Among the
many issues raised at the sixth annual INSS conference on the preparedness of
the home front on July 25, 2013 was the lack of a clear, normative definition of
authority and responsibility for management of the Israeli home front. The full
severity of this lapse arose seven years ago, following the exposure of failures
on the civilian front during the Second Lebanon War, and it has since been
discussed repeatedly in various forums and committees. It has generated the
design of several systemic models and was the basis for the drafts of the Home
Front Law, which though drafted years ago is still on legislative hold. This
lapse was also the focus of a series of critical reports by the state
comptroller (most recently in July 2013), and it is scheduled to be addressed
and resolved by the Prime Minister in the near future.
The
organizational framework of the military front is based on normative clarity
regarding the questions of hierarchy, authority, and responsibility, which
enables coordinated operation of the systems in the face of serious challenges.
In contrast, the home front, which is much more complex and faces complicated
challenges, has no actual arrangement. All the relevant answers to questions of
responsibility and authority on the civilian front are a patchwork, creating
ambiguity (intentional, according to some cynics) and constant confusion and
tension, well beyond what is expected between bureaucratic systems. This makes
emergency preparedness management, as well as the crisis management itself, very
difficult. However, a proper arrangement – normative and organizational – would
enhance preparedness vis-à-vis the growing threats to the civilian
front.
Where then is
the crux of the problem, and why has it not been solved?
The root of
the problem is that by definition, the challenge to the home front is directed
mainly against civilians and civilian systems, and thus it (primarily) requires
inherently civilian responses. On the other hand, in Israel
Coping with
the increasingly complicated threats to the civilian front requires an
integrated and coordinated response by numerous bodies, most of them civilian:
the government ministries, the municipalities, the industrial-business sector,
the not for profit sector, and the civilians themselves, including those with
special needs. Behind this issue stands a fundamental, important question: to
what extent should the IDF and the defense establishment set priorities, plan
responses, and guide the civilian institutions, which have distinctive civilian
needs, on how to prepare for and act during an emergency? This question has only
become more complicated in recent years, especially since the establishment in
2007 of the National Emergency Authority, and later, the Home Front Ministry in
2011, both of which were formed from the outset as part of the Ministry of
Defense.
There are
three main approaches to the regulation of this issue:
a.
The approach
of the defense establishment, which is primarily interested in maintaining the
current situation, with the Defense Minister positioned to be the primary
authority at the top of the pyramid engaged with the civilian front, and the
Home Front Command as the leading agency in whatever is associated with
preparing for and managing emergencies. This approach contends that this setup
has proven itself to be adequate so far, and that it allows reasonable
cooperation with the various organs while relying on the undisputed robustness
of the defense establishment, especially as the threat is essentially a security
one.
b.
The approach
of the National Security Council (NSC), which was asked to prepare the material
and recommendations for the government's deliberation, holds that the normative
and systemic formation should be fundamentally changed, with the Ministry of
Internal Security positioned at the top. This proposal, which originated in past
recommendations of the NSC, argues that the defense establishment should be
released from the onerous burden of the home front and allowed to focus on
managing offensive and defensive campaigns on the military front. Their proposal
is also based on existing laws and governmental decisions, which grant the
Israel Police (conditional) authority and responsibility during serious
disturbances and mass disasters, and also on the transfer of responsibility to
the firefighting and rescue service to the Internal Security Ministry
(2011/12).
c.
The Home
Front Ministry argues that the issue of authority and responsibility for the
civilian front is the core of its existence, and that only a government office
whose exclusive mission is to protect the home front can and should hold all the
regulatory powers and needs to be the one to set national policy and priorities
in whatever is related to the civilian front. According to this approach, the
Home Front Ministry does not need to serve as the “commander” of the different
first responders, but should determine how they will operate in the process of
preparing for an emergency, according to the reference scenario it draws. As
such, the Home Front Ministry must also coordinate between the relevant organs
and make sure the necessary cooperation among them prevails.
The heated
debate between the various approaches is now underway, and it is doubtful that
it will end anytime soon, even if a clear decision is taken in the near future.
The debate, however, should seriously take into consideration the following main
points:
a.
A clear
decision should be taken as soon as possible, one that will allow the proper
setup that also commands the legislative normative
backing.
b.
In any case,
the challenging issue of integration, coordination, and cooperation between the
first responders will remain critical. In any future structure, this should be a
leading priority, and be perceived as a major benchmark for the efficacy of the
restructured system. .
c.
Subsequent
consideration should be given to a comprehensive, second-order organizational
change that would lead to the establishment of a combined staff for the first
responders, based on the model of a gendarmerie in several Western countries
that is responsible for enforcing civil public order in general, and the
systemic response to mass disasters in particular.
d.
It is
imperative that any arrangement take into account the implications of the
capacity of the local authorities to fulfill their roles adequately as the
keystone of the local response to large scale emergencies. There are several
powerful municipalities that have already established worthy models of municipal
frameworks for responding to emergencies. Many others, weaker socio-economically
and in terms of their political leadership, could learn from these models while
accepting support from the government, so that they will also be able to
organize themselves properly for future emergencies.
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