On the 19th and 20th of November, NATO Heads of State will gather in Lisbon, Portugal for a so-called ‘summit’ meeting. This much-hyped event will have been planned and prepared during the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministerial Meetings conducted in Brussels this month.
Although no specific agenda has been released for these meetings, it is relatively safe to assume that two widely divergent topics - the progress of the Afghan war and the subject of missile defence (the defence of NATO territories and populations against medium to long range ballistic missiles) will once again emerge as two red-flag topics during the course of these discussions.
A two-fold complication
These two topics may not seem closely related, but in actuality, they are very closely bound.
This is not based on the supposition that NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan are under any significant ballistic missile threat.
Taliban insurgent forces, even if they had been able to procure a portion of the Scud B inventory abandoned by USSR at the end of its Afghan campaign (which seems highly unlikely), would not be able to deploy or even maintain them. Deployment, preparation and launch of a 300 km range missile with liquid propellants require a minimum control of real estate, both on the ground and in surrounding air space.
This lack of control is quite evident in insurgent operations, where the creation of political instability supersedes territorial control.
Rather, the relationship between Afghan operations and missile defence is, quite simply, financial.
At this point, allow me to reference the guidance provided by official NATO doctrine :“Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover all of Afghanistan’s territory. Accordingly, the number of ISAF troops has grown from the initial 5000 to around 120 000 troops from 47 countries, including all 28 NATO member nations.”
Delivering on the promise
This impressive build-up must needs be backed by a sharply increasing fiscal investment. In part, this effort is provided directly by those nations deploying troops and equipment under the NATO command.
That being said, NATO, itself, maintains a proprietary budget dedicated to funding operations, as well as to the development and maintenance of sophisticated tools of Command, Control, Communications and Information which are crucial in this type of campaign.
Of course, most will understand that these ‘sky rocketing’ expenditures for the support of ISAF operations have the highest degree of priority for NATO commanders.
Simultaneously, however, the NATO Infrastructure budget has to fund major programmes already approved and initiated. These include the new NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS), successor to the old NADGE (NATO Air Defence Ground Environment), the NATO communications infrastructure as well as the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programmes.
If, alongside these current obligations, one adds the immense pressure for several (if not all) of NATO countries’ governments to strictly limit their defence budgets, one may garner a healthy respect for the current situation regarding the NATO infrastructure budget and the way it affects the ability for NATO to undertake a new major programme like missile defence. In two words: ‘no money’, at least until member states disengage from Afghan operations.
At this stage, permit me to highlight some unofficial budgetary estimates which have been circulated concerning the cost of a complete missile defence system (including sensors, weapons and the associated Command, Control and Communications infrastructure).
Put bluntly, we are talking about five digit figures in the millions of Euros or dollars. Even if one spreads these budgetary requirements over, say 10 to 15 years, they are still well above what NATO nations can afford.
Playing the Russia card
The financial hurdle is only one of two major issues plaguing the future of NATO missile defence. The second is politics, and specifically, NATO’s political relationship with Russia. Missile defence had become a major bone of contention (together with the anticipated ratification of Ukraine and Georgia as new NATO members) during the twilight years of President George W. Bush’s administration.
This was directly related to the ‘Ballistic Missile Defence System – European Component (BMDS-EC)’, a US initiative involving installation in central Europe (Poland and the Czech Republic) of permanent sensors and weapons.
Some may interpret this as an act signifying a return to a sort of new Cold War, but the fact is that it threatened the basic consensus among NATO Nations – and this is the key to any NATO decision.
Considering his mandate put forth in mid 2009, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen had to find a way to mitigate these two major (financial and political) risks and maintain NATO’s course on the missile defence track.
His public strategy was clear and concise.
Concerning funding: missile defence “is the kind of investment that makes sense. Extending missile defence to cover not only deployed troops, but Allied populations at home as well, would cost less than €200 million over ten years.” (extract from NATO press release, June 2010)
Concerning Russia: “NATO wants Russia to be a real stakeholder in European and international security. We need Russia as a partner in resolving the great issues of our time. We should explore the potential for linking the US, NATO and Russia missile defence systems at an appropriate time” (address at the Western Alliance's Brussels HQ in September 2009).
Defining value and cementing partnerships
The question then remains, how did tens of billions shrink to €200 Million? The explanation is quite simple. The underlying goal is seemingly to avoid NATO investment in any type of missile defence sensor or weapon and, instead, to rely on member nations (mostly, if not uniquely, the US) for the provision of their own resources.
This would limit NATO investment in the common Command, Control and Communication (C3) architecture linking these resources together and enabling a NATO central command within the larger ballistic missile strategic framework .
In addition, this C3 architecture would only be a limited extension of the one already in development, which is intended for the protection of deployed NATO troops against Theatre Ballistic Missiles (ALBMD).
Concerning a notional partnership with Russia, all NATO nations will agree that the idea is sound, but the question remains: can we place our undivided trust in a tangible linking between US, NATO and Russian missile defence systems (something which would actually go beyond mere lip service shared by two Commanders in Chief)? This would indeed prove to be both a technical and poltical challenge.
In the final analysis, it bears some hypothesising as to the outcome of the next summit on missile defence.
Although no specific agenda has been released for these meetings, it is relatively safe to assume that two widely divergent topics - the progress of the Afghan war and the subject of missile defence (the defence of NATO territories and populations against medium to long range ballistic missiles) will once again emerge as two red-flag topics during the course of these discussions.
A two-fold complication
These two topics may not seem closely related, but in actuality, they are very closely bound.
This is not based on the supposition that NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan are under any significant ballistic missile threat.
Taliban insurgent forces, even if they had been able to procure a portion of the Scud B inventory abandoned by USSR at the end of its Afghan campaign (which seems highly unlikely), would not be able to deploy or even maintain them. Deployment, preparation and launch of a 300 km range missile with liquid propellants require a minimum control of real estate, both on the ground and in surrounding air space.
This lack of control is quite evident in insurgent operations, where the creation of political instability supersedes territorial control.
Rather, the relationship between Afghan operations and missile defence is, quite simply, financial.
At this point, allow me to reference the guidance provided by official NATO doctrine :“Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover all of Afghanistan’s territory. Accordingly, the number of ISAF troops has grown from the initial 5000 to around 120 000 troops from 47 countries, including all 28 NATO member nations.”
Delivering on the promise
This impressive build-up must needs be backed by a sharply increasing fiscal investment. In part, this effort is provided directly by those nations deploying troops and equipment under the NATO command.
That being said, NATO, itself, maintains a proprietary budget dedicated to funding operations, as well as to the development and maintenance of sophisticated tools of Command, Control, Communications and Information which are crucial in this type of campaign.
Of course, most will understand that these ‘sky rocketing’ expenditures for the support of ISAF operations have the highest degree of priority for NATO commanders.
Simultaneously, however, the NATO Infrastructure budget has to fund major programmes already approved and initiated. These include the new NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS), successor to the old NADGE (NATO Air Defence Ground Environment), the NATO communications infrastructure as well as the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programmes.
If, alongside these current obligations, one adds the immense pressure for several (if not all) of NATO countries’ governments to strictly limit their defence budgets, one may garner a healthy respect for the current situation regarding the NATO infrastructure budget and the way it affects the ability for NATO to undertake a new major programme like missile defence. In two words: ‘no money’, at least until member states disengage from Afghan operations.
At this stage, permit me to highlight some unofficial budgetary estimates which have been circulated concerning the cost of a complete missile defence system (including sensors, weapons and the associated Command, Control and Communications infrastructure).
Put bluntly, we are talking about five digit figures in the millions of Euros or dollars. Even if one spreads these budgetary requirements over, say 10 to 15 years, they are still well above what NATO nations can afford.
Playing the Russia card
The financial hurdle is only one of two major issues plaguing the future of NATO missile defence. The second is politics, and specifically, NATO’s political relationship with Russia. Missile defence had become a major bone of contention (together with the anticipated ratification of Ukraine and Georgia as new NATO members) during the twilight years of President George W. Bush’s administration.
This was directly related to the ‘Ballistic Missile Defence System – European Component (BMDS-EC)’, a US initiative involving installation in central Europe (Poland and the Czech Republic) of permanent sensors and weapons.
Some may interpret this as an act signifying a return to a sort of new Cold War, but the fact is that it threatened the basic consensus among NATO Nations – and this is the key to any NATO decision.
Considering his mandate put forth in mid 2009, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen had to find a way to mitigate these two major (financial and political) risks and maintain NATO’s course on the missile defence track.
His public strategy was clear and concise.
Concerning funding: missile defence “is the kind of investment that makes sense. Extending missile defence to cover not only deployed troops, but Allied populations at home as well, would cost less than €200 million over ten years.” (extract from NATO press release, June 2010)
Concerning Russia: “NATO wants Russia to be a real stakeholder in European and international security. We need Russia as a partner in resolving the great issues of our time. We should explore the potential for linking the US, NATO and Russia missile defence systems at an appropriate time” (address at the Western Alliance's Brussels HQ in September 2009).
Defining value and cementing partnerships
The question then remains, how did tens of billions shrink to €200 Million? The explanation is quite simple. The underlying goal is seemingly to avoid NATO investment in any type of missile defence sensor or weapon and, instead, to rely on member nations (mostly, if not uniquely, the US) for the provision of their own resources.
This would limit NATO investment in the common Command, Control and Communication (C3) architecture linking these resources together and enabling a NATO central command within the larger ballistic missile strategic framework .
In addition, this C3 architecture would only be a limited extension of the one already in development, which is intended for the protection of deployed NATO troops against Theatre Ballistic Missiles (ALBMD).
Concerning a notional partnership with Russia, all NATO nations will agree that the idea is sound, but the question remains: can we place our undivided trust in a tangible linking between US, NATO and Russian missile defence systems (something which would actually go beyond mere lip service shared by two Commanders in Chief)? This would indeed prove to be both a technical and poltical challenge.
In the final analysis, it bears some hypothesising as to the outcome of the next summit on missile defence.
Confirmation of the benefits for NATO of a (limited) missile defence effort.
No clear decisions on when to initiate said programme. Perhaps some elements of a generic roadmap to the start of the programme, but nothing preparing a significant financial commitment anytime soon.
No clear decisions on when to initiate said programme. Perhaps some elements of a generic roadmap to the start of the programme, but nothing preparing a significant financial commitment anytime soon.
Renewed call for cooperation between NATO and Russia on European security and missile defence. (note that a NATO-Russia summit may be held in parallel)
Security and defence sector forecasts run the peril of standing side by side with current events – only to be proven false in the final tally. My biggest fear in submitting the above prediction is that I may actually be proven right.
Contributor: Brigadier General Michel Billard has recently retired from his position as Programme Manager for the NATO Theatre Missile Defence Programme.
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