KAYA Mine Protected Vehicle, Turkey

Related project

ARMA 6X6 Armoured Tactical Vehicle, Turkey.

ARMA is a modular wheeled armoured tactical vehicle designed and developed by Otokar in Turkey.

KAYA mine protected vehicle can transport two crew and ten troops

The KAYA is a 4x4 mine protected vehicle (MPV) developed by Otokar, a company based in Turkey. The vehicle is intended to provide mine and ballistic protection for armed forces operating in threat environments.

The development of the KAYA MPV began in 2006 and the first prototype was completed in 2007. The MPV was unveiled for the first time at the IDEX 2009 defence exhibition held in Abu Dhabi.

The KAYA has a length of 6.4m, a width of 2.5m and a height of 2.9m. It can carry two crew members and ten infantrymen. It has a combat weight of 12.5t.

KAYA variants

"The KAYA has a length of 6.4m, a width of 2.5m and a height of 2.9m."

KAYA MPV is available in two variants, the Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)/Troop Carrier variant and Cargo Carrier variant. The APC variant features an armoured cabin and a dedicated troop compartment. It can be modified into an ambulance or a command post vehicle.

The Cargo Carrier variant is fitted with armoured cabin and an unprotected flat bed cargo section in place of troop compartment. The cargo compartment is equipped with drop sides and a tailgate.

KAYA design and crew protection features

KAYA is based on the Daimler Chrysler Unimog 5000 chassis. The MPV features an armoured cabin and a crew compartment. The two segments are mounted as separate units to achieve maximum cross country capability. The flexible design also allows the manufacturer to configure the vehicle for various mission requirements.

A large single-piece bullet proof wind shield in the front protects the driver and commander sitting inside the cabin. Either side of the crew cabin is provided with a forward opening door fitted with a bullet proof window.

The slightly raised troop section at the rear accommodates ten troops. The troops are seated on individual seats attached to the sides of the vehicle. The rear door provides entry and exit for the soldiers.

The troop compartment has six firing ports, 11 small bullet proof windows and three roof hatches. A Stepney is fitted to the right side of the troop section. The external stowage boxes on the lower part of the hull provide additional storage space. The standard equipment includes air conditioning system, additional heater, speed limiter, electrically controlled mirrors, and towing pintle and hook.

 

KAYA can be armed with a roof-mounted weapon station.

Armament

The KAYA MPV can be armed with wide range of weapon stations such as open cupola and remotely controlled weapon station. The overhead station can be mounted with a 7.62mm/12.7mm machine gun or 40mm automatic grenade launcher.


Self-protection

KAYA is specifically developed to provide mine and ballistic protection for the occupants on all terrain conditions, while offering a high level of crew comfort. The engine compartment is provided with armour protection to withstand small arms fire and shell splinters. The V-shaped bottom of the troop section reduces the blast impact by deflecting the bomb fragments away from the vehicle.

The front and rear compartments are fitted with all-welded steel armour. The protection is further enhanced with an appliqué layer of armour. The armour protection around the wheel arches offers additional protection against mines.

The vehicle can be optionally fitted with an automatic fire extinguisher system.

"The propulsion system provides a maximum speed of 96km/h."

KAYA MPV engine and mobility

The KAYA MPV is powered by an OM 924 LA 4-cylinder diesel engine coupled to a UG-100 tiptronic, electro pneumatic transmission. The engine provides a power output of 218hp at 2,200rpm. The propulsion system provides a maximum speed of 96km/h.

KAYA is optionally equipped with Central Tyre Inflation System (CTIS) and run flat tyres for enhanced mobility.

The 200l tank capacity provides KAYA a range of 800km. The wheels are equipped with pneumatic hydraulic dual circuit disk brakes. The vehicle can negotiate a gradient of 60% and side slope of 30%. It can cross vertical obstacles of 480mm and ford 1,200mm deep waters.

LORD, THAT SHAME!

SIGNORE, CHE VERGOGNA!
di Sandro Emanuelli
 

Stasera, all’O.N.U., si compirà l’estremo stupro alla logica e al buon senso, verrà concessa una licenza di uccidere senza limiti a quella genia di terroristi che va sotto il nome di Hamas; ossia il riconoscimento di uno stato, la Palestina, che in effetti non esiste.

Non spetta a me spiegare tutta la storia, la conosciamo tutti a menadito, nelle varie versioni, reale e accomodata, ma io mi chiedo soltanto come si possa invitare nel consesso mondiale uno “Stato” che ha nello statuto la distruzione di un altro Stato e dei suoi abitanti, Israele.

Allora tutte queste visite nei Paesi coinvolti, nelle sinagoghe anche in Italia, con discorsi ridondanti della parola “pace, sono solo fumo negli occhi, pranzi a casa degli “amici” e poi mandi i sicari a ucciderli!...

Mi chiedo anche il classico “cui prodest”? Questo regalo che Monti vuol fare agli arabi fa parte di un “pacchetto” che rientra nella transazione della vendita che sta facendo con loro di beni italiani? Cosa è, uno sconto? Petrolio in cambio di ebrei? C’entra anche l’Iran nel “business”? Sarei portato a crederlo.....

Questo comportamento anomalo è una ulteriore conferma della malafede di questo governo non votato né voluto dal popolo. Certo che, se il Presidente del Consiglio fosse stato ancora Silvio Berlusconi, avremmo mantenuto fede alle nostre alleanze e non aperto la strada al fanatismo dei Fratelli Musulmani che, tra parentesi, odiano i cristiani. Amici credenti o no, vi invito a pregare per il popolo ebraico e anche per il nostro, visto che siamo sotto invasione degli islamici che il governo fa finta di non vedere e la sinistra appoggia per avere nuovi voti, visto che chi li conosce non li vota più.

Israel ..... Just hypocrisy Palestine and Al Qaeda are terrorists

Dear World, A higher number of victims of the Arab does not mean that the Israelis are "meaner". It means that Israel is more successful in protecting
tion of its civilians and terrorists instead are successful in using their population as human shields. So that they can try to turn a military failure into a victory of propaganda. This has been their strategy all along. On which information has never been questioned.

IL - ISRAEL ..... This page is dedicated to those who loves and respects Israel.

 

 

 

 

 

Can't understand those people
how can they fill their life with hate like that



Today, just until noon 25 rockets hit Israel, injuring one person and wounding 2 others.
What country could stand having it's innocent civilians under constant threat?

Share if you believe Israel has the right to defend itself.

more lies

"What would the U.S. do if Cuba were to fire rockets on Florida? No country would agree to live in a reality whereby civilians are continuously threatene

d by missiles!" "While Israel and the IDF do everything in their power to avoid the killing or injuring of innocent Palestinian bystanders, Hamas does just the opposite. Hamas commits a double war crime by indiscriminately targeting Israeli civilians while using their own women and children as human shields. In the era in which we live, highlighting the truth and explaining Israels story in the international media is of vital importance!" pointed out Nir Barkat

What can we possibly say about that



Who is running our country?

Sarah Palin

Who is running our country? We've got a CIA Director sharing security info with his mistress using an unsecure gmail account. We've got the delusional Susan Rice blaming the death of an ambassador on a Youtube video. We've got Iran firing on one of our drones a week before the election. We've got the White House either ignorant of or covering up all of this. Who is minding the store? Everywhere we look we see the rank incompetence or corruption of the people who are supposedly running our country and our major institutions. Let's hope that responsible reporters at Obama's press conference today ask the right questions Americans deserve answers to.

Here's my question for the president: As our nation's chief executive you claim to be unaware of the most important and tragic situations we're facing; so, as a former chief executive, I'd like to know how long it takes for your staff to tell you things like: "Sir, your CIA Director is under investigation"?

- Sarah Palin

Substitutions burst in Obama staff leave the head of the CIA and the Clinton

And not only that. In a few days they resign Petraeus, who reveals to have a relationship extraconuigale and the president of Lockheed Martin, coincidentally also because he has a mistress ... while the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense announced that both not renew the mandate. For now, you can save only the head of the Fed.

WASHINGTON - Strangely, for the same reason two large pieces of public and private, working in the same field with 'federal administration, had to resign. This is David Petraeus, the CIA director and the one who was supposed to be the future CEO of Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon's number one supplier, Christopher Kubasik, forced to leave for having an "intimate relationship" with a female employee. Wave of morality? Hard to believe. Just as it is customary to refer to public reasons "sputtananti" like this.

 Are not the only departed in adjacent areas. Hillary Clinton leaves office, "Foreign Minister", apparently in preparation for the presidential elections in four years. It would also leave Leon Panetta, "Minister of Defense", which was about to give up the job by next spring.

 With the re-election of President Barack Obama's chair Ben Bernanke, a number of Federal Reserve (Fed), the U.S. Federal Reserve, is instead saved until the end of his second term, which expires on January 31 of 2014, however, and will only half of the mandate to Obama. If the Republican candidate Mitt Romney had won, Bernanke would have been the first to jump, Romney has never hidden meaning to replace.

 The extramarital affair that led to the resignation of David Petraeus as CIA director had lasted less than a year since his discharge from the army in August 2011 until the spring. It was the FBI to discover and bring out the dance-loving sex with his biographer Paula Broadwell. In particular, reported NBC, had begun an investigation into the mail Gmail staff of sixty former U.S. general and his biographer forty, "suspected of having attempted to improperly access his email with the possible aim of obtaining secret information. " It was this attempt, which dates back to last spring, to have precipitated the case, even more than the hundreds of erotic messages that Petraeus had continued to send former lover even after she had left him.

 In fact, beyond the reasons given on national security, there are more serious reasons, the new way to manage the CIA as part of a former military man like Petraeus, the failure of September 11 in Benghazi, where the 007 had failed to prevent the assault on the consulate-based CIA he was killed Chris Stevens, Ambassador in Libya. John Kerry, the former presidential candidate in 2004 against Bush Jr., looks set to take up the legacy of Hillary Clinton for Foreign Affairs, closely Ambassadress to the United Nations Susan Rice (who is not a relative of Condoleeza). The waiver of Clinton to a second term is combined with the resignation of Petraeus: The CIA is the operational arm of Foreign Affairs is responsible for obtaining and analyzing information about foreign governments, societies, individuals abroad. The failure of Benghazi nearly cost him re-election of Obama.

 In the same hour in which the case exploded Petraeus, also the world giant of defense Lockheed Martin was forced to resign his future CEO Christopher Kubasik, for having an "intimate relationship" with a female employee. The 51 year old manager has been publicly accused of violating the code of ethics which they impose a "proper conduct" for managers. Kubasik can be considered lucky, will have a severance pay of three and a half million dollars. Will be replaced by a woman, 58, Marillyn Hewson, vice president of electronic systems.

 Kubasik was supposed to take over in January to Bob Stevens as CEO of Lockheed, who said he was "deeply disappointed and saddened" by the story but said that will not affect the Pentagon and other clients, nor for shareholders. It is probably disappointed for other events that may not be disclosed. In the case of Kubasik and Petraeus, in essence, seem to be entered into play risks of blackmailability, however, that for two of professionals that level rather to resemble a joke.

 There are many other ministerial seats at stake, but it's normal rotation and renewals. There is, however, the Treasury Tim Geithner had announced some time that he would leave the administration after the election. As his replacement become the name of the chief of staff to Obama, Jack Lew and the former chief of staff to Bill Clinton, Erskine Bowles. But Obama could also turn to the world of finance focusing on another woman, as Suzanne Nora Johnson, former vice president of Goldman Sachs. Become the first woman to head the Treasury Department.


Font: Roberto Schena

RESIGNS THE HEAD OF THE CIA FOR A FACT VERY HEAVY: HAS BETRAYED HIS WIFE!

, head of the CIA and general peak in the U.S., resigned in the hands of President Obama, who has accepted them.

Reason of this decision is that the same Petraeus has called "unacceptable behavior", ie cheated on his wife with whom has been married for 37 years!

Possible that a betrayal, as execrable is a private matter, lead to these consequences?

It must have been blackmailed?

There is something strange in all this!

Il Direttore della CIA, Petraeus e la Clinton non faranno più parte dello staff di Obama

Are not the only departed in adjacent areas.
Hillary Clinton leaves office, "Secretary of State".

It would also leave Leon Panetta, "Minister of Defense", which was about to give up the job by next spring.

But what is happening all'inteno the Obama administration?

My fear that all charges be replaced are essential to the national security of the U.S., but also to combat terrorism.
The head of the CIA Petraeus, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta have been crucial in the fight against terrorism.

The President Obana, will be able to replace them with people with the same ability, strength and charisma in the command?

The Expensive, Diminishing Threat of Somali Piracy.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has dropped off dramatically in 2012. Successful ship hijackings have decreased from 31 in 2011 (and 49 in 2010) to only four so far in 2012. Attacks against ships have also decreased, falling from 199 reported attacks in the first nine months of 2011 to 70 attacks over the same span in 2012 -- a 65 percent drop. However, diminished activity does not necessarily mean a decrease in the cost of sailing around the Horn of Africa. Somali pirates occupy a unique position, which is right along highly strategic global shipping lanes yet outside the reach of any national power. For international actors, it is politically and militarily easier to try to contain the Somali piracy threat than to eliminate it. But containment comes at a high cost.


Controlling Territory

Many factors have contributed to the decrease in pirate hijackings in 2012. One factor is that shipping companies have begun equipping their ships with more countermeasures, namely armed guards. For several years, commercial ships sailing in the Indian Ocean have used other countermeasures, such as fences, water cannons and adjusted tactics like disabling the ship. But the widespread deployment of armed guards beginning in 2011 (guards had been used sparingly as far back as 2008) has a very close correlation to the recent decrease in hijackings. In late 2009, only about 10-20 percent of commercial ships sailing through waters where Somali pirates operate carried guards; today, some estimates put the percentage as high as 70 percent. To date, pirates have never successfully hijacked a ship that had armed guards. But it should be noted that, even though the use of armed guards appears to be the most effective countermeasure against piracy, there are other factors at work.

For instance, government officials also attribute the drop-off in attacks and hijackings to better coordination between foreign naval patrols, which have made the waters off the Somali coast a less permissive environment for pirate operations. With several years of practice, sailors from international missions such as the U.S.-backed Combined Task Force 151 and the EU-backed Atalanta mission as well as from the unilateral missions of China, Russia, Iran and others have had time to study pirate activity and become more efficient at stopping attacks.

Several dozen foreign naval ships are deployed to secure the waters for commercial shipping at any given time. Their focus is escorting ships through the Gulf of Aden, but the area of pirate activity is much larger than that, reaching across the Arabian Sea to India and Madagascar. Effectively patrolling such a large area requires intelligence and the development of a counterpiracy doctrine that includes going after the larger pirate vessels, called mother ships, that extend pirates' range and allow them to operate in rougher seas during the monsoon.

Taken together, the increased use of armed guards aboard commercial ships and the growing effectiveness of foreign naval patrols have contributed to undermining the pirates' control over the seas. Three years ago pirates were largely uncontested, but now they face a more coordinated defense. They hijacked commercial ships because they were relatively soft targets -- which could be taken by four people with AK-47s, a fishing boat and a ladder -- making the millions of dollars in profit from a ransom payment very attractive. The armed guards and naval patrols have not eliminated piracy, but they have increased the costs of attacking and seizing a commercial ship.
Because pirates are motivated more by profit than by any ideology, a decrease in profitability will deter them from engaging in the practice.

Still, whatever the status of the sea, the coastal towns of Somalia, such as Hobyo and Haradheere, are still out of the control of any national or international force. The Puntland Maritime Police Force, which began operations in early 2012 with the help of Arab funding, made some progress in denying pirates sanctuary on land, but political contention prevents it from controlling the territory outright, making pirate activity still a very attractive economic model in central Somalia.

When piracy flared in the Strait of Malacca in the early 2000s, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia were able to pursue the pirates on land and deny them sanctuary because they had the security forces and territorial integrity to do so. This is also true currently on the western coast of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea, where pirates occasionally hijack ships even though they have no ports in which to anchor the vessels. Since the West African governments have control -- however tenuous -- over their own sovereign territory, they still have the means to track down hijacked ships and keep pirates from creating sanctuaries. Somalia, on the other hand, has struggled for decades to control its territory.
Over the past few years, it hasn't even been able to fully control Mogadishu, its capital, against the Islamist threat from al Shabaab. The new Somali federal government still lacks the capability to control pirate towns such as Hobyo and Haradheere, and its officials do not appear to want a strong Puntland doing it for them.

By wresting maritime control from Somali pirates, commercial shipping companies and foreign navies have reduced the number of attacks but have not eliminated the threat. Several Western forces, including those of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, have gone on land a few times to pursue pirates, but generally, foreign militaries have avoided Somalia. Whereas the countries bordering the Strait of Malacca or Gulf of Guinea are able to go on the offensive to root out piracy, the rest of the world, unable to rely on Somalia, is going on the defensive.

In essence, the commercial shippers and naval forces have adopted a siege strategy -- they hope to starve the pirates of resources, forcing them to give up. Somali pirates held about 20 ships at any given time in 2010; they currently hold 11. As the pirates hijack fewer ships, and as armed guards make piracy more dangerous, the entire enterprise is looking less lucrative and appealing.



The Bottom Line
Even though the Somali pirates have not been as successful in 2012 as they were in recent years, their existence is still making it more expensive to sail around the Horn of Africa. The problem with the siege strategy is that as soon as shipping companies or foreign naval forces let up on the pirates, they will go back to hijacking ships.

The cost of prevention right now is high. It is impossible to know exactly how many ships are vulnerable to Somali pirate attacks each year, but we know that about 33,000 commercial ships pass through the Gulf of Aden yearly. Estimates of how many of those ships carry armed guards range from 40 to 70 percent. That means that about 13,000-23,000 ships are paying for armed guards to accompany them through the vulnerable areas, a roughly 10-day trip, at a cost of approximately $60,000 each time. Based on those figures, the total annual cost for shipping companies merely to deploy armed guards on their ships through the Gulf of Aden is between about $800 million and $1.4 billion. The total cost of piracy to the world in 2011, according to the One Earth Future Foundation's estimates, was between $6.6 billion and $6.9 billion. This estimate included $160 million for ransom payments; other preventative measures, such as rerouting ships or using more fuel to maintain higher speeds, made up the rest of the costs.

In other words, the cost of preventing piracy off the coast of Somalia is substantially higher than the costs piracy inflicts. Nevertheless, shipping companies are willing to pay a premium to prevent disruptions in their operations. They would prefer to pay a small amount for protection on each trip -- even though it adds up -- if it means averting a hijacking and multimillion-dollar ransom.

Somalia's Future

The key component of the siege strategy is that it weakens the pirates' control over their land-based sanctuaries. Their power is connected to their revenue, so the decrease in revenue will decrease their power. The shipping companies and foreign navies hope that some other, less disruptive enterprises will eventually take root along Somalia's pirate-heavy coast.

In the midst of forming its first permanent government since 1991, Somalia is currently incapable of addressing its lack of control over the central Somali coast. Instead, it is focusing on securing the population bases of Mogadishu, Kismayo and other small towns in south-central Somalia from al Shabaab. This will occupy the government for at least the next year. Even after that, Mogadishu has little incentive to try to tighten its control over central coastal pirate towns. The government has much more to lose if it fails in southern Somalia because it redirected scarce government resources to take on piracy. The pirate-held areas are economically depressed and are politically less important. That's why they started engaging in piracy in the first place.

The only force that has significantly challenged the pirates on land is the Puntland Maritime Police Force. Located in northeast Somalia, Puntland is much more stable than the south and is virtually independent. The Puntland Maritime Police Force had success in capturing pirates, destroying their staging bases along the beach, cutting off their supply routes and even, supposedly, attempting to seize hijacked vessels from the pirates. However, the police force suffered from funding cuts and political opposition and appears to no longer be active against the pirates. Although Mogadishu is unable to control much of its territory, the new government doesn't want regional governments accumulating too much strength. In the end, a strong Puntland may be more of a risk to Mogadishu than pirates.

Without a sustained, land-based intervention, Somali piracy will continue -- even if it is at a lower rate -- at least until some other criminal enterprise takes its place. But even at its lower rate, as long as Somali pirates are operating, they will be an expensive burden for the world's shipping industry.





Font: "The Expensive, Diminishing Threat of Somali Piracy is republished with permission of Stratfor."

Election Day - USA 2012

This will be my only political post. But our Military is already hurting... 4 more years is going to crush it. I hope everybody sleeps peacefully knowing our Enemies are celebrating right now.
That is all.

War Game: The Hours following an Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructures - The Policies of the Actors and Principal.

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) held a war game (simulation) focusing on the first 48 hours after an Israeli aerial attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructures.

 

The Scenario

After midnight on November 9, al-Jazeera reports that Israeli airplanes have attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities in three waves of attack. As reports multiply, Israel officially announces it has attacked Iran’s nuclear sites because it had no other choice. According to the scenario, Israel did not coordinate the attack with the United States in advance, and only informed the US once the planes were already en route to the Iranian targets. Initial assessments estimate that the Iranian nuclear program has been set back by nearly three years.

Following the successful attack, Iran decides to react with maximal force, launching missiles from within its borders and urging its proxies – Hizbollah, Hamas, and other radical elements – to attack Israel. Nonetheless, it is careful to avoid attacking American targets. Israel attempts to contain the attacks and works to attain a state of calm as rapidly as possible. The international community is paralyzed, largely because Russia tries to exploit the situation for its own strategic objectives. At the end of the first 48 hours, Iran continues to attack Israel, as do their proxies, albeit to a lesser extent. At this point in the simulation, the crisis does not seem to be close to a resolution.

Main Policies of the Various Actors

 

 

Israel: After achieving its operational goals, Israel showed restraint in the face of provocations and reactions by the radical players spurred by Iran. In parallel, Israel conducted an additional aerial attack to complete destruction of one of the major targets in Iran. Israel’s strategic objective focused on preventing regional escalation and achieving as fast as possible a level of events that was controllable and of low intensity.

 

 

The United States: Although not informed before the event, the United States clearly stood by Israel’s side and did not expose its differences of opinion with Israel, in order to present a united front against any possible regional escalation. The United States demonstrated willingness to return to the negotiating table and even relax the sanctions, provided Iran showed restraint and in exchange for an Iranian declaration it was ending its military nuclear program. The United States decided it would take military action against Iran only if Iran were to close to the Strait of Hormuz or attack American allies and assets in the Gulf. Similarly, the United States activated economic measures to control the rise in oil prices.

 

 

Iran: In light of the outcome of the Israeli attack, Iran felt it had no choice but to react strongly and militarily against Israel, launching some 100 Shehab missiles right away (and another 100 in round two) at Tel Aviv, the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona, and various cities. Iran also pressured its proxies to act against Israel and launch rocket and missiles at Israeli targets, as well as engage in multi-front acts of terrorism. At the same time, Iran appealed to the international community to grant legitimacy to its enrichment program and revoke the sanctions against it. At first, Iran chose not to attack American targets and assets to keep the United States from joining the fight against it. But the more Iran felt it was cornered and its freedom of action was curtailed, it realized that its strongest card lay in acting against America’s allies in the Gulf and closing the Strait of Hormuz.

 

 

Russia chose to promote its objectives in the Caucasus and Europe. Russia also viewed the attack as an opportunity to position itself as the leading actor in the international community because of its ability to communicate with all the actors involved. However, the gap between the US and the Russian positions led to a paralysis of the international community’s ability to act. In turn, and in the absence of American leadership, China, with access to all the relevant actors, became a key player on the international field.

 

 

Syria preferred to focus on its domestic upheaval, maintain a low profile, and not be dragged into combat against Israel.

Hizbollah found itself in a quandary. On the one hand, Hizbollah came under heavy Iranian pressure to begin a massive launch of missiles and rockets at Israel, this being the “day of reckoning” for which Iran had furnished Hizbollah with 50,000 missiles and rockets. On the other hand, Hizbollah was wary about causing heavy damage in Lebanon yet again. It therefore chose to respond to Iran’s demands selectively by launching rockets at Israeli military targets, especially airfields and active anti-missile defense systems. Israel’s restrained response intensified Hizbollah’s dilemma and supported its decision to attack to a relatively limited degree and focus on military targets.

 

 

Hamas chose to walk a fine line by demonstrating some commitment towards Iran, while making sure not to provide Israel with an excuse for a large scale attack in the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ limited ability to control rogue and radical elements in Gaza was evident, and Hamas was forced to ask the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for help in restraining the rogue elements it lacked the power to control.

 

 

The other actors – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Turkey, and the international community: Each chose to operate on the basis of its own particular interests, distance itself from the events, and prevent widespread regional escalation.

 
 

Insights from the War Game

a. The war game staged the first 48 hours after the attack. The intention was not to predict developments, rather to examine the significance and implications of one possible scenario. The players acted very rationally, demonstrating preventive policies and motivated by crucial interests alone, and ignored domestic and external constraints.

b. The Israeli actor assessed that the Israeli public possesses the stamina and fortitude to absorb the blows because it was convinced that for Israel, this was a war of no choice that had achieved is operational goals. The policy of restraint was based primarily on this assumption.

c. Iran has only limited tools and a limited ability to hit Israel directly, and therefore must operate its proxies against it. Iran has tools that are more relevant in the Persian Gulf sector, capable of hurting American interests and causing global oil prices to spike. Nonetheless, Iran clearly understood the cost it would have to pay should it ignite the Persian Gulf, especially the United States joining the fighting. This would only incur greater damage to its nuclear infrastructures and greater destruction to a wide array of quality targets in Iran.

d. A successful Israeli attack with clear cut results and the meeting of the operational objectives would lead to two contradictory trends: on the one hand, Iran would be obligated to respond militarily and via its proxies; on the other hand its dependence on proxies would allow deterrence of the relevant actors and insertion of a wedge between Iran and its regional allies, thereby preventing regional escalation and encouraging containment.

e. Two other important elements likely to help contain the events are America’s clear resolve to stand with Israel and a restrained policy on Israel’s part, especially if the strategic objectives of the attack were met in the initial attack.

f. The simulation again raised the disadvantage of having no access to Iran's Supreme Leader and the limited levers of influence. In general, it became clear that there are no reliable lines of communication with the Iranian leadership. While Russia cannot serve as a credible channel for dialogue, it emerged that China may be capable of serving as a mediator.

g. In planning the exit strategy and a mechanism to contain and mitigate negative developments, Israel cannot rely on the international community. It is highly probable that the deepening of the divide between the United States and Russia would paralyze the international community. Some of the players on the international arena would like to see Israel "bleed" in order to pay for attacking Iran, regardless of the interests of others, and to restrain its actions in the future. If the crisis were prolonged, it could generate unintended consequences with the risk of regional escalation. Efforts by regional and international elements to end the event may involve a cost to Israel in the area of arms control.

 

Conclusion

When the simulation was planned, it appeared that the fall of 2012 would be a critical period, and therefore it was decided to examine the possible developments subsequent to an Israeli attack. This sense of an imminent decision has since abated somewhat, but after the US and Israeli elections, the question of an attack will undoubtedly resurface. It is therefore critical to continue to examine the potential ramifications of an attack.

The scenario of an Israeli attack immediately after the US elections does not reflect the position of the Institute for National Security Studies. The possibility of an Israeli attack at any time is complex and has been analyzed in many INSS publications. Overall, there are two opposing assessments of the implications of an Israeli attack. One anticipates the outbreak of World War III, while the other envisions containment and restraint, and presumes that in practice, Iran’s capabilities to ignite the Middle East are limited. The war game that took place developed in the direction of containment and restraint, with the actors motivated mainly by rational considerations and critical interests.

 

 

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

Guns and Butter in Billion-dollar Arms Deal

«Chi ha orecchie per intendere intenda.»
«He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.»


http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/billion-dollar-arms-deal-in-army-gun-manufacturers/1/221665.html

Russia Foresees Maintaining Land-Based ICBMs Over Long-Term

The Russian military predicts a long future for the land-based component of its strategic nuclear triad, RIA Novosti (1) reported on Thursday.

Russian nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles can presently be fired from movable platforms or from stationary silos. The mobile launchers are envisioned for use in a second retaliatory strike while the silo-based missiles are held to prevent possible attacks.

"This [strategic missile forces] structure will most likely remain unchanged for years or even decades to come," SMF Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Valery Mazurov told the Rossiya 24 channel. "The composition of ICBM systems (2) (in SMF structure) is based on a thorough analysis of potential military conflicts of varied intensity that involve the use of nuclear weapons."

The strategic missile forces are understood to presently have a minimum of 160 movable Topol ICBMs, 18 road-transportable Topol-M missiles, 50 Topol-M missiles in silos, 58 SS-18 high-altitude missiles in silos, and 18 RS-24 Yars ballistic missiles.

In 2011, the strategic missile forces announced the RS-24 and the Topol-M would form the backbone of the land-based leg of the nation's nuclear deterrent and would form a minimum of four-fifths of the SMF stockpile no later than 2016.

The strategic missile forces are wrapping up protective updates to nine key missile sites that are intended to thwart possible extremist assaults, RIA Novosti (3) reported.

"The modernization includes the upgrade of warning and surveillance systems, detection sensors, integrated fire control systems and power supply grids," SMF spokesman Col. Vadim Koval said.

"The overhaul is being carried out at the highest levels of secrecy in regard to the specifications of the installed equipment and its operating algorithms," he said.

The organization is also updating its training and operation regulations for guards protecting stationary and movable missiles.



(1)Russia to Keep Silo and Mobile ICBM Launchers in Future.

Topol-M systems

MOSCOW, November 1 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) will continue deploying silo-based and mobile ballistic missile launchers in the future, SMF Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Valery Mazurov said on Thursday.

The two-component structure of the SMF reflects its purpose as part of Russia’s nuclear triad. Silo-based ICBMs serve as a preventive nuclear deterrent of any potential aggression while road-mobile ICBM launchers ensure the capability to respond to nuclear strikes by potential foes.

“This SMF structure will most likely remain unchanged for years or even decades to come,” Mazurov said in an interview with Rossiya 24 television.

“The composition of ICBM systems [in SMF structure] is based on a thorough analysis of potential military conflicts of varied intensity that involve the use of nuclear weapons,” the general said.

 



According to open sources, the SMF currently operates at least 58 silo-based SS-18 Satan ballistic missiles, 160 road-mobile Topol (SS-25 Sickle) missile systems, 50 silo-based and 18 road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) systems, and 18 RS-24 Yars systems.

The SMF said last year that the Topol-M and RS-24 ballistic missiles would be the mainstay of the ground-based component of Russia's nuclear triad and would account for no less than 80 percent of the SMF's arsenal by 2016.




 



(2) Moscow Finishes Arming Sector of Missile Force



A Russian RS-24 ICBM lifts off in a 2007 test launch.
A missile formation in central Russia is now fully
armed with Topol-M missiles and RS-24 launch systems,
Moscow said on Thursday (AP Photo).

Russia on Thursday said it had finished equipping its Teikovo missile formation, based in the nation's central region, with Topol-M and Yars strategic missile units, RIA Novosti (A) reported.

“The Teikovo division has become the first [strategic missile forces] division fully rearmed with fifth-generation mobile missile systems,” Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Vadim Koval stated.

Moscow furnished Topol-M equipment to a pair of Teikovo formation regiments and Yars gear to the remaining two regiments. The Yars system is built to fire RS-24 ICBMs.

Meanwhile, Moscow on Friday indicated it cannot finalize the timing of a planned Bulava ballistic missile test launch due to difficulties involving computer code for managing the weapon's flight, ITAR-Tass reported.

Efforts are under way to address the faults, and officials hope to conduct the exercise before 2013 from the Borei-class submarine Alexander Nevsky, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said.

A Russian defense industry insider previously said a new Bulava missile trial firing was slated to occur (B) from the vessel in November.






(3)Russia Boosts Security at Missile Launch Sites

Russia Boosts Security at Missile Launch Sites

The Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) are finalizing the modernization of automated security systems at nine of its major missile bases to counter the growing threat of potential terrorist attacks, an SMF spokesman said on Wednesday.

“The modernization includes the upgrade of warning and surveillance systems, detection sensors, integrated fire control systems and power supply grids,” Col. Vadim Koval said.

The spokesman said that automated security at SMF bases is provided by six different systems, developed and produced by Russian defense industry firms.

“The overhaul is being carried out at the highest levels of secrecy in regard to the specifications of the installed equipment and its operating algorithms,” Koval said.

In addition to the modernization of the existing automated systems, the SMF is tightening rules of engagement and training requirements for security personnel at the bases and around mobile missile launch sites.

According to open sources, the SMF currently operates at least 58 silo-based SS-18 Satan ballistic missiles, 160 road-mobile Topol (SS-25 Sickle) missile systems, 50 silo-based and 18 road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) systems, and 18 RS-24 Yars systems.




(A) Teikovo Division Gets Full Arsenal of New Missile Systems

Topol-M ballistic missile system

Topol-M ballistic missile system

The Teikovo missile division of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF), based in central Russia, has been fully equipped with advanced Topol-M and Yars ballistic missile systems, the defense ministry said on Thursday.

“The Teikovo division has become the first SMF division fully rearmed with fifth-generation mobile missile systems,” the ministry spokesman Col. Vadim Koval said.

Two regiments of the Teikovo division are equipped with Topol-M systems while the other two regiments of the division are equipped with Yars systems.

The Yars missile system is armed with the multiple-warhead RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile that has considerably better combat and operational capabilities than the Topol-M (SS-27 Stalin).
Two more missile divisions have started receiving the Yars systems in 2012, Koval said.

The Novosibirsk division (in Siberia) will receive mobile Yars systems, while the Kozelsk division (in central Russia) will be armed with the silo-based version of the system.

The SMF said last year that the Topol-M and RS-24 ballistic missiles would be the mainstay of the ground-based component of Russia's nuclear triad and would account for no less than 80% of the SMF's arsenal by 2016.


(B) Borei-Class Sub to Join Russian Active Force

The Russian Defense Ministry is set in September to assume control of the Borei-class ballistic missile submarine Yuri Dolgoruky, RIA Novosti quoted a United Shipbuilding insider as saying on Friday (see GSN, Aug. 15).

The vessel was previously slated to join the nation's active force in July and later in August, according to prior Russian navy statements.

The United Shipbuilding source added that a new Bulava ballistic missile trial firing is slated to occur in November from the Borei-class submarine Alexander Nevsky during the ship's testing.

Russia is expected to construct eight Borei-class submarines as successors to its older Project 667 boats, according to RIA Novosti. The new vessels, once equipped with the Bulava ballistic missile, are slated to constitute the backbone of Russia's submarine-based strategic ballistic missile deterrent.

Russia's military could take custody in 2012 of the Yasen-class atomic submarine Severodvinsk, the head of Russia's navy said separately. The vessel's atomic energy system faced technical issues that threatened to prevent the step until 2013, according to previous reporting.

Vice Adm. Viktor Chirkov stated: “Yasen is undergoing tests in accordance with the program. We hope it will raise the flag this year”.

No Russian atomic submarine has evaded detection in the Gulf of Mexico for a period of weeks, the U.S. Defense Department said on Thursday in response to a recent press report.

“I don't know what that information was based on, but it was not correct,” spokeswoman Wendy Snyder said in an RIA Novosti report.

A Russian Defense Ministry official declined to address the report



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