Most articles in the Iranian media
on the nuclear issue reiterate Iran 's "inalienable right" to enrich
uranium according to the NPT. Iran contends that as a member of the
NPT, it is treated unfairly by the international community when demands are made
that it suspend enrichment. Iran has repeated this mantra so often that many
experts and policymakers – even if critical of Iran 's nuclear program – concede that as a member
of the NPT, Iran indeed has the right to enrich
uranium. Ahead of a fresh round of negotiations with Iran that could begin soon after the
US presidential elections, it is
important to examine the veracity of this claim.
Since 2006, Iran 's claim is actually negated by the six
resolutions passed by the UN Security Council instructing Iran to suspend enrichment-related activities,
which Iran has blatantly violated. These
Security Council resolutions "trump" any privilege provided by the NPT, as was
clarified in analyses published by the Carnegie Endowment.[1]
The demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment is
currently a legally binding demand.
But there is a more fundamental
issue at stake. The right of Iran – or any other non-nuclear state
– to pursue nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment activities, is not
absolute. According to the NPT, this right is explicitly conditional.
Iran 's ongoing claim to an
inalienable right is based on a partial reading of the relevant clause in
Article IV of the NPT. What
the continuation of the critical sentence clarifies is that the right to nuclear
energy – including enrichment activities – is contingent upon upholding
Articles I and II of the treaty, including the stipulation that states not
manufacture nuclear weapons.[2]
In other words, if a state engages in weapons-related activities, the right no
longer holds.
The crux of the question of
Iran 's right to enrich, therefore, is
whether it has been engaged in military work.
Because Iran has not yet produced a nuclear
device, and because it is making every effort to conceal its military program,
the question – pressing for the past decade – is not easy to answer. What would
serve as acceptable evidence? There is a need to define relevant criteria short
of an actual nuclear weapon, at which time the question loses its relevance.
What follows are some ideas based on the Iranian case, but setting clearer
criteria for determining that a state is "working on a military program" is
essential for stopping additional nuclear proliferators down the
road.
One
important criterion for making this call is evidence of concealment efforts on
the part of the proliferator. In a recent article in the New
York Times, Ray Takeyh recalls that both of Iran 's known
uranium enrichment plants, at Natanz and Fordow, began as "surreptitious plants
that were later discovered by the International Atomic Energy Agency."[3]
Indeed,
the violation of its safeguard agreements with the IAEA is the reason why the
Iranian case was reported to the UN Security Council in the first
place.
The evidence does not stop there,
and another important category relates to details regarded by the IAEA as highly
suspicious. In February 2008, then-deputy director general of the IAEA, Olli
Heinonen, convened a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in order to
present the evidence he possessed regarding Iran 's nuclear
program, and was quoted as saying that some of the evidence was "not consistent
with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon."[4]
This later evolved into a long debate over the fate of the full Iranian nuclear
file that then-director general Mohamed ElBaradei refused to include in his open
reports. The issue was resolved only after ElBaradei was replaced by Yukiya
Amano in late 2009, and the full annex was included in Amano's report on
Iran in early November 2011.
This development underscored a third
and related concern: lack of cooperation with the IAEA. The 2011 report
set the stage for renewed IAEA requests to visit the military facility at
Parchin, where the IAEA suspects that high explosive testing has been carried
out. In the early months of 2012, Iran twice led inspectors to believe
they would be allowed to visit Parchin, and then denied them access. In
parallel, satellite imagery over recent months shows evidence of a clean-up
operation at the facility. This is not the first time Iran has cleaned up suspicious evidence: in 2004,
following IAEA suspicions of undeclared and problematic nuclear activities at
Lavizan , Iran razed the site in order to
interfere with soil samples.
A final criterion can be called
analytic inference. One piece of evidence that fits this category is that the
facility at Fordow has room for only about 3000 centrifuges, which is not nearly
enough to logically serve as part of a civilian nuclear program, but would make
perfect sense as a clandestine facility where stocks of LEU could be secretly
enriched to the high levels needed for a nuclear device. Another relevant issue
is Iran 's enrichment to 20 percent.
Iran 's civilian explanation
here is weak because Iran was
offered fuel for its Tehran reactor in the
context of a deal proposed by the P5+1 in October 2009, and rejected by
Iran . The military-related
explanation – namely, that 20 percent enrichment advances Iran
significantly toward the level needed for breakout capability – is much more
plausible. One can add the US
National Intelligence Estimate released in late 2007, whereby at least
up until 2003 – which means for close to 20 years – Iran had been
working on a military nuclear program, under government direction. There is no
reasonable basis for believing that it scrapped this
program.
Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ
[1] See Amy Reed, "UN Resolution 1696
Moots Iranian Legal Claims," Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment,
August 21, 2006; and a continuation of this debate in "Continued Analysis
of 1696," Carnegie Endowment, August 24, 2006. See also David Albright and
Andrea Stricker, "NAM Countries Hypocritical on Iran," The Iran
Primer, USIP, September 7, 2012.
[2] From the NPT: "Article IV 1. Nothing
in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
Articles I and II of this Treaty" (emphasis added). In Article II the
non-nuclear weapons states undertake, inter alia, "not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."
[3] Ray Takeyh, "Talk to Iran's Leaders,
but Look beyond Them," New York Times, September 19, 2012.
[4] William J. Broad and David E. Sanger,
"Meeting on Arms Data Reignites Iran Debate," New York Times, March
3, 2008.
No comments:
Post a Comment