In March 2012, at the annual AIPAC
policy conference, US President Obama affirmed unequivocally that his policy
regarding Iran ’s nuclear advances was a policy
of prevention, not containment. Since then he has reiterated on a number of
occasions, most recently during his visit to Israel in March of this year, that the
US will not allow
Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.
Since that visit, another round of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran has
failed, and the latest IAEA report on Iran – released May 22, 2013 – indicates
that while there are no major surprises, Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium
programs are creeping slowly but surely toward a situation that will soon be
unstoppable.
Since prevention became official
US policy, voices both in
Israel and abroad have continued to
express doubts as to whether the President could be trusted on this count. This
in turn has prompted repeated assertions from Obama directly, as well as from
members of his administration, that this President does not bluff, and that he
is indeed sincere. Most likely Obama spent some time during his visit to
Israel trying to drive this message
home to Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Nevertheless, recent developments on
the ground regarding Syria could be interpreted as
unwillingness of the Obama administration to use military force, even to
confront the actual use of WMD. Obama has backed away from military force in
response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria , although
in late 2011 he stipulated explicitly that this would be a red line, with the
implicit message that military intervention would be on the table. The lack of
interest in intervening militarily in Syria might indicate a similar unwillingness to
do so in Iran .
However, this could also be read
quite differently. In other words, it is equally plausible that Obama is
choosing his next Middle East battle. If one
accepts that it is highly unlikely that the administration would employ military
force in two Middle East crises, it could be that the
resistance to using force in Syria means that there is actually a greater
chance that it could be used in Iran . This alternative interpretation
is strengthened by the fact that US resistance to intervening in
Syria might also be driven by
uncertainty as to how force might effectively be employed in this case: what
kind of force to use, against which targets, and on behalf of which opposition
element. In the case of Iran , the military options are more
easily defined, especially if there is a targeted use of force against nuclear
facilities. Intervening in Syria , even if chemical weapons use
was the trigger, would mean intervening in a raging civil war, a difficult
gamble. In Iran , military force could be used in
a more precise and targeted manner.
But beyond the issue of trust and
the interpretation of developments on the ground in Syria , there is still confusion about
US policy on
Iran that goes to Obama’s ability to
uphold the policy, even if he is firmly committed to it. In an effort to
substantiate the commitment to prevention and the rejection of containment, the
White House has stated that its intelligence services, augmented by information
supplied by the IAEA inspectors, will supply timely information for action in
case Iran breaks out and embarks on the
production path to nuclear weapons.[1]
But there are some nagging questions regarding prevention policy as it currently
stands. First, it is blatantly apparent that the “diplomatic“ route for solving
the Iran conundrum has failed, even though the US administration has yet to
admit this. In considering the next stage, can the United States indeed depend
on the fact that it will obtain reliable information that an Iranian decision to
develop nuclear weapons has been taken? If it does, will it be at a stage when
there is still a realistic option of employing military force in a manner that
will reverse the current trajectory toward a military nuclear capability? And
most importantly, will the US
ultimately be willing to employ force in dealing with Iran ?
These questions are coming into
sharper relief of late against the backdrop of claims by different experts.
While some continue to maintain that any diversion of nuclear material to a
military program will surely be detected by the IAEA, other analysts continue to
explore the containment option based on certain doubts they harbor over whether
the Iranian decision will necessarily be noted and/or that there will be enough
time to then stop Iran .[2]
Both positions cannot be correct, and the grounds for doubting the ability of
the US to stop
Iran based on timely information are
strong.
History is replete with instances of
intelligence failures. In this case, depending on IAEA inspectors for the supply
of timely information can prove disastrous – not because of the quality of
inspections, rather due to the restrictive conditions under which they are
conducted. Current inspections in Iran are not carried out according to
the more pervasive Additional Protocol, but rather under the (misnamed)
“full-scope” or “comprehensive” safeguards procedures, which are actually
neither full-scope nor comprehensive. Moreover, Iran could
decide to curtail the inspections further, or in the worst case scenario, expel
the inspectors, rendering the situation untenable. Would this cause the
US to consider military action to
remedy the situation? Without additional cause for concern, this is doubtful. At
most, the UN Security Council would sound another warning, which would merely
provide Iran with additional time to breakout
without being detected.
The even more disturbing scenario
that is openly discussed of late is that Iran has
parallel, clandestine enrichment and development of nuclear weapons programs.
Because of the limitations imposed on the IAEA inspectors and the inherent
limitations of intelligence gathering, this scenario cannot be
discounted.
The authors of the Kahl et al report
on containment argue that “the Obama administration is rightly committed to
preventing – not containing – a nuclear-armed Iran ,
but…prevention efforts, up to and including the use of force, could fail.” It is
on this basis that they contend that the United States
could eventually be forced to shift to a policy of containment despite current
preferences.[3]
Colin Kahl, the report’s lead author, is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for the Middle East , and therefore
might reflect the thinking of the administration on this
subject.
If
the implications of these doubts are not addressed head-on and the
US policy of prevention
adjusted accordingly – and very soon, containment of a nuclear
Iran might very likely become
the default policy of the United States , even though Obama
currently (and adamantly) rejects it.
[1] In addition, Director
of National Intelligence James Clapper said in his March 12, 2013 testimony that
Iran “could not divert safeguarded
material and produce a weapon-worth of weapons-grade uranium before this
activity is discovered.” See “Iran Can’t Build Nuke without Tripping Alarm
Bells, US Says, Times of Israel , March 12,
2013.
[2] See Colin H. Kahl, Raj Pattani and Jacob Stokes,
If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran,
Center for a New American Security, May 2013, http://www.cnas.org/ifallelsefails.
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