As Caliphates Compete, Radical Islam Will Eventually Weaken...

A still from a video released by Nigerian militant group Boko
 Haram in February shows leader A
bubakar Shekau surrounded by numerous armed militants.

Summary

The rise of the Islamic State will inspire other jihadist groups to claim their own caliphates and emirates. In the long run, the extremism of these contrived dominions and the competition among them will undermine the jihadist movement. However, before that happens, the world will witness much upheaval.

Analysis

In a 52-minute video that surfaced in late August, Abubakar Shekau, the head of Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram, spoke of an Islamic State in northeastern Nigeria. The statement came two months after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the chief of the transnational jihadist movement in Syria and Iraq, declared the re-establishment of the caliphate, renaming the group the Islamic State. Though likely inspired by the Islamic State, Boko Haram is not simply mimicking its more powerful Syrian-Iraqi counterpart; it is taking its cue from the Nigeria-based Sokoto Caliphate, which was established in the early 1800s and existed for almost a century until Britain gained control of the region.

The Caliphate's Role in History

According to classical Muslim political theorists, there can be only one caliphate for the entire Muslim global community, or ummah. In practice, though, there have been rival claimants to authority and even competing caliphates throughout the history of Islam. In our July 1 analysis on the subject, Stratfor explained not only how multiple emirates and sultanates emerged independently of the caliphate but also that there were rival caliphates -- for example, the Abbasid in Baghdad (749-1258), Umayyad in the Iberian Peninsula (929-1031) and Fatimid in Cairo (909-1171).

These medieval-era caliphates were not just the byproduct of geographical constraints facing the original caliphate but also heavily shaped by political and religious rivalries and political evolution. These dynastic empires were the building blocks of the Muslim world, not unlike the wider international system of the time. For this reason, they endured for centuries until Europe's geopolitical push into the Muslim world in the 18th century.

I

n the past two centuries, the medieval caliphates, emirates and sultanates have been replaced by nation-states. Though artificially created and weak, these modern Muslim polities are unlikely to be swept away by radical Islamists seeking to re-establish caliphates and emirates. Although nationalism was initially a European import into the Arab/Muslim world and continues to face competition from religious and tribal identities, it is well established in the public psyche.
This can be seen in the organization of most Islamists along national lines. Most Islamists, who are aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood or some variant of it, embrace the nation-state and should not be conflated with the minority of radical Islamists and jihadists who seek to eliminate national boundaries and return to a romanticized notion of the past. Still, caliphates and emirates have emerged because of the failures of the modern Muslim nation-states to create democratic systems and, more broadly, to provide a viable political economy for their citizens -- a failure that radical Islamist forces have deftly exploited.

Deficiencies in Modern Caliphates

Radical Islamists are able to capture the imagination of the economically disadvantaged youth who understand neither politics nor Islam. The most successful jihadist entity in terms of capturing territory, the Islamic State, rose in part because of rare circumstances related to the regional geopolitical struggle between the Shiite and Sunni camps in the Middle East. However, as is evident from the international alignment of forces against the Islamic State, the transnational jihadist movement faces severe challenges moving forward.
In addition, its ultra-extremist policies and behavior are further alienating the Islamic State from the Muslim world. Al Qaeda's denunciation of the Islamic State as a deviant force underscores the competition it faces from within the jihadist movement. Furthermore, there is an entire constellation of radical Islamists beyond al Qaeda that does not accept the Islamic State's claim to a caliphate. These Islamists will seek to form their own caliphates or emirates in the same battle spaces. Meanwhile, other groups operating in different parts of the Muslim world seek to form their own caliphates.
An important concept in this context is that of the leader of the faithful, or emir al-momineen, which was the title given to the second caliph of Islam, Omar bin al-Khattab (579-644). Since then, this title has become synonymous with that of the caliph. In the contemporary age, Afghan Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar assumed the title in the 1990s, when the movement ruled most of Afghanistan. Decades earlier, Morocco's constitution conferred this title upon the country's monarch.
Morocco's king only claims leadership of the country's Muslim majority. Likewise, the Afghan Taliban's status as a nationalist jihadist force meant that Mullah Omar only claimed leadership of the Muslims of Afghanistan. Al-Baghdadi's move to declare himself caliph of all the Muslims of the world therefore challenges the authority of the emirates and dynastical or republican regimes in the Islamic world.

The Fate of Jihadists and Caliphates

In the distant future, radical Islamism will likely lose its appeal because of two broad factors. First, the attempt to create caliphates and the associated difficulties of governance will force many radical Islamists to opt for pragmatism and become relatively moderate. Second, opposition from fellow Muslims also learning about politics and governance will give them less room to operate.
Yet, while this modern phenomenon of competing caliphates, emirates or Islamic states will only further weaken jihadist groups, the idea of the caliphate remains an unresolved matter. Muslims have long accepted that the notion does not connote a single state for the ummah; instead it symbolizes pan-Muslim cooperation in the form of a supra-national regime such as the European Union. This remains a desirable goal, as is evident from the Organization of Islamic Conference which, though anemic, remains intact.
Still, these developments will be the outcome of a multigenerational struggle. Until then, the social, political and economic problems of the Arab/Muslim world, along with sectarian strife, geopolitical rivalries and the interests of outside powers (especially the United States and the West), will sustain the conditions in which violent extremists thrive. Thus, radical Islamism will remain a threat globally -- and especially for Muslims themselves -- for decades.

 Font: Stratfor

I DRONI VANNO BENE E GL’INTERROGATORI CON TORTURA INVECE NO?



Barack Obama - Drone

John Rizzo, legale della Cia dopo l’11 settembre: “I terroristi catturati ci hanno fornito informazioni per prevenire attentati. Ora si spara dal cielo, ma i morti non parlano”.
Del resto i sondaggi dicono che il 71% degli americani accetta senza problemi le 2.500 vittime dei droni in Asia, mentre vive con rimorso Abu Grahib e Guantanamo…
Solo con la cattura e il sequestro del materiale in possesso  di gruppi "Terroristici" si possono avere informazioni utili all'Intelligence per sventare attacchi terroristici.
La nuova politica di ucciderli con i Droni, non permette all'Intelligence di avere materiale da analizzare e nemmeno di poter interrogare il "terrorista"...

IN MORTE DEL POLITICAMENTE CORRETTO – I DRONI VANNO BENE E GL’INTERROGATORI CON TORTURA INVECE NO? – L’EX AVVOCATO DELLA CIA ACCUSA: “L’IPOCRISIA DI OBAMA CI ESPONE A UN ATTACCO”


I terroristi vanno semplicemente uccisi o catturati e torturati per strappargli tutte le informazioni utili a salvare altre vite? Il quesito può sembrare tremendo e immorale, ma è brutalmente attuale. Soprattutto alla vigilia di un tredicesimo anniversario dell'11 settembre segnato dalla paura di un nuovo attacco. Soprattutto all'indomani della decapitazione di due cittadini americani che né la Cia, né le Forze Speciali sono riuscite a salvare. A riportare in auge parole come waterboarding e rendition sono le critiche a un'intelligence Usa accusata di non aver previsto l'ascesa dello Stato Islamico. E dietro le critiche si fa strada, negli Stati Uniti, la rivalutazione delle strategie adottate dall'amministrazione George W. Bush a fronte di un diffuso scetticismo nei confronti dei metodi adottati invece da Barack Obama.



Guantanamo: ecco le celle.
I prigionieri sono da considerare ad alto rischio,
in quanto composta da personaggi
sicuramente legati alle reti "TERRORISTICHE"
 qaedista e isis ect.

Il presidente democratico già all'indomani della sua prima elezione prese nettamente le distanze dalla strategia del predecessore. «Ritengo - disse allora Obama - che il waterbording sia una tortura e che sia stato un errore qualunque siano state le motivazioni legali e razionali». Il primo a riconoscere le inadeguatezze di un'intelligence incapace di prevedere la nascita di un Califfato del terrore tra Irak e Siria è però lo stesso Obama.

«Non c'è dubbio che la loro avanzata e i loro movimenti nel corso degli ultimi mesi - ammetteva ai primi d'agosto il presidente - sono stati molto più rapidi di quanto stimato dalla nostra intelligence». Alla base di questa impreparazione non vi sarebbe - secondo i critici dell'amministrazione Obama - solo la scelta di abbandonare l'Irak, ma anche quella di rinunciare agli «interrogatori intensificati» ovvero a vere e proprie tecniche di tortura capaci di far confessare i terroristi costringendoli a rivelare dettagli e connessioni impossibili da ottenere con altri metodi.

L'anno scorso l'avvocato John Rizzo, principale consulente legale della Cia dopo l'11 settembre, ricordava in un'intervista a Der Spiegel che la ragione per cui non si oppose all'adozione di tecniche d'interrogatorio molto prossime alla tortura fu la paura di un «nuovo attacco all'America». E soprattutto la paura di privilegiare i propri scrupoli morali a discapito di pratiche forse riprovevoli, ma capaci di salvare la vita di migliaia di americani. «Non avrei mai potuto convivere con l'idea che ...(dopo un nuovo attentato)... potesse saltar fuori che la Cia aveva preso in considerazione queste tecniche, ma io le avevo bloccate perché ritenevo troppo rischioso adottarle».

Interno del carcere di Guantanamo a Cuba

Alle certezze di Rizzo si contrappongono le analisi degli esperti d'intelligence che sottolineano da anni l'inaffidabilità delle confessioni estorte con la violenza per la tendenza di chi le subisce a soddisfare aspettative e richieste degli aguzzini. John Rizzo risponde ricordando, però, i successi ottenuti dopo l'11 settembre. «Grazie a quel programma - sostiene l'avvocato della Cia - non c'è stato un secondo attacco sul suolo americano e Bin Laden è stato ucciso. Stando comodamente seduti qui, tanti anni dopo, è troppo facile dire che lo si poteva ottenere anche senza ricorrere a quelle tecniche d'interrogatorio e senza il danno d'immagine pagato dagli Stati Uniti».

Proprio l'eccessiva considerazione per l'immagine esteriore e la maniacale attenzione ai canoni del «politicamente corretto» avrebbero spinto l'amministrazione Obama, secondo i suoi detrattori, ad adottare strategie non solo inefficaci dal punto di vista dei risultati, ma anche intrinsecamente immorale quanto le tecniche dell'era Bush. Al centro di questo dibattito c'è anche stavolta l'opzione «droni», ovvero la decisione di trasformare gli aerei senza pilota della Cia nella principale arma anti-terrorismo. Mentre il 71 per cento degli americani accetta senza problemi le 2500 vittime, tra terroristi e perdite collaterali, causate dai droni soltanto in Pakistan, gran parte dell'America continua a provare un senso di auto-riprovazione per le uscite da Abu Ghraib o Guantanamo.

La giornata trascorre così:
Colazione con possibilità di doccia
Visite mediche
Pranzo
Ora d'aria
Possibilità di scrivere lettere sotto la supervisione dei soldati,
con penne e carta fornite dai soldati, che vengono raccolte al termine
Pasto serale

«Questo perché l'immagine di un veicolo incenerito o di una casa distrutta non è sufficiente a farci realizzare - spiega Abu Bruce Hoffman, direttore del Centro per gli studi sulla Sicurezza dell'Università di Georgetown - che quella cosa capita a un esser umano come noi. In questi casi - spiega ancora Hoffman - non disponiamo degli stessi dettagli fornitici dagli articoli che ci spiegano con dovizia di particolari come Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, la mente dell'11 settembre, abbia subito il waterboarding per 183 volte di fila». Con una differenza. I terroristi uccisi dai droni non parlano. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, invece, contribuì con le sue rivelazioni alla sconfitta di Al Qaida e - nel lungo termine - all'uccisione di Bin Laden.

Found: The Islamic State's Terror Laptop of Doom...

Buried in a Dell computer captured in Syria are lessons for making bubonic plague bombs and missives on using weapons of mass destruction.

ANTAKYA, Turkey —
Abu Ali, a commander of a moderate Syrian rebel group in northern Syria, proudly shows a black laptop partly covered in dust. "We took it this year from an ISIS hideout," he says.
Abu Ali says the fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which have since rebranded themselves as the Islamic State, all fled before he and his men attacked the building. The attack occurred in January in a village in the Syrian province of Idlib, close to the border with Turkey, as part of a larger anti-ISIS offensive occurring at the time. "We found the laptop and the power cord in a room," he continued, "I took it with me. But I have no clue if it still works or if it contains anything interesting."

As we switched on the Dell laptop, it indeed still worked. Nor was it password-protected. But then came a huge disappointment: After we clicked on "My Computer," all the drives appeared empty.

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Upon closer inspection, the ISIS laptop wasn't empty at all: Buried in the "hidden files" section of the computer were 146 gigabytes of material, containing a total of 35,347 files in 2,367 folders. Abu Ali allowed us to copy all these files -- which included documents in French, English, and Arabic -- onto an external hard drive.

A screenshot of material found on the computer. The files appear to be videos of speeches by jihadist clerics.

The laptop's contents turn out to be a treasure trove of documents that provide ideological justifications for jihadi organizations -- and practical training on how to carry out the Islamic State's deadly campaigns. They include videos of Osama bin Laden, manuals on how to make bombs, instructions for stealing cars, and lessons on how to use disguises in order to avoid getting arrested while traveling from one jihadi hot spot to another.

But after hours upon hours of scrolling through the documents, it became clear that the ISIS laptop contains more than the typical propaganda and instruction manuals used by jihadists. The documents also suggest that the laptop's owner was teaching himself about the use of biological weaponry, in preparation for a potential attack that would have shocked the world.

The information on the laptop makes clear that its owner is a Tunisian national named Muhammed S. who joined ISIS in Syria and who studied chemistry and physics at two universities in Tunisia's northeast. Even more disturbing is how he planned to use that education:
The ISIS laptop contains a 19-page document in Arabic on how to develop biological weapons and how to weaponize the bubonic plague from infected animals.
                 "The advantage of biological weapons is that they do not cost a lot of money, while the human casualties can be huge," the document states.

The document includes instructions for how to test the weaponized disease safely, before it is used in a terrorist attack. "When the microbe is injected in small mice, the symptoms of the disease should start to appear within 24 hours," the document says.

The laptop also includes a 26-page fatwa, or Islamic ruling, on the usage of weapons of mass destruction. "If Muslims cannot defeat the kafir [unbelievers] in a different way, it is permissible to use weapons of mass destruction," states the fatwa by Saudi jihadi cleric Nasir al-Fahd, who is currently imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. "Even if it kills all of them and wipes them and their descendants off the face of the Earth."

When contacted by phone, a staff member at a Tunisian university listed on Muhammed's exam papers confirmed that he indeed studied chemistry and physics there. She said the university lost track of him after 2011, however.

A photo of Muhammed S. found on his laptop.
This image has been digitally altered. 

Out of the blue, she asked: “Did you find his papers inside Syria?” Asked why she would think that Muhammed’s belongings would have ended up in Syria, she answered, “For further questions about him, you better ask state security.”

An astonishing number of Tunisians have flocked to the Syrian battlefield since the revolt began. In June, Tunisia’s interior minister estimated that at least 2,400 Tunisians were fighting in the country, mostly as members of the Islamic State.

This isn't the first time that jihadists have attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even before the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda had experimented with a chemical weapons program in Afghanistan. In 2002, CNN obtained a tape showing al Qaeda members testing poison gas on three dogs, all of which died.

Nothing on the ISIS laptop, of course, suggests that the jihadists already possess these dangerous weapons. And any jihadi organization contemplating a bioterrorist attack will face many difficulties: Al Qaeda tried unsuccessfully for years to get its hands on such weapons, and the United States has devoted massive resources to preventing terrorists from making just this sort of breakthrough. The material on this laptop, however, is a reminder that jihadists are also hard at work at acquiring the weapons that could allow them to kill thousands of people with one blow.

"The real difficulty in all of these weapons ... [is] to actually have a workable distribution system that will kill a lot of people," said Magnus Ranstorp, research director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College. "But to produce quite scary weapons is certainly within [the Islamic State's] capabilities."

The Islamic State's sweeping gains in recent months may have provided it with the capacity to develop such new and dangerous weapons. Members of the jihadi group are not solely fighting on the front lines these days -- they also control substantial parts of Syria and Iraq. The fear now is that men like Muhammed could be quietly working behind the front lines -- for instance, in the Islamic State-controlled University of Mosul or in some laboratory in the Syrian city of Raqqa, the group's de facto capital -- to develop chemical or biological weapons.

In short, the longer the caliphate exists, the more likely it is that members with a science background will come up with something horrible. The documents found on the laptop of the Tunisian jihadist, meanwhile, leave no room for doubt about the group's deadly ambitions.

"Use small grenades with the virus, and throw them in closed areas like metros, soccer stadiums, or entertainment centers," the 19-page document on biological weapons advises. "Best to do it next to the air-conditioning. It also can be used during suicide operations."

Weapons of mass destruction are the holy grail for terrorist groups, and over the years a number of organizations have announced their intentions to acquire chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. But the discovery of a laptop purportedly belonging to a member of the Islamic State is raising new questions about whether the terrorist group, which U.S. officials say is more dangerous than al Qaeda, is poised to launch a WMD attack.
 
U.S. officials and terrorism experts said that the discovery of the laptop raises troubling questions about the Islamic State's intentions and its ability to conduct a WMD strike. But they urged caution, noting that the presence of documents on building biological weapons does not necessarily add up to an actual capability to use them.
 
"I wouldn't dismiss the idea of a WMD attack by terrorists," said Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "It's something we should guard against. But in terms of something I worry about, it's far down the list."
 
Still, the laptop and its more than 35,000 files provide a rare and unsettling window into the Islamist State's inner workings. One U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss developing intelligence, said the files on the laptop offer some of the most precise information to date on the Islamic State's WMD aspirations. The information indicates that the Islamic State likely now has the ability to build at least some form of biological or chemical weapon, the official said.
 
The laptop, which was examined by correspondents for Foreign Policy, contains thousands of files related to planning and launching terrorist attacks. Most troubling is a document that discusses how to weaponize bubonic plague. But turning that knowledge into a working weapon requires particular expertise, and it's not clear that the Islamic State has it.
 
"That they have the capabilities and intentions [to build some WMD] is beyond dispute," Gartenstein-Ross said. But the Islamic State would still face considerable obstacles if it actually attempted to build a weapon with bubonic plague. "It's a very dangerous thing to try to harness as an offensive weapon, in part because you might kill all your own guys in the process," Gartenstein-Ross said.
 
But the risk of building WMD hasn't blunted terrorists' ambition. Only last year, Iraqi officials broke up an al Qaeda cell in Iraq that attempted to build chemical weapons for attacks in the West. Chemical weapons are potentially less dangerous than weaponized biological agents, which is what makes the files on the Islamic State's laptop so concerning.