Guns and Butter in Billion-dollar Arms Deal

«Chi ha orecchie per intendere intenda.»
«He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.»


http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/billion-dollar-arms-deal-in-army-gun-manufacturers/1/221665.html

Russia Foresees Maintaining Land-Based ICBMs Over Long-Term

The Russian military predicts a long future for the land-based component of its strategic nuclear triad, RIA Novosti (1) reported on Thursday.

Russian nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles can presently be fired from movable platforms or from stationary silos. The mobile launchers are envisioned for use in a second retaliatory strike while the silo-based missiles are held to prevent possible attacks.

"This [strategic missile forces] structure will most likely remain unchanged for years or even decades to come," SMF Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Valery Mazurov told the Rossiya 24 channel. "The composition of ICBM systems (2) (in SMF structure) is based on a thorough analysis of potential military conflicts of varied intensity that involve the use of nuclear weapons."

The strategic missile forces are understood to presently have a minimum of 160 movable Topol ICBMs, 18 road-transportable Topol-M missiles, 50 Topol-M missiles in silos, 58 SS-18 high-altitude missiles in silos, and 18 RS-24 Yars ballistic missiles.

In 2011, the strategic missile forces announced the RS-24 and the Topol-M would form the backbone of the land-based leg of the nation's nuclear deterrent and would form a minimum of four-fifths of the SMF stockpile no later than 2016.

The strategic missile forces are wrapping up protective updates to nine key missile sites that are intended to thwart possible extremist assaults, RIA Novosti (3) reported.

"The modernization includes the upgrade of warning and surveillance systems, detection sensors, integrated fire control systems and power supply grids," SMF spokesman Col. Vadim Koval said.

"The overhaul is being carried out at the highest levels of secrecy in regard to the specifications of the installed equipment and its operating algorithms," he said.

The organization is also updating its training and operation regulations for guards protecting stationary and movable missiles.



(1)Russia to Keep Silo and Mobile ICBM Launchers in Future.

Topol-M systems

MOSCOW, November 1 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) will continue deploying silo-based and mobile ballistic missile launchers in the future, SMF Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Valery Mazurov said on Thursday.

The two-component structure of the SMF reflects its purpose as part of Russia’s nuclear triad. Silo-based ICBMs serve as a preventive nuclear deterrent of any potential aggression while road-mobile ICBM launchers ensure the capability to respond to nuclear strikes by potential foes.

“This SMF structure will most likely remain unchanged for years or even decades to come,” Mazurov said in an interview with Rossiya 24 television.

“The composition of ICBM systems [in SMF structure] is based on a thorough analysis of potential military conflicts of varied intensity that involve the use of nuclear weapons,” the general said.

 



According to open sources, the SMF currently operates at least 58 silo-based SS-18 Satan ballistic missiles, 160 road-mobile Topol (SS-25 Sickle) missile systems, 50 silo-based and 18 road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) systems, and 18 RS-24 Yars systems.

The SMF said last year that the Topol-M and RS-24 ballistic missiles would be the mainstay of the ground-based component of Russia's nuclear triad and would account for no less than 80 percent of the SMF's arsenal by 2016.




 



(2) Moscow Finishes Arming Sector of Missile Force



A Russian RS-24 ICBM lifts off in a 2007 test launch.
A missile formation in central Russia is now fully
armed with Topol-M missiles and RS-24 launch systems,
Moscow said on Thursday (AP Photo).

Russia on Thursday said it had finished equipping its Teikovo missile formation, based in the nation's central region, with Topol-M and Yars strategic missile units, RIA Novosti (A) reported.

“The Teikovo division has become the first [strategic missile forces] division fully rearmed with fifth-generation mobile missile systems,” Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Vadim Koval stated.

Moscow furnished Topol-M equipment to a pair of Teikovo formation regiments and Yars gear to the remaining two regiments. The Yars system is built to fire RS-24 ICBMs.

Meanwhile, Moscow on Friday indicated it cannot finalize the timing of a planned Bulava ballistic missile test launch due to difficulties involving computer code for managing the weapon's flight, ITAR-Tass reported.

Efforts are under way to address the faults, and officials hope to conduct the exercise before 2013 from the Borei-class submarine Alexander Nevsky, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said.

A Russian defense industry insider previously said a new Bulava missile trial firing was slated to occur (B) from the vessel in November.






(3)Russia Boosts Security at Missile Launch Sites

Russia Boosts Security at Missile Launch Sites

The Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) are finalizing the modernization of automated security systems at nine of its major missile bases to counter the growing threat of potential terrorist attacks, an SMF spokesman said on Wednesday.

“The modernization includes the upgrade of warning and surveillance systems, detection sensors, integrated fire control systems and power supply grids,” Col. Vadim Koval said.

The spokesman said that automated security at SMF bases is provided by six different systems, developed and produced by Russian defense industry firms.

“The overhaul is being carried out at the highest levels of secrecy in regard to the specifications of the installed equipment and its operating algorithms,” Koval said.

In addition to the modernization of the existing automated systems, the SMF is tightening rules of engagement and training requirements for security personnel at the bases and around mobile missile launch sites.

According to open sources, the SMF currently operates at least 58 silo-based SS-18 Satan ballistic missiles, 160 road-mobile Topol (SS-25 Sickle) missile systems, 50 silo-based and 18 road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) systems, and 18 RS-24 Yars systems.




(A) Teikovo Division Gets Full Arsenal of New Missile Systems

Topol-M ballistic missile system

Topol-M ballistic missile system

The Teikovo missile division of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF), based in central Russia, has been fully equipped with advanced Topol-M and Yars ballistic missile systems, the defense ministry said on Thursday.

“The Teikovo division has become the first SMF division fully rearmed with fifth-generation mobile missile systems,” the ministry spokesman Col. Vadim Koval said.

Two regiments of the Teikovo division are equipped with Topol-M systems while the other two regiments of the division are equipped with Yars systems.

The Yars missile system is armed with the multiple-warhead RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile that has considerably better combat and operational capabilities than the Topol-M (SS-27 Stalin).
Two more missile divisions have started receiving the Yars systems in 2012, Koval said.

The Novosibirsk division (in Siberia) will receive mobile Yars systems, while the Kozelsk division (in central Russia) will be armed with the silo-based version of the system.

The SMF said last year that the Topol-M and RS-24 ballistic missiles would be the mainstay of the ground-based component of Russia's nuclear triad and would account for no less than 80% of the SMF's arsenal by 2016.


(B) Borei-Class Sub to Join Russian Active Force

The Russian Defense Ministry is set in September to assume control of the Borei-class ballistic missile submarine Yuri Dolgoruky, RIA Novosti quoted a United Shipbuilding insider as saying on Friday (see GSN, Aug. 15).

The vessel was previously slated to join the nation's active force in July and later in August, according to prior Russian navy statements.

The United Shipbuilding source added that a new Bulava ballistic missile trial firing is slated to occur in November from the Borei-class submarine Alexander Nevsky during the ship's testing.

Russia is expected to construct eight Borei-class submarines as successors to its older Project 667 boats, according to RIA Novosti. The new vessels, once equipped with the Bulava ballistic missile, are slated to constitute the backbone of Russia's submarine-based strategic ballistic missile deterrent.

Russia's military could take custody in 2012 of the Yasen-class atomic submarine Severodvinsk, the head of Russia's navy said separately. The vessel's atomic energy system faced technical issues that threatened to prevent the step until 2013, according to previous reporting.

Vice Adm. Viktor Chirkov stated: “Yasen is undergoing tests in accordance with the program. We hope it will raise the flag this year”.

No Russian atomic submarine has evaded detection in the Gulf of Mexico for a period of weeks, the U.S. Defense Department said on Thursday in response to a recent press report.

“I don't know what that information was based on, but it was not correct,” spokeswoman Wendy Snyder said in an RIA Novosti report.

A Russian Defense Ministry official declined to address the report



Font: NTI

Most U.S. Drones Openly Broadcast Secret Video Feeds

A MQ-9 Reaper drone on the runway in Ft. Drum, New York. Photo: USAF

Four years after discovering that militants were tapping into drone video feeds, the U.S. military still hasn’t secured the transmissions of more than half of its fleet of Predator and Reaper drones, Danger Room has learned. The majority of the aircraft still broadcast their classified video streams “in the clear” — without encryption. With a minimal amount of equipment and know-how, militants can see what America’s drones see.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, have become the single most important weapon in America’s far-flung pursuit of violent extremists. Hundreds of American Predators and Reapers fly above Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan — watching suspected enemies, and striking them when necessary. Nearly 3,000 people have been killed in the decade-long drone campaign.

“If somebody could obtain reliable access to real-time Predator or Reaper video — without attribution or alerting U.S. military — that would a tremendous intel coup,” says Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “There is an insatiable demand from Predator and Reaper imagery in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Any reluctance to use those for spying or missile strikes places operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia at some risk.”

Military officials have known about — and mostly shrugged off — the vulnerability since the development of the Predator in the 1990s. But the problem drew increased attention in 2008, when drone video footage was found on the laptops of Shi’ite militants in Iraq, who were able to intercept the feed using a piece of $26 software. The Pentagon and the defense industry assured the public that they’d close the hole by retrofitting the robotic aircraft with new communications protocols and encrypted transceivers that would keep the video from being intercepted again.

Four years into the effort, however, only “30 to 50 percent” of America’s Predators and Reapers are using fully encrypted transmissions, a source familiar with the retrofitting effort tells Danger Room. The total fleet won’t see its communications secured until 2014. This source and others who work closely with drone operations say that drones flying overseas are among the first to get the newly secured equipment. They also noted that they are unaware of any incidents of militants using America’s unmanned eyes in the sky to their advantage. “But I’m surprised I haven’t,” the source adds. “And that doesn’t mean it’s not happening.”




An instructor trains a pilot and sensor operator in the ground-based “cockpit” for a MQ-9 Reaper drone. Photo: USAF

This isn’t the only vulnerability in the drone fleet. In March of 2011, an unknown software glitch caused a Predator stationed at a U.S. base in Africa to start its engine without human direction. Last October, as Danger Room first reported, Air Force technicians discovered a virus infecting the drones’ remote cockpits in Las Vegas. It took weeks of sustained effort to clean up the machines. The aircraft, which rely on GPS to guide them through the air, can run into problems if GPS signals are jammed in a particular area — something that can be done with cheap, commercially available hardware. Iranian officials claimed they hacked the GPS control signal of an advanced drone, though it’s impossible to verify that lofty claim.

No one who works with UAVs is questioning the fundamental integrity of the drone fleet at the moment; it would take an incredibly sophisticated hacker to commandeer a Predator, for example. Nor is anyone pretending that this premiere tool of the U.S.global counterterror campaign is flawless.

Predators and the larger, better-armed Reapers transmit video and accept instructions in one of two ways. The first is via satellite, to remote pilots and sensor operators who are often on the other side of the planet; these satellite communications are encrypted, and are generally considered secure.

The second is through a radio frequency signal called the Common Data Link, which is used to share the drone’s video feed with troops on the ground. The CDL’s carrier signal — its specific pattern of frequencies, in a given order and for a given length of time — tells both transmitter and receiver on how to function. The problem is that the Predators’ version of the CDL carrier signal (also known as a “waveform”) didn’t include an order to encrypt the signal. So neither the transmitter on the drone nor the receivers that troops used on the ground employed encryption, either.

There were reasons for this. The original Predator, just 27 feet long, was little more than a scaled-up model plane with an 85-horsepower engine. It had a payload of just half a ton for all its fuel, cameras and radios. And encryption systems can be heavy. (Big crypto boxes are a major reason the Army’s futuristic universal radio ended up being too bulky for combat, for example.) With the early Predator models, the Air Force made the conscious decision to leave off the crypto.

The flying branch was well aware of the risk. “Depending on the theater of operation and hostile electronic combat systems present, the threat to the UAVs could range from negligible with only a potential of signal intercept for detection purpose, to an active jamming effort made against an operating, unencrypted UAV,” the Air Force reported in 1996. ”The link characteristics of the baseline Predator system could be vulnerable to corruption of down links data or hostile data insertions.”

The Predator models steadily grew in power and payload, and took a big leap in dimensions and capability with the 36-foot-long Reaper version introduced in 2007. The Reaper has a 950-horsepower engine and a nearly 4,000-pound payload — more than enough capacity for crypto-enabled systems which, like all electronics, had shrunk in size and weight.

The problem was that, by then, the military had rushed to the battlefield hundreds of Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receivers, or Rovers – rugged, laptop-sized receivers with screens for watching drone footage. And those early version of the Rovers were developed and distributed so fast, the military once again left the crypto off. “It could be both intercepted (e.g., hacked into) and jammed,” e-mails an Air Force officer with knowledge of the program.

Which mean the Pentagon was stuck, for a time. The military couldn’t replace the old CDL waveform with something encryptable until the Rovers — and the radio transmitters aboard the Predators — could handle such a signal.

Eventually, the Rovers began to be swapped out for newer models. The latest version, the “Tactical Rover,” (.pdf) is about the size of an old-school mobile phone. It can use both the Advanced Encryption Standard an the triple-Data Encryption Standard to secure video feeds. There are now about a thousand of the units in the military’s hands.

And now, the Predators and Reapers are starting to get enhanced radios, too. “The fleet-wide upgrade begins later this year and carries on for several years,” says Maj. Mary Danner-Jones, an Air Force spokesperson. The service is spending $12 million on crypto-enabled Vortex transceivers (.pdf).

That’s allowing a new, hardened waveform to be introduced throughout the Predator and Reaper fleet. The Air Force recently gave Predator-maker General Atomics Aeronautical Systems a $26 million contract to retrofit its drone cockpits to accept the carrier signal, among other enhancements.

The question is why hasn’t this happened sooner. After all, the Navy installed multiple layers of encryption in their ’bots some time ago. Navy spokesman Jamie Cosgrove tells Danger Room that “the vast majority” of naval drones are encrypted – “and have been since development.”

One source who works on developing Navy UAVs, but is not authorized the speak on the record, explains why: ”Standard unencrypted video is basically a broadcast to whoever can figure out the right carrier frequency, so essentially, we are simulcasting to battlefield commanders and the opposing force. If that opposing force knows we can see them and from where, they can take better evasive maneuvers.”

It’s possible that none of the militants America is trying today are as sophisticated as the ones who intercepted that drone video in 2008. It’s possible that the value of such footage-from-above is so fleeting that extremists have never again bothered to grab it. But it’s worth noting that Predator and Reaper video is considered by the U.S. military to be classified information. And when U.S. commanders on the ground get into a firefight, the first call they usually make is for a drone, so they can take a look at the battlefield through the eyes of a drone.


Font: By Noah Shachtman and David Axe

The Empire Strikes Back?

The upheavals in the Arab world have created a situation that abounds with challenges for Russia, which has found itself sidelined in the Middle East by the Sunni coalition, working – in Russia’s eyes – in concert with the West.

From Russia’s point of view, the Middle East has now become a battleground for regional and global powers in their struggle over the future order. This confrontation has grown particularly acute because of the civil war in Syria between the Western-oriented Sunni camp and the Shiite camp, backed by Russia and China. Indeed, in this renewed conflict between global powers, Russia went from being a secondary player that cooperated with the West in the revolutions in North Africa to a dominant actor.

In the Syrian conflict, where it is waging a stubborn battle to defend its regional status, Russia has had some success thanks to a tactic that includes assistance to Syria. At work is an effort to isolate the battlefield (through extensive use of Russia's veto power in the UN and pressure to undermine any intentions of military intervention in Syria) and military and economic assistance to the Syrian regime, which consequently is managing to retain its relative advantage on the ground. While Russia has so far played the Syrian chapter well, it is also acting to ensure its future status in Syria, with attempts at dialogue with the Syrian opposition and preparation for the dissolution of the state. In this context, the Russians are reaching out to the various ethnic, religious, and other factions and groups in Syria and abroad.

Recently the confrontation has broadened, with Turkey increasing its intervention in the crisis, both vis-à-vis Syria and by directly challenging Russia. Turkish-Russian tensions, which surfaces in contexts other than the Middle East (such as in the Caucasus), is liable to escalate into a direct confrontation. At present, the friction between them also entails competition for influence vis-à-vis the Kurds throughout the region.

Russian-Western tensions are not limited to the Middle East. Russia feels Western pressure in regions important to it along its borders in the states of the former Soviet Union. Turkey seeks to expand the influence of NATO and sideline Russia in the Caucasus, adding fuel to the fire of Russian-Western tensions. Apparently Russia is motivated to cling to its stubborn stance in Syria at least in part by its desire to distance the United States from Russian areas of interest along its borders and confine it to the Middle East.

Recent changes in Russia’s conduct in the Middle East are evident. Moscow is becoming more assertive, moving beyond the Syrian conflict and the radical axis, and spreading to other areas. This is the conclusion from a review of several areas:

- Iran: Russian-Iranian cooperation continues against the background of the developments in Syria. This was reflected recently in renewed expressions of Russian support for Iran, countering the West's campaign against Iran’s nuclear program.

- Iraq: Along with Russian efforts to regain a serious presence in the country, Prime Minister al-Maliki recently visited Russia. During his visit various agreements were signed, including a $4.2 billion arms deals and oil production contracts. Iraq, in tense relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors on the one side and Turkey on the other, is thus repositioning itself in the region in clear defiance of the United States.

- Egypt is Russia's next objective. Recently Russia has spared no effort to interest the current Egyptian regime in restoring cooperation, damaged during the "Arab Spring," to its former state. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is scheduled to visit Cairo soon, and Egypt will likely respond favorably to Russia’s overtures.

- Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states: These nations, which since the "Arab Spring" have been battling the Shiite axis and trying to keep Russia out of the region, have ironically enough found themselves courted by Russia as it attempts to interest them in cooperation with tempting offers of military equipment. Foreign Minister Lavrov is expected to visit Saudi Arabia and other states on his way from Egypt, and some suggest that he will bring with him proposals to defend the Gulf states against the radical elements.

- Jordan too is within Russia’s sphere of interest, also apparently as a way to promote Russian influence over Jordan's domestic affairs. The full picture is not yet clear, but one may discern Russian designs in this direction.

- The Palestinians: Russia was and remains supremely interested in reviving the political process in the Israeli-Palestinian channel as a convenient platform for Russia to return to international affairs in the region and divert attention away from other centers of tension in which it is involved. Its support of Hamas has never diminished, even as it has continued to maintain a dialogue with the Palestinian Authority, hoping to create an opportunity to appear as a mediator between the two.

- Israel: There was a recent important breakthrough in bilateral relations, concerning joint ventures with strategic significance for Russia. This cooperation helps Russia extricate itself from its regional isolation and the negative ramifications of the "Arab Spring."

- Africa too, is in Russia’s new sphere of interest. The Russian President’s special envoy to the region, Mikhail Margelov, recently visited several states in eastern and central Africa in an effort to promote ideas for joint political and economic ventures.

An examination of the gamut of Russian activities in the Middle East raises the question of their common denominator. These activities are likely part of a clearly designed program, which on the face of it seems to be a diplomatic counter-offensive intended to extricate Russia from its isolation in the Middle East and restore its former status and recover former assets harmed by the "Arab Spring" and the regional Sunni-Western alliance. If so, we are looking at a Russian framework for overcoming its marginal status by promoting direct arrangements with regional states, wooing them with tempting offers, and waiting to reap at least some success, and perhaps even reestablish a bloc of supportive nations.

At the same time, it is also possible that we are looking at a much more complex and daring program, whose objective is to jumpstart a more far-reaching process. Perhaps at work is the start of a Russian program intended as a coordinated and concerted effort to establish a new regional order. In that case, the Russian framework includes moves that cover the entire region and are intended to change the current geopolitical reality in Syria, Iraq, and the Kurdish regions and beyond. There is significant, cumulative evidence supporting this possibility.

As usual in such situations, it is too early to assess fully what may ensue from a Russian program of this sort. In any case, it is evident that Russia is engaged in a comprehensive counter-offensive, conducted in all likelihood according to a clearly defined framework, which could have the power to affect the future shape of the region. Should this occur, even only in part, there is much food for thought for Israel regarding the implications of the new international reality taking shape around it, as well as more than a few issues that must be worked out with Russia.


Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ



 

The Real 'El Chapo'.

A widely propagated myth would have us believe that Mexican drug lord Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera and his Sinaloa Federation are less violent than many of their competitors. Statements from journalists and analysts allege that Sinaloa is more businesslike than Los Zetas, whose reputation for brutality is well-documented, and that this business savvy somehow renders the group relatively benign. In turn, this has led many to believe that the Mexican government could broker a deal with the leader of one of Mexico's largest criminal organizations.

However, a close examination of Sinaloa's evolution demonstrates the group is hardly the hallmark of civility. In fact, the history of Mexico's cartel wars over the past decade reveals that Guzman, his Sinaloa Federation and the various cartels with which they partner have been more territorially aggressive than any other Mexican cartel.

Expansion and Escalation

Sinaloa incursions upset the balance of power that Miguel Angel "El Padrino" Felix Gallardo established in the late 1980s when he appropriated criminal territories to Guzman and his other lieutenants. Tens of thousands of people have died from the wars that arose from this imbalance.

This is because Guzman's expansion efforts necessarily entailed encroaching on a rival's turf. In the early 1990s, he sent forces from Sinaloa state into Tijuana, Baja California state -- controlled at the time by the Arellano Felix brothers -- to buy stash houses and construct a tunnel for moving drugs across the border. In response, the brothers tortured and killed Sinaloa operatives in Tijuana; they even tried to assassinate Guzman. Sinaloa retaliated in November 1992, when its operatives tried to kill Francisco Javier and Ramon Arellano Felix in a Puerto Vallarta nightclub.

The Sinaloa-Arellano Felix brothers war marked the beginning of an escalation in Mexico's cartel war. Cartels began to hire police officers to work as enforcers. Eventually, the Gulf cartel formed Los Zetas, a group largely composed of former soldiers from Mexican Airmobile Special Forces. Cartel warfare thus was militarized. Enforcer groups were no longer untrained thugs with guns; they were trained fire teams that knew how to maneuver and use their weapons.

Seeking shelter from the Arellano Felix brothers, Guzman fled to Guatemala but was arrested in June of 1993. He was extradited to Mexico, where he continued to run his criminal enterprises from the safety of a prison cell until he escaped in January 2001.

When Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen was arrested in March 2003, Guzman saw an opportunity to make a move on the Gulf cartel's territory, especially the lucrative plaza of Nuevo Laredo, the busiest point of entry for trucks into the United States from Mexico that provides direct access to the Interstate Highway 35 corridor.

Guzman's push into Nuevo Laredo was spearheaded by the Beltran Leyva brothers, who convinced local gangs such as Los Chachos to turn against the Gulf cartel. Beltran Leyva gunmen aided local forces, and eventually a hybrid group was formed when a U.S. citizen and member of Los Chachos named Edgar "La Barbie" Valdez Villarreal assumed command of Sinaloa enforcer group Los Negros.

Los Zetas responded strongly to the Sinaloa incursion into Nuevo Laredo and a bloody struggle erupted for control of the city. By mid-2005, law and order had almost completely broken down in Nuevo Laredo, and then-President Vicente Fox deployed federal police and army units to take control of the town. But even these forces proved insufficient to stop the violence, which persisted for three years until it became evident that Los Zetas were not going to be defeated. By that time, Guzman had begun focusing on other places to expand.


A Boss of Many Groups
On Sept. 11, 2004, Sinaloa hit men gunned down Rodolfo Carrillo Fuentes, a leader of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization, also known as the Juarez cartel, as he left a theater in Culiacan, Sinaloa state. Rodolfo's brother Vicente retaliated by having Guzman's brother murdered in prison. This chain of events set off a war between the two organizations for control of the Juarez and Chihuahua City plazas that continues to this day. (While the Juarez cartel is just a shadow of its former self -- Sinaloa has all but consolidated control of Chihuahua state -- Chihuahua nonetheless remains the second-deadliest state in Mexico because of this struggle.)

Sinaloa meanwhile had resumed its efforts to control Tijuana. A string of arrests and the deaths of the Arellano Felix brothers, who constituted the core leadership of the Arellano Felix Organization, severely degraded the group's operational capability. In early 2008, internal fighting between the faction loyal to the Arellano Felix brothers' successor, Luis Fernando "El Ingeniero" Sanchez Arellano, and those loyal to the group's top enforcer, Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental, further degraded the organization. This conflict sparked marked levels of violence in the region until Mexican federal police dismantled the Garcia faction.
  
Desperate for support against Sanchez Arellano, Garcia sought protection from the Sinaloa Federation, which he knew had been trying to claim Tijuana for years. Ultimately the strategy failed, but the protracted battle left the Sanchez Arellano faction of the AFO extremely weak. In the latter half of 2010, the Sinaloa Federation used the opening afforded by Garcia to solidify control over parts of western Baja California state, namely the Tecate and Mexicali regions, positioning itself to seize Tijuana.


Knowing it could not withstand another lengthy battle against a much larger and resourceful group, the AFO struck a deal with Sinaloa whereby both groups would operate independently and abide by a non-aggression pact. With Tijuana secured, Sinaloa controlled the plazas from Juarez west to Tijuana.

In a similar scenario, the Gulf cartel turned to Sinaloa and La Familia Michoacana for help against Los Zetas, which had broken off from its parent group in early 2010. The three groups formed an alliance that referred to itself as the New Federation. Guzman's attention once again was drawn to the lucrative smuggling corridors in the northeast. With help from Sinaloa and La Familia Michoacana gunmen, the Gulf cartel was able to push Los Zetas out of Reynosa, and by mid-2010, Los Zetas were under heavy pressure from the forces of the New Federation. However, several events that year, including the July 29 death of Guzman's close ally, Ignacio "El Nacho" Coronel, and the Dec. 10 death of La Familia Michoacana leader Nazario "El Mas Loco" Moreno Gonzalez, gave Los Zetas an opportunity to recover.

In 2011, Sinaloa undertook another major incursion into Los Zetas territory, this time targeting Veracruz. In doing so, it used another proxy group as muscle -- the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, comprising the remnants of Coronel's organization that traveled across Mexico from their home turf in Guadalajara. Sometimes operating under the moniker Los Matazetas, the CJNG began killing Los Zetas -- and people it believed to be Los Zetas supporters -- in Veracruz. In late September and early October of 2011, the CJNG conducted several high-profile body dumps of individuals deemed Los Zetas. In one incident on Sept. 20, 2011, 35 bodies were dumped on a street in heavy traffic. It was later determined that most of these victims were not members of Los Zetas.


As the CJNG shows, the Sinaloa cartel has formed several enforcer groups over the past decade. These groups have included Los Negros, the CJNG, La Gente Nueva (also known as Los Chapos) and Los Antrax. Such organizations operate under their own names, just as Los Zetas did when they were the armed wing of the Gulf cartel. But like Los Zetas, who acted on behalf on the Gulf cartel, Sinaloa enforcers act at the behest of Guzman and his lieutenants.

Instances of Sinaloa brutality abound. Los Negros leader Valdez tortured and executed four Los Zetas members in a video sent to the Dallas Morning News; the CJNG dumped 35 bodies in downtown Veracruz; and Sinaloa enforcers left groups of dismembered bodies in Nuevo Laredo accompanied by narcomantas signed "El Chapo" on several occasions between March and May of 2012. These are actions of the Sinaloa cartel, and they are every bit as vicious as the actions of other groups.

Some believe that peace ensues once the Sinaloa cartel asserts its control over an area, but that is not necessarily true. Violence decreased in Juarez after Sinaloa wrested control of the plaza, but Chihuahua continues to struggle with violence. In fact, three of the four most violent states in Mexico -- Chihuahua, Sinaloa and Guerrero -- are in Sinaloa's area of control. There are no quick solutions to Mexico's violence, and there is no reason to believe a government pact with Guzman would prove otherwise.


Font: By Scott Stewart

How Prepared is Israel for an Earthquake?

On October 21-25, 2012, Israel held its first national exercise to examine how prepared the state and its institutions are for a severe earthquake. This was the country's sixth home front exercise, held annually as part of the lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War. The annual exercise is also the climax of a series of smaller exercises held throughout the year. Until now, the annual exercises were based on security scenarios, primarily missile and rocket attacks on the civilian front. The decision to devote this year’s scenario to an earthquake is notable, as it implies (a) recognition of the importance of preparing for natural disasters whose damage to life and property are expected to be much higher than those inflicted by war, terrorism, and other man-made conflicts; and (b) the adequate understanding that preparing for an emergency is essentially generic in nature, as many of its components are shared by man-made and natural disasters. Thus, preparedness for natural disasters in general and earthquakes in particular has a direct impact on the preparedness for the more familiar security scenarios.

The goal of the exercise was defined as “improving the integrated response and preparedness on the part of the home front organs and the population to manage a severe earthquake hitting Israel.” The exercise examined the response of municipal and national civilian and military units, infrastructure systems, and the population at large in the case of an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale, occurring at a depth of 10 kilometers in the Hula Valley area in the country’s northern region. According to the scenario, the quake also generated high sea waves (5-15 meters) along the coast, damaging the port of Haifa and the Reading power station in Tel Aviv.

According to the recently determined framework for emergency preparedness, which also served the concrete scenario for the exercise, the earthquake caused 7,000 fatalities (less than half of the past scenarios), 8,600 severely to moderately injured, 37,000 lightly wounded, 9,500 people trapped under rubble, 170,000 people displaced from their homes, 28,000 buildings with heavy damage, and severe disruptions to many critical infrastructures. The scope of the economic damage at the national level was estimated at a minimum of NIS 50 billion. The principal issues examined in the exercise were: command and control, continuous functioning, civilian services, evacuation, international assistance, and multi-stage rehabilitation. The specific objectives of the exercise were: raising the public awareness to the gravity of the challenge, validating the response strategies, examining future improvements to preparedness, and creating the conceptual basis for systemic post-disaster reconstruction.

There were several significant insights to emerge from the exercise, including:

• The national exercise was based on the assumption that Israel is not properly prepared for a severe earthquake with mass casualties, and that despite some initial steps taken recently, the nation must undergo a long, complicated process.
• Exercises in general and the current one in particular are crucial for the sake of enhancing systemic preparedness at the national and local levels. An exercise reflects the basic assumption that there is a direct, positive correlation between appropriate preparedness and the reduction of damage inflicted by foreseen disasters, whether natural or man-made. To its credit, Israel is one of the world leaders in holding exercises of this sort.
• After many years of focusing almost exclusively on security-related emergencies, the civilian front has now been drilled on the challenges of response to natural disasters. While less common in this region, their damage can be much more severe and it is important to be prepared for them.
• Beyond the immediate casualties, the anticipated damage to routine life is a critical issue requiring the formulation of a strategic approach and meticulous preparedness. At the heart is the sensitive question of mass evacuation and the supply of services in emergencies. Theoretical solutions on the drawing board are important, but it is doubtful they can provide the necessary response.
• The question of international assistance was central to the exercise and for good reason. The issue was dealt with mostly at the technical level, focusing on the orderly intake of foreign aid. This is of course important, but no less significant is the realization that Israel is incapable of handling widespread disasters on its own. This has a bearing on other contexts as well.
• The expected damage to critical infrastructures (electricity, water, communications, transportation) is a key topic demanding thorough study and prior preparation suitable for this present scenario as well as for other (perhaps more likely) hazardous episodes, such as cyber attacks or widespread war / terrorist activity. This is a challenge that calls for urgent attention to ensure redundancy and improve systemic flexibility, which currently appears insufficient, in part because of budget limitations.
• Authority and responsibility / command and control: as always, the twofold question arises of who is responsible for preparing the systems and for managing the events as they unfold. The legal issue has yet to be resolved. Unlike the security realm, the civilian system is far from being properly regulated. The situation is more complicated because of the nature of natural hazards, the high number of casualties and the scope of damage, and – no less importantly – the possible damage to means of communications and control. As with other scenarios, the expectation here was that the IDF, partly by deploying the Home Front Command, would take charge at an initial stage. But for this to happen, even in the most limited fashion, the IDF must prepare in advance for sensitive civilian scenarios. This is a difficult challenge.
• Handling the issue of rehabilitation and recovery after a mass disaster has always been an Achilles’ heel. The very fact that the issue was raised specifically in the present drill reflects constructive thinking. Hopefully this will generate concrete, long term systemic processes to create mechanisms that will allow relatively rapid and appropriate rehabilitation after severe future emergencies.

After a long period of neglect, Israel has drawn a clear starting line for the systemic tackling of mass natural disasters. To what extent will the exercise generate a structured and effective system of preparedness that meets different needs, including the omnipresent security challenges? Hopefully, future deliberations will generate a more adequate balance between the commonly emphasized prevention posture of disasters and defense against them on the one hand, and what has been generally neglected, i.e., preparation for the day after, in the form of ensuring the sequential functioning and rehabilitation. To date, there has been little progress toward this much needed balance.


Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

Anti-terrorism law must not undermine fundamental rights: Rabbani

ISLAMABAD, (SANA): Chairman Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) Mian Raza Rabbani on Wednesday has said that Pakistan needed a counter-terrorism law that would not give the state powers to undermine the fundamental rights of the people.

He was talking to media representatives after a session of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS).

A British lawyer and an expert on anti-terrorism laws, Lord Alexander Charles Carlyle, also attended session of the PCNS held in Islamabad.
During the session chaired by Senator Rabbani, Lord Carlyle briefed the committee on Britain’s counter-terrorism laws.

After the session, Rabbani told media representatives that Pakistan was currently formulating laws to counter terrorism, adding that, it was important to examine and learn from the counter-terrorism laws enforced in other countries.

He added that recommendations pertaining to the recovery of missing persons would be given the final approval in the next session of the committee.

The meeting took place at a time when the government has already introduced “the Investigation for Fair Trial Bill, 2012” in the National Assembly “to provide for investigation for collection of evidence by means of modern techniques and devices to prevent and effectively deal with scheduled offences and to regulate the powers of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies” to deal with terrorism.

The bill is pending before the house committee for law and justice and if adopted in its present shape, emails, SMSs, phone calls and audio-visual recordings will be admissible evidence, while suspects will be held for six months after a warrant is issued by a district and sessions judge in his chambers.

The proposed legislation has attracted criticism from some quarters for being too intrusive and against the norms of privacy.
Ends-SANA-TR-A

Font: South Asian News Agency (SANA)

U.K. Lawmakers Eye Basing Submarines at U.S. Port, if Expelled by Scots.

The British ballistic missile submarine HMS Vengeance. A U.K. parliamentary report cites a U.S. base in Georgia as one possible temporary home for British nuclear-armed submarines if the vessels are forced out of an independent Scotland (Royal Navy photo).

 

WASHINGTON -- A new report issued by a British parliamentary panel suggests that the United Kingdom might consider temporarily basing its nuclear-armed submarines at a U.S. military seaport if Scotland achieves independence and refuses to continue hosting the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, located in southeast Georgia, has been identified as a potential option for absorbing one or more U.K. Vanguard-class vessels; maritime facilities in France are another possible alternative, according to the panel of British legislators.

“Any agreement whether to relocate the U.K. nuclear deterrent outside the British Isles, possibly in France or the USA, would be a decision for the U.K. in discussion with its allies,” states the Oct. 25 report, authored by the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee.

Four days earlier, Alex Salmond -- the first minister of Scotland and head of the Scottish National Party -- said he thought London might do well to arrange basing for the Trident D-5 missile-carrying submarines elsewhere in the United Kingdom or even abroad.

The British government "could either relocate Trident to another facility in the rest of the U.K. or, alternatively, they could use the nuclear facilities in America, or in France for that matter,” Salmond said on a BBC news show. “Trident is effectively an American weapon.”

The parliamentary assessment warns, though, that it “would be very difficult, both logistically and politically,” to base the U.K. nuclear force abroad. Defense Secretary Philip Hammond last week said his government is “confident that the Scottish people will choose to remain part of the United Kingdom” and “we have no plans to move the nuclear deterrent from there.”

Yet, with the matter as-yet unresolved, the question of how Scottish independence might affect London’s deterrence force is beginning to loom. Lawmaker Nick Harvey, a former armed forces minister, said it was “hard to think of any single item that would be larger in [British-Scottish] negotiation.”

All four U.K. ballistic missile-armed submarines currently use Faslane on the River Clyde’s Gareloch as their home port, while warheads are stored and mated with the missiles at Coulport, eight miles away on Loch Long. The nation maintains one Vanguard submarine on patrol at all times.

Future basing has been thrown into doubt in the run-up to a 2014 Scottish referendum on independence. Salmond has said his organization’s long-sought expulsion of nuclear arms from an independent Scotland could be formalized in a new constitution. Earlier this month, the party said an SNP government would “negotiate the speediest safe transition of the nuclear fleet from Faslane.”

There are no clear alternative naval facilities in the United Kingdom that offer both deep-water access for military submarines and secure areas for warhead-marrying operations, which must be located a safe distance from industry and population centers, according to some experts.

If secession proceeds, it might be possible for the U.K. government to negotiate a transition plan under which the nuclear-armed submarines could remain stationed temporarily in Scotland. However, it is far from clear if this option would prove politically viable.

“Nuclear weapons in Scotland could be disarmed within days and removed within months,” and the submarines that carry them could be banished within two years, according to the parliamentary report.

Salmond last week indicated some interest in imposing on an estranged United Kingdom “curtains for Trident,” using the separation as a means of effectively denuclearizing London, possibly for decades.

“We recognize that such speedy action would inevitably create the prospect of unilateral nuclear disarmament being imposed upon the Royal Navy and U.K., since the construction of facilities elsewhere could take upwards of 20 years,” stated the committee, comprising seven Scottish and four English members of Parliament. “It is not clear how quickly the U.K. could restore continuous at-sea deterrence.”

Committee Chairman Ian Davidson is a Labor Party lawmaker representing southwest Glasgow; his multipartisan panel includes just one member of the Scottish National Party.

The top British defense official last week said his government would never allow such a forced denuclearization to occur.

“Our continuous submarine-based nuclear deterrent is the ultimate safeguard of our national security,” Hammond said in response to the parliamentary report. “We have made a clear commitment to maintain that deterrent and there is absolutely no question that the U.K. will unilaterally disarm.”

“The U.K.’s preferred option is for nothing to change,” according to the committee’s 30-page document. “Failing that, the next best option would be securing an agreement that enabled the submarines to operate out of Faslane until an alternative base was found elsewhere.”

If Scotland were to drive out the Trident-carrying submarines, one domestic British option might be to store warheads and mate them to missiles at upgraded nuclear facilities in Berkshire, about 50 miles west of London, the document states. Under this scenario, the submarines could be based at Devonport on England’s southwest coast, where they now go for routine maintenance, the analysis states.

Francis Tusa, editor of the U.K. monthly Defense Analysis, told legislators that although it would not be an ideal setup, “it does not mean you cannot do it,” the report states.

Norman Polmar, a naval expert who has advised several top U.S. Navy civilians and brass, agreed, saying of the Devonport option: “Why not? Just expand the port.”

Interviewed on Tuesday, he played down the safety risks of attempting to duplicate Coulport functions proximate to a population center, saying similar activities typically take place near large U.S. cities.

The Scottish Affairs Committee said it could not estimate relocation costs, but experts said the price tag would probably reach billions of dollars. The question of who would foot the costs to develop new Vanguard basing likely would be a major focus of any Scotland secession negotiations.

The lawmakers called the storage and loading of warheads outside the British Isles a possible “temporary measure,” noting that two deep-water ports with submarine-servicing capacity being mulled are “French facilities in Brittany or the U.S. facilities in Georgia.”

Kings Bay is currently home to six of the U.S. Navy’s 14 U.S. Ohio-class nuclear-armed “SSBN” vessels, as well as two conventionally armed “SSGN” submarines, according to base spokesman Scott Bassett.

The facility likely could accommodate additional submarines from the United Kingdom in the near term, some experts said. More space will be freed up as the U.S. Navy reduces its Trident ballistic missile-carrying fleet to 12 vessels by 2028, and to just 10 vessels between 2032 and 2040, according to these sources.

The British government intends to replace its Vanguard-class boats with Successor submarines beginning in 2028, though there remains heated debate within the leadership coalition over whether results of an analysis of alternatives expected early next year might alter those plans.

With most federal offices in the Washington area closed on Monday and Tuesday because of Hurricane Sandy, a U.S. Defense Department spokeswoman did not respond by press time to a reporter’s query regarding basing prospects or any bilateral discussions on the issue.

Washington and London have long had a close relationship in nuclear-weapons matters, to include significant cooperation in submarine and ballistic missile operations.

Among the joint activities today is a leasing arrangement under which the Royal Navy operates with Trident D-5 missiles from the U.S. arsenal, which are assembled, stored and maintained at Kings Bay, Bassett said. Missile loading onto British Vanguard-class submarines -- each of which can carry 16 D-5s -- also takes place at Kings Bay, Bassett said.

Since 2010, U.K. policy has been to carry no more than 40 warheads on each vessel, though the Trident missile has a capacity of up to 12 warheads.

Polmar said the logistics of basing British submarines at Kings Bay would be so challenging as to rule out the option entirely.

“Absolutely not,” in part “because of the support facilities involved,” he said, noting that the Vanguard submarines and nuclear reactors “are all different from ours.”

However, another nuclear-arms expert did not find the notion to be altogether far-fetched.

“There is infrastructure there” for Trident-armed submarines at Kings Bay, said Hans Kristensen, who directs the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. “The only question is whether they can squeeze in more.”

Polmar also cited two additional factors why such an arrangement would be “totally impossible”: cost and transit time to U.K. patrol areas.

Kristensen agreed the long steaming distances could be an obstacle, saying, “That burns up a lot of core fuel.”

“Setting up a base two to three thousand miles away is ludicrous,” Polmar said. “It would be easier and cheaper to buy the city of Faslane.”

Even if logistics were determined to be feasible, U.S. basing might prove politically unworkable, according to experts.

Home-porting the submarines overseas could “raise questions about how independent the U.K.’s deterrent was,” the parliamentary panel said.

When Trident was first procured, the idea of mating warheads to missiles in the United States was explored but “was seen as just a step too far to being perceived as not having an independent deterrent,” Malcolm Chalmers, a defense policy expert at the Royal United Services Institute, told the panel. That view prevailed, leading to the use of Coulport for this sensitive task.

Nor would sending the submarines to French naval facilities be an easy fix, in the view of some.

“The idea of dumping off the boats there for a few years while we sort out a long-term solution would be a little tricky to manage,” British legislator Peter Luff, a defense equipment minister at the time who has since lost his post, told the committee in June.

The notion of a “sovereign base” located in a newly independent Scotland -- or perhaps sovereign or jointly run facilities in the United States or France -- might be explored as a means of preserving independent nuclear control, the parliamentary report suggests.

As things stand, some Kings Bay military commands, including the Strategic Weapons Facility-Atlantic, fly both the U.S. flag and the Union Jack to reflect the ongoing Trident partnership, Bassett said.

Given the “special relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom, basing the Vanguard vessels at a U.S. port would not be such a stretch, one former U.S. nuclear officer said last week.

“We probably won’t go to nuclear war without them,” said the former officer, who asked not to be named in discussing sensitive military and diplomatic matters. “So what difference does it make where you’re stationed?”

"We rely on Diego Garcia,” a British territory in the Indian Ocean, for staging bomber operations, said the ex-officer. “We station our nuclear bombs in Europe on foreign soil. I don’t see it as that big of an issue.”

In London, though, indications are mounting that the U.K. government and Royal Navy actually would see basing abroad as a huge issue, given that the entirety of the nation’s nuclear arsenal is in question, rather than logistics for a select few assets.

Still, there remain many bridges yet to be crossed, not the least of which is the 2014 referendum vote that might, in the end, dispense with the notion of Scottish independence -- an outcome that many in the British capital are hoping for.

 

For the time being, “we were told that the Ministry of Defense was not making contingency plans for the event of Scotland becoming a separate country,” according to the parliamentary report.

The ministry, legislators learned, “had not been approached or had discussions with the Scottish government about defense matters” should independence be formally embraced, the report states.

 

 

Font: NTI

 

 



 

 

Did Psychic Espionage Reveal Spy?

Photo: Jean-Philippe Wispelaere Credit: Australian government

An upcoming book claims that a spy was discovered through the use of psychic powers.

According to the "Canberra Times", Scott Carmichael, a former investigator for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), "is writing a book about how he used a psychic to identify [saboteur Jean-Philippe] Wispelaere after the former Australian Defence Intelligence Organization analyst tried to sell stolen U.S. documents to Singaporean embassy officials in Thailand."

 

NEWS: Does Tom Cruise Have Psychic Powers?

Wispelaere was caught in a Federal Bureau of Investigation sting when he flew to the United States to broker the documents. He was arrested, convicted of espionage, and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

How, exactly, was Wispelaere discovered? Carmichael claims that a psychic named Angela Ford told him that the DIA should look for a muscular Australian man in his twenties who used the name Baker, and tried to sell secrets at the Singaporean embassy.

Based upon this description and evidence, Carmichael says, he was able to identify Wispelaere (a bodybuilding low-level Australian intelligence officer who used the name Baker) and tip off the FBI to launch the investigation.

Carmichael's claim has come as a surprise to law enforcement, who know exactly how Wispelaere was discovered -- and it had nothing to do with psychics. According to several sources including a March 8, 2001 "Jane's Intelligence Watch Report," "[Wispelaere's] potential buyers informed U.S. authorities" about the spy's offer.

So it was not Angela Ford or any other psychic who tipped police off, but instead the embassy worker Wispelaere offered the information to. There appears to be no credible sources that mention any psychic information solving the case.

 

NEWS: Psychics Accused of Exploitation

The book has not been released yet so it's impossible to know what evidence, if any, Carmichael offers for his claim. But if what he says is true, apparently Angela Ford is much more accurate than the countless psychics who try --and always fail -- to find missing persons for the police.

If the U.S. government employs accurate psychics as Carmichael claims, it raises many interesting and puzzling questions. For example, why was the intelligence community's information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction so badly wrong in 2003?

Valid, verifiable psychic information could have averted the costliest war in history. For that matter, why didn't psychics locate Osama bin Laden? Presumably psychic power could have found him within days or weeks, instead of careful (non-psychic) intelligence collection spanning a decade.

 

NEWS: Skeptics Issue $1 Million PsychicChallenge

While tipping off investigators to aborted attempts at spying may be helpful, in the larger picture it would seem much more important to identify active, actual, ongoing spying that damages our national security. No psychics identified and stopped recent spies such as Aldrich Ames or Robert Hanssen (whose spying was called "possibly the worst intelligence disaster in U.S. history").

In fact, it is certain that there are active, undetected spies currently working in American intelligence agencies at this very moment. If Ford and other psychics truly can expose spies, locate terrorists, and find missing persons, there seems little or no evidence of it.