Thursday, December 30, 2010

Armando Spataro: Il caso Battisti uccide il diritto

L' ex terrorista non è perseguitato per le sue idee ma è un criminale comune, condannato all' ergastolo per 4 omicidi e non è stato processato in uno stadio. Chi ammazza il prossimo deve pagare, altrimenti le democrazie smentiscono se stesse.
Caro direttore, sono stato il pubblico ministero italiano che, insieme ad altri magistrati, ha diretto le indagini che portarono alle condanne di Cesare Battisti. Dunque, pur con il dovuto rispetto per la decisione del Ministro Tarso Genro, spero di poter offrire alla pubblica opinione brasiliana un contributo di verità per colmare i vuoti d' informazione su cui quella decisione si fonda. E' difficile per gli italiani, infatti, comprendere come ad un tale assassino puro possa essere stato concesso asilo politico E' opportuno partire dai fatti per smentire argomenti spesso usati da Battisti e dai suoi «amici».
1) Battisti non è un estremista perseguitato in Italia per le sue idee politiche, ma un criminale comune che commetteva rapine per motivi di lucro personale e che si è politicizzato in carcere. E' poi entrato in una organizzazione terroristica che ha commesso ferimenti ed omicidi. Battisti venne arrestato nel giugno 1979, insieme ad alcuni complici, in una base terroristica di Milano, dove vennero sequestrati mitra, pistole, fucili e documenti falsi: dunque, non era certo un dissidente politico!
2) Battisti è stato condannato all' ergastolo per molti gravi reati, tra cui anche quattro omicidi: in due di essi (omicidio del maresciallo Antonio Santoro, Udine, 6 giugno 1978; omicidio del poliziotto Andrea Campagna, Milano 19 aprile 1979), egli sparò materialmente alle vittime; in un terzo (Lino Sabbadin, macellaio, ucciso a Mestre il 16 febbraio 1979) svolse il ruolo di «palo» in aiuto dei killer; per il quarto (Pierluigi Torregiani, Milano 16 febbraio 1979) partecipò alla decisione ed organizzazione del fatto. Vorrei chiedere al Ministro brasiliano quali motivazioni politiche egli vede negli omicidi di un gioielliere e di un macellaio, «giustiziati» per ritorsione (avendo reagito con le armi a rapine che essi avevano subito) o in quelli di poliziotti che facevano il loro dovere.
3) Non è vero che Battisti sia stato condannato solo per le accuse del pentito Pietro Mutti, né è vero che costui fosse inattendibile. Affermare ciò significa offendere la serietà della giustizia italiana. Le confessioni di Mutti, infatti, sono state convalidate da molte testimonianze e dalle successive collaborazioni di altri ex terroristi. La verità, dunque, sta scritta nelle sentenze, che sono a disposizione di chiunque abbia la pazienza di leggerle e che pesano come macigni.
4) Non è vero che a Battisti sia stata negata la possibilità di difendersi in quanto assente durante i processi. In realtà fu Battisti a sottrarsi alla giustizia evadendo nel 1981 dal carcere dove era detenuto. Non a caso nel 2006, la Corte Europea dei Diritti dell' Uomo di Strasburgo ha respinto il ricorso di Battisti contro la concessione dell' estradizione da parte della Francia, giudicandolo per questa ragione «manifestamente infondato» ed affermando che comunque, in tutti i processi, egli era stato sempre assistito dai suoi avvocati di fiducia. Forse che anche la Corte di Strasburgo perseguita Battisti?
5) E' falso che l' Italia ed il suo sistema giudiziario non siano stati in grado di garantire la tutela dei diritti a persone accusate di terrorismo nei cosiddetti «anni di piombo». E' un' affermazione che ci ferisce. Sono tanti i magistrati, gli avvocati, gli uomini delle istituzioni, i poliziotti che sono stati vilmente uccisi, da persone come Battisti, solo perché applicavano la legge.
L' Italia non ha conosciuto Tribunali speciali o militari, né derive antidemocratiche nella lotta al terrorismo. Lo ricordò in quegli anni anche il nostro presidente della Repubblica, Sandro Pertini, affermando che l' Italia poteva vantare di avere fermato il terrorismo nelle aule di giustizia anziché «negli stadi», alludendo a metodi illegali che non conosciamo e che anche oggi contrastiamo.
Non credo che l' asilo politico sia stato pensato dai padri fondatori delle nostre democrazie per garantire impunità a persone come Battisti, che fu uno degli assassini più spietati e determinati che il terrorismo italiano abbia mai conosciuto e che mai si è dissociato dall' uso delle armi.
Mi auguro rispettosamente, dunque, che le competenti Autorità brasiliane abbiano la possibilità di ritornare sulle proprie decisioni. Non perché la giustizia equivalga a vendetta, ma perché essa è il luogo di affermazione delle regole dello Stato di diritto: e chi le viola, tanto più se uccide il prossimo, deve pagare. Altrimenti le democrazie smentiscono se stesse.
Procuratore della Repubblica di Milano, Coordinatore del Dipartimento antiterrorismo
Spataro Armando
(23 gennaio 2009) - Corriere della Sera

Friday, December 17, 2010

Russian President Medvedev to visit Israel in mid-January

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's first visit to Israel in mid-January, part of a Middle East tour, is intended to signify a major switch in Kremlin Middle East policy to warmer relations with Israel and correspondingly less intense ties with Iran, Syria and the radical Palestinian Hamas. This will be the second visit by a Russian president to Jerusalem. Vladimir Putin's was the first when he was president in 2005.
debkafile's Moscow sources report that the Kremlin has watched the Obama administration Israel-Palestinian peace diplomacy run out of steam and sees its chance for a more active role on this diplomatic track.
Furthermore, the Russians have got two bids in play for a slice of the as-yet untapped Mediterranean gas. While offering to partner Lebanon in exploring the oil and gas potential opposite its shores earlier this month, debkafile's sources report that the Russian energy giant Gazprom sent secret envoys to Tel Aviv at the same time. They came to discuss investment opportunities with the Israeli firms holding the concessions for the Tamar, Dalit and Leviathan Mediterranean gas fields off the Israeli shore and a possible partnership in Israel's Ashkelon-Eilat oil and gas pipelines.
According to our sources, Russian energy experts calculate that Israel's offshore gas reserves, currently  estimated at about 25 trillion cubic feet, are in fact much bigger and maintain they could be better explored with Russian professional assistance. Leviathan is seen as the most promising of the three strikes.
debkafile revealed Monday, Dec. 13, that Mikhail Margelovis, head of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Federation Council and chairman of Global Zero, would be arriving to prepare the ground for Medvedev's visit both in Jerusalem and Ramallah.
Our intelligence sources report that ahead of these visits, Moscow sent five messages to Jerusalem:
1. For the purchase of military UAVs for the Russian army – for which an agreement will be signed – Moscow will guarantee to withhold advanced weapons, such as the sophisticated S-300 interceptor missile systems, from Iran and Syria. By this move, the Medvedev-Putin administration is drawing a line limiting Russia's vital contribution to their military buildup and upgrade.
2. Moscow shares Israel's view that any hi-tech Russian military hardware sold to Damascus or Tehran would eventually reach Hizballah. The Russians have no wish to upgrade Hizballah's arsenal and therefore has a further incentive for keeping this weaponry out of Iranian and Syrian hands.
3. The Kremlin has recently shifted ground on the Palestinian issue and is no longer willing to automatically endorse Palestinian demands of Israel. Unlike Palestinian negotiators headed by Mahmoud Abbas, Moscow is prepared to look at interim solutions for the Palestinian-Israel dispute. The Russians say the Palestinians are aware of the new winds blowing in Moscow. That is why they did not lobby Russia to support their unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood within pre-1967 War borders, and turned to more amenable governments in Europe, the Far East and South America.
4. The Russians ask Israel to take note of another change in its favor: Hamas's Damascus-based leader Khaled Meshaal is no longer welcome in Moscow.
5. Moscow is seeking to exploit the deepening strategic ties between Israel and Greece to jump aboard their plans to build an underwater gas pipeline linking Greece to the Israeli Mediterranean port of Ashkelon. This would link up with the existing Ashkelon oil and gas pipeline to Eilat, Israel's Red Sea port.
Russian energy strategists are eyeing the planned and existing segments of this route with great interest, having calculated that the quickest and cheapest outlet for marketing Russian gas to the Far East is through Eilat.
Israeli leaders, President Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu have high hopes of the Medvedev visit.

US-Israel tiff on security and Iran. US envoy denied direct access to generals

The Obama administration and the Netanyahu government have fallen out on issues relating to Israeli security and current estimates of where the Iranian nuclear program stands, debkafile's military and Washington sources report. Defense Minister Ehud Barak put his foot down Wednesday, Dec. 15, when the president's Special Adviser on the Middle East Dennis Ross arrived in Israel and tried to set up separate interviews with the IDF's incoming and outgoing chiefs of staff and head of intelligence.
Barak had arranged for Lt. Gen. Yoav Galant, who takes over from Lt. Gen. Gaby Ashkenazi in April 2011, and the new Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aviv Cochavi, to join his briefing session with the US envoy Thursday, Dec. 16 and offer their assessments on security issues and Iran. He thereby drew a line on the practice common in the last couple of years for American officials and officers to apply directly to high IDF officers at any time.
Since 2008, US officials used this freedom of access to go around the Israeli prime minister and defense minister and persuade the army chiefs there was no need of military action against Iran's nuclear sites and Hizballah's buildup of Iranian weaponry. During 2009 and early 2010, hardly a week went by without high-ranking US bureaucrats and generals touching down in Israel and going straight into nonstop meetings with IDF officers.
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Israel during this period more often than any country in the world other than Pakistan - or even US forces scattered around the world.
In Jerusalem, those visits and meetings came to be characterized as: "Holding Israel's hand against pulling the trigger."  
This restraining tactic was abruptly discontinued in March 2010 when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promised President Barack Obama to withhold public oratory on the Iranian threat for a year, during which he would give Obama the chance to try his hand at halting Iran's progress toward a nuclear bomb by means of sanctions and diplomatic engagement. While the sanctions were indeed clamped down, the path of diplomacy – in which Israel never believed anyway – is now the subject of a sharp disagreement between Israel and Washington. Jerusalem is in particular furious over the president's handing over of the conduct of talks with Iran to the European Union and allowing its foreign affairs executive Catherine Ashton to run the Six Power (Five Permanent UNSC Members plus Germany) talks with Iran.
Israel contends that leaving the issue in EU hands is a recipe for procrastination. This maneuver when employed by Ashton's predecessor Javier Solana gave Iran all the time it needed to advance toward its objective of a nuclear bomb.
Barak was in Washington only three days ago and held long conferences with Defense Secretary Robert Gates, CIA chief Leon Panetta, Dennis Ross and Vice President Joe Biden. debkafile's Washington sources report the impression Obama administration officials gained from those meetings was that Israel had hardened its position on military action – deciding, in particular, that the accumulation of weapons from Iran and Syria to Hizballah had gone beyond what Israel found supportable for its security. Indeed, the Israeli defense minister spoke publicly after his round of talks in Washington of "an Israeli expression of concern over the continuing arming of Hizballah with Iranian and Syrian weaponry."
Washington became alarmed. Fearing Israeli was losing patience with US pressure for inaction and that Netanyahu's pledge to Obama might expire sooner rather than later, Denis Ross was sent to Israel to apply the brakes.  Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James E. Cartwright, who was supposed to accompany him, canceled at the last moment.
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak saw the Ross mission following directly on Barak's Washington talks - and especially his bid for individual interviews with top IDF officers - as an attempt by the US administration to go over the heads of the ministers responsible for decision-making and apply the hand-holding stratagem directly to the generals so to keep Israel's fingers off the trigger. This time it was blocked.

Saturday, December 11, 2010

Advice from an Israeli Agent AN ABSOLUTE, MUST READ !!!


Juval Aviv was the Israeli Agent upon whom the movie ' Munich ' was based. He was Golda Meir's bodyguard, and she appointed him to track down and bring to justice the Palestinian terrorists who took the
Israeli athletes hostage and killed them during the Munich Olympic Games.

In a lecture in New York City he shared information that EVERY American needs to know -- but that our government has not yet shared with us.
He predicted the London subway bombing on the Bill O'Reilly show on Fox News stating publicly that it would happen within a week. At the time, O'Reilly laughed, and mocked him saying that in a week he wanted him back on the show. Unfortunately, within a week the terrorist attack had occurred.
Juval Aviv gave intelligence (via what he had gathered in Israel and the Middle East ) to the Bush Administration about 9/11, a month before it occurred. His report specifically said they would use planes as bombs and target high profile buildings and monuments. Congress has since hired him as a security consultant.
Now for his future predictions. He predicts the next terrorist attack on the U.S. will occur within the next few months.
Forget hijacking airplanes, because he says terrorists will NEVER try and hijack a plane again as they know the people onboard will never go down quietly again. Aviv believes our airport security is a joke -- that we have been reactionary rather than proactive in developing strategies that are truly effective.
For example:
1) Our airport technology is outdated. We look for metal, and the new explosives are made of plastic.
2) He talked about how some idiot tried to light his shoe on fire. Because of that, now everyone has to take off their shoes. A group of idiots tried to bring aboard liquid explosives. Now we can't bring liquids on board. He says he's waiting for some suicidal maniac to pour liquid explosive on his underwear; at which point, security will have us all traveling naked!
Every strategy we have is reactionary.
3) We only focus on security when people are heading to the gates.
Aviv says that if a terrorist attack targets airports in the future, they will target busy times on the front end of the airport when/where people are checking in. It would be easy for someone to take two suitcases of explosives, walk up to a busy check-in line, ask a person next to them to watch their bags for a minute while they run to the restroom or get a drink, and then detonate the bags BEFORE security even gets involved. In Israel , security checks bags BEFORE people can even ENTER the airport.
Aviv says the next terrorist attack here in America is imminent and will involve suicide bombers and non-suicide bombers in places where large groups of people congregate. (i.e., Disneyland, Las Vegas casinos, big cities (New York, San Francisco, Chicago, etc.) and that it will also include shopping malls, subways in rush hour, train stations, etc., as well as, rural America this time. The interlands ( Wyoming , Montana , etc.).
The attack will be characterized by simultaneous detonations around the country (terrorists like big impact), involving at least 5-8 cities, including rural areas.
Aviv says terrorists won't need to use suicide bombers in many of the larger cities, because at places like the MGM Grand in Las Vegas , they can simply valet park a car loaded with explosives and walk away.
Aviv says all of the above is well known in intelligence circles, but that our U. S. Government does not want to 'alarm American citizens' with the facts. The world is quickly going to become 'a different place', and issues like 'global warming' and political correctness will become totally irrelevant.
On an encouraging note, he says that Americans don't have to be concerned about being nuked. Aviv says the terrorists who want to destroy America will not use sophisticated weapons. They like to use suicide as a front-line approach. It's cheap, it's easy, it's effective; and they have an infinite abundance of young militants more than willing to 'meet their destiny'.
He also says the next level of terrorists, over which America should be most concerned, will not be coming from abroad. But will be, instead, 'homegrown', having attended and been educated in our own schools and universities right here in the U.S. He says to look for 'students' who frequently travel back and forth to the Middle East . These young terrorists will be most dangerous because they will know our language and will fully understand the habits of Americans; but that we Americans won't know/understand a thing about them.
Aviv says that, as a people, Americans are unaware and uneducated about the terrorist threats we will inevitably face. America still has only a handful of Arabic and Farsi speaking people in our intelligence networks, and Aviv says it is critical that we change that fact SOON.
So, what can America do to protect itself? From an intelligence perspective, Aviv says the U.S. needs to stop relying on satellites and technology for intelligence. We need to, instead, follow Israel 's, Ireland 's and England 's hands-on examples of human intelligence, both from an infiltration perspective as well as to pay attention to, and trust 'aware' citizens to help. We need to engage and educate ourselves as citizens; however, our U. S. government continues to treat us, its citizens, 'like babies'. Our government thinks we 'can't handle the truth' and are concerned that we'll panic if we understand the realities of terrorism. Aviv says this is a deadly mistake.
Aviv recently created/executed a security test for our Congress, by placing an empty briefcase in five well-traveled spots in five major cities. The results? Not one person called 911 or sought a policeman to check it out. In fact, in Chicago , someone tried to steal the briefcase!
In comparison, Aviv says that citizens of Israel are so well 'trained' that an unattended bag or package would be reported in seconds by citizen(s) who know to publicly shout, 'Unattended Bag!' The area would be quickly & calmly cleared by the citizens themselves.
Unfortunately, America hasn't been yet 'hurt enough' by terrorism for their government to fully understand the need to educate its citizens or for the government to understand that it's their citizens who are, inevitably, the best first-line of defense against terrorism.
Aviv also was concerned about the high number of children here in America who were in preschool and kindergarten after 9/11, who were 'lost' without parents being able to pick them up, and about our schools that had no plan in place to best care for the students until parents could get there. (In New York City , this was days, in some cases!)
He stresses the importance of having a plan, that's agreed upon within your family, of how to respond in the event of a terrorist emergency. He urges parents to contact their children's schools and demand that the schools too, develop plans of actions, just as they do in Israel .
Does your family know what to do if you can't contact one another by phone? Where would you gather in an emergency? He says we should all have a plan that is easy enough for even our youngest children to remember and follow.
Aviv says that the U. S. government has in force a plan, that in the event of another terrorist attack, EVERYONE's ability to use cell phones, blackberries, etc., will immediately be cut-off, as this is the preferred communication source used by terrorists and is often the way that their bombs are detonated.
How will you communicate with your loved ones in the event you cannot speak to each other? You need to have a plan.
If you understand, and believe what you have just read, then you must feel compelled to send this to every concerned parent, guardian, grandparents, uncles, aunts, whomever. Don't stop there. In addition to sharing this via e-mail, contact and discuss this information with whomever it makes sense to. Make contingency plans with those you care about. Better that you have plans in place, and never have to use them, then to have no plans in place, and find you needed them.
If you choose not to share this, or not to have a plan in place, and nothing ever occurs -- good for you! However, in the event something does happen, and even more so, if it directly affects your loved ones, then this e-mail will haunt you forever.
Telling yourself after the fact, "I should have sent this to so and so, but deleted it as so much trash from old Bill Jones, plus, I just didn't believe it", will not change anything. You were alerted, had the chance to do something, and instead of erring on the side of caution, you chose to disregard, if nothing else, a sensible, valuable warning.

Sunday, December 5, 2010

INTellingence: Open Source Intelligence




The president and policymakers rely on insights from the Central Intelligence Agency to inform their foreign policy decisions. CIA officers use a variety of sources in formulating their assessments. The following article is the first in a series that will explore different sources and collection disciplines, which are the building blocks of what we call “finished intelligence.” This article will focus on open source intelligence.

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Information does not have to be secret to be valuable. Whether in the blogs we browse, the broadcasts we watch, or the specialized journals we read, there is an endless supply of information that contributes to our understanding of the world. The Intelligence Community generally refers to this information as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). OSINT plays an essential role in giving the national security community as a whole insight and context at a relatively low cost.

OSINT is drawn from publicly available material, including:

•The Internet
•Traditional mass media (e.g. television, radio, newspapers, magazines)
•Specialized journals, conference proceedings, and think tank studies
•Photos
•Geospatial information (e.g. maps and commercial imagery products)


The DNI Open Source Center
CIA is responsible for collecting, producing, and promoting open source intelligence through its management of the DNI Open Source Center (OSC). OSC was established on November 1, 2005 in response to recommendations by the Robb-Silberman Commission, and is charged with a unique, Community-wide responsibility.

OSC and its worldwide network of partners have the skills, tools, and access necessary to produce high-quality open source intelligence. These capabilities include translations in over 80 languages; source, trends, and media analyses; specialized video and geospatial services; and rare cultural and subject matter expertise.

To OSC Director Douglas Naquin strong partnerships are absolutely essential.

“Given the variety and scope of the questions we can address through publicly available information, I believe it is incumbent on us to work across organizations — inside and outside government — to make the most effective use of available expertise and capability. We in OSC focus on comparative advantage: If we find an organization or company that can do something particularly well — for example, translations — we will leverage that advantage to the extent we can, allowing us then to focus our resources on what we do best.”

Answering New Questions
OSINT has always been an important part of all-source analysis, but continuing advances in information technology have given a voice to even larger numbers of people and made it possible to address new intelligence questions.

“For example, open sources can tell us how various groups overseas react to a speech by the president,” Naquin said. “We don’t have to settle for the ‘official’ view but can assess various groups’ perceptions as well as track trends over time.”

“Just because open source is ‘free’ or publicly available doesn’t mean it is easy,” Naquin added. To filter, understand, and analyze the enormous amount of material that comes into OSC 24/7, Open Source Officers (OSO) must be fluent in foreign languages, sensitive to cultural nuances, experts in their field, whether video, geospatial tools, media analysis or library science.

“If a government changes its stance toward the United States, an analyst with a thorough understanding of the language and familiarity with the culture might not only be able to forecast this change but can tell us why,” Naquin said. “The ability to combine foreign language skill, cultural knowledge, and advanced search techniques is not common.”

Policymakers and other government officials also rely on that expertise to gain a good picture of countries they plan to visit.

“They want to know the environment and various players before they visit,” Naquin said. “Not just guidebook information, but details that will help make their visits fruitful. It’s surprising what one can find in open sources if one knows where to look.”

Unique Analysis
OSC makes most of the information it collects and processes available both to the Intelligence Community and to the entire U.S. Government. Beyond making this “raw” data available to their all-source counterparts, OSC analysts identify and flag for others new insights or trends from open sources.

An experienced OSO is attuned to changes in tone, word choice, and syntax in official messages from foreign governments and organizations. Comparisons with past statements can provide insights into how the foreign actors view an incident or issue. The analysis can also help identify their “hot buttons” or “red lines."

Challenges and Opportunities
As with all intelligence disciplines, OSINT has its challenges. The sheer volume is daunting, and separating wheat from chaff requires skill, knowledge, and a reliance on sophisticated information technology. It also takes a concerted effort to coordinate with partners to avoid duplication and make the best use of resources, but the payoff in both effectiveness and efficiency is high.

“As I look back over the past couple of years, we’ve made more significant contributions than even I would have anticipated,” Naquin said. “We work, however, at the convergence of the two most dynamic industries: media and information technology. It’s like being in a kayak going downstream at the fork of two rivers; the ride will be challenging, but if you have the skill, it’s also going to be good.”

The Internet, of course, has revolutionized the open source environment. Naquin expects that trend to continue.

“An organization that invests in open source today is akin to an individual who invested in Google in its first year. OSINT has always been an integral component in intelligence, but in five years, I believe the value proposition can only increase. An organization with an appreciation for OSINT’s value and potential will be the most effective in the future.”

INTelligence: Signals Intelligence




The president and policymakers rely on insights from Central Intelligence Agency products to help form their foreign policy decisions. CIA officers use a variety of sources in formulating their assessments. The following article is the second in a series that will explore different sources and collection disciplines, which are the building blocks of what we call “finished intelligence.” This article focuses on signals intelligence.

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Communication is an important part of everyday life; especially when it comes to leading a country. World leaders communicate with their people in a variety of ways. All of these forms of communication emit a signal that can be collected. The information gathered from these intercepted signals is of vital importance to national security.

Signals Intelligence
The Intelligence Community refers to the collection and exploitation of signals transmitted from communication systems, radars, and weapon systems as signals intelligence (SIGINT).

SIGINT consists of:

•Communications Intelligence (COMINT) – technical and intelligence information derived from intercept of foreign communications.
•Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) – information collected from systems such as radars and other weapons systems.
•Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT) – signals detected from weapons under testing and development.

Collection
SIGINT is collected in a variety of ways depending on the type of signal targeted. NSA collects the raw SIGINT and then NSA translators, cryptologists, analysts, and other technical experts turn the raw data into something that an all-source analyst can use.
Signals Analysis
Once the NSA has collected, processed, and analyzed SIGINT, it is passed on to CIA and Intelligence Community analysts who use it to complement information from other sources to produce finished intelligence.

The volume and variety of today’s signals adds challenges to the timely production of finished intelligence for policymakers. It is a lot of work to track and analyze all the SIGINT collected.

Importance of SIGINT
SIGINT is one of the most useful sources of information and can often provide a new and different perspective on a critical intelligence topic for the nation’s policymakers.

INTelligence: Geospatial Intelligence


The president and policymakers rely on insights from Central Intelligence Agency products to help form their foreign policy decisions. CIA officers use a variety of sources in formulating their assessments. The following article is the third in a series that will explore different sources and collection disciplines, which are the building blocks of what we call “finished intelligence.” This article focuses on geospatial intelligence.
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A picture is worth a thousand words: a lesson every intelligence officer learns. Every day satellites in the sky capture the comings and goings of nations around the world. These images may provide the missing piece to the puzzle that can help keep the nation safe.

Geospatial Intelligence
The Intelligence Community (IC) refers to the use and analysis of geospatial information to assess geographically referenced activities on Earth as geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). It is everything you can see or know about the earth.

GEOINT consists of:

•Imagery  - a likeness of any natural or man-made feature, as well as its location.
•Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) – information derived through interpreting imagery.
•Geospatial Information – information that identifies a natural or constructed feature on Earth by its geographic location and other characteristics.


GEOINT Collection
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is the prime producer and functional manager for national and allied GEOINT efforts for the IC.  CIA analysts often use NGA products to complement their analysis of a situation in finished intelligence.


GEOINT Analysis
GEOINT is a layering of multiple sources, including imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information. No one source can do it all. The final product is intelligence that can answer questions such as:

•Where am I?
•What are the natural and man-made structures?
•What does the area look like now? What might it look like after an event?
•What do we need to prepare for?
•Where are our allies? Where are our enemies? Where might they move?


Importance of GEOINT
GEOINT because it provides invaluable information about the activities of our adversaries that may help shape foreign policy.

INTelligence: Human Intelligence


The president and policymakers rely on insights from Central Intelligence Agency products to help form their foreign policy decisions. CIA officers use a variety of sources in formulating their assessments. The following article is the fourth in a series that will explore different sources and collection disciplines, which are the building blocks of what we call “finished intelligence.” This article focuses on human intelligence.

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Throughout history, information derived from human sources has helped shape foreign policy decisions. If Oleg Penkovsky had not been providing the CIA with detailed information regarding the Soviet’s missile capabilities, the Cuban Missile Crisis might have had a completely different outcome.

 Human Intelligence
Human intelligence (HUMINT) is defined as any information that can be gathered from human sources.

The National Clandestine Service (NCS) is the branch of the CIA responsible for the collection of HUMINT. The NCS is charged with strengthening national security and foreign policy objectives through the clandestine collection of HUMINT.


HUMINT Collection
HUMINT is collected through:

•Clandestine acquisition of photography, documents, and other material
•Overt collection by people overseas
•Debriefing of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who travel abroad
•Official contacts with foreign governments

The NCS officers responsible for collecting HUMINT are called Operations Officers. They focus on acquiring information from individuals with access to vital foreign intelligence on the full range of national security issues.
To be successful, NCS officers must understand one of the most complex aspects of running assets — human nature. Emotions, intentions and motivations differ from person-to-person and change overtime. Understanding people, with all of their complexities, is crucial to the business of running assets to collect HUMINT.

Collection methods can take place in a variety of ways, including in-person meetings. Some HUMINT operations are short in duration, while others take years. Through it all, NCS officers must understand and assess the intentions and motivations of their assets, as well as the authenticity of the intelligence they provide. The most successful HUMINT sources provide volumes of intelligence responsive to Intelligence Community requirements.

NCS officers, particularly Collection Management officers, work to ensure that CIA information addresses the gaps in the U.S. government’s knowledge base. When the gaps are most appropriately addressed with HUMINT resources, NCS officers draft intelligence requirements for the asset base. When CIA collection addresses an intelligence requirement, the HUMINT information is disseminated as raw intelligence. In order for CIA assets to remain safe, NCS officers take careful measure to protect the identity of clandestine assets.

The success of NCS operations relies on officers working as a team. All NCS officers—from Targeters identifying future assets, to Staff Operations Officers supporting operations — are crucial to the success of the NCS in meeting the HUMINT needs of the Intelligence Community.

Analysis Drawing on HUMINT
Raw HUMINT is disseminated to the Intelligence Community, including analysts in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence and U.S. Military officers in the field. HUMINT can be used in its raw form to make decisions on the battlefield, or more often, HUMINT, along with other types of intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, etc.), is analyzed to produce finished intelligence products for U.S. policymakers.

Importance of HUMINT
Human intelligence plays a critical role in developing and implementing U.S. foreign and national security policy and in protecting U.S. interests.

HUMINT resources in the NCS are tapped when only a well-placed human asset would have access to the intelligence needed by the President, U.S. Policymakers, the U.S. Military, and other key members of the Intelligence Community. If the intelligence can be collected through other collection methods, then HUMINT resources — with inherent risks to human lives — can be preserved for intelligence requirements for which no other collection method exists. The system of CIA being the collector of last resort is in place because assets and NCS officers have lost their lives collecting HUMINT.

Saturday, December 4, 2010

MI6 Chief Gives First Public Speech in Agency’s History


Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) chief John Sawers addresses a gathering of academics, officials and editors in London, on October 28, 2010. In an unprecedented public speech, MI6 chief John Sawers said that intelligence activities were responsible for Iran's admission last year of a second enrichment plant, which in turn led to tougher diplomatic pressure. AFP PHOTO/Toby Melville/POOL

British Spy Chief Breaks Agency’s History of Silence (Wall Street Journal):

In the first public speech by a serving head of the MI6, the U.K.’s foreign spy agency, Sir John Sawers said fighting terrorism is the agency’s top focus and condemned the use of torture in gathering intelligence.

“The most draining aspect of my job is reading, every day, intelligence reports describing the plotting of terrorists who are bent on maiming and murdering people in this country,” Sir John told the Society of Editors here, in a televised address.

He said more than a third of MI6′s resources were directed at counterterrorism—the first time the agency had publicly given even that scant detail about resources.

The 30-minute speech touched on a range of topics, including the threat of terrorism from places such as Yemen, Somalia and North Africa as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While Sir John’s speech provided little in the way of significant revelation, the move marked a shift toward greater openness by the agency, which was founded a century ago and only publicly admitted its existence in 1994.

The foreign-intelligence service has just published its first official history, and Sir John, a former ambassador to the United Nations, during the past year made a rare appearance by an MI6 head, before a U.K. panel on the Iraq war.

Sir John said his speech Thursday was partly motivated by his feeling that the public debate about MI6 is “not well informed” because of the agency’s secretive nature.

Sir John Sawers’s speech – full text:

The Times published a reader’s letter earlier this year. It read: “Sir – is it not bizarre that MI5 and MI6, otherwise known as the secret services, currently stand accused of being – er – secretive?”

I may be biased. But I think that reader was on to something rather important and most government work these days is done by conventional and transparent processes. But not all.

Britain’s foreign intelligence effort was first organised in 1909, when the Secret Intelligence Service was formed.

We have just published an official history of our first 40 years. I’m sure you will all have read all 800 pages of it.

The first chief, Mansfield Cumming, used to pay the salaries of SIS officials out of his private income, dispensed in cash from a desk drawer. I’m glad to say that, even after the chancellor’s statement last week, I’m not in the same position.

SIS’s existence was admitted only in 1994. We British move slowly on such things.

And this, I believe, is the first public speech given by a serving chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service.

“Why now?” might you ask. Well, intelligence features prominently in the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, published last week.

We often appear in the news. Our popular name – MI6 – is an irresistible draw. We have a website, and we’ve got versions in Arabic and Russian. We recruit our staff openly, with adverts in the national press.

But debate on SIS’s role is not well informed, in part because we have been so determined to protect our secrets.

In today’s open society, no government institution is given the benefit of the doubt all the time. There are new expectations of public – and legal – accountability that have developed. In short, in 2010 the context for the UK’s secret intelligence work is very different from 1994.I am not going to use today to tantalise you with hints of sensitive operations or intelligence successes.

Instead, I want to answer two important questions: what value do we get from a secret overseas intelligence effort in the modern era? How can the public have confidence that work done in secret is lawful, ethical, and in their interests?

First, how do we all fit in? The Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, operates abroad, dealing with threats overseas and gathering intelligence mainly from human sources. The security service, MI5, works here in the UK, protecting the homeland from terrorist attack and other threats.

GCHQ produces intelligence from communications, and takes the lead in the cyber world.

These three specialised services form the UK intelligence community, and we operate in what the foreign secretary has called a networked world. Technology plays an ever growing part in our work, for SIS as well as GCHQ, and the boundary line between home and abroad is increasingly blurred.

So the three agencies work increasingly closely together, and the next five years will see us intensifying our collaboration to improve our operational impact and to save money. Yes, even the intelligence services have to make savings.

Secret intelligence is important information that others wish you not to know; it’s information that deepens our understanding of a foreign country or grouping, or reveals their true intentions. It’s information that gives us new opportunities for action.

We at SIS obtain our intelligence from secret agents. These are people are nearly all foreign nationals, who have access to secret information and who choose to work with us.

Our agents are the true heroes of our work. They have their own motivations and hopes. Many of them show extraordinary courage and idealism, striving in their own countries for the freedoms that we in Britain take for granted.

Our agents are working today in some of the most dangerous and exposed places, bravely and to hugely valuable effect, and we owe a debt to countless more whose service is over.

Agents take serious risks and make sacrifices to help our country. In return, we give them a solemn pledge: that we shall keep their role secret.

The information we get from agents is put into an intelligence report. The source is described in general terms. It is just that – a report. It tells us something new or corroborates what we suspect.

A report’s value can be overplayed if it tells us what we want to hear, or it can be underplayed if it contains unwelcome news or runs against received wisdom.

It is a part of the picture, and may not be even wholly accurate, even if the trusted agent who gave it to us is sure that it is.

So sources of intelligence have to be rigorously evaluated, and their reports have to be honestly weighed alongside all other information. Those who produce it, and those who want to use it, have to put intelligence in a wider context. The Joint Intelligence Committee plays a crucial role.

The Butler Review following Iraq was a clear reminder, to both the agencies and the centre of government, politicians and officials alike, of how intelligence needs to be handled. The SIS board recently reviewed our implementation of Lord Butler’s recommendations, to make sure we’ve implemented them fully, in spirit as well as in substance.

I am confident that they have been. And we will look at the wider issues again once the Chilcott Inquiry reports.

So why do we need secret intelligence? Well, let’s start with the terrorist problem.

Most people go about their daily work not worrying about the risk of a terrorist attack. That a bomb may have been planted on their route, or hostages might be seized. I’m glad they don’t worry about those sorts of things: part of our job is to make people feel safe.

But those threats exist, as we’re recalling now with the 7/7 inquest. That said, on any given day the chances that a terrorist attack will happen on our streets, even in central London, feel small enough to be safely ignored by the public.

You, and millions of people like you, go about your business in our cities and towns free of fear because the British government works tirelessly, out of the public eye, to stop terrorists and would-be terrorists in their tracks.

The most draining aspect of my job is reading, every day, intelligence reports describing the plotting of terrorists who are bent on maiming and murdering people in this country.

It’s an enormous tribute to the men and women of our intelligence and security agencies, and to our cooperation with partner services around the world, that so few of these appalling plots develop into real terrorist attacks.

Some of these terrorists are British citizens, trained in how to use weapons, how to make bombs. Others are foreign nationals who want to attack us to undermine our support for forces of moderation around the world.

Many of the reports I read describe the workings of the al-Qaida network, rooted in a nihilistic version of Islam.

Al-Qaida have ambitious goals. Weakening the power of the west. Toppling moderate Islamic regimes. Seizing the holy places of Islam to give them moral authority. Taking control of the Arab world’s oil reserves. They’re unlikely to achieve these goals, but they remain set on trying, and are ready to use extreme violence.

Jonathan Evans, the head of MI5, recently described how the threat is intensifying. Precisely because we are having some success in closing down the space for terrorist recruitment and planning in the UK, the extremists are increasingly preparing their attacks against British targets from abroad.

It’s not just the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa pose real threats to the UK.

From his remote base in Yemen, Al-Qaida leader and US national Anwar al-Awlaki broadcasts propaganda and terrorist instruction in fluent English over the internet.

Our intelligence effort needs to go where the threat is. One of the advantages of the way we in SIS work is that we are highly adaptable and flexible. We don’t get pinned in one place.

There is no one reason for the terrorist phenomenon. Some blame political issues like Palestine or Kashmir or Iraq. Others cite economic disadvantage. Distortions of the Islamic faith. Male supremacy. The lack of the normal checks and balances in some countries. There are many theories.

I’ve worked a lot in the Islamic world. I agree with those who say we need to be steady and stand by our friends.

Over time, moving to a more open system of government in these countries, one more responsive to people’s grievances, will help. But if we demand an abrupt move to the pluralism that we in the west enjoy, we may undermine the controls that are now in place and terrorists would end up with new opportunities.

Whatever the cause or causes of so-called Islamic terrorism, there is little prospect of it fading away soon.

SIS deals with the realities, the threats as they are. We work to minimise the risks. Our closest partners include many in the Muslim world who are concerned at the threat Al-Qaida and their like poses to Islam itself.

In the UK, the security service, MI5, leads our counter-terrorism effort. They do a superb job and SIS’s work starts with the priorities that the security service sets.

It’s not enough to intercept terrorists here, at the very last minute. They need to be identified and stopped well before then, which means action far beyond our own borders.

This is where SIS comes in. Over one-third of SIS resources are directed against international terrorism. It’s the largest single area of SIS’s work.

We get inside terrorist organisations to see where the next threats are coming from. We work to disrupt terrorist plots aimed against the UK, and against our friends and allies. What we do is not seen. Few know about the terrorist attacks we help stop.

It scarcely needs saying, but I’ll say it anyway: working to tackle terrorism overseas is complex and often dangerous. Our agents, and sometimes our staff, risk their lives.

Much intelligence is partial, fragmentary. We have to build up a picture. It’s like a jigsaw, but with key sections missing, and pieces from other jigsaws mixed in.

SIS officers round the world make judgements at short notice with potentially life or death consequences.

Say an agent warns us of a planned attack. We may need to meet that agent fast and securely, to understand his intelligence more fully. To work with GCHQ who look for other signs. To work with MI5 and the police to act on that intelligence here in the UK.

Ministers and lawyers need to be briefed and consulted on next steps. We need partner agencies abroad to pool information, to monitor individuals or to detain them where there are clear, specific concerns.

Disrupting the terrorists is a painstaking process with much careful preparation, and then sudden rapid activity. Details have to be got right. It all has to be tackled fast and securely. There is little margin for error.

All this goes on 24 hours a day, every day of the year. And it keeps us far safer than we would be without it.

Proliferation terrorism is difficult enough and, despite our collective efforts, an attack may well get through. The human cost would be huge. But our country, our democratic system, will not be brought down by a typical terrorist attack.

The dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons – and chemical and biological weapons – are more far-reaching. It can alter the whole balance of power in a region.

States seeking to build nuclear weapons against their international legal obligations are obsessively secretive about it. SIS’s role is to find out what these states are doing and planning, and identify ways to slow down their access to vital materials and technology.

The revelations around Iran’s secret enrichment site at Qom were an intelligence success. They led to diplomatic pressure on Iran intensifying, with tougher UN and EU sanctions which are beginning to bite. The Iranian regime must think hard about where its best interests lie.

The risks of failure in this area are grim. Stopping nuclear proliferation cannot be addressed purely by conventional diplomacy. We need intelligence-led operations to make it more difficult for countries like Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

The longer international efforts delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons technology, the more time we create for a political solution to be found.

Long-range strategic intelligence: the National Security Strategy which the prime minister published last week sets out the strategic direction for foreign, defence and security policy for the years ahead. Intelligence is at the heart of that strategy.

SIS has the responsibility to gather long-range strategic intelligence, to track military and economic power in other countries, and find out what they going to do with it. We try to see inside the minds of potential policy adversaries and predict their behaviour.

We have expertise on states that operate opaquely and without public accountability. We provide early warning of new weapons systems, or of major changes in policy.

Machiavelli said that “surprise is the essential factor in victory”. A lot of SIS work is about making sure that the British government does not face unwelcome surprises. And that some of our adversaries do.

Cyber: My colleague Iain Lobban at GCHQ recently described the cyber threats we face in the modern world.

Attacks on government information and commercial secrets of our companies are happening all the time. Electricity grids, our banking system, anything controlled by computers, could possibly be vulnerable. For some, cyber is becoming an instrument of policy as much as diplomacy or military force.

As Iain is the first to recognise, there isn’t a purely technological solution. We need to invest in technology to defend ourselves, and the government has allocated funds for that purpose in the Spending Round.

Even high technology threats have that crucial human dimension, and SIS will be gathering intelligence on individuals and states launching cyber attacks against us, to find out how they organise themselves and to develop ways to counter them.

We have already set to work. It’s a big task of the future.

Supporting the military, and building security where the military are involved in a conflict, you will find SIS and GCHQ alongside them.

In Afghanistan, our people provide tactical intelligence that guides military operations and saves our soldiers’ lives. Our strategic intelligence helps map the political way forward.

We are building up the Afghan security service, already probably the most capable of the Afghan security institutions, to help the Afghans take responsibility for their own security.

Capacity building is not limited to Afghanistan. We offer training and support to partner services around the world. It wins their cooperation, it improves the quality of their work, and it builds respect for human rights.

Our government expects SIS to maintain a global reach, collecting intelligence in all areas of major British interest to reduce the risk of unpleasant surprises.

And we have our network of partners which provides us a discreet channel of communication to other governments on the most sensitive issues.

So we are a very special part of government. SIS exists to give the UK advantage. We are a sovereign national asset. We are the secret frontline of our national security.

How can the public have confidence that work done by us in secret is lawful, ethical and in their interests?

Let me explain how it all works in practice.

SIS does not choose what it does. The 1994 Intelligence Services Act sets the legal framework for what we do. Ministers tell us what they want to know, what they want us to achieve. We take our direction from the National Security Council.

As chief of SIS, I am responsible for SIS operations. I answer directly to the foreign secretary.

When our operations require legal authorisation or entail political risk, I seek the foreign secretary’s approval in advance. If a case is particularly complex, he can consult the attorney general. In the end, the foreign secretary decides what we do.

Submissions for operations go to the foreign secretary all the time. He approves most, but not all, and those operations he does not approve do not happen. It’s as simple as that.

There is oversight and scrutiny by parliamentarians and by judges.

The Intelligence and Security committee is chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, and includes other senior politicians, many of them former ministers. They hold us to account and can investigate areas of our activity.

And two former judges have full access to our files, as intelligence commissioner and interception commissioner. They make sure our procedures are proper and lawful.

These processes of control and accountability are as robust as you will find anywhere. SIS fully supports them. We want to enjoy public confidence.

We don’t operate on our own. Intelligence is a team game. If we need to track a British terrorist in another country, or stop a shipment of components for a secret nuclear programme, we need to work with services abroad.

We work with over 200 partner services around the world, with hugely constructive results. And our intelligence partnership with the United States is an especially powerful contributor to UK security.

No intelligence service risks compromising its sources. So we have a rule called the control principle – the service who first obtains the intelligence has the right to control how it is used, who else it can be shared with, and what action can be taken on it.

It’s rule number one of intelligence sharing. We insist on it with our partners, and they insist on it with us. Because whenever intelligence is revealed, others try to hunt down the source. Agents can get identified, arrested, tortured and killed by the very organisations who are working against us.

So if the control principle is not respected, the intelligence dries up. That’s why we have been so concerned about the possible release of intelligence material in recent court cases.

We can’t do our job if we work only with friendly democracies. Dangerous threats usually come from dangerous people in dangerous places. We have to deal with the world as it is.

Suppose we receive credible intelligence that might save lives, here or abroad. We have a professional and moral duty to act on it. We will normally want to share it with those who can save those lives.

We also have a duty to do what we can to ensure that a partner service will respect human rights. That is not always straightforward.

Yet if we hold back, and don’t pass that intelligence, out of concern that a suspect terrorist may be badly treated, innocent lives may be lost that we could have saved.

These are not abstract questions for philosophy courses or searching editorials. They are real, constant, operational dilemmas.

Sometimes there is no clear way forward. The more finely-balanced judgments have to be made by Ministers themselves. I welcome the publication of the consolidated guidance on detainee issues. It reflects the detailed guidance issued to SIS staff in the field and the training we give them.

Torture is illegal and abhorrent under any circumstances, and we have nothing whatsoever to do with it. If we know or believe action by us will lead to torture taking place, we’re required by UK and international law to avoid that action. And we do, even though that allows the terrorist activity to go ahead.

Some may question this, but we are clear that it’s the right thing to do. It makes us strive all the harder to find different ways, consistent with human rights, to get the outcome we want.

Other countries respect our approach on these issues. Even where we find deep differences of culture and tradition, we can make progress, slowly but surely, by seeking careful assurances and providing skilled training.

I also welcome the prime minister’s initiative in setting up the Gibson Inquiry into the detainee issue. If there are more lessons to be learned, we want to learn them.

And, after 9/11, the terrorist threat was immediate and paramount. We are accused by some people not of committing torture ourselves but of being too close to it in our efforts to keep Britain safe.

Let me say this: SIS is a Service that reflects our country. Integrity is the first of the service’s values.

I am confident that, in their efforts to keep Britain safe, all SIS staff acted with the utmost integrity, and with a close eye on basic decency and moral principles.

So, back to that reader’s letter in The Times.

The recent debate about secrecy reflects two concerns. First, national security, and the need for the intelligence and security agencies to work in secret to protect British interests and our way of life from those who threaten it.

And second, the need for justice – the rights of citizens to raise complaint against the government and get a fair hearing.

As a public servant, and as a citizen, I devoutly want both objectives upheld, and not to have one undermine the other.

The judges have to determine what constitutes a fair trial.

We in the intelligence and security agencies have to make sure that our secrets don’t become available to those who are threatening our country. And we have to protect our partners secrets.

As the prime minister said in parliament, at present we’re unable to use secret material in court with confidence that the material will be protected.

The government has promised a green paper to set out some better options for dealing with national security issues in the courts, and I look forward to that.

Part of sustaining public confidence in the intelligence services is debate about the principles and value of intelligence work.

And the purpose of today is to explain what we in SIS do and why we do it. Why our work is important, and why we can’t work in the open. A lot is at stake.

Secret organisations need to stay secret, even if we present an occasional public face, as I am doing today. If our operations and methods become public, they won’t work.

Agents take risks. They will not work with SIS, will not pass us the secrets they hold, unless they can trust us not to expose them.

Foreign partners need to have certainty that what they tell us will remain secret – not just most of the time, but always.

Without the trust of agents, the anonymity of our staff, the confidence of partners, we would not get the intelligence. The lives of everyone living here would be less safe. The United Kingdom would be more vulnerable to the unexpected, the vicious and the extreme.

Secrecy is not a dirty word. Secrecy is not there as a cover up. Secrecy plays a crucial part in keeping Britain safe and secure.

And without secrecy, there would be no intelligence services, or indeed other national assets like our Special Forces. Our nation would be more exposed as a result.

Without secrecy, we can’t tackle threats at source. We would be forced to defend ourselves on the goal-line, on our borders. And it’s more than obvious that the dangers of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and cyber attack are not much impressed by international borders.

Ladies and gentlemen, the remarkable men and women who make up the staff of SIS are among the most loyal, dedicated and innovative in the entire public service.

We ask more of them than we do of any other public servants not in uniform. Exceptional people, doing extraordinary things for their country.

Our people can’t and don’t talk about what they do. They receive recognition for their achievements only within the confines of the service.

You don’t know them, but I do. It is an honour to lead them.