Israeli-Arab Crisis Approaching

In September, the U.N. General Assembly will vote on whether to recognize Palestine as an independent and sovereign state with full rights in the United Nations. In many ways, this would appear to be a reasonable and logical step. Whatever the Palestinians once were, they are clearly a nation in the simplest and most important sense — namely, they think of themselves as a nation. Nations are created by historical circumstances, and those circumstances have given rise to a Palestinian nation. Under the principle of the United Nations and the theory of the right to national self-determination, which is the moral foundation of the modern theory of nationalism, a nation has a right to a state, and that state has a place in the family of nations. In this sense, the U.N. vote will be unexceptional.

However, when the United Nations votes on Palestinian statehood, it will intersect with other realities and other historical processes. First, it is one thing to declare a Palestinian state; it is quite another thing to create one. The Palestinians are deeply divided between two views of what the Palestinian nation ought to be, a division not easily overcome. Second, this vote will come at a time when two of Israel’s neighbors are coping with their own internal issues. Syria is in chaos, with an extended and significant resistance against the regime having emerged. Meanwhile, Egypt is struggling with internal tension over the fall of President Hosni Mubarak and the future of the military junta that replaced him. Add to this the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the potential rise of Iranian power, and the potential recognition of a Palestinian state — while perfectly logical in an abstract sense — becomes an event that can force a regional crisis in the midst of ongoing regional crises. It thus is a vote that could have significant consequences.

The Palestinian Divide

Let’s begin with the issue not of the right of a nation to have a state but of the nature of a Palestinian state under current circumstances. The Palestinians are split into two major factions. The first, Fatah, dominates the West Bank. Fatah derives its ideology from the older, secular Pan-Arab movement. Historically, Fatah saw the Palestinians as a state within the Arab nation. The second, Hamas, dominates Gaza. Unlike Fatah, it sees the Palestinians as forming part of a broader Islamist uprising, one in which Hamas is the dominant Islamist force of the Palestinian people.

The Pan-Arab rising is moribund. Where it once threatened the existence of Muslim states, like the Arab monarchies, it is now itself threatened. Mubarak, Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi all represented the old Pan-Arab vision. A much better way to understand the “Arab Spring” is that it represented the decay of such regimes that were vibrant when they came to power in the late 1960s and early 1970s but have fallen into ideological meaninglessness. Fatah is part of this grouping, and while it still speaks for Palestinian nationalism as a secular movement, beyond that it is isolated from broader trends in the region. It is both at odds with rising religiosity and simultaneously mistrusted by the monarchies it tried to overthrow. Yet it controls the Palestinian proto-state, the Palestinian National Authority, and thus will be claiming a U.N. vote on Palestinian statehood. Hamas, on the other hand, is very much representative of current trends in the Islamic world and holds significant popular support, yet it is not clear that it holds a majority position in the Palestinian nation.

All nations have ideological divisions, but the Palestinians are divided over the fundamental question of the Palestinian nation’s identity. Fatah sees itself as part of a secular Arab world that is on the defensive. Hamas envisions the Palestinian nation as an Islamic state forming in the context of a region-wide Islamist rising. Neither is in a position to speak authoritatively for the Palestinian people, and the things that divide them cut to the heart of the nation. As important, each has a different view of its future relations with Israel. Fatah has accepted, in practice, the idea of Israel’s permanence as a state and the need of the Palestinians to accommodate themselves to the reality. Hamas has rejected it.

The U.N. decision raises the stakes in this debate within the Palestinian nation that could lead to intense conflict. As vicious as the battle between Hamas and Fatah has been, an uneasy truce has existed over recent years. Now, there could emerge an internationally legitimized state, and control of that state will matter more than ever before. Whoever controls the state defines what the Palestinians are, and it becomes increasingly difficult to suspend the argument for a temporary truce. Rather than settling anything, or putting Israel on the defensive, the vote will compel a Palestinian crisis.

Fatah has an advantage in any vote on Palestinian statehood: It enjoys far more international support than Hamas does. Europeans and Americans see it as friendly to their interests and less hostile to Israel. The Saudis and others may distrust Fatah from past conflicts, but in the end they fear radical Islamists and Iran and so require American support at a time when the Americans have tired of playing in what some Americans call the “sandbox.” However reluctantly, while aiding Hamas, the Saudis are more comfortable with Fatah. And of course, the embattled Arabist regimes, whatever tactical shifts there may have been, spring from the same soil as Fatah. While Fatah is the preferred Palestinian partner for many, Hamas can also use that reality to portray Fatah as colluding with Israel against the Palestinian people during a confrontation.

For its part, Hamas has the support of Islamists in the region, including Shiite Iranians, but that is an explosive mix to base a strategy on. Hamas must break its isolation if it is to counter the tired but real power of Fatah. Symbolic flotillas from Turkey are comforting, but Hamas needs an end to Egyptian hostility to Hamas more than anything.

Egypt’s Role and Fatah on the Defensive

Egypt is the power that geographically isolates Hamas through its treaty with Israel and with its still-functional blockade on Gaza. More than anyone, Hamas needs genuine regime change in Egypt. The new regime it needs is not a liberal democracy but one in which Islamist forces supportive of Hamas, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, come to power.

At the moment, that is not likely. Egypt’s military has retained a remarkable degree of control, its opposition groups are divided between secular and religious elements, and the religious elements are further divided among themselves — as well as penetrated by an Egyptian security apparatus that has made war on them for years. As it stands, Egypt is not likely to evolve in a direction favorable to Hamas. Therefore, Hamas needs to redefine the political situation in Egypt to convert a powerful enemy into a powerful friend.

Though it is not easy for a small movement to redefine a large nation, in this case, it could perhaps happen. There is a broad sense of unhappiness in Egypt over Egypt’s treaty with Israel, an issue that comes to the fore when Israel and the Palestinians are fighting. As in other Arab countries, passions surge in Egypt when the Palestinians are fighting the Israelis.

Under Mubarak, these passions were readily contained in Egypt. Now the Egyptian regime unquestionably is vulnerable, and pro-Palestinian feelings cut across most, if not all, opposition groups. It is a singular, unifying force that might suffice to break the military’s power, or at least to force the military to shift its Israeli policy.

Hamas in conflict with Israel as the United Nations votes for a Palestinian state also places Fatah on the political defensive among the Palestinians. Fatah cooperation with Israel while Gaza is at war would undermine Fatah, possibly pushing Fatah to align with Hamas. Having the U.N. vote take place while Gaza is at war, a vote possibly accompanied by General Assembly condemnation of Israel, could redefine the region.

Last week’s attack on the Eilat road should be understood in this context. Some are hypothesizing that new Islamist groups forming in the Sinai or Palestinian groups in Gaza operating outside Hamas’ control carried out the attack. But while such organizations might formally be separate from Hamas, I find it difficult to believe that Hamas, with an excellent intelligence service inside Gaza and among the Islamist groups in the Sinai, would not at least have known these groups’ broad intentions and would not have been in a position to stop them. Just as Fatah created Black September in the 1970s, a group that appeared separate from Fatah but was in fact covertly part of it, the strategy of creating new organizations to take the blame for conflicts is an old tactic both for the Palestinians and throughout the world.

Hamas’ ideal attack would offer it plausible deniability — allowing it to argue it did not even know an attack was imminent, much less carry it out — and trigger an Israeli attack on Gaza. Such a scenario casts Israel as the aggressor and Hamas as the victim, permitting Hamas to frame the war to maximum effect in Egypt and among the Palestinians, as well as in the wider Islamic world and in Europe.

Regional Implications and Israel’s Dilemma

The matter goes beyond Hamas. The Syrian regime is currently fighting for its life against its majority Sunni population. It has survived thus far, but it needs to redefine the conflict. The Iranians and Hezbollah are among those most concerned with the fall of the Syrian regime. Syria has been Iran’s one significant ally, one strategically positioned to enhance Iranian influence in the Levant. Its fall would be a strategic setback for Iran at a time when Tehran is looking to enhance its position with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Iran, which sees the uprising as engineered by its enemies — the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey — understandably wants al Assad to survive.

Meanwhile, the fall of Syria would leave Hezbollah — which is highly dependent on the current Syrian regime and is in large part an extension of Syrian policy in Lebanon — wholly dependent on Iran. And Iran without its Syrian ally is very far away from Hezbollah. Like Tehran, Hezbollah thus also wants al Assad to survive. Hezbollah joining Hamas in a confrontation with Israel would take the focus off the al Assad regime and portray his opponents as undermining resistance to Israel. Joining a war with Israel also would make it easier for Hezbollah to weather the fall of al Assad should his opponents prevail. It would help Hezbollah create a moral foundation for itself independent of Syria. Hezbollah’s ability to force a draw with Israel in 2006 constituted a victory for the radical Islamist group that increased its credibility dramatically.

The 2006 military confrontation was also a victory for Damascus, as it showed the Islamic world that Syria was the only nation-state supporting effective resistance to Israel. It also showed Israel and the United States that Syria alone could control Hezbollah and that forcing Syria out of Lebanon was a strategic error on the part of Israel and the United States.

Faced with this dynamic, it will be difficult for Fatah to maintain its relationship with Israel. Indeed, Fatah could be forced to initiate an intifada, something it would greatly prefer to avoid, as this would undermine what economic development the West Bank has experienced.

Israel therefore conceivably could face conflict in Gaza, a conflict along the Lebanese border and a rising in the West Bank, something it clearly knows. In a rare move, Israel announced plans to call up reserves in September. Though preannouncements of such things are not common, Israel wants to signal resolution.

Israel has two strategies in the face of the potential storm. One is a devastating attack on Gaza followed by rotating forces to the north to deal with Hezbollah and intense suppression of an intifada. Dealing with Gaza fast and hard is the key if the intention is to abort the evolution I laid out. But the problem here is that the three-front scenario I laid out is simply a possibility; there is no certainty here. If Israel initiates conflict in Gaza and fails, it risks making a possibility into a certainty — and Israel has not had many stunning victories for several decades. It could also create a crisis for Egypt’s military rulers, not something the Israelis want.

Israel also simply could absorb the attacks from Hamas to make Israel appear the victim. But seeking sympathy is not likely to work given how Palestinians have managed to shape global opinion. Moreover, we would expect Hamas to repeat its attacks to the point that Israel no longer could decline combat.

War thus benefits Hamas (even if Hamas maintains plausible deniability by having others commit the attacks), a war Hezbollah has good reason to enter at such a stage and that Fatah does not want but could be forced into. Such a war could shift the Egyptian dynamic significantly to Hamas’ advantage, while Iran would certainly want al-Assad to be able to say to Syrians that a war with Israel is no time for a civil war in Syria. Israel would thus find itself fighting three battles simultaneously. The only way to do that is to be intensely aggressive, making moderation strategically difficult.

Israel responded modestly compared to the past after the Eilat incident, mounting only limited attacks on Gaza against mostly members of the Palestinian Resistance Committees, an umbrella group known to have links with Hamas. Nevertheless, Hamas has made clear that its de facto truce with Israel was no longer assured. The issue now is what Hamas is prepared to do and whether Hamas supporters, Saudi Arabia in particular, can force them to control anti-Israeli activities in the region. The Saudis want al Assad to fall, and they do not want a radical regime in Egypt. Above all, they do not want Iran’s hand strengthened. But it is never clear how much influence the Saudis or Egyptians have over Hamas. For Hamas, this is emerging as the perfect moment, and it is hard to believe that even the Saudis can restrain them. As for the Israelis, what will happen depends on what others decide — which is the fundamental strategic problem that Israel has.

Font: By George Friedman

The Chinese Chief of Staff Visits Israel: Renewing Military Relations?

On August 14, 2011 General Chen Bingde, the Chinese Chief of Staff, arrived on a state visit to Israel. Although the visit it not expected to generate a profound change in the bilateral military ties, it has aroused a great deal of attention. First of all, the visit is being portrayed as part of a growing military relationship between the countries. This occasion, the first time a Chinese chief of staff has visited Israel, comes on the heels of a visit to Israel in May 2011 by the commander of the Chinese navy, while the following month Israel's Defense Minister visited China – the first such visit in a decade.

Second, the serious crises in Israeli-Chinese relations of the early 2000s made the military the most sensitive area in these relations. Israel, which until then had provided China with military technologies, was forced under American pressure to abrogate unilaterally an agreement to supply China with the Phalcon airborne early warning system; a few years later, again under American pressure, it was forced to reject a Chinese request to provide maintenance work on UAVs (the Harpy) it had supplied previously. Israel subsequently arrived at an understanding with the United States that prevented further military exports to China. These circumstances brought Israeli-Chinese relations to a nadir, and although political relations have since been restored, the limitations on security exports to China still in place would presumably make it difficult to renew military relations.

Under these circumstances, the reciprocal visits indeed give rise to speculation about closer military cooperation between China and Israel. Possible explanations should first be sought on the Chinese side. First, as the party previously injured by the severing of military relations and especially because of the enormous gap in size between the two nations, the renewal of relations depends on China’s desire to do so. Second, as long as there has been no change in Israel’s military exports policy – and there is no evidence of such a change – Israel has nothing new to offer China. Nonetheless, it seems that even under present circumstances, strengthening military relations may benefit China. Militarily, China is interested not only in original technologies but also in broader knowledge, and Israel, with its vast operational experience, is viewed by China as an authoritative source. China is clearly aware that the transmission of military knowledge is likely to be quite limited, but given the lack of practical experience (China has not conducted a military campaign since 1979), any information China receives may be of value. As for the transmission of military technologies, China with its political experience and patience may assume that current export limitations could one day be lifted, and may therefore continue to raise the issue on different occasions.

Information sharing is relevant not only in the military sphere, but also in broader strategic contexts. Over the last decade and in the latter half in particular, China’s involvement in the Middle East has deepened. Despite its desire to limit its activities in the region to the economic sphere, China’s growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil has impelled it to promote political ties to the region including, to a certain extent, military ties. It has promoted these ties by nurturing extensive diplomatic connections, increasing investments, demonstrating interest in regional political processes, selling arms, and recently by cautiously increasing its military presence. In addition to participating in regional peacekeeping forces, it sent a small naval force to the Gulf of Aden as part of the international struggle against piracy (December 2008), held joint maneuvers with Turkey (fall of 2010), and sent naval vessels and airplanes to evacuate its citizens from Libya (February 2011).

In a situation in which China’s interests in the region are becoming more complex and its desire for continued stability is growing, the association with Israel has clear benefits. Not only can Israel provide China with a current perspective on what is happening in the region – for example, the developments of the “Jasmine Revolution” and trends in terrorism – but by maintaining strategic channels of information with Israel, China can avoid surprises on the part of Israel. Moreover, this type of relationship may even afford China some measure of influence over Israel’s moves. In a broader dimension, strengthening military ties with Israel may be part of a Chinese effort to establish gradually a strategic presence in the Middle East, a subject that has recently been discussed in China. The fact that Israel is the clear ally of the United States only strengthens the profitability of such a move, because in the growing competition between the two powers, the seeming strengthening of military relations with an American ally earns points for China.

As for Israel, the new situation presents it with a dilemma. On the one hand, given China’s rising global status, Israel has an interest in strengthening bilateral ties, especially because since the Phalcon affair Israel has sought to repair the damage and recover from lost opportunities. In addition, strengthening ties with China may offer Israel an additional means to promote its campaign against the Iranian nuclear program and limit the transfer of Chinese weapons and ammunition (apparently indirectly and unintentionally) to Hamas and Hizbollah. In addition, in light of China’s strengthening ties with the Arab world and Iran because of its growing dependence on imported oil, there is a real concern that Beijing will show increased support for them on the international diplomatic arena. China’s vote in the UN in favor of the Goldstone Report – against its own foreign policy principles – is an example of this diplomacy. Therefore, it is up to Israel to find joint areas of interest to balance this tendency, if only in part.

On the other hand, having previously suffered due to its military relations with China, Israel is not interested in creating the impression that cooperation is growing, thereby yet again arousing American suspicions. These limitations are clear to China, and if it is sincerely interested in a long term strengthening of military relations with Israel, China will likely not force Israel to choose between China and the US – a choice whose outcome is not in question – and will rather take advantage of every possible channel to strengthen cooperation. For its part, Israel will find it difficult to forego the opportunity to strengthen its military relations with China, but unlike the past, when it ignored the tension between the US and China or alternately chose one side only, it will now have to find a way to maneuver between the two.

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי

Dr. Yoram Evron is a research associate at INSS and a lecturer in the Asian Studies Department at the University of Haifa.

The Syrian Regime: Protests at Home and Criticism from Abroad

As the month of Ramadan begins, the internal crisis in Syria is intensifying. Reports of the mass murder of civilians and allegations of crimes against humanity by Bashar al-Asad’s regime are multiplying. The number of participants in Friday protest rallies seems to have crossed the one million mark and reflects a central trend: the strengthening of the protest movement and the worsening of the crisis in Syria. It may well be that during Ramadan, Islam’s month of fasting, a critical mass of protesters will form, meaning that Asad’s regime may not only face a serious threat from the blood-soaked turmoil, but that perhaps as a result of the chain reaction his days are numbered.

The protests that began in March 2011 in the town of Daraa involved no more than a few thousand people. Afterward, the protests spread to other Syrian cities and the number of participants rose steadily, from thousands to tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands to one million or more. The steady rise in the number of protesters and their growing motivation and courage in bringing down the regime are part of an ongoing process of creating a critical mass of protesters.

The protests encompass a wide range of Syrian population groups, including minorities that have only recently begun to participate actively in the protests, such as Kurds and Christians, and Syrian majority groups of Sunni Muslims. Consequently, there is growing pressure on the Alawis, the power base supporting the regime, to turns their back on the Asad family and join in the demonstrations. According to various Western estimates, it is only a matter of time before the Alawis cross over to the protesters’ side. Should that in fact occur, not only may they be able to prevent revenge attacks on the community when the day comes for having formerly collaborated with the Asad regime, but such a development may also significantly shorten the road to the collapse of the regime.

The protesters and opposition groups have heightened the pressure on the Alawis, at times with outright threats, to participate in the anti-Asad demonstrations. Although there is a tendency to view the Alawis as a uniform group, reality is much more complex. Among the Alawis there are many who automatically support the regime, but there are many others who acknowledge the tyranny and corruption of the regime and have even suffered at its hands and therefore oppose it. Presumably the latter group will at some point support the protesters, but it is less likely, especially in the near future, that they will take an active part in the demonstrations. The fear among the Alawis is twofold: not only do they fear the response of Asad’s regime should they join the protests, but they also fear the majority of Syria’s Sunni Muslim civilians when considering the day after the fall of Asad’s regime. The pressure by the protesters and the opposition on the Alawis and supporters of the regime is particularly evident in the Syrian army and security services and the ruling Baath party. These institutions are the power base of support for the regime, and some of the Alawis in them are particularly dominant. Since the outbreak of the demonstrations, the number of deserters from the Syrian army has grown slowly but steadily. At the same time, the opposition’s demand to abolish the law giving exclusivity to the Baath party has become one of its threshold demands.

Additional pressure affecting the fate of the regime, joining Syria’s heightening internal protests, is the involvement of international entities and nations. Syrian opposition elements are systematically working in different arenas in the world to enlist support for their struggle against the regime; efforts are directed to the US and the EU as well as Russia and China. It appears that the Syrian opposition’s primary success in recruiting support for their struggle in the Middle East is in Turkey, which hosts Syrian opposition groups and allows them to act from Turkish soil via the media against Asad’s regime.

Despite the close cooperation between Turkey and Syria in recent years, the outbreak of the protest and the Asad regime’s violent means of suppressing it have led to an estrangement between the countries. Turkey is still not calling for Asad to step down, but has denounced the events in Hama as an atrocity and has not ruled out the possibility of military intervention in Syria. Turkey, as well as other nations in the international community, is not thrilled by the military intervention option, but is worried about the protest trickling over to the Kurdish population on Turkish soil as well as a large wave of refugees, which Turkey would find difficult to handle.

The situation in Syria has also positioned Turkey against Iran. Unlike Turkey, Iran is actively supporting the Asad regime and is helping it suppress the turmoil. Despite the unnatural link between Asad’s secular regime and the ayatollahs in Iran, the strategic relations between Syria and Iran have for many years provided mutual gain to the two nations. The fall of Asad would represent a blow to the Iranian regime. While Turkey too invested much into its relations with Bashar al-Asad and is therefore likewise not happy with developments in Syria, its cooperation with opposition elements is preparing it for the day after. It is doubtful if the situation in Syria would drag Turkey and Iran in to a direct confrontation, but the lack of stability in Syria is already presenting Turkey and Iran with some dilemmas and will continue to create points of friction between them should the unrest intensify.

In conclusion, protests in Syria and their violent suppression are growing, as is international criticism of the regime. The UN Security Council statement denouncing Syria for widespread violations of human rights and use of force against civilians is evidence of the fact that the internal protests will also be accompanied by growing pressure on the regime from the outside. Such external pressure encourages the opposition to continue to act, damages the Asad regime on the cognitive level, and could also have operational ramifications. In the Middle East, the two key nations with which Syria had close relations in recent years are operating in opposition to one another: Turkey is pressuring Asad to implement extensive reforms and is working together with the opposition, while Iran continues actively to support Asad’s regime and its suppressive moves. The chances that Turkey’s policy will succeed seem brighter than those of Iran’s, which in turn could generate greater influence for Turkey in Syria on the day after, with all the strategic implications of such a state of affairs.

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Dr. Liad Porat, University of Haifa; Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss, Institute for National Security Studies

Al-Qaida could use hidden 'belly bombs' to attack passenger planes, US warns

Airlines told of terrorists developing 'surgically implanted' explosive compounds in effort to beat airport security.

Ibrahim Asiri, a Saudi terror suspect believed to have had a hand in

devising bombs to be concealed inside attackers' bodies. Photograph: Reuters

American officials have warned airlines that they believe al-Qaida is developing "belly bombs" to beat airport security and allow suicide bombers to launch terror attacks on board passenger planes.

The department of homeland security has sent a bulletin to airline executives saying it has identified a potential threat from terrorists who could "surgically implant explosives or explosive components in humans".

Although many airports use advanced imaging technology that can "see" through people's clothing, the technology might not pick up a bomb which is hidden inside a body.

"Due to the significant advances in global aviation security in recent years, terrorist groups have repeatedly and publicly indicated interest in pursuing ways to further conceal explosives," said Kawika Riley, spokesman for the department's transport security administration.

"As a precaution, passengers flying from international locations to US destinations may notice additional security measures."

Experts say the explosives could be implanted in abdomens, buttocks and breasts allowing suicide bombers to pass undetected through airport body scanners. Explosive compounds such as pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) could be implanted, then the person's wounds allowed to heal, making the material difficult to detect. On board the plane, the material could be detonated by injection.

US officials have been on high alert for terror attacks since US forces killed al-Qaida's leader, Osama bin Laden in May. They say there is no intelligence about a plot, but US and international carriers are being urged to consider the threat.

The bombs are thought to be a particular risk in Europe and the Middle East where full body scanners are not as widely used as they are in the US.

Authorities told ABC News that these "belly bombs" were thought to be the work of 28-year-old Ibrahim Asiri, who became a high-profile target for the US after his failed attempt to hide bombs in printer cartridges being moved from Yemen to Chicago.

He was also believed to be behind the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on 25 December 2009 by the "underwear bomber", Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

The Nigerian had a pouch of PETN in his underwear. He tried injecting the pouch with a chemical to create a detonation but he set his clothes on fire instead and was overpowered by passengers.

Research conducted by the BBC after the underwear bombing suggests that Abdulmutallab would have failed to damage the plane's fuselage even if the bomb had gone off.

The BBC documentary claimed that the blast would only have been strong enough to kill the bomber and the person who was sitting next to him.

Al-Qaida terrorists are believed to have hidden explosives inside their bodies for suicide bombings. In August 2009 Asiri's brother, Abdullah Hassan, died trying to kill Saudi Arabia's deputy interior minister with a bomb reported to have been hidden in his rectum. Saudi officials subsequently told CNN that the bomb may have been hidden in his underwear.

• This article was amended on 7 July 2011. The original said that Al-Qaida terrorists are known to have hidden explosives inside their bodies for suicide bombings. This has been corrected and the text updated.

Font: Guardian News and Media Limited 2011

The United States and Pakistan: Partnership in Crisis

The killing of Osama Bin Laden by American Navy SEALs forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan in early May represents a new peak in the ongoing tension between the United States and Pakistan regarding the issue of combating terror in general, and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas within Pakistan's sovereign territory in particular. Nevertheless, at this stage, the two sides are avoiding an irreparable divide based on their clear mutual interests: Pakistan needs the economic support of the United States and aims to prevent unilateral American backing for India, Pakistan's bitter rival, and the United States needs comprehensive Pakistani assistance in the war against regional and international terrorist elements – the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and al-Qaeda – whose ability to act against the interests of the United States is dependent, to a large extent, on Pakistan's policy toward them.

The flagrant violation of Pakistan's sovereignty by American commando forces who operated in the heart of a large city without coordinating with the authorities in Islamabad resulted in vigorous public and political criticism in Pakistan. The Pakistani parliament held a special session on the military-security establishment’s failure in not knowing and preventing either the American military action or the presence of Bin Laden in the heart of the country. According to information published after the killing, Bin Laden lived in a compound in the heart of the country for at least five years, and even hosted visitors there. This raised questions in the West concerning the possibility that Bin Laden enjoyed cooperation and assistance from elements in the local security forces. This in turn further increased American frustration with the unsatisfactory level of security cooperation with Pakistan in the war on terror – especially with what was seen as a lack of willingness on Pakistan's part to allocate sufficient forces for the war in the tribal region in Waziristan (FATA) –and with Pakistan’s request to limit attacks by American drones. These attacks are the main effective means of action for the United States in the war against the terror organizations mentioned above; the principal targets were the senior leadership of these organizations who concentrate in the tribal regions. Therefore, although on occasion they caused harm to unarmed civilians – either because they were used by terrorists as human shields or were killed accidentally – a restriction on these attacks by the Pakistani government would impede the war on terror.

A previous point of friction in the complex relations between the two countries centered on an incident that occurred three months ago, when Ray Davis, a CIA contractor, shot two local intelligence agents to death in Lahore in broad daylight because he suspected they intended to rob him. Davis was imprisoned immediately after the incident, and although he had diplomatic immunity, the Pakistani public demanded that he be tried on the charge of premeditated murder, a crime for which the punishment is the death penalty. After about a month of contacts, Davis was smuggled out of the country following a compromise agreement that involved the United States government paying blood money to the families of those killed, as is allowed in certain circumstances by Islamic law. The incident sparked heightened public discussion on the breadth and depth of American clandestine intelligence activity in Pakistan and became a cause célèbre for local political elements that oppose all American activity in the country.

For example, members of the Islamist opposition in Pakistan used the incident in their domestic political game to attack the secular government headed by President Zardari, calling the deal to free Davis “a national tragedy.” Zardari’s government has coped with frequent coalition crises and is working against the attempt to weaken the secular political forces in the country. This trend was particularly evident in two political assassinations, in January, Salman Taseer, the governor of the Punjab region and a prominent spokesman against Islamic religious extremism and attempts to apply the blasphemy laws[1] against minorities in Pakistan, was murdered by his bodyguard, and two months later, Shahbaz Bhatti, the Christian federal minister for minorities, was assassinated as well.

In the face of public allegations in the United States about Pakistan’s impotence, as manifested in the Bin Laden affair, and in light of President Obama's recent promise that he would launch more unilateral raids into Pakistan whenever he felt they were required, senior officials of the Pakistani military and security establishment made serious statements in the Pakistani parliament. At the end of the debate, the government of Pakistan announced officially that it criticized the flagrant violation of its sovereignty by the United States; firmly denied any involvement or operational or logistical assistance to the operation; and claimed that such actions harm the two countries' joint efforts in the war on terror. This announcement was also intended as a clear warning to the United States against carrying out future similar actions on its sovereign territory. Likewise, the Pakistani parliament adopted a resolution to take a number of steps restricting American freedom of action in Pakistan, such as in the supply and transfer of equipment on Pakistani territory if the American aerial attacks continue. At the same time, it was decided that a comprehensive internal examination will be carried out to review the related intelligence and security failures.

While the friction between the two countries is real, it appears that there are mutual attempts to cool the atmosphere, mainly through conciliatory announcements and official visits. Examples of this are President Zardari’s conciliatory letter in the Washington Post, which was published immediately after Bin Laden’s killing and was intended to minimize the serious criticism of Zardari in American public opinion; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s tempered comments to the effect that there is no proof of Pakistani government involvement or assistance in hiding Bin Laden on its territory; and Clinton's recent visit to Pakistan with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen. Thus in spite of the increasing tension, the two governments are interested in preserving their ties, in view of their shared interests and the benefits in maintaining security and economic cooperation. The United States sees Pakistan as an essential partner in stabilizing Afghanistan and an important aid in the war on terror underway within Pakistan. Furthermore, geo-strategic considerations regarding Pakistan's status as a nuclear state with a key role in preserving regional stability in the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India, and the signals from Pakistan that it intends to strengthen its ties with China as a possible alternative to its pro-Western policy, discourage the United States from taking strong measures against it.

Pakistan, which suffers from a difficult economic situation, has enjoyed generous American economic and security aid since 2002 as a result of its pro-Western policy, to the tune of approximately $20 billion. A reduction or an end to this aid is liable to cause serious damage to the local economic system and paralyze state institutions. Furthermore, Pakistan is coping with a complicated security challenge within the country and is continues to feel under constant threat from India. Pakistan is very well aware of the price of a rift in relations with the United States, which would likely serve India's interests, and this factor encourages it to maintain strong ties with the United States and sanction its presence as a stabilizing element in the region.

It is still too early to say how the current crisis between the two states will evolve and whether it will lead to a strategic turning point and a change in the entire regional system of power. However, it appears that the advantages inherent in preserving the partnership are likely to urge their leaders to curbing this current deterioration in relations and prevent an irreparable divide.

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

Dueling Speeches and Israeli-American Relations: The Storm before the Calm before the Storm?

Because two previous confrontations between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama had left both a bit bloodied and bowed, it is unlikely that either was seeking a third round during Netanyahu’s recent visit to the United States. Yet that is precisely what happened – largely because of a phrase that was both superfluous and misunderstood.

Since the outbreak of the anti-regime protests in Tunisia in late December 2010, and especially after the United States joined a French-led initiative to provide military support to the anti-Qaddafi opposition movement in Libya, Obama has come under growing criticism for pursuing a course that struck many as hesitant, inconsistent, and even contradictory. On May 19, Obama therefore delivered a speech at the State Department, 80 percent of which was devoted to an effort to provide more coherent framing and guidance for US policy on the "Arab spring." This address was described by some as Cairo II – a follow-up to Obama’s initiative almost immediately after taking office to engage more positively with the Muslim world. With Netanyahu literally on his way to the United States, Obama found it impossible not to make at least some reference to the principles underlying America’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a neuralgic issue in US-Muslim and especially US-Arab relations. The Palestinian threat to request United Nations recognition of Palestinian statehood at the General Assembly in September gave added urgency to this need. While the United States might well be prepared to oppose this initiative on its own, it would much prefer to preempt it by encouraging the restart of negotiations, or at least to mobilize a “moral majority” of like-minded states, especially in Europe, to stand against the automatic mathematical majority against Israel in the General Assembly.

Consequently, Obama reaffirmed the traditional essentials of American policy, including the commitment to Israeli security and the insistence that any resolution of the conflict could not be imposed but had to be negotiated between the parties. But he also tried to sharpen some terms of reference for negotiations in the hope that Israeli endorsement of his formulation would persuade some Europeans to vote against the expected draft resolution or, even more ambitiously, persuade the Palestinians to shelve their plan and return to the negotiating table. On the territorial question, the term of reference for negotiation that Obama proposed was: “The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps.”

There is no reason to suspect that, Obama, by invoking 1967, intended to provoke a firestorm of controversy and a clash with Netanyahu. This was a carefully crafted speech that accommodated most Israeli sensitivities: the reference to borders was located in a brief paragraph that stipulated “negotiations” or “negotiated” three times, the point of reference used was “1967 lines” rather than the tendentious and inaccurate term “1967 borders” to which most Israelis are allergic, and the coupling of this point of reference with mutually agreed swaps clearly implied that it was meant to be the starting point of negotiations rather than their outcome. Moreover, Obama could legitimately claim that this formulation was no more than a rephrasing of the US approach to the territorial issue stretching back at least to 1969, when Secretary of State William P. Rogers declared that recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, but that any change in the preexisting lines "should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security."

On the other hand, “1967” has such a highly charged symbolic value in the discourse about the conflict that Obama and his political advisers should have expected headline writers, pundits, and Israeli politicians to simplify and sensationalize his speech and focus on that one phrase to the exclusion of almost everything else – which they did. Moreover, the growth of settlement blocs in the intervening years has created a demographic reality that other US presidents, especially Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, acknowledged explicitly – which Obama did not do. Consequently, Netanyahu, perhaps caught off guard and concerned about a political backlash at home, did not reaffirm his own previous endorsement of a two-state solution or focus his attention on settlement blocs, but instead felt compelled to stress his refusal to do what he had not actually been asked to do: return to the 1967 lines. And Obama then felt compelled, three days later, to remove ambiguity and lower the flames of this controversy by telling the AIPAC Policy Conference that his term of reference had been misreported or misinterpreted and that what he meant was that the parties themselves will negotiate a border that is, by definition, "different than the one existing on June 4, 1967." On the same occasion, he reiterated that no vote at the United Nations would ever create an independent Palestinian state and that the US would continue to stand up against efforts to single Israel out at the UN or in any international forum.

What many breathless analysts described as a crisis in US-Israeli relations therefore turned out to be a tempest in a teapot, extinguished even before Netanyahu arrived at Capitol Hill on May 24 to address, for the second time in his life, a joint meeting of the Congress. Even before he stepped up to the dais, Netanyahu had already achieved the objective of ensuring that the United States would not stand with those that might vote in the General Assembly in favor of recognizing Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza, and his rapturous bipartisan reception on Capitol Hill probably serves as warrant against a reversal of American policy on this question.

However, that does not mean that what he said or didn't say in Congress was insignificant. For as he spoke, Obama was setting out on a five-day trip to Europe, where there is much more of what Obama delicately called "impatience" with the peace process and where the Middle East, including the question of what to do at the United Nations in September, would be the topic of intense discussion. It remains to be seen whether the words that Netanyahu used to conquer hearts and minds in Congress will also help Obama conquer hearts and mind in Europe. If they do, it means that Obama will also have achieved his main objective during the Netanyahu's visit. If they do not, the US-Israeli relationship will remain solidly entrenched, but the Obama-Netanyahu relationship may once again be reduced to what is sometimes euphemistically called a "frank and constructive" exchange of views.

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IDF Israel female soldiers נשים לוחמות.

Egypt–Israel–United States: Problems on the Horizon?

From Egypt's signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 to the recent mass demonstrations in Cairo’s

Tahrir Square

, there has never been a question as to Egypt’s commitment to the agreement. In spite of difficult tests over the years, including Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Baghdad (1981); the invasion of Lebanon and the IDF’s continued presence there (1982-2000); two intifadas; and various operations in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza, Egypt observed most of the articles in the military part of the treaty and helped lower the heat in the Arab discourse on subjects related to Israel, especially the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The exception to this general rule was Egypt’s position on the Israeli nuclear issue.

Public opinion polls conducted in Egypt since the start of the recent demonstrations have addressed the question of Egypt’s continued commitment to the peace treaty with Israel. In a telephone poll conducted among 615 respondents for the International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York, 46 percent of respondents stated that they would be "much more likely" to vote for a party that supports keeping the treaty with Israel, the Arab peace initiative, and the two-state solution. Another 17 percent said they would be "somewhat more likely" to prefer such a party. That is, 63 percent expressed willingness to support Egypt’s continued commitment to the treaty (even though it is impossible to tell from the poll whether the support is conditional, for example, on achieving a solution on the basis of two states for two peoples).[1]

Another poll conducted for the Pew Research Center in March-April 2011 among one thousand respondents presented more disturbing results.[2] Fifty-four percent of those polled stated that Egypt should cancel the agreement, while 36 percent replied that it should maintain it. Support for maintaining the treaty was greater among those with higher incomes and higher levels of education. (Since the IPI poll was conducted by telephone, the positive result is presumably misleading because of the greater weight given to those in possession of a telephone and capable of answering the questions without a face-to-face connection).

Along with other surveys, these two polls have pointed to former Foreign Minister and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa as the leading candidate in the Egyptian presidential elections. Moussa’s views on relations with Israel are important, as are the opinions of the current foreign minister, Nabil el-Araby. In a comprehensive interview with the German newspaper Der Spiegel on March 16, Moussa, responding to a question about his critical position towards Israel, stated, “Egypt fully supports the joint Arab position toward Israel. The Palestinians need their own, viable state, and Israel has to withdraw from the occupied territories. And as a very first step, the blockade of the Gaza Strip has to be lifted, immediately and in full.” As to whether he could have a discussion with Netanyahu, Moussa stated, “First of all, Netanyahu would have to show that he is interested in a just peace. That would reduce the tensions in the region.”[3]

In response to a question by Lally Weymouth of the Washington Post whether, if he became president of Egypt, he would keep the treaty with Israel, Amr Moussa replied: “The treaty is a treaty. For us, the treaty has been signed and it is for peace, but it depends also on the other side. If you asked me what kind of relations between the Arab world and Israel I would like, I would say that the Arab position – of which Egypt is a party – rests on the Arab initiative of 2002.”[4]

Current Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabli el-Araby, a seasoned diplomat who has a reasonable chance of keeping his position in a future Egyptian government, stated unequivocally (also in an interview to Lally Weymouth), “Egypt is going to comply with every agreement and abide by every treaty it has entered into. That is the goal of treaties…Once it is done and everything is signed, both sides abide and comply faithfully.”[5]

The responses from el-Araby, a professional lawyer who worked as a lawyer during most of his years in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, and the statements by Amr Moussa show that in spite of the results of the PEW poll, a sweeping Egyptian decision to cancel the peace treaty with Israel is not expected. It is clear to both Egypt and to its future leaders that this would cause severe damage to Egypt and to its economy. However, on at least two subjects, deterioration is likely if Moussa and el-Araby continue to play a central role in Egypt’s foreign policy after September 2011. These two subjects are the Palestinian issue and the nuclear issue.

It comes as no surprise that Amr Moussa, who until recently was the Arab League secretary general, speaks about the Arab initiative of 2002. For his part, El-Araby has made no secret of the fact that Egypt wholeheartedly supports a UN General Assembly decision to recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with territorial exchanges, according to the Clinton parameters of December 2000, and that Egypt is pressuring Europe to support such a decision.

The convergence in September 2011of elections in Egypt and the General Assembly discussion is likely to give rise to fiery statements from Egyptian presidential candidates. Israel has an interest in preserving the treaty with Egypt and therefore should refrain from hasty responses to the comments by the presidential candidates. These events may also become entangled in the issue of American aid to Egypt, and in this discussion too, Israel and its friends in Congress are liable to deliver hasty responses. The discussions in Congress about the 2012 budget will be most heated in September (the American fiscal year starts on 1 October). The administration’s desire to aid Egypt was clear already at the start of the uprising in Cairo. Secretary of State Clinton raised the issue in her meeting with the Republican Speaker of the House on February 14,[6] and four days later, Clinton announced aid totaling $150 million to address the economic problems that resulted from the demonstrations in Egypt.[7] In talks with President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu will likely and justifiably raise Israel's concern over changes in the Egyptian position, but it is important that his comments do not send any signals on the subject of American aid to Egypt. Against the backdrop of expected cuts in the overall American aid budget, there are a number of American legislators who would be happy to identify such signals, and therefore it is critical that Israel not involve itself in this discussion.

Indeed, Israel’s hasty decision in the wake of the agreement between Fatah and Hamas to stop the transfer of tax money collected for the Palestinian Authority provides a negative example of potential fallout. The European Union responded immediately with a decision to transfer monies to the Palestinian Authority, which as such damaged Israel's position.

Relations between Egypt and Hamas will presumably thaw, even if the Muslim Brotherhood does not play a role in the Egyptian government after September 2011. If the hopes expressed by the Washington Post editorial[8] – that Egypt will moderate Hamas positions – are realized, tension in the United States-Israeli-Egyptian triangle is likely to arise over disagreements regarding the extent to which Hamas has actually moderated its positions. Prime Minister Netanyahu should anchor this issue in the framework of the three Quartet conditions – recognition of Israel, acceptance of the agreements between Israel and the PLO, and renunciation of terrorism – and avoid reactions and chain reactions that will damage Israel's relations with Egypt in the post-Mubarak period.

This suggestion also applies to the Egyptian attempt to convene a  conference on a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East in 2012, as was decided in the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. It was Amr Moussa who turned the struggle against Israeli nuclearization into the flagship of Egyptian diplomacy. In the interview with Lally Weymouth, Amr Moussa says that “the nuclear issue in the Middle East means Israel and then Iran.” Nabil Fahmy, who served as Egypt’s ambassador to the United States between 1999 and 2008, reiterated his call to establish a nuclear free zone in the Middle East that will include Iran and Israel, with practical steps by Israel in this direction and a clear and defined timetable.[9] The United States indeed supported the decision last year, but it is doubtful that President Obama, whose high ranking officials – in spite of the American vote – repudiated the decision even then, will lend a hand, at the height of the US presidential election campaign and against the background of the developments in the Middle East, to a conference that will only add fuel to the regional fire. Thus it is preferable that Israel tackle this issue as well behind the scenes, and not be dragged into threats and drastic actions that will damage the delicate relations in the Israeli-Egyptian-United States triangle.

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1] http://www.ipacademy.org/images/pdfs/egypt-poll-results-april2011.pdf; Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703992704576305423166596598.html?KEYWORDS=poll+egypt.

[2] www.pewglobal.org.

[3] http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,750969-2,00.html.

[4] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/amr-moussas-vision-for-egypt/2011/05/09/AF36AxbG_story.html.

[5] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-foreign-minister-on-the-way-forward-after-mubarak/2011/05/05/AFRI3BCG_story.html.

[6] U.S. State Department announcement, February 14, 2011.

[7] See also Clinton’s comments at the Brookings Institution on April 12, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/04/160642.htm.

[8] Washington Post, May 11, 2011.

[9] Spring issue of the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=26.