Is the US Receding to a Containment Policy on Iran?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In March 2012, at the annual AIPAC policy conference, US President Obama affirmed unequivocally that his policy regarding Iran’s nuclear advances was a policy of prevention, not containment. Since then he has reiterated on a number of occasions, most recently during his visit to Israel in March of this year, that the US will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. Since that visit, another round of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran has failed, and the latest IAEA report on Iran – released May 22, 2013 – indicates that while there are no major surprises, Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium programs are creeping slowly but surely toward a situation that will soon be unstoppable.

 

Since prevention became official US policy, voices both in Israel and abroad have continued to express doubts as to whether the President could be trusted on this count. This in turn has prompted repeated assertions from Obama directly, as well as from members of his administration, that this President does not bluff, and that he is indeed sincere. Most likely Obama spent some time during his visit to Israel trying to drive this message home to Prime Minister Netanyahu.

 

Nevertheless, recent developments on the ground regarding Syria could be interpreted as unwillingness of the Obama administration to use military force, even to confront the actual use of WMD. Obama has backed away from military force in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, although in late 2011 he stipulated explicitly that this would be a red line, with the implicit message that military intervention would be on the table. The lack of interest in intervening militarily in Syria might indicate a similar unwillingness to do so in Iran.

 

However, this could also be read quite differently. In other words, it is equally plausible that Obama is choosing his next Middle East battle. If one accepts that it is highly unlikely that the administration would employ military force in two Middle East crises, it could be that the resistance to using force in Syria means that there is actually a greater chance that it could be used in Iran. This alternative interpretation is strengthened by the fact that US resistance to intervening in Syria might also be driven by uncertainty as to how force might effectively be employed in this case: what kind of force to use, against which targets, and on behalf of which opposition element. In the case of Iran, the military options are more easily defined, especially if there is a targeted use of force against nuclear facilities. Intervening in Syria, even if chemical weapons use was the trigger, would mean intervening in a raging civil war, a difficult gamble. In Iran, military force could be used in a more precise and targeted manner.

 

But beyond the issue of trust and the interpretation of developments on the ground in Syria, there is still confusion about US policy on Iran that goes to Obama’s ability to uphold the policy, even if he is firmly committed to it. In an effort to substantiate the commitment to prevention and the rejection of containment, the White House has stated that its intelligence services, augmented by information supplied by the IAEA inspectors, will supply timely information for action in case Iran breaks out and embarks on the production path to nuclear weapons.[1] But there are some nagging questions regarding prevention policy as it currently stands. First, it is blatantly apparent that the “diplomatic“ route for solving the Iran conundrum has failed, even though the US administration has yet to admit this. In considering the next stage, can the United States indeed depend on the fact that it will obtain reliable information that an Iranian decision to develop nuclear weapons has been taken? If it does, will it be at a stage when there is still a realistic option of employing military force in a manner that will reverse the current trajectory toward a military nuclear capability? And most importantly, will the US ultimately be willing to employ force in dealing with Iran?

 

These questions are coming into sharper relief of late against the backdrop of claims by different experts. While some continue to maintain that any diversion of nuclear material to a military program will surely be detected by the IAEA, other analysts continue to explore the containment option based on certain doubts they harbor over whether the Iranian decision will necessarily be noted and/or that there will be enough time to then stop Iran.[2] Both positions cannot be correct, and the grounds for doubting the ability of the US to stop Iran based on timely information are strong.

 

History is replete with instances of intelligence failures. In this case, depending on IAEA inspectors for the supply of timely information can prove disastrous – not because of the quality of inspections, rather due to the restrictive conditions under which they are conducted. Current inspections in Iran are not carried out according to the more pervasive Additional Protocol, but rather under the (misnamed) “full-scope” or “comprehensive” safeguards procedures, which are actually neither full-scope nor comprehensive. Moreover, Iran could decide to curtail the inspections further, or in the worst case scenario, expel the inspectors, rendering the situation untenable. Would this cause the US to consider military action to remedy the situation? Without additional cause for concern, this is doubtful. At most, the UN Security Council would sound another warning, which would merely provide Iran with additional time to breakout without being detected.

 

The even more disturbing scenario that is openly discussed of late is that Iran has parallel, clandestine enrichment and development of nuclear weapons programs. Because of the limitations imposed on the IAEA inspectors and the inherent limitations of intelligence gathering, this scenario cannot be discounted.

 

The authors of the Kahl et al report on containment argue that “the Obama administration is rightly committed to preventing – not containing – a nuclear-armed Iran, but…prevention efforts, up to and including the use of force, could fail.” It is on this basis that they contend that the United States could eventually be forced to shift to a policy of containment despite current preferences.[3] Colin Kahl, the report’s lead author, is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, and therefore might reflect the thinking of the administration on this subject.

 

If the implications of these doubts are not addressed head-on and the US policy of prevention adjusted accordingly – and very soon, containment of a nuclear Iran might very likely become the default policy of the United States, even though Obama currently (and adamantly) rejects it.

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[1] In addition, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in his March 12, 2013 testimony that Iran “could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of weapons-grade uranium before this activity is discovered.” See “Iran Can’t Build Nuke without Tripping Alarm Bells, US Says, Times of Israel, March 12, 2013.

[2] See Colin H. Kahl, Raj Pattani and Jacob Stokes, If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran, Center for a New American Security, May 2013, http://www.cnas.org/ifallelsefails.

[3] Ibid.

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Syria, Russia, and the S-300: Military and Technical

Concern that Russia intends to provide Syria with advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems was one of the reasons for Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit to Russia last week.

 

The S-300 system (or in its Western name, SA-10 Grumble) is an advanced surface-to-air missile system made in the USSR / Russia. Its development began in the 70s as a result of lessons learned from the Yom Kippur and Vietnam Wars. It was intended as an "access denial" system, and as such has extended capabilities and range. The system entered into service in the Soviet air defense service (Voyska PVO) and is today used by the Russian air force.[1]

 

In the early 90s, significant improvements were added to the system, which was renamed the S-300 PMU, followed by the S-300 PMU-2 "Favorit" (this system was awarded a separate NATO label – SA-20 Gargoyle).[2] The improvements included modifications of all the components – radars, control systems, and interception missiles. The current system has good capabilities up to a range of 200 km, as well as good capabilities against low flying aircraft, and in the latest models even against surface-to-surface missiles. It is today in service in the Russian military (about 1,900 launchers) and the Chinese military[3].

 

An S-300 battalion generally includes several components: engagement radar, detection radar for long ranges, low altitude detection radar, command center, and several launchers (up to 8 launchers). Each of these components is installed on a wheeled vehicle. Several types of interception missiles were developed for this system.

 

Syria's interest in acquiring long range anti-aircraft missile systems is not new. Already in the late 80s, in the wake of the first Lebanon War, Syria was eager to obtain long range air defense systems. It received the S-200 system (known in the West as SA-5 Gammon). They supplied long range defense but they are static, heavy – and obsolete.

 

Reports about a possible large arms deal amounting to $5 billion between Russia and Syria surfaced in 2007. These deals were said to include fighter aircraft, anti-tank missile systems, and various types of surface-to-air missile systems, including the S-300. No details were released and it was not clear whether these deals were indeed signed. Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert asked the Russian government to refrain from selling the S-300 system to Syria. It seemed then that Russia complied with the request since the system was never delivered, although other air defense systems – such as the Pantsyr-S1 system (a short range mobile air defense system, for protection of mobile forces and point targets) – were delivered in 2009.

 

Unlike the deal with Syria, which was never publicly announced, a parallel deal for sale of S-300 systems to Iran was made public and led to much international pressure on Russia, which ultimately, in 2010, suspended the deal (claiming that the sanctions voted by the Security Council on Iran were the reason for the suspension).

 

Since the outbreak of the upheaval in Syria in 2011, Russia has supported Bashar al-Assad and provided his regime with advanced equipment, including the Bastion coastal defense systems (equipped with the Yakhont supersonic missile) and the mobile air defense system Buk-M2 (Western name – SA-17) that were delivered in 2011. Last week's reports, including statements by senior Russian officials, indicate that there was indeed a contract for the S-300 systems (according to some sources, the deal was for 6 launchers and 144 missiles), and that today Russia is prepared to supply the system.

 

At this point, a few questions are in order. First, why does the Assad regime need the system especially now? Second, is the Syrian military able to undertake the logistical-operational effort of integrating the system? Third, is Russia indeed ready to supply the systems now?

 

Regarding Syria's motivation to receive the system, it seems that the recent attacks in Syria that according to foreign news services were conducted by Israel – in January 2013 and earlier this month – have demonstrated Assad's vulnerability. Assad, while of late scoring some success in his combat against the rebels, needs guarantees against the type of foreign intervention that caused the downfall of Qaddafi in Libya. From the start of the events in Syria in 2011, Israel refrained from any action within the Syrian territory, as did all other external parties (the US, NATO, Turkey). Now, however, the chances of foreign intervention in Syria – against the regime – have increased. A request for the air defense systems signals that Syria has a much better air defense than the Libyan systems and that Russia stands firmly behind it.

 

It is doubtful whether the Syrian military is currently able to absorb the systems. Integration of a system such as the S-300 requires a significant and prolonged investment to learn the system, establish facilities for operation and maintenance, and create and train operating units. It is highly questionable whether in its current state the Syrian military is able to invest the required manpower and resources for this purpose. Furthermore, it is doubtful that it will be able to secure the systems upon their arrival against an attack by the rebels.

 

There is a concern, however, despite its low probability, that Assad might transfer the systems to a safer place and to loyal hands, i.e., Hizbollah. Hizbollah would be able to send people to Russia to learn the system and can find a safe place for it within Lebanese territory, out of the rebels' reach. From Israel's point of view, such a development would be extremely serious.

 

At this stage, it is hard to know if Russia indeed intends to complete the deal and transfer the systems to Syria (with the knowledge that the systems might be entrusted to Hizbollah, exactly as the Syrians intended to transfer the Buk-M2 systems) or if the moves of the last weeks are idle steps, intended to emphasize – at the rhetorical level – Russia's determination of to continue to support the Assad regime and send a message to Israel that continuing the attacks in Syria will exact a heavy price. The only option for immediate deployment and operation of the system in Syria is the Egyptian model of the 70s, namely, delivery of the system with Russian operators. It is hardly likely that the Russians would go as far as endangering their soldiers and expose them both to the rebels' aggression and to a third party challenge.

 

 

 

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[1] The S-300 system is not to be confused with the S-300V (Western name of the SA-12 Gladiator/Giant), which was developed in parallel but separately for the Soviet land forces.

[2] All the designations mentioned here apply to the export versions of the system, which are the subject of this article.

[3] A further version, S-300 PMU-3 was renamed, and is marketed today as the S-400 Triumf (NATO code name SA-21 Growler).

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Prime Minister Netanyahu's Visit to Russia

Shortly after his return from China, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu flew to Russia for a hastily arranged visit with President Vladimir Putin. The catalyst for the visit was the significant increase in activity around the Syrian issue, including the attacks against Syrian targets attributed to Israel, high level visits to Russia by leading international figures, and Russia’s announcement of its intention to supply Syria with S-300 missiles. Israel and Russia have held contacts prior to the visit, including a conversation between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Putin, and thus the visit itself raised many questions, including: was it in fact about the S-300 missiles? Indeed, Moscow has recently hosted high level visitors, among them US Secretary of State John Kerry and British Prime Minister David Cameron. The main topic in their talks with Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was reportedly the Syrian issue. Thus it is evident that there is vigorous activity by the Western powers and Israel on the Syrian issue vis-à-vis Russia. What is this about?

 

Since the start of the civil war in Syria, Russia has gradually become the leading player on the Syrian front. It has implemented a strategy of preventing outside foreign intervention (using political and military tools), which improves Bashar al-Assad’s ability to halt the rebel forces. This strategy is actually used to pressure other global and regional players (the United States and NATO on the one hand, and Turkey and elements in the Sunni axis on the other). At the same time, Russia is working to promote alternatives to a settlement on the Syrian issue that will ensure its future standing in the Middle East, along with the survival of the radical axis of Iran, Syria, and Hizbollah with Russian backing. Furthermore, Russia is exploiting its Syrian leverage to promote solutions that are essential to it in the global arena regarding its friction with the West (over a long list of issues).

 

Yet while Russia’s achievements as to its Syrian policy are clear, it has thus far not succeeded in extracting significant Western concessions regarding the terms it has proposed for an agreement in Syria, at least until recently. Now it appears that the latest developments are leading the Western actor to reexamine its uncompromising position toward Russia’s approach to a future settlement in Syria. Questions have arisen about the ability of the rebels to overcome the regime without substantial outside military aid, what now seems less and less feasible, and there is increasing dissatisfaction with the growing Islamization among the Syrian opposition. However, these developments are still not enough to meet Russia halfway on its proposed position. The attacks attributed to Israel, which Moscow has presented as preparation for the option of outside military intervention on behalf of the rebels – which Russia is laboring hard to prevent – also appear in this light.

 

The recent developments took place against this backdrop. During Secretary Kerry’s May 7-8 visit to Moscow, the Syrian problem was discussed at length, apparently in softer tones than in the past. Kerry’s visit was preceded by a number of phone calls between President Obama and President Putin (three since March), and a visit to Moscow by Tom Donilon, Obama’s national security adviser, who presumably brought messages from Obama concerning American willingness to cooperate on issues essential to Russia. Kerry’s visit apparently ended with understandings reached on Syria, with the parties officially announcing their agreement to convene an international conference to discuss a settlement on the Syrian issue. The emerging model is apparently the establishment of a transitional government with the participation of the two camps in Syria. What comes out of this picture is that the United States has conceded on Assad’s removal as a condition for continuing the negotiations, while at the same time Russia has showed willingness to concede on later support for Assad. It has also been reported that Putin and Obama are expected to meet during the G8 summit in Northern Ireland on June 17-18, and later, at the G20 meeting to be held in September in Russia, which should lead to the resolution of all the unresolved issues on their agenda.

 

Immediately after Kerry’s departure, Prime Minister Cameron arrived in Moscow and discussed Syria with Putin. He too was favorably disposed toward the idea of an international conference, including the idea of establishing a transitional government in Syria. It has been reported that such a conference will in fact take place in late May. However, the Russians claimed that despite the good understandings reached in both visits, there are still large gaps between the positions of the sides. Coincidentally, the attack on the Syrian targets attributed to Israel occurred at the same time.

 

Immediately after that attack, the issue of the supply of S-300 missiles to Syria rose to the headlines, followed by reports of the contacts between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Putin, as well as Netanyahu’s intention to visit Russia. The contract to supply S-300 missiles is from 2010, but the missiles were not delivered to Syria or Iran because of understandings reached with Russia. The subject reappeared in the summer of 2012, but again no missiles were delivered – some say because of an Israeli request (Putin visited Israel in June 2012). The recycling of the issue, along with a somewhat cynical announcement by Foreign Minister Lavrov that new contracts had not been signed to supply the missiles and that “only” existing ones were being fulfilled, requires an explanation. Russia’s intention apparently is to use the missile issue as leverage to prevent foreign military intervention in Syria, and also to obtain additional concessions in negotiations with the West on formulating a settlement on Syria in the framework of the international conference. The effectiveness of this leverage is clear, evidenced by the visits to Putin, which enable him to upgrade Russia’s positions on the subject of Syria.

 

During Netanyahu’s visit, Russia apparently took a sympathetic approach and appeared willing to make various concessions. Although details of the meeting were not publicized, it seems that all of the key questions on Syria were debated. And while the Russians continue to claim that they will honor the contract, it is still too early to determine definitively whether the missiles will indeed be delivered. In any case, however, it is clear that concessions are not made without receiving something in return.

Russia spy agency claims CIA agent arrested for trying to recruit Russian agent in Moscow.

 

Russia seizes 'CIA agent in Moscow': US diplomat arrested on suspicion of spying

• US diplomat named as Ryan Christopher Fogle was arrested last night.
• Russia claim he was attempting to recruit a Russian secret services official.
• US ambassador to be summoned to Russian foreign ministry to explain.
• Photos of his belongings show he was in possession of two wigs, three pairs of sunglasses, a microphone, knife and a substantial amount of money.

 

 

 

Russia today claimed to have arrested a US diplomat in Moscow on suspicion of spying.
The FSB counter intelligence service claimed it caught Ryan Christopher Fogle red handed seeking to recruit a Russian intelligence officer.
It said the envoy, a third secretary in the political section of the American embassy, was arrested overnight - it did not say which service the target was from or what stage the matter had reached.
Pictures released after the US diplomat's arrest show he was in possession of two wigs, three pairs of sunglasses, a microphone, knife and a substantial amount of money.

 

Arrested: The US diplomat - suspected by the Russian of being a CIA agent - was named as Ryan Christopher
 Fogle. He was arrested last night in Moscow

 

 

Claims: The FSB counter intelligence service said the envoy, a third secretary
in the political section of the American embassy was caught
red handed seeking to recruit a Russian intelligence officer

 

Stash: He was detained with 'special technical devices, written instructions for the person
he was recruiting, a lot of cash, and things to help change one's appearance,' according to the FSB


 

Mission: The website of the American embassy in Russia informs that its
Political Section is engaged in 'bringing to the attention of the Russian government the
 US position on the issues of foreign policy and security'
 



Questions: Pictures of items seized were released of the US
 diplomat undergoing questioning inside the offices of the FSB,
formerly known in Soviet times as the KGB

 

Russia's security services claimed Tuesday to have arrested a CIA agent posing as an employee of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for allegedly trying to recruit a Russian secret service agent to work for the U.S.

The Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had detained a man identified as Ryan Christopher Fogle on the evening of May 13 or early the next morning for attempting to recruit a Russian agent.

The U.S. Embassy would not comment on the reports when contacted Tuesday morning by CBS News.

Russian news agency RIA Novosti quoted a statement from the FSB as saying Fogle was arrested while trying to recruit a member of the Russian security services, and he had on his person, "special technical devices, written instructions for the Russian citizen being recruited, a large sum of cash and means of changing his appearance."

After being arrested and processed by Russian security services, the man was handed back to the U.S. diplomatic mission in Moscow.

The purported Russian-issued diplomatic ID card of a U.S. man identified by Russian

security services as Ryan Christopher Fogle. / RT

The FSB said Fogle had been masquerading as a career diplomat at the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy, but that he was a CIA employee. A photo provided by the FSB and published across Russian media allegedly showed his Russian-issued diplomatic identification card.

Also published was a picture apparently showing the moment the man was arrested -- a man with shoulder-length blonde hair being pinned on the ground by Russian agents.



A photo published by "Russia Today" shows an alleged CIA agent

identified by Russian security services as Ryan Christopher Fogle

 sitting in custody in Moscow, May 14, 2013./ RT

Another photo showed the same man, but with short brown hair, sitting at a desk -- apparently in custody. On a table nearby there was the backpack the man had been pictured carrying and a blonde wig.

The Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed to CBS News that U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul had been summoned to the Ministry over the incident. An official at the Ministry said they had not yet heard back from the Embassy regarding the summons.

Pictures were released of the US diplomat undergoing questioning inside the offices of the FSB, formerly known in Soviet times as the KGB.
It is unclear whether the US will retaliate by expelling a Russian diplomat.




Past: Three years ago, Russian spy Anna Chapman -
a glamorous SVR foreign intelligence operative was
 arrested in the US and deported

Ambassador Michael McFaul, who was doing a question-and-answer session on Twitter when the detention was announced, declined to comment.He is to be summoned to the Russian foreign ministry tomorrow for an explanation of the diplomat's alleged undercover activities.
The incident comes on the eve of talks in Sweden between US secretary of state John Kerry and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov.
The two countries are seeking to improve relations but a spy scandal is likely to have the opposite impact.
Three years ago, Russian spy Anna Chapman - a glamorous SVR foreign intelligence operative who had been married to a British ex-public schoolboy - was arrested with nine others in the US.
After confessing to working as 'illegal agents' - who did not have diplomatic cover - the group were deported in a Cold War style spy swap.
The website of the American embassy in Russia informs that its Political Section is engaged in 'bringing to the attention of the Russian government the US position on the issues of foreign policy and security'.
The section's duty is also to 'inform Washington about the main provisions of the foreign and defence policy of Russia' as well as Russian domestic political life.

'The US embassy is not giving any comments on this matter,' a spokeswoman told Mail Online.

Jerusalem Day

 

 

 

Celebrating 46 years of the reunification of Jerusalem! Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, now and forever!!!

CTF 151 and Yemeni Navy cooperate in counter-piracy operations.

A warship attached to Combined Maritime Forces’ (CMF’s) Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 has conducted a series of counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, working alongside personnel from both the Yemeni Navy and Marines.

The Royal Navy’s Type 23 Frigate HMS Kent, assigned to CTF 151, conducted a successful patrol of the islands of Socotra, off the Yemeni coast.

 

HMS Kent’s Royal Marines Boarding Team

 demonstrates board and search tactics to Colonel Ali

 Saleen of the Yemen Navy and Lieutenant Colonel

 Saalih Muhamed Alhumaymi of the Yemen Marines

 

To help the Ship’s Company better understand the patterns of life that they witnessed in the region, HMS Kent embarked two Yemeni officers to act as local subject matter experts.

Colonel Ali Saleen of the Yemen Navy and Lieutenant Colonel Saalih Muhamed Alhumaymi of the Yemen Marines, both based in Socotra, shared their knowledge of the islands with Kent’s team and helped them build up a solid working knowledge of what to expect from the movements of legitimate fishing and sailing vessels in the region.

 

 

Captain Rob Courtier RM welcomes Colonel Ali Saleen,

 Yemeni Navy aboard HMS Kent.

 

This information will be used in the future to identify suspicious activity that could be related to pirate activities.

During the three-day patrol, the Yemeni officers were shown the various equipment and techniques that CTF 151 units use to conduct maritime security operations. Col. Saleen said: “It’s good to see how other navies operate and work together to share information.”

 

 

Colonel Ali Saleen of the Yemen Navy and Lieutenant

 Colonel Saalih Muhamed Alhumaymi of the Yemen

 Marines being shown around HMS Kent’s Merlin helicopter

On the second day, information was received regarding suspicious vessels operating to the south of the island; after closer inspection by Kent the vessels proved to be legitimate fishermen. A series of discussions with the fishermen allowed further ‘pattern of life’ information to be gleaned by Kent’s Ship’s Company.

“To make the most of HMS Kent’s capabilities on counter-piracy operations it is vital that we work closely with all regional partners with a vested interest in keeping the sea lanes free from danger and harassment,” said Kent’s Commanding Officer, Commander Ben Ripley.

“Sharing with the Yemeni Armed Forces how CMF and CTF 151 conduct their business is a fine example of how we are working with nations engaged in providing Maritime Security in the Middle East. The knowledge that the Yemeni officers passed on to my Ship’s Company will prove invaluable in understanding the dynamics of the region and increasing the likelihood of successfully disrupting piracy activity.

 

 

Colonel Ali Saleen of the Yemen Navy and Lieutenant

Colonel Saalih Muhamed Alhumaymi of the Yemen Marines approaching HMS Kent.

 

 

“The past three days have added real value in the early stages of our mission and I thank the Yemeni Armed Forces for their friendship and assistance.”

HMS Kent is currently working in support of CTF 151, whose remit involves disrupting piracy and armed robbery at sea as part of an international effort to provide maritime security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Northern Indian Ocean.

Font: Combined Maritime Forces

 

Netanyahu’s Visit to China: Opportunities beyond Iran

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to make an official visit to China in early May 2013. This would be the first visit by an Israeli prime minister to China in over six years, and given the rarity of the meetings between the two heads of state and China’s increased influence internationally, the trip is important. Furthermore, this past March China completed a change of government, and new people are now holding top leadership positions. This will be an opportunity for Israel to meet China’s new leaders, some of whom are expected to remain in their positions for the next ten years.

No less important, China has been rethinking its Middle Eastern policy since the start of the Arab Spring. Since China opened up to the world in the late 1970s, its approach to the Middle East has been characterized by a lack of significant involvement in political and diplomatic processes in the region, exclusive focus on promoting its economic interests, and maintenance of a balanced policy toward states and other actors in the region. The Arab Spring, which damaged China’s economic interests in the region, coupled with Beijing’s declared intention in recent years to acquire a significant status in world politics, led China to presume that its existing policy toward the Middle East has exhausted itself. Instead, it must deepen its ties in the region in order to establish a firm, long term foothold while exploiting the fact that the regional array of forces is undergoing significant change. The highly influential October 2012 article by Wang Jisi, China’s leading Chinese scholar of international relations, created a stir by asserting that China needs to adopt a new strategy, “march West,” strengthening its influence and position in Central Asia and the Middle East.

This trend entails a significant challenge for Israel. If China assumes that Israel’s close relations with the United States will prevent Israel from strengthening its relationship with China, and at the same time, Beijing assesses that its dependence on Arab (and Iranian) oil will grow, the process of its increasing involvement in the Middle East is liable to bypass Israel. In the meantime, as is demonstrated by China's invitation to Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, at the same time Netanyahu will be visiting there (albeit for a slightly shorter visit), China is adhering to its balanced approach to Israel and the Palestinians and is linking bilateral relations with Israel to its regional policy. Clearly, the Sino-Israeli bilateral relationship still does not stand fully on its own.

Finding common interests with China is of great importance for Israel, and a meeting between the heads of state at this time can promote this. In spite of China’s traditional support for the Arab line and its energy ties with the Muslim states, it credits Israel with several important assets. One is that Israel holds one of the main keys to stability in the region, an issue in which China has much interest; another is that the events of the Arab Spring have demonstrated that Israel is an island of stability in the heart of a volatile region. In addition, Israel is an important source of knowledge about events in a region in which China often feels at a loss. Israel is also seen in China as a source of advanced technologies, and China has an interest in promoting its science and technology ties with Israel, and perhaps even energy ties as Israel’s natural gas industry develops. Finally, while China no longer believes, as it once did, that Israel has unlimited influence in Washington, it does feel that strengthening its relationship with Jerusalem would be a sign that it gradually is coming to possess a foothold in the region, while somewhat offsetting, and perhaps even undermining, American political influence there.

Under these circumstances, Netanyahu’s visit to China provides a significant opportunity that should not be missed. One way, in fact, to miss the opportunity would be to place too much emphasis on the Iranian issue. The importance of the Iranian threat is clear and certainly Israel must do everything it can to thwart it, including raising the issue with China’s new top leaders. However, the issue has been discussed in recent years at every significant meeting between the states, and more than once it has taken up the lion’s share of the agenda while pushing aside topics that—from China’s point of view—are no less important. Consequently, if Israel makes Iran the main focus of discussion, China’s will take this to mean that strengthening bilateral ties is not of primary importance to Israel; rather, from Israel’s perspective, China’s importance is limited to promoting Israel’s security interests.

Therefore, discussions should be balanced between subjects important to Israel (Iran), topics important to China, and to bilateral relations between the states. First and foremost, Israel should demonstrate to China that it is interested in promoting bilateral relations, and that to this end it is prepared to help, with its limited capabilities, to further China’s interests in the Middle East. Specific issues that can be raised in this context are promoting Chinese investments in Israel (an interest of both countries) and establishing formal and semi-formal high level dialogues between the two states. As for the China-Israel-United States triangle, Israel can make it clear to China that while its technological ties will remain subject to the framework of understandings between Jerusalem and Washington, it is working to promote its activities with China in a wide variety of non-sensitive areas. Finally, in light of China’s desire to play a more visible role in Middle Eastern politics, Israel can suggest that China participate in various international frameworks connected to the Middle East and discuss with it burning regional developments, such as Syria. Mahmoud Abbas' visit to Beijing at the same time as Netanyahu also invites a discussion of China’s possible contribution to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Placing these issues on the table would convey Israel's recognition of China’s rising status and its increasing importance in the region, and would make it possible to express Israel’s concerns and expectations to China in a more balanced manner.

Finally, more than any other Israeli politician, Benjamin Netanyahu is identified with the close US-Israel relationship. This likely leads China to assume that he would refrain from taking significant steps to promote relations with China so as not to arouse the displeasure of the United States, which, since its decisive action against Sino-Israeli security relations, has been perceived as an impediment to their further development. In addition, Netanyahu has not played a significant role in the development of relations in the past, and on two occasions he canceled planned visits to China. On the other hand, it was during Netanyahu’s first term as prime minister that an agreement was signed, later canceled, to provide the Phalcon early warning system to China. Netanyahu was not involved in canceling the deal, nor was he involved in another security crisis between Israel and China in 2004-2005. Thus in spite of his limited role in the development of relations, his “balance sheet” is positive. This has been especially noticeable in recent years given his moves to promote economic and diplomatic ties between the two countries. His intentions to include Chinese companies in large infrastructure projects in Israel, for example, are known, as is his instruction to ministers in his government during a time of budget cuts to reduce official trips to every country except China. Therefore, despite his commitment to ties with the United States, Netanyahu’s contribution to relations with China is largely positive, and the planned visit can help bolster this dynamic.

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Seeking Information on Benghazi Attacks



These images released by the FBI on May 1, 2013, show three unknown suspects sought in the Benghazi, Libya, attack on the US Consulate on September 1, 2012. In a statement the FBI says, "We are seeking information about three individuals who were on the grounds of the U.S. Special Mission when it was attacked. These individuals may be able to provide informationto help in the investigation."

Seeking Information on Benghazi Attacks

The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation appreciates that the Libyan people and the government of Libya have condemned the September 11, 2012 attacks on U.S. Special Mission personnel and facilities in Benghazi, Libya.

The FBI is now asking Libyans and people around the world for additional information related to the attacks, which resulted in the deaths of four Americans, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya.

We are seeking information about three individuals who were on the grounds of the U.S. Special Mission when it was attacked. These individuals may be able to provide information to help in the investigation.
We need your help to solve this crime. If you have any information, text or e-mail BenghaziTips@ic.fbi.gov or submit information confidentially at https://forms.fbi.gov/benghazi-en.

US releases pictures related to Benghazi attack.

US authorities on Wednesday released pictures of three men it said were present during the September 11, 2012 attack on the US mission in eastern Libya, saying it wanted to question them.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's website did not say whether the three men -- all of whom appear to be carrying guns in the pictures -- are suspects in the attack that killed four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens.

"The FBI is now asking Libyans and people around the world for additional information related to the attacks," the federal law enforcement agency said.

"We are seeking information about three individuals who were on the grounds of the US Special Mission when it was attacked. These individuals may be able to provide information to help in the investigation," it said.

US President Barack Obama has faced withering criticism over the attack from Republicans, who accuse the administration of failing to do enough to protect diplomatic missions and of covering up the true nature of the attack.

Senior administration officials initially described the attack as a spontaneous reaction to an anti-Islam Internet video that had sparked violent demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere.

Officials later admitted that there had been no protest outside the consulate in the eastern city of Benghazi, and US media have reported that a nearby annex -- which was also attacked -- was part of a secret CIA mission.

US President Barack Obama has referred to the assault as a "terrorist" attack and vowed to hunt down those responsible.