 21 Aug 2014By
Raffaello Pantucci, Senior Research Fellow

Iraq: Examining the Professed Caliphate

A Kurdish soldier stands watch against Sunni militants outside
the city of Kirkuk. (Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

Summary

The Islamic State, previously known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, has changed its name, but otherwise the militant group remains the same. Over the past weekend, a spokesman for the group announced that it had established a caliphate stretching from Diyala province, Iraq, to Aleppo, Syria. The caliphate is a political institution that the Islamic State claims will govern the global Muslim community. "Iraq" and "Levant" have been dropped from the organization's name to reflect its new status.
The trouble with the announcement is that the Islamic State does not have a caliphate and probably never will. No amount of new monikers will change the fact that geography, political ideology and religious, cultural and ethnic differences will prevent the emergence of a singular polity capable of ruling the greater Middle East. Transnational jihadist groups can exploit weakened autocratic states, but they cannot institutionalize their power enough to govern such a large expanse of land. If anything, the Islamic State's drive to unify the Middle East will actually create more conflicts than it will end as competing emirates vie for power in the new political environment.
 

Analysis

In recent years, the term "caliphate" has become somewhat warped; it has become more of a slogan for radical Islamist groups than an actual political objective. Even the Islamic State, which has made impressive territorial gains quickly, has only an emirate, which encompasses a far smaller geographic area than a caliphate. Establishing an emirate is not terribly remarkable. Similar groups have established emirates before: The Taliban ruled more than 90 percent of Afghanistan prior to 9/11, and al Qaeda franchise groups oversaw short-lived emirates in Yemen and Mali.
Still, the Islamic State's announcement is the first serious attempt at re-establishing the caliphate since the institution was abolished in 1924 by the Turkish republic, which replaced the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Over the past 90 years, there have been a few attempts to revive the caliphate, but none were particularly successful. Notable examples include Hizb al-Tahrir, which rejects democracy and nationalism, and more recently, al Qaeda.

The Caliphate: Origin and Evolution

Caliphate is derived from the Arabic word for "successor," a designation for those who would govern the Muslim community after the Prophet Mohammed died. However, Mohammed did not appoint his political successor; such a person was supposed to be elected by the community. Differences quickly emerged as to who should lead the Muslims subsequently. One camp preferred Mohammed's closest associate, Abu Bakr, while another camp favored Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law, Ali. The group loyal to Abu Bakr would later be known as Sunni, and the group loyal to Ali would later be known as Shia.
But neither group knew exactly how it wanted a caliphate to function. Centuries later, the Shia developed a theory whereby the leadership of the community is not political, but rather divinely ordained. Even among the Sunnis, the caliphate was not a neatly outlined system of government. Their texts include only general principles for politics and governance; most practices were developed as the situation arose.
Abu Bakr eventually became the first successor, or "caliph," in 632. After roughly two years in office, he died of natural causes and another top lieutenant of Mohammed, Omar, took over. He was assassinated a decade later, but not before he appointed a council of six men to elect his replacement. They chose a man named Uthman, during whose tenure Islam saw its first significant, and violent, political disagreements, which ultimately led to Uthman's assassination.

Ali succeeded Uthman, but by that time the divisions within the caliphate had worsened beyond repair, leaving Ali to manage three separate civil wars. He, too, was later assassinated, bringing an end to what was known as the Rashidun caliphate and giving rise to the Umayyad caliphate.
As an institution, the caliphate would continue to be central to Islam for some time. But it declined well before the modern era. In Egypt, the Mamluks (1250-1517) kept the term caliphate more for religious symbolism than political necessity; their authority came from military power rather than from pledges of the faithful. Even the Ottoman Empire was more akin to a sultanate. It was not until 1517, when Sultan Selim I defeated the Mamluks, that the Ottoman sultans assumed the title of caliph. But even then, the caliphate lay dormant until Sultan Abdul-Hamid II unsuccessfully tried to revive it in 1876. When the caliphate was abolished in 1924, it had not really existed for centuries.
Truthfully, the caliphate was nearly always in flux. Even during the Abbasid era (749-1258), which is considered the golden age of the caliphate, autonomous and sometimes independent emirates and sultanates threatened the central government. The Abbasids overthrew the Ummayads, but the Ummayads maintained a rival caliphate on the Iberian Peninsula from 929 to 1031. At roughly the same time, another rival caliphate led by the Fatimid dynasty based itself in Cairo (909-1171).
In actuality, a single entity able to rule the entire Muslim world did not exist but for a brief period of early Islamic history. Geography constrained every regime. For a while, the caliphs in Medina, Kufa, Damascus, and Baghdad ruled large expanses through a sort of provincial system, but over time provincial rulers accrued power and in some cases independence. These rulers would sometimes ally with the caliph, but their loyalties would change as other power centers emerged.

Resurrecting the Caliphate

As a concept, the caliphate has evolved throughout history. The basis for Sunni jurisprudence was formed during Mohammed's rule and the Rashidun era. But interestingly, no caliphate ever referred to itself as the "Islamic State," though the Ottomans adorned honorific names like "The Exalted State." The notion of an Islamic state is actually a modern development, a response to the rise of the secular nation-state.
Of course, not all Muslims advocate the creation of an Islamic state any more than they reject the nation-state. And even those that do agree in principle may disagree on the methods used to create it. Radical groups like Hizb al-Tahrir and the Islamic State want to replace the nation-state with a caliphate. Moderates may take a more measured approach.
But all this points to a larger issue: The role of Islam in politics remains unsettled. Most Muslims have embraced such ideals as nationalism, republicanism and democracy. But radical groups are as relevant as ever, due in no small part to the rise of secular authoritarianism, Islamism, the failure of Arab/Muslim states to build viable political economies, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S. wars in the Muslim world. These issues have helped militant Islamists drum up support, vying for a return to the past by restoring the caliphate.

Until now, calls for its restoration were disregarded as propaganda. In light of the Syrian civil war and the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, such calls are arguably much more significant. The Islamic State knows it probably cannot create a caliphate, but simply saying as much benefits the group tactically: It stokes fear in the West and, considering it was announced during the first weekend of Ramadan, it appeals to Muslim sensibilities.
Plenty of Muslims, Islamists and jihadists reject the Islamic State. But for now, the group wants to use the caliphate to consolidate control over newly acquired territory. In the long run, the declaration of the caliphate also helps the group to resurrect the concept in political discourse, especially as the region is in such disarray. The Islamic State knows the declaration of a caliphate and a caliph is an issue that the Muslim world will have to address as it reconciles the role of Islam in politics.
   

UPDATED:

Barak Obama just released Islamic terrorists from GITMO, exchanging the murderers for a soldier who ended up in enemy hands five years ago amidst unexplained circumstances. Obama glowingly suggests now that he succeeded in negotiating with terrorists to seal the deal, violating America's agreement with our allies that we would not be so reckless, short-sighted and stupid as to negotiate with terrorists – and now these Islamists who hate us are free to go about their business of killing us. Meanwhile, we have a U.S. Marine detained in Mexico who is ignored by Obama – it's like someone said: "our Marine is the ONLY one Obama won't let cross the border." Obama needs to hop on Air Force One and visit our neighbors to the south to seal THAT deal because surely the Commander-in-Chief lives up to his word and 230 years of U.S. Military ethos promising we "leave no one behind."

This feel-good story doesn't feel real good, America. The timing of this is to distract from the VA scandals and other Obama Error disasters. Now more than ever we need a cornerstone of our democracy to do its job and get the answers to what the devil is going on in the White House. Media, that would be you. You prove yourselves idiots if you take for an answer that there's nothing amiss on this one either, "not even a smidgen."

As for the released soldier, let's hope he can enjoy his freedom back home. It would be wonderful for him to make it back to Idaho in time for Father's Day. Perhaps around a traditional all-American barbeque for pops, he can convince his dad there's no need to continue his anti-American rants that tear the fabric of the flag to which his son pledged allegiance.

See this article for more on that:
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/06/01/Was-the-Taliban-Telling-The-Truth-About-Sgt-Bergdahl

White House Breaks the Law Releasing These Gitmo Terrorists, Of Course Claims “Exigent Circumstances”

These concerns were passed on to me today. There will be much follow up on this very concerning situation, if the media does it's job. Let's have faith that light will shine truth in all this, via media or elected Republican leaders who are now asking questions about the Obama Administration's continual disregard for law. What do you think?

“The current Democrat administration has just released the 5 most dangerous detainees held at Gitmo in exchange for Army SGT Bowe Bergdahl. The terrorists which Obama approved for release are high ranking Taliban leaders and are responsible for murdering countless Americans (these 5 are also credited with forging working relationships with the terror group Al Qaeda in a joint effort to slaughter as many Americans as possible).

So let's get this straight, Democrats admit to breaking the law, again, (with justification of course) all in an effort to free Islamic butchers so they can pick up where they left off in terrorizing and murdering Americans and innocents around the globe.”

This concerned American also linked the following:
http://www.redflagnews.com/headlines/very-suspicious-you-wont-believe-what-freed-pows-father-tweets-then-deletes

I've been to the beautiful state of Idaho many times; t'was born there. Can't recall EVER thinking it was much like Afghanistan.

Font: Sarah Palin

Agente de la CIA que avisó del golpe cuenta cómo operó durante el gobierno de Allende...

Relato coincide con publicación histórica del Departamento de Estado...

  Esta semana se conocieron dos publicaciones importantes acerca del rol de Estados Unidos en el golpe de 1973. Un volumen de más de mil páginas del Departamento de Estado hace una recopilación histórica de documentos sobre la relación con Chile entre 1969 y 1973, y el relato de un agente encubierto de la CIA revela detalles de cómo operaba la agencia de inteligencia en Santiago, incluyendo la relación con el diario El Mercurio.



“Un intento de golpe tendrá lugar el 11 de Septiembre”, escribió el ex agente de la CIA Jack Devine el 9 de septiembre de 1973, luego de recibir el dato de un empresario y ex oficial naval. El cable fue clasificado como “crítico”, lo que según Devine significa que el entonces Presidente Richard Nixon lo recibió inmediatamente, enterándose dos días antes del golpe que se preparaba en Santiago de Chile (ver documento desclasificado en 1999). El relato es parte de una crónica titulada “Lo que realmente pasó en Chile”, publicada este 22 de mayo en el sitio web de la revista Foreign Affairs como parte del especial “Lo que realmente pasó: Resolviendo los casos no aclarados de la Guerra Fría”.

La publicación apareció un día antes de que el Departamento de Estado diera a conocer el relato histórico del gobierno estadounidense sobre la relación con Chile entre 1969 y 1973. El volumen tiene 1045 páginas y fue elaborado con fuentes oficiales de la época, como los cables que enviaba el embajador Edward Korry, llamados “Korrygrams”, entre muchas otras. Detalla la relación con el gobierno de Eduardo Frei Montalva, la elección de Allende, el apoyo a sus opositores y el rol de la CIA, entre otros hechos que llevaron al derrocamiento del presidente socialista.

Un relato mucho más informal es en cambio el que hace Devine en su artículo, pero que devela también detalles cotidianos de cómo operó la CIA en Chile durante el gobierno de Allende. Si bien el ex agente afirma que “la CIA no complotó con los militares chilenos para derrocar a Allende en 1973”, su narración da cuenta del activo rol que tuvo la agencia estadounidense en financiar y promover los hechos que culminaron con el golpe de estado.

UN AGENTE EN SANTIAGO

Jack Devine era un joven cuya primera destinación internacional fue la de agente encubierto de la CIA en Santiago durante el gobierno de Allende. “Era exactamente el tipo de lugar en que cualquier nuevo agente operativo de la CIA quiere estar”, escribe Devine 40 años más tarde. Según su versión, los oficiales de la agencia destinados en Santiago eran poco entusiastas ante la idea de un golpe y no lo ocultaban, pero el propio director de la CIA Richard Helms envió al jefe de operaciones encubiertas a Santiago “para decirle al jefe de la estación que si no estaba preparado para presionar por un golpe podía volver a Estados Unidos en ese mismo momento”.

El agente también tenía entre sus funciones manejar la “cuenta de medios” de la agencia en Chile, particularmente la relación con El Mercurio (ver reportaje de CIPER sobre la relación de la CIA con El Mercurio para desestabilizar a Allende). Según Devine, el problema del dueño del periódico, Agustín Edwards, era que temía que Allende lo expropiara y tomara el control de los medios, “lo que lo hacía un aliado natural para la agencia”. En ojos de Devine, el diario no usaba propaganda para engañar a los lectores sobre las políticas de Allende, pero sí enfatizaba las historias sobre las estatizaciones, las acciones violentas y el desastre economico.

El agente recalca que la CIA no se metía en la parte editorial de El Mercurio y sólo se reunía con el área gerencial porque no le interesaba cooptar al diario, sino asegurar que existiera la libertad de prensa. El bloqueo del acceso al papel, el retiro del avisaje y las movilizaciones laborales, asegura Devine, fueron lo que gatillaron que “la agencia le diera al diario alrededor de US$ 2 millones a lo largo de dos años, lo que le permitió seguir publicando”.

Devine reconoce el importante rol de la CIA en la agitación política durante el gobierno de Allende. Y si bien no revela grandes operaciones, sí cuenta una anécdota significativa: Una de sus fuentes era una mujer mayor, de clase media, a la que le entregó “varios cientos de dólares” para organizara una manifestación de mujeres con cacerolas vacías para protestar por la falta de alimentos. “Sonaba como una buena idea que al menos justificaba una pequeña inversión”, dice, pero no pensó que reuniría a miles de personas y se transformaría en la primera “Marcha de las cacerola” contra la UP. “Allende trató de mitigar el daño sugiriendo que Estados Unidos estaba detrás de las marchas. Por supuesto, en algún grado tenía razón”, dice el agente, pero ya no era una táctica efectiva.

“Mi tía murió”, era según Devine la frase clave de sus fuentes para anunciar que el golpe estaba en curso y meses antes un “mi tía está enferma y puede no recuperarse” los hizo creer que faltaba poco, pero no pasó nada. Para septiembre de 1973 habían perdido credibilidad estos anuncios en Washington. Por eso creían que el memo que mandó el 9 de septiembre podía ser otro error.

En la víspera del golpe un equipo se quedó a la espera de todos modos. “El bebé nacerá mañana”, fue un mensaje anónimo que recibieron esa noche por teléfono y que no respondía a ningún código previamente acordado. “El tío Jonás estará en la ciudad mañana”, fue otro recado que entre muchos otros de esa noche. Recién a los 8 Am supieron que los preparativos del golpe habían partido en Valparaíso.

“Nixon y su consejero de seguridad nacional, Henry Kissinger, estaban complacidos. También lo estaba la CIA: contra toda probabilidad, la estación en Santiago ayudó a crear el clima para un golpe sin teñir el esfuerzo al involucrarse directamente”, dice Devine. Estaban orgullosos de haber evitado una nueva Cuba en América Latina y él también lo estaba, pero le duró poco.

Después del golpe, se juntó con un socialista que era su fuente. Vio las cicatrices y marcas que tenía después de las sesiones de tortura a las que había sido sometido. Ya el 24 de septiembre la CIA informaba a Washington de los asesinatos en operaciones de limpieza contra los opositores y en octubre reportaban al menos 1,600 muertos. “Mis compañeros en la CIA y yo estábamos seriamente desilusionados por la brutalidad y la represión del régimen de Pinochet”, dice Devine hoy, quien aunque reconoce que el asunto le perturba, mantiene la fe en el potencial que tenía la acción encubierta. Es, de todos modos, una lección a tomar en cuenta para futuras operaciones de Estados Unidos, cree el ex agente.

LA HISTORIA OFICIAL

A diferencia del relato de Devine, que está lleno de detalles personales, el volumen que el Departamento de Estado dio a conocer este viernes 23 de mayo es una visión histórica y oficial del rol de Estados Unidos en el golpe. Aunque la gran mayoría de los documentos ya habían sido desclasificados y analizados por especialistas como Peter Kornbluh del National Security Archive, la nueva publicación organiza la información cronológicamente y por episodios, siempre desde el punto de vista de la diplomacia de Estados Unidos.

De acuerdo al National Security Archive, uno de los documentos desclasificados revela cómo Estados Unidos empezó aplanear el bloqueo de la elección de Allende mucho antes de la votación misma, el 4 de septiembre de 1970. Una minuta del 19 de agosto de ese año señala que Kissinger pidió a la CIA “que el plan fuera tan preciso como fuera posible e incluyera que órdenes serían dadas el 5 de septiembre, a quién y cómo”, de modo de evitar que el Congreso ratificara a Allende.

Además de los siempre interesantes detalles sobre el involucramiento de Nixon y de Kissinger en el derrocamiento de Allende, un episodio sabroso es el de “Los Plomeros”, que reúne todos los antecedentes oficiales sobre la supuesta vinculación entre el caso Watergate y el robo que sufrió la embajada chilena en Washington un fin de semana de mayo de 1972. El incidente había sido calificado de serio, pues no se habían robado nada de valor –unas radios, un número indeterminado de documentos y libros–, lo que hacía pensar que no se trataba de un delito común. Sin embargo, no sería hasta enero del año siguiente que se vincularía este robo con “Los Plomeros”, como eran conocidos los integrantes de un equipo de investigación encubierto de la Casa Blanca durante el caso Watergate.

El robo también fue investigado por la comisión Church del Congreso de Estados Unidos, bajo la premisa de que la que podría estar detrás era la empresa ITT, involucrada en actos contra el gobierno de Allende. Sin embargo, la comisión recibió testimonios de que alguien con fuentes en la comunidad cubana reveló que Frank Sturgis, Eugenio Martínez y Virgilio González –todos involucrados en el caso Watergate– habían entrado a la embajada chilena a fotografiar documentos. Las grabaciones secretas de la oficina de Nixon dan cuenta de que el presidente también creía que estaba vinculado con la irrupción en las oficinas demócratas del edificio Watergate que dio origen al caso del mismo nombre. Si bien nunca hubo evidencia concluyente, el fiscal especial para el caso Watergate concluyó que había factores circunstanciales que “sugieren fuertemente” que ambos hechos estaban vinculados.

El episodio de “Los Plomeros” aparece en el cuarto de los cinco capítulos del informe histórico del Departamento de Estado y que se dividen así: “Una democracia ruidosa: El declive de Eduardo Frei (enero-diciembre, 1969)”; “Una operación arruinada: La elección presidencial de 1970”(1 de enero-4 de septiembre, 1970); “Dos Tracks: La intervención de Estados Unidos en la confirmación del presidente chileno” (5 de septiembre-4 de noviembre, 1970); “Fría y correcta: La respuesta de Estados Unidos a la administración de Allende” (5 de noviembre, 1070-31 de diciembre, 1972); “Este tipo chileno puede tener algunos problemas: La caída de Salvador Allende” (enero-septiembre, 1973). El informe completo puede descargarse aquí.

Aún falta la segunda parte, que analizará el periodo 1973-1976, y que sería dada a conocer en los próximos meses. “El próximo volumen podría avanzar en el registro histórico sobre el apoyo de la CIA a la DINA, el conocimiento de la CIA sobre la Operación Cóndor y el acto de terrorismo internacional de Pinochet en Washington que asesinó al ex canciller Orlando Letelier y a Ronni Karpen Moffit”, dijo Kornbluh.



Font: Francisca Skoknic en Actualidad y Entrevistas 
 Publicado: 23.05.2014

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Following the revelations on the so-called Datagate scandal, an unsparing comment by the British Secret Services on their Italian counterparts made the headlines. According to her majesty's 007s, Italy did not take part in a European mass surveillance telecommunications network - run by the British GCHQ (the government agency charged with signals intelligence, SIGINT) together with Germany, Sweden, France and Spain - because "Italians are incompetent and are not willing to collaborate between them".

 

There are two reasons why the British have no competence or knowledge to assess, from a technical point of view, whether the Italians are truly incompetent. The first one is that SIGINT activities are the most covert aspect of any intelligence agency's operations (and thus it is quite hard for competitors to have enough evidence on this subject). Secondly, such an activity is shared solely among those Secret Services that are traditionally collaborative. And this is not the case in the relationship between the British (MI-5 or MI-6 for whom the GCHQ works) and the Italians.

 

The "lack" of collaboration between Italian and British intelligence agencies is the result of past diffidence, British snobbish attitude, asymmetric collaboration requests and, lastly, the fact that the English are part of a global intelligence network (especially in the interception of communications) run by the United States (and that features other loyal anglo-saxons as the Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders). From the Italian's point of view, it is thus more worthwhile collaborating directly with the Americans that with their subordinates. It should also be noted that the U.S. have a greater leverage on Italian politics when it comes to rewarding faithful collaborators within the Italian intelligence agencies with promotions and honors (as is the case with some current heads of those institutions).

 

There are then also the limits imposed on the Services' activities by Italian law. Interceptions and wiretaps require the approval of a judge. It is hence difficult for any Italian intelligence agency to serenely operate in international mass surveillance with the danger of facing prosecution from authorities at home.

 

Probably the only true accusation formulated by the British is the contentious nature of the relationship between AISE, Italy's external intelligence agency, and AISI, the homeland intelligence agency. This is unfortunately a recurrent aspect. The conflict between the two agencies is the result of their history.

 

 

 

Law n. 801 of 1977

 

Exactly on October 24 1977, the Italian Parliament passed a new law, n. 801/1977, whose intent was to discipline Italy's entire intelligence apparatus. SID (Defense Information Service), then under the Defense Chief of Staffs, was dissolved and two parallel organisms were created: SISMI (Military Security Information Service) and SISDE (Democratic Security Information Service).

 

The reason behind such a decoupling lied in the logic guiding those who had wanted this reform: the creation of two organism instead of one meant, de facto, weakening the power of an intelligence structure that in the past had been accused of plots, deviations, coup d'états and a series of negative acts undermining the safeguard of democracy. This pushed the two neo-born Services to not being philosophically inclined to collaboration, but rather to competition (that also postulated the reciprocal "control" over one another's activities). Another qualifying element was that now intelligence activities were taken away from the military, that had had exclusive control over them until then, and put them under the aegis of two Ministries: Defense (for SISMI) and Interior (SISDE). Law 801 also designated the Prime Minister as the person politically responsible for intelligence activities. The PM would then delegate their control to a dedicated Under Secretary. But, as a matter of fact, both intelligence structures also referred to their designated Ministries, also lead by politicians. An institutional mishmash that definitely did not favor cooperation or synergies.

 

Whether this contraption really guaranteed the democratic hold over intelligence activities is debatable. The only certain fact in 1977 was that, at least contextually, the operative unity of intelligence gathering was weakened. It is also true that law 801 set the creation of a coordination organism, CESIS (Executive Committee for Information and Security Services), but over the years this structure has performed a merely bureaucratic function. It basically acted as a secretariat for the Under Secretary delegated with the control over intelligence. The truth is CESIS has never controlled neither of the Secret Services and both have kept a constant conflicting competition.

 

But those who drafted the law wanted politics to take over and control intelligence activities. Whether this happened in a disorderly and organically debatable way was of little importance.

 

 

A controversial history

 

This was the nemesis of the history of Italian intelligence agencies. A past filled with suspicions, insinuations and political maneuvers that regularly called for cleansing, controls and democratic tests. 

                

It had been the so for SIM (Military Information Service) first, dissolved after the war (in the intention of "cleansing" fascist era infiltrations), then for SIFAR (Armed Forces Information Service), abolished in 1965 (following the accusations against Gen. Giovanni De Lorenzo of organizing a coup), and finally for SID, decoupled on the wave of suspicions and allegations into SISMI and SISDE in 1977.

 

The ordeal did not cease after this reform because on March 17 1981 a list of people belonging to the masonic lodge of the Great Orient of Italy (Propaganda 2, aka P2) was found. In it were the names of 962 individuals, 208 out of them were army officials, including the heads of all intelligence agencies (Walter Pelosi from CESIS, Giuseppe Santovito from SISMI and Giulio Grassini from SISDE). This showed how the decoupling of intelligence activities had not granted their democratic reliability. In fact, the P2 had provided a masonic reply to the weakening of the Services' operations.

 

Nevertheless, and this is the core of the British accusations, the competition between the two intelligence structures that started in 1977 has continued until the present day.

 

It was immediately evident that the division envisioned by the 1977 bill between a Service dedicated to operations abroad, SISMI (that still maintained the control over counterespionage and anti-proliferation on national soil), and its domestic counterpart, SISDE, was a hybrid difficult to solve. Both Services initially created and maintained their own information structures abroad and at home. During Riccardo Malpica's tenure, chief of SISDE from 1987 until 1991, the attempts to place men outside Italy were subject to continuous reprisals from SISMI, formally the only structure allowed to be present abroad. The same happened, in a regime of reciprocation, for SISMI's activities at home.

 

The duel between these two parallel structures also had an impact on the relationship with foreign intelligence Services. Both SISMI and SISDE negotiated their own collaborations, information exchange programs, contacts and channels of communication without letting their competitor know about the contents and the deals signed. This has lead not only to a squandering of energies and resources, but also to a discrepancy in the contents that were time after time exchanged with their foreign counterparts. All of this has created the paradox that some joint operations were carried out in parallel and both SISMI and SISDE were unaware of what the other was doing. The same happened for foreign delegations invited to Italy without the other agency's prior knowledge, or for training courses and supplies provided in a framework of national competition. This void was often exploited by some foreign intelligence Services that have tried to capitalize on informations and collaborations.

 

Giuseppe Santovito

The 2007 reform

 

 

Given such a picture and after three decades of negative experience, the Italian political class decided to restore some order in this issue. The new semantic configuration has turned the Services into "Agencies": AISE (Agency for Informations and External Security) and AISI (Agency for Informations and Internal Security).

 

Law n. 124 of August 3 2007 has maintained the division of tasks between those operating abroad (AISE) and those working on domestic soil (AISI). The distinction is based on a "territorial" criteria, rather than on "operational assignments". The result is that some structures and duties that once belonged to SISMI (now AISE) - mainly counterespionage - were passed onto AISI. Obviously, first those structures dedicated to these tasks were dismantled (officially they merged with the new Agency), as if this were a normal procedure regarding men and their assignments.

 

By doing so, a delicate job, made of secret operations, sometimes on the legal borderline, that employs qualified sources operating on a confidential basis that are not easily passed on from one organization to another or even from one overseer to another, was totally disregarded. But this was an aspect that had no value for both the politician and the legislator. The result is that several tasks were passed on lacking all the know how that made them efficient.

 

The legislator also intervened on the pair "territory"-"operational assignments" with one exception: anti-proliferation activities. They remained in the hands of AISE also on national soil. This waiver was the result of American and Israeli pressure to maintain a structure with which they had built, over time, a preferential relationship (mainly with its chiefs that have been supported in a brilliant career).

 

One of the benefits of law n. 124/2007 was that it took the two agencies away from the aegis of their respective ministries (Interior and Defense), reassigning the responsibility of their operations directly to the Prime Minister. By doing so, at least one political filter over the operations of the two Agencies was removed and determined efforts were made towards the coordination between these two organisms. In fact, the old CESIS was replaced by the DIS (Department for Information and Security), whose power to control over the two Agencies was increased.

 

This does not mean contradictions have not emerged: a unique training school was founded under the DIS, but some operational trainings were assigned to the Agencies. The same effort lead to the unification under a unique administration of the two Agencies, even though the management of the "reserved" portion of their budget - that is out of ordinary administrative channels and represents the most substantial part of available funds - was left to the Agencies. Even though employment proposals have to come from the Agencies themselves, recruitment and logistics have also been centralized. In practice, instead of centralizing and optimizing resources and activities, the reform has given room to a duplication of structures.

 

One last observation concerns the fact that the chief of the new-born DIS is not an intelligence expert, someone knowledgeable of how Agencies operate and sensible to the problems arising from overlapping tasks. It surely wasn't a technical choice to assign the post to Ambassador Giampiero Massolo, whose diplomatic career solely features, in an early age, a two year experience in Moscow (where he could have learnt the ropes in a post where intelligence is strongly supportive of diplomacy). He landed at the head of DIS for an internal row at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Massolo was Secretary General at the Farnesina and his role, rank and seniority were superior to those of Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata, former Italian ambassador to Washington DC, that had been named Minister of Foreign Affair by Mario Monti's technocratic government. There was hence an "incompatibility" that was solved by assigning Giampiero Massolo at the DIS. The usual technique of "promoveatur ut amoveatur".



Giampiero Massolo

Putting aside the dissertation on the congruity in the hiring of the heads of the Services, the latent conflict between the two Agencies is still unsolved and strikes a sour note. To this regard, law n. 124 of 2007 outlines mechanisms, provides directives and methods, but is still incapable of unraveling the veil of distrust and competition that hinders any hypothesis of bilateral collaboration.

 

The link between the Agencies and their former respective Ministries has remained, also because two military officials lead the two organizations and they still value gravitating towards those entities they belonged to or were hired by previously. Also in this case, and especially during the tenure of Admiral Bruno Branciforte (AISE) and of Giorgio Piccirillo (AISI), the competition was transferred to their respective ministries (Defense and Interior) and between the Ministers themselves. The "fight" was over illegal immigration, that both politicians wanted to use for personal political gains. This circumstance prevented the flow of information on an issue regarding transnational crimes. This happened, for example, with the Italian police officials based in Tripoli with regard to the Agency's representatives in Libya. During that same period, a guideline issued by the chiefs of AISI concerning the escort of the Prime Minister (a task assigned to AISI) forbad contacting AISE representatives during the PMs trips abroad.

 

For what we know, such a state of the art is still unchanged, as indirectly confirmed by the British intelligence Services.