Egypt Launches the Largest Military Base in the Middle East.

Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has inaugurated a military base in the country’s northwestern city of Al-Hammam to protect facilities and projects in coastal cities.

Egypt’s President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi inaugurated on July 22, 2017, the Mohamed Naguib Military Base, located in Al-Hammam area, west of Alexandria. Students from several military colleges and institutions were graduating at the event.

At the beginning of the ceremony, a guard of honor was presented to the dignitaries, and the Egyptian national anthem was played. Later, the Egyptian President handed over the base flag to the Commander of the Northern Military Region. A film about joint military training with Arab countries was screened, followed by the Egyptian flag raising ceremony.

The base is named after Mohamed Naguib, the primary leader of the Egyptian revolution in 1952, which ended the Mohamed Ali dynasty that ruled over Egypt and Sudan from 1805 until 1952 and the first president of the Republic of Egypt after its establishment on June 18, 1953.

The Mohamed Naguib Military Base

The base, reportedly the largest in the Middle East, is built on what used to be a military city, constructed in 1993, and consists of 1,155 buildings built and renovated over the past two years. It is expected that the base will have a museum commemorating Naguib as well as a mosque with a capacity for 2,000 individuals, sports fields, and swimming pools.

The military base will serve as a headquarters for some forces of the Northern Military Region, which is expected to increase its efficiency in protecting west of Alexandria, the North Coast, the currently under construction Al-Dabaa nuclear power plant, oil fields, the new Alamein City, among other sites. The base will also be used in military exercises with the armies of other countries.

The base consists of a production unit to achieve self-sufficiency with 379 feddans (approx. 393 acres) of fruit trees and 1,600 feddans (approx. 1660 acres) of seasonal plants and vegetables.

The Arab Delegations

High-profile Arab delegations attended the event which coincides with Egypt’s celebration of the 65th anniversary of the 23 July 1952 revolution. Among the Arab delegations were representatives from Gulf countries, including Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, the crown prince of Bahrain, Prince Khalid Al Faisal, governor of Saudi Arabia’s Mecca province, Sheikh Mohammad Al Khaled, Kuwait’s deputy prime minister and minister of defense and Libyan Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

The opening of the Mohamed Naguib Military Base comes months after a similar base was established near the border with Libya. Authorities have said that the Barrani Military Base, close to the porous western border, aims to prevent infiltration of militants from Libya, a country plagued by militancy over the past six years.

President Al-Sisi’s Opening Remarks

President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi underlined that the Arab participation in the inauguration ceremony of Mohammed Naguib military base is a cogent proof of Arab unity and welcomed the Arab leaders on behalf of the Egyptian people. Addressing Arab military graduates, he said we send a message to the world that Arabs join hands to build not to destroy, connive or foment sedition.

6 raisons pour lesquelles Israël est devenu le n°1 de la cybersécurité.

“La cybersécurité est un secteur florissant. Il prend de plus en plus d’ampleur car la cybersécurité n’est jamais une solution permanente, c’est un business sans limite,” a déclaré Benjamin Netanyahu, le premier ministre d’Israël, à la septième conférence annuelle sur la cybersécurité de l’Université de Tel Aviv.

Thomas Bossert, assistant du président des Etats-Unis à la sécurité intérieure et à la lutte contre le terrorisme, a annoncé lors de l’événement la création d’un groupe de cybersécurité bilatérale entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie, qui mettra en place “des défenses innovantes de cybersécurité que nous pouvons tester ici puis apporter aux Etats-Unis.”

Israël est devenu une puissance de la cybersécurité qui se trouve au cœur d’une industrie d’une valeur de 82 milliards de dollars (sans compter les dépenses pour les équipes de sécurité interne et les procédures). En plus de collaborer avec des super-puissances, Israël assiste de plus petites nations (comme par exemple Singapour) en créant plus de trois cent startup de la cybersécurité et en exportant l’année dernière 6,5 milliards de dollars en produits de cet ordre. Le pays a également convaincu plus de trente multinationales d’ouvrir des centres de recherche et de développement locaux, tout en attirant des investisseurs étrangers. “En 2016, nous détenions environ 20% de l’investissement mondial de la cybersécurité privée,” a avancé Netanyahu.

Lors de la conférence, j’ai participé à une série de comptes rendus réalisés à l’intention d’une délégation de journalistes étrangers reçue par le ministère des affaires étrangères d’Israël. Ces comptes rendus incluaient des plans d’ensemble du fonctionnement de la cybersécurité israélienne présentés par le général de division, le professeur Isaac Ben-Israel, directeur du centre Blavatnik de recherche de Cyber-études de l’université de Tel Aviv, le précédent directeur de la recherche et du développement pour les forces de défense d’Israël, le Ministre de la défense, ainsi que le Dr Eviatar Matana, président de la Direction nationale de la cybersécurité d’Israël.


Voici six facteurs essentiels qui ont contribué à faire d’Israël un centre mondial de la recherche et de la pratique en matière de cybersécurité:

Lorsque le Premier ministre Netanyahu demanda en 2010 au professeur Ben-Israël un plan sur cinq ans établissant la façon de répondre, à l’échelle nationale, à la recrudescence des menaces informatiques, ce dernier répondit qu’en terme de cybersécurité cinq années équivalaient à peu près à trois ou quatre générations technologiques, ce qui rendait impossible l’élaboration d’un plan. Ben-Israël et son équipe spéciale de cybersécurité ont donc recommandé de développer une “structure qui saurait quoi faire quand ces menaces imprévues surviendraient.”

La structure est un cadre en perpétuelle évolution pour une collaboration entre le gouvernement (y compris l’organe militaire), les entreprises et les universités, le gouvernement jouant principalement le rôle de guide et de conseiller. Un cyber-espace est une structure mondiale qui n’a pas de frontières nationales, explique Dr. Matania. “Nous avons réalisé que les organisations constituent essentiellement la frontière digitale de notre nation.” Les entreprises cependant, en Israël et partout ailleurs, sont réticentes à l’idée de s’afficher travaillant main dans la main avec leurs gouvernements respectifs tandis qu’elles agissent à l’échelle mondiale. De plus, Israël rencontre des difficultés en matière de libertés individuelles.

Israël a procédé à plusieurs tentatives de création d’une structure opérationnelle qui pourrait résoudre ces tensions, la plus récente de ces tentatives étant l’établissement de l’Autorité Nationale de la cybersécurité en 2015. Cette structure incarne la double mission du gouvernement qui consiste à améliorer la coordination de la cybersécurité tout en retirant le gouvernement des bases de données et des décisions des entreprises individuelles.

Alors que le gouvernement israélien a joué un rôle important en lançant et en soutenant le secteur florissant de la technologie en Israël, il a également servi de catalyseur à l’évolution rapide de l’industrie de la cybersécurité dans le pays. En 2011, lorsque le Bureau national de la cybersécurité fut établi à la suite des recommandations de Ben-Israel concernant le groupe de travail, son mandat incluait, en plus de la coordination de la cybersécurité et la politique de développement, “la vision de faire entrer Israël dans le top cinq des pays leaders du domaine de la cybersécurité dans un futur proche.”

Considérant la cybersécurité comme “un moteur de croissance économique,” le gouvernement a identifié ce domaine comme un secteur dans lequel Israël profite d’un avantage compétitif du fait d’une recherche d’excellence et d’une expérience pratique unique. Cet avantage fut aussi perçu et appréhendé comme un contributeur important à la coopération internationale, un bénéfice additionnel pour le pays.

Les conditions géopolitiques négatives qui sont celles d’Israël depuis la proclamation de son indépendance en 1948 ont forcé le petit pays à investir ses faibles ressources dans le développement et le maintien de capacités militaires supérieures. Alors que les ordinateurs se sont installés au fur et à mesure dans la société, la cyberdéfense est devenue une activité cruciale.

Après des années de collecte d’informations et de pratique de cybersécurité, l’Unité 8200 a évolué en devenant un incubateur pour les startup israéliennes de la cybersécurité et d’autres domaines. “Nous sommes parvenus à faire d’un désavantage un avantage,” se réjouit Nadav Zafrir, le précédent chef de l’Unité 8200. Il poursuit ainsi: “Par le passé, le service militaire était perçu comme une perte de temps, ce qui est différent à présent. Nous n’avions pas prévu cela. Personne n’a pensé à la façon de faire de l’Unité 8200 un catalyseur pour l’économie israélienne, mais c’est ce qui est arrivé.”

Les jeunes personnes qui servent au sein de l’Unité 8200 et des unités similaires expérimentent de réels défis et solutions de cybersécurité. Parce que ces unités fonctionnent comme des startup, elles expérimentent aussi le travail d’équipe, le fait de diriger d’autres personnes, d’être responsable de la prise de décisions importantes, ainsi que la survie à l’échec ; le tout étant une excellente préparation à la vie entrepreneuriale. Afin de garder ces jeunes de lancer leurs propres entreprises, au moins pour un temps, l’Unité 8200 les incite à étendre leur service en finançant leur études doctorales ou en présentant d’autres attraits comme la confrontation à des défis qu’ils ne rencontreraient pas dans la vie civile.

Israël est un pays connu pour sa culture dynamique, sa capacité d’improvisation, d’innovation et d’initiative. L’énergie et l’ambition de son peuple sont dirigées vers des aspirations académiques spécifiques. L’enseignement de la cybersécurité débute au collège, et Israël est l’unique pays au monde dans lequel la cybersécurité est une option au lycée. Un certain nombre d’universités israéliennes proposent une spécialisation en cybersécurité, et Israël est le seul pays dans lequel il est possible d’obtenir un doctorat en cybersécurité (en tant que discipline indépendante, et non en tant que science de l’informatique). Aujourd’hui, il existe six centres de recherche universitaires dédiés à la cybersécurité.

En plus de plusieurs programmes sponsorisés par le gouvernement, ayant pour but de déployer une jeunesse prometteuse et de mettre à sa disposition une formation spécialisée avant et pendant le service militaire, le secteur privé est aussi impliqué dans la culture de l’enseignement de la science et de la technologie. Par exemple, le Centre de la Cyber-éducation recrute des ingénieurs et des programmeurs pour enseigner dans les écoles, en plus d’organiser des visites d’entreprises technologiques pour les écoliers et d’aider les enseignants volontaires à obtenir des emplois dans des entreprises de ce type.

Dans son discours, le professeur a expliqué que tandis que la cybersécurité requiert des solutions technologiques, les difficultés qu’elle pose ne sont pas d’ordre technologique. De ce fait, il est important d’appliquer une approche interdisciplinaire à la cybersécurité et de comprendre la pluralité des domaines qui l’affectent, comme par exemple le domaine juridique, le domaine économique ou encore le domaine sociologique, entre autres. Ben-Israël a mis en lumière le fait que les étudiants de l’Université de Tel Aviv, peu importe la discipline qu’ils étudient (excepté les arts), ont la possibilité de se spécialiser en cybersécurité.

L’interdisciplinarité implique le fait de voir les choses sous des angles différents et de briser les barrières artificielles. En Israël, l’expérience unique des cyber professionnels se charge de cela. Durant le service militaire obligatoire, l’introduction académique initiale à la cybersécurité est améliorée et complétée par l’expérience pratique. Ces cyber-professionnels rejoignent ensuite les universités, les laboratoires d’idées, des entreprises de toute taille, et les agences gouvernementales. L’expérience partagée des cyber-professionnels assure que toutes les formes de solutions de cybersécurité sont appliquées aussi bien en théorie qu’en pratique.

En plus de cela, la diversité des expériences, des approches, et des points de vue, est renforcée par les histoires multiples des participants. En 2014, la population juive-israélienne était composée à 25% d’immigrants et 35% des enfants étaient également immigrants, une fresque humaine permettant une palette de solutions de cybersécurité innovantes.

L’approche typique de la cybersécurité a été jusqu’à présent majoritairement réactive et focalisée sur les attaques potentielles. Lorsque les gouvernements sont impliqués (y compris le gouvernement israélien, pendant plusieurs années), ils assignent des responsabilités afin de traiter les différents types d’attaques provenant de différentes entités, fragmentant ainsi la politique nationale et rendant sa coordination moins optimale.

Après des années passées à commettre des erreurs, la politique nationale de cybersécurité du pays adopte une approche nouvelle. Elle a évolué en devenant une stratégie plus proactive, plus compréhensive, concentrée non pas sur les attaques potentielles mais sur les menaces potentielles et plaçant les organisations en première ligne de défense.

Ce nouveau type de stratégie de cybersécurité présente trois aspects : la résistance, la résilience et la défense. “Si les deux premiers aspects sont bien travaillés,” explique Matania, “ils vont amortir 65% des menaces.” Le premier aspect est similaire à l’immunisation dans le secteur de la santé. Le gouvernement peut conseiller et guider, mais il est de la responsabilité des organisations de s’immuniser. Le gouvernement est un peu plus actif dans le deuxième aspect, en aidant au partage d’information, à l’analyse et à l’atténuation des cyberattaques spécifiques. Le troisième aspect porte sur la réaction face à un événement de grande ampleur ; cet aspect relève exclusivement de la responsabilité du gouvernement.

Le parc technologique de Beersheva permet la présentation de la philosophie israélienne en matière de cybersécurité, de son concentré unique de pratique et de théorie, d’interdisciplinarité, d’intérêts publics et privés.

Avec sa mission de faire de la région une source majeure de talent et d’expertise, en particulier dans le domaine de la cybersécurité, le parc a attiré des multinationales considérables et leurs centres de recherche et de développement, ainsi que des entreprises du capital-risque, des laboratoires de recherche avancée, l’Institut national de cyber-étude et les équipes du service national des cyber-urgences. De plus, l’Unité 8200 est en voie de déplacer ses unités de stratégie technologique sur le même campus.

À terme, l’Unité 8200 héritera d’environ un tiers du parc, comme l’a déclaré le professeur Rivka Carmi, président de l’Université Ben Gourion. Il n’y aura toutefois pas de barrière entre l’unité et les chercheurs civils, les entrepreneurs et autres experts de la cybersécurité y travaillant. Les talents des professionnels du secteur sont au cœur de la philosophie israélienne de cybersécurité : ces talents incarnent non seulement les solutions face aux cyber-menaces, mais aussi le moyen de changer les risques en opportunités.

From ISIS-Lands to the Netherlands: Jihadists Try to Get the Press to Help Them Come Home.

As Mosul falls and Raqqa comes under attack, European jihadists have decided they don’t really love death more than their enemies love life. But… nobody wants them back.

AMSTERDAM—Now that the self-proclaimed caliphate of the so-called Islamic State is falling apart in Syria and Iraq, many European jihadists are looking for ways to come home—and some of the Dutch ones have been reaching out to the media, hoping it will save their lives.

Just last week two fighters contacted TV shows in the Netherlands to announce their return to Dutch soil, a third contacted the police.

The grim irony of such a ploy is obvious. Many would-be holy warriors from European backgrounds have been associated with organizations that took journalists hostage, ransomed some, tortured and beheaded others. When they thought their groups were on a roll, jihadists bragged to their Western enemies “we love death as you love life.” And all too many times in France, Britain, Belgium, and Germany they have slaughtered innocents by the score.

But the three from the Netherlands are part of a group of 10 presumed jihadists who have criminal court cases pending against them. Dutch public prosecutors believe most of them are still to be found in what’s left of ISIS-land. After a Rotterdam court recently decided they could be present at their hearing, their trial was postponed until January 2018, allowing them time to return.

A 22-year-old Dutch-Moroccan rapper known to the court as Marouane B. is one of the potential returnees. He says he is en route back to the Netherlands and a few days ago posted a rap about his intended return, singing, “I will come back one day, mama, don’t worry… I am fleeing.” (The video has since been taken down.)

In a phone call to Dutch News RTL, Marouane refused to say whether he is affiliated with ISIS or not. “I had expected to be a change factor in the civil war by fighting [Syrian dictator Bashar] Assad,” he said. “That didn’t succeed, because the world is siding with Assad, at least that’s what it looks like from here, and I always had the intention of returning after the war.”

In a similar interview, a Dutch postman turned Islamic convert turned Islamist, Victor Droste, spoke to the Dutch TV news program 1 Vandaag via Skype. Droste admitted he’d been at the front, but refused to say whether he had been fighting. He fervently denied being part of ISIS, but he looked the part, and had been publicly advocating his support for Sharia and Islamism in the year before he left the Netherlands in 2013.

The Dutch government made conscientious attempts to inform the alleged jihadists about the trial via social media like Facebook and through their relatives. The efforts didn’t fail, but they are just the beginning of awkward attempts to address what could be an enormous problem.

An estimated 300 Dutch men, women, and children are known to have traveled to the Middle East to join the ranks of various jihadist organizations, including ISIS.

European Union counterterrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove has warned that the EU as a whole will be hard-pressed to deal with some 1,500 to 2,000 fighters who may try to return as ISIS is driven out of its strongholds in Mosul and Raqqa (PDF).

Different countries are addressing the problem in different ways. According to French intelligence sources, Paris has deployed special operations forces on the ground in Syria to hunt down and kill French jihadists who could pose a threat if they return.

The latest figures from the National Dutch Terrorism Prevention Coordinator (NCTV) tell us that as of June this year, 190 who left the Netherlands managed to join ISIS, and 50 returned. Some, at least 45 jihadists, died. But most of the survivors find themselves now cornered in a flailing wannabe state, a far cry from the heroic caliphate they had been dreaming of, and death has proved less appealing when it becomes palpably real.

With the jihadists’ stories trickling in, the Dutch security services try to gauge the security risk involved if they return. Even if the men are found not guilty of participation in war crimes and/or membership of a terrorist organization, which is unlikely, they are still suffering from PTSD. Letting them loose on the society they rejected would be risky business, and not just for the Netherlands.

“We have a responsibility toward other countries, too,” says Daan Weggemans, a terrorism expert attached to Leiden University who also serves as an expert witness in terrorism court cases. “Our focus tends to be on Dutch returning jihadists, but security is all about the broader picture. The idea that Dutch jihadists would only return to the Netherlands is not right.”

Jihadists are rarely stopped by borders, and certainly not by the open frontiers on the European continent, where they can take advantage of lax security in one place to stage attacks in another.

Exchanging information among security services is crucial, says Weggemans, but there are holes. Libya, for instance, is a major route for people pouring into Europe, but hardly keeps track of who is who, and there is considerable traffic back and forth. The bomber who wrought such carnage at a teen concert in Manchester, U.K., earlier this year was a Briton with extensive ties to family—and to ISIS—in Libya.

Foreigners who would come to the Netherlands with a stream of refugees might be a risk, says Weggemans, but so are jihadists who are in touch with, say, the nephew of a friend, and end up virtually invisible to authorities in an apartment here. “Those are the returnees that I worry about,” he says.

Islamist men returning from war are a major security risk. But then what are we to do with returning wives and children? After a serious amount of brainwashing they are hardly reliable candidates for free-spirited, democratic society. Differently put, how is any person who has actively supported people who put severed heads on spikes in town squares or gays being thrown off tall buildings going to deal with, say, two men kissing in the street in Amsterdam? Or mini skirts, or the notion of equal rights for women, for that matter?

Making policy on returning children poses yet another challenge. An estimated 80 children with a Dutch background are in Syria and Iraq, with ISIS or other jihadist groups, according to the April report of the Dutch National Security Service. Fifty percent are 9 years old or older and half of them are boys.

“With the minors there is also a big element of concern,” Weggemans explains. “They could have seen or done terrible things and were possibly trained a certain way. We know quite a bit about it and such information is very important if you start to help these children... You know that some were too young to be involved, others were educated there, girls were veiled, boys in training camps. We have to think about what we do when kids come back.”

So far, the Netherlands has been spared terrorist attacks. That may in part be because of internal policy, our relative insignificance, or dumb luck. Nobody knows precisely why. But the quiet to date holds no promise for the future. As in every other country, an attack on Dutch soil could happen any moment.

“I know it's been said many times before, but we have to acknowledge that we won't be able to prevent all attacks.” Weggemans tells The Daily Beast. Even if you have very active security services, you simply can't keep track of everyone.

But the challenge of the moment is what to do with those who identify themselves and ask to be treated with mercy in a liberal society after the failure of the fanatical caliphate they longed to establish.

Font: NADETTE DE VISSER

How many fighters does the Islamic State still have in Libya?

When the Islamic State lost control of Sirte, Libya late last year, it was a blow for the so-called caliphate’s plans in North Africa. The group’s first spokesman, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, ranked Sirte just behind Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria in terms of importance. Adnani was killed in Aug. 2016 and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s loyalists were ejected from their urban stronghold on the Mediterranean several months later.

But the Islamic State still has a presence in Libya and it is not clear how many fighters remain in the country.

According to the State Department’s newly released Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, the group lost a significant number of its members during the battle for Sirte. Yet, several thousand of its men were either stationed elsewhere or survived.

“Although more than 1,700 ISIS terrorists were killed during the Sirte counterterrorism operations,” the State Department report reads, “many members of the terrorist organization fled to Libya’s western and southern deserts, abroad, or into neighboring urban centers.”

State also cites reports saying that the group had “as many as 6,000 fighters in its ranks” as of early 2016 — that is, several months before the US began its air campaign in Sirte in Aug. 2016. The number of jihadists fighting under the so-caliphate’s banner swelled between 2015 and 2016, as the Islamic State “doubled its presence in the country” during that time.

Taken at face value, therefore, the State Department’s report suggests that approximately 4,300 members of the Islamic State’s Libyan arm were not killed during the operation to free Sirte from the jihadists’ grip. How many of them remain in Libya today? We don’t know.

As FDD’s Long War Journal has warned, it is difficult to determine how many fighters the Islamic State has in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere. The US government’s estimates have varied dramatically over time. State says that “up to 1,700 ISIS militants’ bodies were recovered in Sirte,” but it isn’t clear how firm that figure is.

In addition, the self-declared caliphate could have had either more or less than the 6,000 fighters it was estimated to have in Libya as of early 2016. Those who survived the battle in Sirte, or didn’t take part in it, could have fled for neighboring countries, such as Tunisia or Egypt. They also could have retreated to other African nations, or further “abroad” to the Islamic State’s heartland in Iraq and Syria.

All of this means that determining the number of Islamic State fighters left in Libya today is a task fraught with uncertainty. And the same goes for assessing the size of the organization’s membership around the globe.

Since the loss of Sirte in late 2016, the Islamic State’s operational tempo has been relatively low, indicating that either it is not capable of carrying out regular attacks, or is seeking to regroup for the future.

Still, taken at face value, the figures cited by the State Department suggest that the Islamic State could still have a significant footprint inside Libya. And we wouldn’t be surprised if this is the case. On a per capital basis, Libya and Tunisia exported as many foreign fighters (or more) than any other countries for the war in Iraq and the follow-on conflicts. And the Islamic State made Libya one of its top priorities from 2014 to 2016, reversing these flows by sending some fighters back to their home countries in North Africa.

In 2014, as the State Department reminds readers, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi “dispatched a group of ISIS operatives from Syria to Libya to establish a branch of the terrorist group.” They first “set up a base in” Derna, but lost their hub there after being defeated by rival, al Qaeda-linked jihadists. (The Islamic State exaggerated its strength, before eventually conceding defeat in 2016.) Baghdadi “formally” recognized the group’s Libyan arm in Nov. 2014 “after announcing he had accepted oaths of allegiance from fighters in the country.”

The US hunted down some of the personnel dispatched by Baghdadi in 2015, including Abu Nabil al Anbari (aka Wissam Najm Abd Zayd al Zubaydi) in November of that year. The Defense Department described al Anbari as “an Iraqi national who was a longtime al Qaeda operative and the senior [Islamic State] leader in Libya.” Other senior Islamic State personnel were deployed to the country as well. The jihadists’ effort became so important that US officials began to openly worry that Baghdadi’s men could use Libya as a fallback zone as they lost ground in Iraq and Syria.

Between Aug. 1 and Dec. 19, 2016, US Africa Command conducted “495 precision airstrikes against Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices, heavy guns, tanks, command and control centers and fighting positions” as part of Operation Odyssey Lightning. The operation was conducted in conjunction with the Libyan Government of Nation Accord (GNA), which backed the militiamen that made up most of the ground forces. GNA “reports suggested” significant losses on the anti-Islamic State side, according to State, with “more than 700 fighters from GNA-aligned forces” killed and 3,200 others wounded “during the seven‑month-long campaign against ISIS.”

In Jan. 2017, the US bombed two Islamic State training camps south of Sirte, citing the presence of the group’s “external plotters.” The Defense Department estimated that dozens of jihadists were killed. Subsequent reporting revealed that the “external plotters” were connected to planned attacks in Europe.

But that wasn’t the end of the Islamic State’s presence in Libya, as the jihadists had cadres sprinkled throughout the country.

“At the end of 2016,” Foggy Bottom says, the self-declared caliphate’s arm “was no longer in control of any towns in Libya, but its members continued to operate throughout the eastern, southern, and western regions of the country.” The jihadists “also carried out attacks in Tripoli and Benghazi.”

In December, the Islamic State’s Rumiyah magazine, which is published in multiple languages, carried an interview with Sheikh Abu Hudhayfah al Muhajir, who was identified as the group’s leader in Libya. The “detachments of the mujahidin” are “spread today throughout the deserts of Libya,” Muhajir claimed, and they will make their enemies “taste severe hardship.” He vowed that they “will reclaim the cities and areas once more, by Allah’s power and strength.”

Muhajir was asked about the Islamic State’s strength in “regions outside of Sirte.” He claimed that the number of “mujahid brothers in the Libyan wilayat [province] continue to be…abundant.” Their “covert units are scattered throughout all the cities and regions, and their detachments cruise the deserts both east and west.” [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, Pentagon: Islamic State has lost its safe haven in Sirte, Libya.]

Abu Hudhayfah al Muhajir gave an inflated sense of his group’s capabilities. Time will tell how strong the Islamic State’s reconstituted presence in Libya will be. A number of scenarios are possible, including defections to other jihadist groups. But the State Department’s report warns that “many members of the terrorist organization” fanned out across the country and elsewhere after the battle for Sirte.

Font: BY THOMAS JOSCELYN | July 20, 2017

State Department: Pakistan continues to provide safe haven for Taliban, allied jihadists.

An audio message from Siraj Haqqani was included in a Dec. 2016
Taliban video emphasizing the group’s alliance with al Qaeda.

The State Department’s newly released Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 points to Pakistan’s ongoing complicity with jihadists in Central and South Asia, including the Afghan Taliban. Despite describing Pakistan as an “important counterterrorism partner,” Foggy Bottom blames the country for harboring some of the forces fighting America’s allies in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani military and intelligence establishment cracks down on jihadist groups that target elements of the state, but regularly leaves others unscathed, as long as their terrorism is directed elsewhere. The effect of this “Good Taliban, Bad Taliban” policy continues to be felt in Afghanistan, where the insurgency rages nearly 16 years into the American-led war.

Pakistan “did not take substantial action against the Afghan Taliban or [the Haqqani Network, HQN], or substantially limit their ability to threaten US interests in Afghanistan, although Pakistan supported efforts to bring both groups into an Afghan-led peace process,” Foggy Bottom’s report reads.

“Afghanistan, in particular, continued to experience aggressive and coordinated attacks by the Afghan Taliban, including the affiliated Haqqani Network (HQN) and other insurgent and terrorist groups,” State noted. Importantly, a “number of these attacks were planned and launched from safe havens in Pakistan.”

While the State Department refers to the Haqqani Network as being “affiliated” with the Taliban, it is actually wholly “integrated” into the Taliban’s operations.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, who leads the network established by his father Jalaluddin, has been one of the Taliban’s top two deputies since 2015. (Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 notes Siraj’s top leadership role in the Taliban.) The Taliban and the Haqqanis have both repeatedly rejected the notion that they are independent groups. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report: Taliban again affirms Haqqani Network is an integral part of group.]

Although Afghan forces prevented the Taliban from capturing a provincial capital in 2016, State reports that the war “was characterized by the capture and recapture of facilities and territory by both sides.”

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) maintained “control of major population centers,” including “provincial capitals and the majority of district centers.” But “the Taliban gained or maintained control of substantial territory in less populated, rural areas…thereby creating an environment of persistent insecurity.”

State notes that the Taliban’s extensive “rural” footprint allowed it “to regularly exert pressure on population centers,” orchestrating sieges on provincial capitals in “Farah, Helmand, Kunduz, and Uruzgan.”

The Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, “also increased high-profile terrorist attacks targeting Afghan government officials – including justice officials – and members of the international community” in 2016.

All of this makes the Taliban’s sanctuary inside Pakistan vitally important, as at least part of the insurgency’s leadership continues to safely operate from inside the country.

Meanwhile, the ANDSF “suffered an unprecedented number of casualties in an intense fighting season.” According to the ANDSF’s own statistics, its casualties were “30 percent higher in 2016 than in 2015.”

The Haqqani Network has been designated as a terrorist organization by the US government, so there is a section on the group in State’s discussion of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” There is no section on the overall Taliban, which hasn’t been designated, even though the Haqqanis’ men lead it. The State Department says that the Haqqani Network “is believed to have several hundred core members, but it is estimated that the organization is able to draw upon a pool of upwards of 10,000 fighters,” making it a formidable guerrilla army.

The Taliban wasn’t the only jihadist organization to benefit from Pakistan’s policies, according to Foggy Bottom.

The Pakistani state “did not take sufficient action against other externally focused groups, such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba [LeT] and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM),” which “continued to operate, train, organize, and fundraise in Pakistan.” The only “significant action against LeT or JeM” taken by Pakistan in 2016 was to continue “implementing an ongoing ban against media coverage of their activities.” However, both LeT and JeM were able to “hold rallies, raise money, recruit, and train in Pakistan.”

All of the aforementioned jihadist groups operating in Pakistan — the Afghan Taliban (including the Haqqani Network), LeT, and JeM — have been allied with al Qaeda. This means that the Pakistani state’s preferred jihadists have often cooperated with” America’s terrorist foe.

Ayman al Zawahiri has repeatedly sworn an oath of allegiance (bay’ah) to the Taliban’s emir, including current leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also swore bay’ah to Akhundzada’s predecessor, Mullah Mansour, who was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan in 2016.

Siraj Haqqani has been a staunch supporter of al Qaeda and has sat on the group’s shura council.

The State Department says that the Haqqani network “draws strength through cooperation with other terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan, including al Qaeda” and JeM. Siraj’s father, Jalaluddin, was one of Osama bin Laden’s earliest backers in the region, as the two “established a relationship” in the mid-1980s. “After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001,” according to State, “Jalaluddin retreated to Pakistan where, under the leadership of [Siraj Haqqani], the group continued to direct and conduct terrorist activity in Afghanistan.” Various unconfirmed reports have stated that Jalaluddin has since passed away.

Pakistan does fight some jihadists, mainly those who directly target elements of the state.

According to the State Department, “Pakistani military and security forces undertook operations against groups that conducted attacks within Pakistan such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan,” otherwise known as the Pakistani Taliban. Al Qaeda is also allied with the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani officials have even sought to negotiate with al Qaeda’s leadership in an attempt to rein in the Pakistani Taliban’s violence.


Font: BY THOMAS JOSCELYN & BILL ROGGIO | July 19, 2017 

Weapons Intelligence Team

Hidden away within Multi-National Base Tarin Kot in Uruzgan province, a small team of Australian Defence Force and United States personnel are spearheading a potent new capability reducing the threat from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for the Afghan population and Australian and Coalition troops in Afghanistan.



The Weapons Intelligence Team (aka WIT or 'CSI Tarin Kot') analyses IED components to enable the ADF and its Coalition partners to determine the best methods of countering the threat.



This intelligence allows Australian and Coalition forces to update their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter the threat for troops on the ground.

The specialised team within WIT uses techniques akin to a police crime lab on the TV program 'CSI' to analyse recovered IED componentry to create the evident for the Afghan justice system to prosecute individuals involved in supplying, creating and laying IEDs against civilians and Coalition troops.



This evidence adds to a worldwide database used by police forces, immigration and other officials to help prevent crime.

10 MOST ELITE SPECIAL FORCES IN THE WORLD

Elite special forces are some of the best-trained and most formidable units a country can boast.

Whether emerging from the water to silently take out guards or storming a plane to rescue the hostages and eliminate the hostage-takers, special forces take on some of the hardest missions and live some of the most secret lives in the military world. These troops are the ones that states look to in order to get the job done.

Improvised Explosive Devices “Weapons Intelligence Team” Course

The “Weapons Intelligence Team” course took place at the NATO Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Centre of Excellence, in Hoyo de Manzanares, Spain in June 2017.


An “improvised explosive device” (IED), like a roadside bomb, is a type of unconventional explosive weapon that can take any form, is inexpensive and easy to get by terrorists and insurgents. It represents a critical threat both in theatre of operations and at home.


NATO has acquired inputs and intelligence from the analysis of the increasingly sophisticated weapons systems that insurgents and terrorists are using, and has developed an action plan to detect and neutralise IEDs and to identify and disrupt the networks supporting this threat.

The Weapons Intelligence Team course is a tool to spread this IED expertise to NATO Allies and partner countries.


During the course, the students learn how to collect evidence as well as identify, locate and target different threat networks using IEDs, such as roadside bombs. The first part of the course took place in a land environment in Hoyo de Manzanares, Spain, where the NATO C-IED Centre of Excellence is located. For the first time, the last week of the course took place in a maritime scenario, at Naval Station Rota in Spain.



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L’Onu nie tout lien entre terrorisme islamique et religion.

Juil 11, 2017

Dans sa 35ème session tenue entre le 6 et le 23 juin 2017, le Conseil des Droits de l’Homme de l’ONU s’est penché sur les événements survenus en Syrie au cours de l’année 2016. Le texte condamne fermement les violations des droits de l’homme telles les bombardements de populations civiles (au cours du second semestre de l’année 2016), les abus sur les femmes et les enfants, les attaques d’hôpitaux et d’écoles, et celles commises contre ceux qui apportent de l’aide humanitaire, l’utilisation des armes chimiques, le déplacement de populations, les massacres, les tortures dans les prisons…menées et couvertes par les autorités syriennes.

Y sont également rappelés les différentes résolutions concernant la Syrie adoptées depuis 2011, la condamnation des crimes et des crimes de guerre, l’appel à un cessez le feu et l’arrêt de toutes les violations des Droits de l’Homme, en vue de trouver une solution politique durable. Le point numéro 5 mérite toutefois une attention particulière : il s’agit de la condamnation des actes commis par Daesh, Al Nusra et les autres organisations désignés comme « terroristes » par le Conseil de sécurité.

Plus précisément, le 5ème point du texte indique :

« (Le conseil) condamne fermement les actes terroristes et la violence commise contre les civils par le soi-disant État islamique en Irak et au Levant, le front Al Nusra ou les autres organisations terroristes désignées par le conseil de sécurité, et la violation répétée, systématique, et généralisée, des abus des Droits de l’Homme et la violation du Droit international humanitaire. (Il est alors) réaffirmé que le terrorisme, incluant les actions du soi-disant État islamique en Irak et au levant, ne peut pas et ne doit pas être associé avec une religion une nationalité une civilisation et nuit à la mise en œuvre des mesures du Conseil de sécurité, résolution 2170 du 15 août 2014 ».

Ce qui pose problème, c’est la mention selon laquelle le Conseil des Droits de l’Homme réaffirme que « le terrorisme, incluant les actions du soi-disant Etat Islamique en Iraq et au Levant (Daesh) ne peut pas et ne doit pas être associé avec une religion, une nationalité ou une civilisation.. » (sic).

Cette position est pour le moins surprenante. En effet, l’Etat Islamique se présente lui-même comme une organisation d’inspiration salafiste, qui entend instaurer un califat sur les territoires qu’il contrôle depuis le 29 janvier 2014 (appelant notamment les autres mouvements jihadistes à lui prêter allégeance).

Or, l’idéologie de l’Etat Islamique repose sur la branche de l’Islam sunnite qui prône un retour aux pratiques religieuses de l’époque de Mahomet en rééduquant la communauté des croyants. Aussi, retirer tout lien entre l’Etat Islamique et la religion relève du déni de réalité.

De même, le Front al-Nosra (« Front de la conquête du Cham »), est également d’inspiration salafiste jihadiste (il est considéré comme terroriste par l’Onu depuis mai 2014). Il se différencie simplement de l’EI par son affiliation à Al-Qaïda. Une fois encore, son lien avec la religion est indéniable.

D’ailleurs, ce qui distingue Al Qaida de l’Etat Islamique relève précisément des modalités de mise en œuvre des préconisations envisagées par le Coran : pour le premier, le Jihad doit être mené contre les Etats-Unis, Israël et les pays occidentaux alors que pour le second, l’ennemi principal est l’Iran et les Chiites. Une fois encore, nier tout lien entre l’Etat Islamique ou de Al Nostras est absurde.

En réalité, non seulement l’idéologie de l’Etat Islamique ou du Front al-Nosra est d’inspiration religieuse mais en outre, elle n’est qu’une illustration de la guerre de religion que livrent les groupuscules jihadistes sunnites aux chiites.

Sur ce point, on peut noter une ressemblance troublante entre les conflits opposant sunnites et chiites, et ceux qui ont ensanglanté l’Europe aux XVI° siècle (entre catholiques et protestants). Les sunnites représentent 80 % de la population musulmane (comme les catholiques dans le monde chrétien) alors que les chiites, 20 %, c’est-à-dire, la même proportion que les protestants dans la religion chrétienne.

L’inconvénient pour le jihadisme islamique sunnite, c’est qu’il doit non seulement se débarrasser des chiites mais également des Gens du Livre, c’est-à-dire les juifs et les chrétiens (le programme est chargé).

Il n’appartient, bien évidement pas, à l’Onu se s’immiscer dans les querelles idéologiques du monde de l’Islam. Elle ne saurait pour autant nier les liens entre les organisations terroristes islamiques et la religion. Elle pourrait, en revanche, inviter les doctrinaires de l’Islam à en aménager les règles de sorte que la religion de Mahomet devienne compatible avec les autres systèmes de foi.

Autrement dit, il est urgent, pour le monde de l’Islam, qu’il entreprenne sa propre introspection, et qu’il fasse le tri entre les textes qui doivent se comprendre à l’aune des évènements qui ont marqué la vie de Mahomet, mais qui sont désormais inapplicables.

Ce travail est d’autant plus urgent que les mouvements salafistes se multiplient en Europe (Allemagne, Belgique, France, Suède…). Or, il s’agit de mouvements de type jihadistes, c’est-à-dire qu’ils appellent à la lutte armée pour imposer l’Islam des origines (tels Al Qaida ou l’Etat Islamique) et renverser le système occidental.

Bien évidemment, si une réforme de l’Islam doit intervenir, c’est de l’intérieur qu’elle arrivera. Le monde démocratique occidental (considéré comme impie par les jihadistes) ne saurait dicter au monde de l’Islam, les règles d’humanité qu’il convient de partager entre les différentes nations du monde.

Le monde découvrira alors qu’à l’instar du « matérialisme historique » de Karl Marx en vertu duquel se produira, à terme, une égalité entre le détenteur des moyens de production et le prolétaire (qui n’a que la force de ses bras pour subvenir à ses besoins), il existe une « dialectique spirituelle » conduisant les familles religieuses à se reconnaître entre elles… conformément à leur ordre d’arrivée.

En attendant ce moment, l’Onu ne saurait occulter la dimension religieuse des groupes terroristes islamiques en affirmant que leurs actes sont dénués de tout lien avec la religion.

C’est précisément l’un des enjeux du XXI° siècle.

Camus affirmait : « mal nommer les choses ajoute aux malheurs du monde ». Il invitait donc l’homme à qualifier correctement les situations pour éviter les problèmes. Pour autant, mal nommer les choses présente un caractère involontaire obligeant l’homme à une plus grande vigilance. Ce n’est pas le cas des mentions contenues dans le texte du Conseil des Droits de l’Homme de juin 2017.

La communauté internationale se doit de qualifier les situations telles qu’elles sont, (et dont elle a parfaitement conscience), d’autant que l’Onu comprend en son sein de très éminents juristes. Le refus d’admettre le lien entre terrorisme et religion ferait courir de graves dangers à l’humanité.

Terrorism intelligence shared via INTERPOL’s Project Kalkan strengthens global ‘early warning system’

Iranian Police Chief, Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari said: “The role of INTERPOL in strengthening law enforcement’s efforts to counter terrorism cannot be underestimated. The results of Project Kalkan are an example of what can be built through international police cooperation.”  

10 July 2017


TEHRAN, Iran – Implementing operational counter-terrorism mechanisms is the focus of an INTERPOL Project Kalkan working group meeting with experts from Central and South Asia, and neighbouring regions.

Bringing together more than 70 investigators from 26 countries, the two-day (10 and 11 July) meeting is the latest in a series of specialized exchanges. Sharing best practices and identifying gaps in intelligence in order to better contain and disrupt transnational terrorist activities will also be part of the round-table sessions and case study exchanges.

Since the last meeting in April, information exchanged via Project Kalkan has already led to the arrest of eight terrorist suspects and the positive location of a further four individuals.

Nearly 20 analytical reports have been produced including one on high value targets in Syria and Iraq, in addition to identifying links between terrorist groups and networks associated with human and drug trafficking via ‘shadow facilitators’.

Delegates will also address a number of significant cases identified within the Project which point to new patterns in the use of forged passports by Foreign Terrorist Fighters to move in and out of conflict zones.

Opening the meeting, INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock said the project, created in 2004, represented a turning point in global information sharing on countering terrorism.

“Project Kalkan has made significant contributions at both the tactical and strategic levels in strengthening the role of international police cooperation,” said Secretary General Stock.

Of the more than 18,000 Foreign Terrorist Fighter profiles recorded by INTERPOL, nearly 40 per cent were provided by Project Kalkan countries.

Iranian Police Chief, Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari said: “The role of INTERPOL in strengthening law enforcement’s efforts to counter terrorism cannot be underestimated. The results of Project Kalkan are an example of what can be built through international police cooperation.”

Co-hosted by the Iran Police, the working group meeting was supported by the Japanese Government as part of the ‘Interdicting Foreign Terrorist Fighters travelling to conflict zones’ project.

INTERPOL to highlight need for military to police terrorism data flow at Global Coalition meeting

11 July 2017

LYON, France – Ahead of a meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, INTERPOL has underlined the need for military success against the group to be translated into actionable intelligence for police around the world.

With mounting pressure on former ISIS strongholds likely to result in increased numbers of battle-hardened terrorists returning home, fleeing to neighbouring countries, or joining other conflicts, it is vital that critical information left by retreating fighters and recovered by Global Coalition forces is quickly shared with the global law enforcement community through a secure multilateral platform.

Details of more than 18,000 Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) have now been shared via INTERPOL’s global network with an increasing amount being sourced from the conflict zones. Biometric data such as photos, fingerprints and DNA profiles have already led to the positive identification of terrorists around the world, including via facial recognition.

“Although there has been military success in Iraq and Syria, ISIS retains the ability to direct or inspire deadly attacks across multiple continents,” said Secretary General Jürgen Stock.

“Experience has shown the essential role that military-police cooperation plays in keeping pace with the threat as it disperses beyond the conflict zone. INTERPOL provides an established and trusted interface which supports this cooperation on a global level,” added Secretary General Stock.

INTERPOL projects Vennlig and Hamah have enabled evidence of terrorist activity collected from Iraq and Afghanistan to be shared with law enforcement, intelligence and defence agencies in more than 60 countries, leading to the identification of previously unknown terrorists and facilitation networks.

“Once terrorist information is shared at the global level, every traffic check, passport control or random search holds the potential for a break in a terrorism investigation or to foil an evolving plot,” said Mr Stock.

“However, countries worldwide need to ensure their frontline officers have direct access to INTERPOL’s databases in order to make these crucial identifications and prevent terrorists from traveling with ease to conduct attacks,” added Mr Stock pointing to the recent statements by the G7 and G20 calling for countries to make full use of INTERPOL’s information systems.

With an increasing number of individuals involved in terrorist attacks having a criminal background, Secretary General Stock also underlined the need for the most basic information stored in national police systems to be shared at the global level.

Fingerprint checks of arrested foreign nationals by one European country against INTERPOL’s databases resulted in 11 hits in just one two-week period in June.

Individuals linked to recent terrorist attacks in Europe, including at least one suspect travelling on a passport recorded in the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database, had been subjects of INTERPOL alerts prior to the attacks.

“Unless and until countries ensure vital policing information is in the hands of frontline officers, the threat will continue to outpace our response,” said Secretary General Stock.

“The networks are in place, the officers are on our streets, we just need to make sure that all possible dots are connected,” concluded the INTERPOL Chief.

U.S. aims for U.N. vote on North Korea sanctions within weeks: diplomats.

United States Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley

United States Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley aims to put to a vote within weeks a U.N. Security Council resolution to impose stronger sanctions on North Korea over its long-range ballistic missile test, said several senior U.N. diplomats.

Haley told some U.N. diplomats late last week of the ambitious timeline for a U.N. response to North Korea's launch on Tuesday of a missile that some experts believe could have the range to reach Alaska, and parts of the U.S. West Coast.

The U.S. mission to the United Nations declined to comment on the timeline for a council vote. Some Security Council diplomats have expressed doubt that a draft resolution could be put to a vote quickly.

Following a nuclear weapons test by North Korea in September, while U.S. President Barack Obama was still in office, it took the U.N. Security Council three months to agree to strengthened sanctions.

The United States gave China a draft resolution to impose stronger sanctions on Pyongyang after the 15-member Security Council met on Wednesday to discuss the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch, diplomats said.

China's U.N. Ambassador Liu Jieyi told Reuters on Monday that it was important to ensure that any action the Security Council might take should be conducive to achieving the goal of a denuclearized, peaceful and stable Korean peninsula.

"We really must think very carefully about what is the best approach in the Security Council because a resolution, sanctions, are themselves not an objective," he said.

When asked if the council could act within weeks, Liu said it would depend on how members "see the way forward in terms of council action, in terms of how that is put into the wider context of ... improving the situation, preventing further tests, ensuring Security Council resolutions will be abided by."

Traditionally, the United States and China have negotiated new sanctions on North Korea before formally involving other council members. Diplomats said the United States would informally keep Britain and France in the loop, while China was likely talking to Russia.

The United States, China, Russia, Britain and France are the Security Council's permanent veto-wielding powers. The United States could also face a battle to persuade Russia that council action against North Korea is needed.

On Thursday, Russia objected to a council condemnation of North Korea's missile launch because the U.S.-drafted statement labeled it an ICBM, a designation Moscow disagrees with. Diplomats said that negotiations on the statement had stalled.

North Korea has been under U.N. sanctions since 2006 over its ballistic missile and nuclear programs and the council has ratcheted up the measures in response to the country's five nuclear weapons tests and two long-range missile launches.

During the Security Council meeting last Wednesday, Haley said some options to strengthen U.N. sanctions were to restrict the flow of oil to North Korea's military and weapons programs, increasing air and maritime restrictions and imposing targeted sanctions on senior officials.

Diplomats said Washington proposed such options to Beijing two months ago, but that China had not engaged in discussions on the measures and instead only agreed to adding some people and entities to the existing U.N. sanctions list in June.



(Reporting by Michelle Nichols; Editing by James Dalgleish)