EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: The army’s new multi-year plan shows that the IDF is reorganizing its
priorities for the coming decade. Military priorities include the attainment of
intelligence superiority, development of knockout fire delivery capability,
active defense systems, cyber warfare, and border protection systems, while the
ground forces are to be downgraded in importance and priority.
The recent announcement regarding future cuts in the
defense budget, as well as the launching of the new multi-year plan for the IDF
(“Te’uza”), prompt the question: where is the Israeli military heading?
The IDF formulated several principles of warfare in
recent years: keeping the campaign as short as possible, allowing minimum
damage to the home front (assuming that the home front will have a hard time
facing a prolonged missile attack), and achieving a clear and definite image of
victory. The Israeli military is not interested in another confrontation whose
outcome is less than unequivocal, like the 2006 Lebanon war.
In order to uphold these principles, several
objectives must be met. At the top of the list stands the attainment of
intelligence superiority, followed by the development of a knockout fire
delivery capability, mainly from the air. A high priority is also assigned to
active defense systems, cyber warfare, and protecting borders (specifically
those with Syria and Egypt).
These objectives were formulated at a workshop
attended by the most senior officers of the IDF in the summer of 2013, in which
participants were divided into work teams. One team, led by the head of the IDF
Operations Directorate, Maj. Gen. Yoav Har-Even, addressed the operational concept.
A second team,
led by the head of the IDF Planning Directorate, Maj.
Gen. Nimrod Shefer, addressed the reorganization of the various IDF branches. A
third team, led by the head of the IDF C4I Directorate (responsible for
telecommunications), Maj. Gen. Uzi Moscovitch, addressed the advancement of
ideas for improving firepower and command and control (C2) through the computer
network. The fourth team, led by head of the IDF Manpower Directorate, Maj.
Gen. Orna Barbivai, addressed the feasibility of revising the model of the
standing army in view of the expected cuts in army personnel.
According to the army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Benny
Gantz, Israel is a world power in three major fields: unmanned vehicles (mainly
in the air), precision fire, and C2. The main question going forward is whether
to place the emphasis on fields regarded as relative weaknesses of the IDF –
such as the maneuvering capabilities of the ground forces – or to further
strengthen the fields in which the army excels anyway. Gantz ruled for the
latter option.
Continued Spending for R&D and Platform
Procurement
Many of the ideas currently on the agenda were in fact
included in a previous multi-year plan (“Kela”), led primarily by Gantz,
Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, and then Chief of Staff Moshe
Ya’alon, who is currently Defense Minister.
As part of the battle over the defense budget, the
army recently created the impression that the cuts annulled much of the
procurement and R&D projects designed to significantly strengthen the IDF.
This is not exactly the case. The Israeli defense industries and the army
itself currently have more than 100 different development projects in the
pipeline, most of which are secret.
At the same time, the procurement budgets of the IDF
for submarines and fighter planes remain untouched. By the end of the decade
the IDF will have six Dolphin-class submarines, with the cost of each submarine
touching the billion dollar mark. The army will also receive two squadrons (of
24 aircraft each) of the F-35 future fighter, a deal to be covered by US aid.
One squadron has already been ordered, and the actual aircraft delivery will
begin in late 2016. The second squadron will be requisitioned in the following
years.
Investment in UAVs, Satellites, and Missiles
Over the last decade the Israeli military has invested
a fortune in the procurement of unmanned airborne vehicles (UAVs). This trend
will continue; in the coming years, new tactical UAVs, as well as larger
Hermes- 900 UAVs, will be delivered to the IDF. IAI will supply additional
super-
UAVs, like the Boeing 737-sized “Eitan” (Heron TP)
UAV, as well as an abundance of miniature drones.
By the year 2025, the army’s UAVs will probably be
executing all missions, from intelligence gathering – capable of detecting any
minor suspect movement on land or at sea – to strike missions. Even today, the
operational range of the UAVs employed by the IDF easily covers long-range
destinations, such as Iran. It is for this purpose that satellite-based C2 systems
were developed for the IDF. These systems render irrelevant the limitation
regarding the radio communication required to operate these vehicles at extreme
ranges.
In the coming decades, the IDF will continue to invest
in satellites as well, though at a somewhat slower pace than the Ministry of
Defense would have preferred. Some satellite projects are in real danger in
view of the expected cuts (such as the development of “mini satellites”). The
major projects in this field will not be interrupted, and the IDF will continue
to employ satellites as a primary tool for intelligence gathering and
communication.
Moreover, in the foreseeable future, outer space is
expected to evolve into an actual battlefield. Various countries are preparing
to intercept one another’s satellites using long-range missiles. One of the
options discussed in this context involved the employment of fighter aircraft
during wartime to launch miniature satellites that will promptly begin to orbit
the earth, so that the enemy would not have sufficient time to study their
orbits and intercept them.
Only minimal details have been released regarding a
recent secret test of a rocket propulsion system for long-range missiles.
According to foreign publications, this test was a part of a major project
associated with the development of an advanced surface-to-surface missile, the
Jericho-4, which has a range of thousands of kilometers.
Within the shorter ranges, the IDF is regarded as the
world’s most advanced military organization in the field of precision fire
delivery using missiles launched from the air, ground, sea, and submarines. The
world media has even claimed that precision-guided missiles of these types were
responsible for the attacks staged in recent months against strategic weapon stores
in Syria. In order to hit a target that emerges and becomes visible for only a
number of seconds, a state-of-the-art intelligence gathering network is
required, along with a permanent link between the intelligence gathering
resources and the various types of fire delivery elements.
In order to meet this challenge, new fields of
activity have been launched by the IDF, with such impressive definitions as NCW
(Network Concentric Warfare) and IBW (Intelligence-Based Warfare). Through the
contribution of NCW and IBW systems, the army’s fire delivery capacity has
increased several times, in comparison to the 2006 Lebanon war. By 2025, the
fire delivery capability of the IDF is expected to be more similar to a
computer game than to the battlefields of old.
According to the decisions of the IDF General Staff,
only projects led by the General Staff – and not those led by the military
branches – will be authorized henceforth. The prerequisite to be met by each
project is that it must make a contribution to the entire operational
capability of the IDF, rather to the capability of a specific branch (such as
the air force, navy, or the ground forces). As a rule, the Intelligence Branch
and IAF will enjoy total precedence within the IDF until the middle of the next
decade, with the Intelligence Branch enjoying a higher priority than the IAF.
While all the other arms and service branches, including the IAF, will be
closing down units, the intelligence budget will not be reduced. Up until now,
the IDF assigned top-quality personnel to the pilot training course of the IAF.
Now, however, the cyber warfare teams get top priority.
Until the year 2025, substantial investments will be
made in anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense systems (including the new
systems Arrow-III and David’s Sling, which cannot be “frozen,” as these are
joint Israeli-American projects). Substantial funds will also be invested in
radar systems designed to spot sources of enemy fire and in active protection
systems for vehicles, capable of identifying incoming missiles and destroy them
in mid-air. In the coming years, IAI will complete a major project, Barak-8,
involving a state-of-the-art naval missile defense system.
Reduction in the Ground Forces
The ground forces of the IDF will take the most substantial
cut. Between 2002 and 2006, the ground forces budget was cut by no less than 25
percent. This trend was suspended pursuant to the 2006 war, but will be resumed
soon. The development of fast, continuous maneuvering capabilities is an issue
that is disputed within the military and political echelon.
IDF authorities do not believe that the ground forces
will become obsolete because of drastic reductions in training activities, but
its order of battle will be reduced. The demobilized armored formations will be
replaced by less-expensive formations, equipped with light, agile vehicles,
wheels instead of
tracks, and by regional formations that would be
assigned to cope with the ever-increasing number of terror incidents along the
borders.
The IDF is expected to announce a substantial
reduction in the manufacture of the newest Merkava tanks – whose rate of
production has been slow anyway – and the complete halting of the production of
Namer APCs (armored personnel carriers). This decision will require a $15
million compensation to the General Dynamics Corporation, which had developed a
production line for this APC in the US – in view of the Israeli commitment to
requisition a guaranteed minimum amount, a commitment the army will not uphold.
Conclusion
The army’s plans look excellent. The main problem is that
certain scenarios – such as the collapse of the Hashemite regime in Jordan, the
demise of the peace agreement with Egypt, a third Intifada, or a nuclear threat
from Iran – can no longer be regarded as unreasonably fanciful. Such
developments, or other unforeseeable ones, could render all of these plans
irrelevant.
Amir Rapaport is a research associate at the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He is also editor of Israel Defense
magazine, defense analyst for Maariv, and a former military correspondent for
Yediot Ahronot.
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