The Institute for National
Security Studies (INSS) held a war game (simulation) focusing on the first 48
hours after an Israeli aerial attack on Iran ’s nuclear
infrastructures.
The
Scenario
After midnight on November 9,
al-Jazeera reports that Israeli airplanes have attacked Iran ’s nuclear
facilities in three waves of attack. As reports multiply, Israel officially announces it has attacked
Iran ’s nuclear sites because it had
no other choice. According to the scenario, Israel did not coordinate the attack with the
United States in advance, and
only informed the US once the planes were already en
route to the Iranian targets. Initial assessments estimate that the Iranian
nuclear program has been set back by nearly three years.
Following the successful attack,
Iran decides to react with
maximal force, launching missiles from within its borders and urging its proxies
– Hizbollah, Hamas, and other radical elements – to attack Israel .
Nonetheless, it is careful to avoid attacking American targets.
Israel attempts to contain the
attacks and works to attain a state of calm as rapidly as possible. The
international community is paralyzed, largely because Russia tries to
exploit the situation for its own strategic objectives. At the end of the first
48 hours, Iran continues to
attack Israel , as do their proxies, albeit
to a lesser extent. At this point in the simulation, the crisis does not seem to
be close to a resolution.
Main Policies of the Various
Actors
The United States : Although
not informed before the event, the United
States clearly stood by Israel ’s side and did not expose its differences
of opinion with Israel , in order to present a united
front against any possible regional escalation. The United States demonstrated
willingness to return to the negotiating table and even relax the sanctions,
provided Iran showed restraint and in exchange for an Iranian declaration it was
ending its military nuclear program. The United
States decided it would take military action against
Iran only if
Iran were to close to the
Strait of Hormuz or attack American allies and
assets in the Gulf. Similarly, the United States activated economic
measures to control the rise in oil prices.
Hizbollah found
itself in a quandary. On the one hand, Hizbollah came under heavy Iranian
pressure to begin a massive launch of missiles and rockets at
Israel , this being the “day
of reckoning” for which Iran had furnished Hizbollah with
50,000 missiles and rockets. On the other hand, Hizbollah was wary about causing
heavy damage in Lebanon yet again. It therefore chose
to respond to Iran ’s demands selectively by
launching rockets at Israeli military targets, especially airfields and active
anti-missile defense
systems. Israel ’s restrained response
intensified Hizbollah’s dilemma and supported its decision to attack to a
relatively limited degree and focus on military targets.
Hamas chose
to walk a fine line by demonstrating some commitment towards Iran , while making sure not to provide
Israel with an excuse for a large
scale attack in the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ limited ability to control rogue and
radical elements in Gaza was evident, and Hamas
was forced to ask the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for help
in restraining the rogue elements it lacked the power to
control.
The other actors –
Egypt , Saudi Arabia , the Gulf states , Turkey, and the international
community: Each
chose to operate on the basis of its own particular interests, distance itself
from the events, and prevent widespread regional escalation.
Insights from the War Game
a.
The war game staged the first 48
hours after the attack. The intention was not to predict developments, rather to
examine the significance and implications of one possible scenario. The players
acted very rationally, demonstrating preventive policies and motivated by
crucial interests alone, and ignored domestic and external constraints.
b.
The Israeli actor assessed that the
Israeli public possesses the stamina and fortitude to absorb the blows because
it was convinced that for Israel , this was a war of no choice
that had achieved is operational goals. The policy of restraint was based
primarily on this assumption.
c.
Iran has only limited tools and a
limited ability to hit Israel directly, and therefore must
operate its proxies against it. Iran has tools that are more relevant in the
Persian Gulf sector, capable of hurting
American interests and causing global oil prices to spike. Nonetheless,
Iran clearly understood the
cost it would have to pay should it ignite the Persian Gulf, especially the
United
States joining the fighting. This would only
incur greater damage to its nuclear infrastructures and greater destruction to a
wide array of quality targets in Iran .
d.
A successful Israeli attack with
clear cut results and the meeting of the operational objectives would lead to
two contradictory trends: on the one hand, Iran would be obligated to respond
militarily and via its proxies; on the other hand its dependence on proxies
would allow deterrence of the relevant actors and insertion of a wedge between
Iran and its regional allies, thereby preventing regional escalation and
encouraging containment.
e.
Two other important elements likely
to help contain the events are America’s clear resolve to stand with Israel and
a restrained policy on Israel’s part, especially if the strategic objectives of
the attack were met in the initial attack.
f.
The simulation again raised the
disadvantage of having no access to Iran 's Supreme Leader and the limited
levers of influence. In general, it became clear that there are no reliable
lines of communication
with the Iranian leadership. While Russia cannot serve as a credible channel for
dialogue, it emerged that China may be capable of serving as a
mediator.
g.
In planning the exit strategy and a
mechanism to contain and mitigate negative developments, Israel cannot
rely on the international community. It is highly probable that the deepening
of the divide between the United States and Russia would
paralyze the international community. Some of the players on the international
arena would like to see Israel "bleed" in order to pay for attacking
Iran , regardless of the interests of
others, and to restrain its actions in the future. If the crisis were prolonged,
it could generate unintended consequences with the risk of regional escalation.
Efforts by regional and international elements to end the event may involve a
cost to Israel in the area of arms
control.
Conclusion
When the simulation was planned, it
appeared that the fall of 2012 would be a critical period, and therefore it was
decided to examine the possible developments subsequent to an Israeli attack.
This sense of an imminent decision has since abated somewhat, but after the
US and Israeli elections, the
question of an attack will undoubtedly resurface. It is therefore critical to
continue to examine the potential ramifications of an
attack.
The scenario of an Israeli attack
immediately after the US elections does not reflect the
position of the Institute for National Security Studies. The possibility of
an Israeli attack at any time is complex and has been analyzed in many INSS
publications. Overall, there are two opposing assessments of the implications of
an Israeli attack. One anticipates the outbreak of World War III, while the
other envisions containment and restraint, and presumes that in practice,
Iran ’s capabilities to ignite
the Middle East are limited. The war game that
took place developed in the direction of containment and restraint, with the
actors motivated mainly by rational considerations and critical
interests.
No comments:
Post a Comment