The Consequences of Intervening in Syria

 

 

 

The French military's current campaign to dislodge jihadist militants from northern Mali and the recent high-profile attack against a natural gas facility in Algeria are both directly linked to the foreign intervention in Libya that overthrew the Gadhafi regime. There is also a strong connection between these events and foreign powers' decision not to intervene in Mali when the military conducted a coup in March 2012. The coup occurred as thousands of heavily armed Tuareg tribesmen were returning home to northern Mali after serving in Moammar Gadhafi's military, and the confluence of these events resulted in an implosion of the Malian military and a power vacuum in the north. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other jihadists were able to take advantage of this situation to seize power in the northern part of the African nation.

 

As all these events transpire in northern Africa, another type of foreign intervention is occurring in Syria. Instead of direct foreign military intervention, like that taken against the Gadhafi regime in Libya in 2011, or the lack of intervention seen in Mali in March 2012, the West -- and its Middle Eastern partners -- have pursued a middle-ground approach in Syria. That is, these powers are providing logistical aid to the various Syrian rebel factions but are not intervening directly.

Just as there were repercussions for the decisions to conduct a direct intervention in Libya and not to intervene in Mali, there will be repercussions for the partial intervention approach in Syria. Those consequences are becoming more apparent as the crisis drags on.

Intervention in Syria

For more than a year now, countries such as the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and European states have been providing aid to the Syrian rebels. Much of this aid has been in the form of humanitarian assistance, providing things such as shelter, food and medical care for refugees. Other aid has helped provide the rebels with non-lethal military supplies such as radios and ballistic vests. But a review of the weapons spotted on the battlefield reveals that the rebels are also receiving an increasing number of lethal supplies.


For example, there have been numerous videos released showing Syrian rebels using weapons such as the M79 Osa rocket launcher, the RPG-22, the M-60 recoilless rifle and the RBG-6 multiple grenade launcher. The Syrian government has also released videos of these weapons after seizing them in arms caches. What is so interesting about these weapons is that they were not in the Syrian military's inventory prior to the crisis, and they all likely were purchased from Croatia. We have also seen many reports and photos of Syrian rebels carrying Austrian Steyr Aug rifles, and the Swiss government has complained that Swiss-made hand grenades sold to the United Arab Emirates are making their way to the Syrian rebels.

With the Syrian rebel groups using predominantly second-hand weapons from the region, weapons captured from the regime, or an assortment of odd ordnance they have manufactured themselves, the appearance and spread of these exogenous weapons in rebel arsenals over the past several months is at first glance evidence of external arms supply. The appearance of a single Steyr Aug or RBG-6 on the battlefield could be an interesting anomaly, but the variety and concentration of these weapons seen in Syria are well beyond the point where they could be considered coincidental.

This means that the current level of external intervention in Syria is similar to the level exercised against the Soviet Union and its communist proxies following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The external supporters are providing not only training, intelligence and assistance, but also weapons -- exogenous weapons that make the external provision of weapons obvious to the world. It is also interesting that in Syria, like Afghanistan, two of the major external supporters are Washington and Riyadh -- though in Syria they are joined by regional powers such as Turkey, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, rather than Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, the Saudis and the Americans allowed their partners in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency to determine which of the myriad militant groups in Afghanistan received the bulk of the funds and weapons they were providing. This resulted in two things. First, the Pakistanis funded and armed groups that they thought they could best use as surrogates in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Second, they pragmatically tended to funnel cash and weapons to the groups that were the most successful on the battlefield -- groups such as those led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, whose effectiveness on the battlefield was tied directly to their zealous theology that made waging jihad against the infidels a religious duty and death during such a struggle the ultimate accomplishment.

A similar process has been taking place for nearly two years in Syria. The opposition groups that have been the most effective on the battlefield have tended to be the jihadist-oriented groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. Not surprisingly, one reason for their effectiveness was the skills and tactics they learned fighting the coalition forces in Iraq. Yet despite this, the Saudis -- along with the Qataris and the Emiratis -- have been arming and funding the jihadist groups in large part because of their success on the battlefield. As my colleague Kamran Bokhari noted in February 2012, the situation in Syria was providing an opportunity for jihadists, even without external support. In the fractured landscape of the Syrian opposition, the unity of purpose and battlefield effectiveness of the jihadists was in itself enough to ensure that these groups attracted a large number of new recruits.

But that is not the only factor conducive to the radicalization of Syrian rebels. First, war -- and particularly a brutal, drawn-out war -- tends to make extremists out of the fighters involved in it. Think Stalingrad, the Cold War struggles in Central America or the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans following the dissolution of Yugoslavia; this degree of struggle and suffering tends to make even non-ideological people ideological. In Syria, we have seen many secular Muslims become stringent jihadists. Second, the lack of hope for an intervention by the West removed any impetus for maintaining a secular narrative. Many fighters who had pinned their hopes on NATO were greatly disappointed and angered that their suffering was ignored. It is not unusual for Syrian fighters to say something akin to, "What has the West done for us? We now have only God."

When these ideological factors were combined with the infusion of money and arms that has been channeled to jihadist groups in Syria over the past year, the growth of Syrian jihadist groups accelerated dramatically. Not only are they a factor on the battlefield today, but they also will be a force to be reckoned with in the future.

The Saudi Gambit

Despite the jihadist blowback the Saudis experienced after the end of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan -- and the current object lesson of the jihadists Syria sent to fight U.S. forces in Iraq now leading groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra -- the Saudi government has apparently calculated that its use of jihadist proxies in Syria is worth the inherent risk.

There are some immediate benefits for Riyadh. First, the Saudis hope to be able to break the arc of Shiite influence that reaches from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. Having lost the Sunni counterweight to Iranian power in the region with the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the installation of a Shiite-led government friendly to Iran, the Saudis view the possibility of installing a friendly Sunni regime in Syria as a dramatic improvement to their national security.

Supporting the jihad in Syria as a weapon against Iranian influence also gives the Saudis a chance to burnish their Islamic credentials internally in an effort to help stave off criticism that they are too secular and Westernized. It allows the Saudi regime the opportunity to show that it is helping Muslims under assault by the vicious Syrian regime.

Supporting jihadists in Syria also gives the Saudis an opportunity to ship their own radicals to Syria, where they can fight and possibly die. With a large number of unemployed, underemployed and radicalized young men, the jihad in Syria provides a pressure valve similar to the past struggles in Iraq, Chechnya, Bosnia and Afghanistan. The Saudis are not only trying to winnow down their own troubled youth; we have received reports from a credible source that the Saudis are also facilitating the travel of Yemeni men to training camps in Turkey, where they are trained and equipped before being sent to Syria to fight. The reports also indicate that the young men are traveling for free and receiving a stipend for their service. These young radicals from Saudi Arabia and Yemen will even further strengthen the jihadist groups in Syria by providing them with fresh troops.

The Saudis are gaining temporary domestic benefits from supporting jihad in Syria, but the conflict will not last forever, nor will it result in the deaths of all the young men who go there to fight. This means that someday the men who survive will come back home, and through the process we refer to as "tactical Darwinism" the inept fighters will have been weeded out, leaving a core of competent militants that the Saudis will have to deal with.
But the problems posed by jihadist proxies in Syria will have effects beyond the House of Saud. The Syrian jihadists will pose a threat to the stability of Syria in much the same way the Afghan groups did in the civil war they launched for control of Afghanistan after the fall of the Najibullah regime. Indeed, the violence in Afghanistan got worse after Najibullah's fall in 1992, and the suffering endured by Afghan civilians in particular was egregious.

Now we are seeing that the jihadist militants in Libya pose a threat not only to the Libyan regime -- there are serious problems in eastern Libya -- but also to foreign interests in the country, as seen in the attack on the British ambassador and the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi. Moreover, the events in Mali and Algeria in recent months show that Libya-based militants and the weapons they possess also pose a regional threat. Similar long-lasting and wide-ranging repercussions can be expected to flow from the intervention in Syria


Font: By Scott Stewart

The Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean: Exercise or Military Operation?

Russian missile cruiser Moskva, which is participating in the
January 2013 exercise in the Mediterranean

 

 

 

A joint Russian naval exercise in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea, off the Syrian coast, began on January 22, 2013 and is scheduled to end today, January 29, 2013. The Russians are calling this the largest exercise since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and vessels from three different naval theaters – the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the North Sea – have reached the region. The exercise is taking place simultaneously in two naval theaters: the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, with 23 vessels, strategic air force units, and air defense units participating. The force includes 10 warships: a missile cruiser; an anti-submarine ship; two escort vessels; four landing craft carrying 300 marines and 10 armored vehicles each; two submarines, one nuclear-powered and one diesel-powered, and auxiliary ships. This naval force carries nuclear weapons (tactical nuclear missiles carried by the submarines were also mentioned). In an extraordinary measure, the Russian chief of staff is commanding the exercise directly. A similar exercise, albeit of smaller scope, took place in the summer of 2012, and Russian vessels have been operating in this region in an ongoing manner over the past two years.

 

Concomitant with the start of the exercise, 77 Russian civilians were evacuated from Syrian via Lebanon on two airplanes sent for this purpose by the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations. It is unclear whether this evacuation was an actual emergency or a drill. It is possible that the evacuees are part of the Russian diplomatic mission in Aleppo, which is currently closing due to the security situation there. In any case, the Russian authorities emphatically denied any intention of evacuating their citizens from Syria – some eight thousand people were mentioned, and the actual number is probably higher. The Russian authorities also deny any intention of using the fleet in the exercise for evacuation missions, but they have not denied the existence of shelf plans for this purpose.

 

An additional intriguing aspect of the exercise is the recent host of messages in the Russian media indicating that the exercise was actually designed as a deterrent in the Syrian theater. Several comments are particularly noteworthy:

1. The exercise is not routine; it is a demonstration of Russian power, accompanied by an enhanced presence in the Mediterranean.
2. The exercise is related to the global conflict and reflects Russia’s intentions to act as a superpower.
3. The exercise is related to the Middle East situation, which poses a threat along the borders of Russia and its allies.
4. The exercise is related to the grave situation in Syria, and is designed to forestall any plans (by the West, Sunni countries, or Turkey) for intervention in Syria. The Russians interpret reports on Assad’s potential use of chemical weapons as a cover for such intervention.
5. Finally, the exercise guards the Alawite coast ahead of a possible move there by Assad for the purpose of fortifying it as a defense line and creating an Alawite state.

With the beginning of the Russian naval exercise, at a press conference on the Middle East, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russia’s policy on the Syrian question had not changed. The Russians believe in achieving a solution through dialogue between the parties, and are continuing their efforts to initiate contacts with the Syrian opposition (on this occasion, Lavrov also warned the US and Israel against attacking Iran). In addition, the Russian authorities reiterated that Russia had no plans to intervene militarily in Syria, and did not intend to supply it with offensive weapons or send experts or military systems operators there. At the same time, President Putin promised aid to Lebanese President Suleiman, currently visiting Moscow.

 

Against this background, the question arises whether the naval activity is indeed an exercise, or an operation designed to promote Russian strategic objectives. Is it related to recent events in Syria, despite the fact that exercise was planned far in advance with no connection to these events? If so, are the messages accompanying it a way of exploiting the fleet’s presence in the region, or were they also prepared in advance? In any event, it seems that new objectives, at least at the declaratory level, were added to an exercise planned previously to wave the Russian flag and bolster the presence in a region of importance to the Russians.

 

More specifically, the statements issued in strident tones may reflect Russian willingness to raise the ante in its conflict with the West, given the recent worsening of relations between Russia and the US, not only in the Syrian context, but also and primarily, in both global and bilateral contexts. In addition, Russia seems to assess that preparations are indeed underway for military intervention in Syria, including through use of the chemical weapons issue, and it is in Russia’s interest to deter any such intentions. Another possible factor is the deterioration of Assad’s position, which is liable to require a retreat to the Alawite region, a move that the Russians would have to secure from the sea. Finally, aspects other than Syria cannot be ruled out, such as use of the exercise as a means of applying pressure against Turkey, Russia’s enemy, which poses a growing challenge to Russian interests in the region. Russia is also interested in expanding its presence and activity in the Mediterranean Sea for the purpose of promoting cooperation with additional regional partners, such as Greece, Cyprus, and perhaps Malta, all of which are being visited by Russian ships during the exercise.

 

An analysis of these possible actions suggests what may come next. Under the camouflage of an exercise, Russia sent a large naval force to a sensitive region of fighting. The fact of the recurring presence of the Russian fleet in a region in which a conflict is growing hotter constitutes a statement in and of itself. This Russian measure, accompanied by blunt rhetoric, indicates an effort at deterrence in the Syrian theater, as well as a general demonstration of force. On the other hand, however, Russian capabilities in this sphere are limited, in comparison with its rivals in the Middle East, and certainly in the global arena. Of interest here is the silence of the Western media, which arouses reflection on the Russian side. It appears that the West, meaning the US, is hinting that it does not find this Russian behavior overly impressive. The Russian demonstration of force, therefore, may seem somewhat pathetic.

 

The presence of Russian force in the region may thus be exploited in two ways. The first is to impel the US to reach understandings with Russia about a settlement in Syria. In this context, it is more correct to see this as a dispute about the price that the US will have to pay Russia for the understandings in Syria. Two, in the absence of the desired understandings with the West, Russia plans, beyond its general support for Assad, to create conditions enabling it to deploy its forces in the Alawite area by securing the coastline and creating a deterrent against intervention. If this is the case, it appears that preparations are underway for the beginning of the dissolution of Syria.

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Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy.

North Korea's state-run media reported Sunday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ordered the country's top security officials to take "substantial and high-profile important state measures," which has been widely interpreted to mean that North Korea is planning its third nuclear test. Kim said the orders were retaliation for the U.S.-led push to tighten U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang following North Korea's missile test in October. A few days before Kim's statement emerged, the North Koreans said future tests would target the United States, which North Korea regards as its key adversary along with Washington's tool, South Korea.

North Korea has been using the threat of tests and the tests themselves as weapons against its neighbors and the United States for years. On the surface, threatening to test weapons does not appear particularly sensible. If the test fails, you look weak. If it succeeds, you look dangerous without actually having a deliverable weapon. And the closer you come to having a weapon, the more likely someone is to attack you so you don't succeed in actually getting one. Developing a weapon in absolute secret would seem to make more sense. When the weapon is ready, you display it, and you have something solid to threaten enemies with.

North Korea, of course, has been doing this for years and doing it successfully, so what appears absurd on the surface quite obviously isn't. On the contrary, it has proved to be a very effective maneuver. North Korea is estimated to have a gross domestic product of about $28 billion, about the same as Latvia or Turkmenistan. Yet it has maneuvered itself into a situation where the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea have sat down with it at the negotiating table in a bid to persuade it not to build weapons. Sometimes, the great powers give North Korea money and food to persuade it not to develop weapons. It sometimes agrees to a halt, but then resumes its nuclear activities. It never completes a weapon, but it frequently threatens to test one. And when it carries out such tests, it claims its tests are directed at the United States and South Korea, as if the test itself were a threat.

There is brilliance in North Korea's strategy. When the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korea was left in dire economic straits. There were reasonable expectations that its government would soon collapse, leading to the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Naturally, the goal of the North Korean government was regime survival, so it was terrified that outside powers would invade or support an uprising against it. It needed a strategy that would dissuade anyone from trying that. Being weak in every sense, this wasn't going to be easy, but the North Koreans developed a strategy that we described more than 10 years ago as ferocious, weak and crazy. North Korea has pursued this course since the 1990s, and the latest manifestation of this strategy was on display last week. The strategy has worked marvelously and is still working.

A Three-Part Strategy

First, the North Koreans positioned themselves as ferocious by appearing to have, or to be on the verge of having, devastating power. Second, they positioned themselves as being weak such that no matter how ferocious they are, there would be no point in pushing them because they are going to collapse anyway. And third, they positioned themselves as crazy, meaning pushing them would be dangerous since they were liable to engage in the greatest risks imaginable at the slightest provocation.

In the beginning, Pyongyang's ability to appear ferocious was limited to the North Korean army's power to shell Seoul. It had massed artillery along the border and could theoretically devastate the southern capital, assuming the North had enough ammunition, its artillery worked and air power didn't lay waste to its massed artillery. The point was not that it was going to level Seoul but that it had the ability to do so. There were benefits to outsiders in destabilizing the northern regime, but Pyongyang's ferocity -- uncertain though its capabilities were -- was enough to dissuade South Korea and its allies from trying to undermine the regime. Its later move to develop missiles and nuclear weapons followed from the strategy of ferocity -- since nothing was worth a nuclear war, enraging the regime by trying to undermine it wasn't worth the risk.

Many nations have tried to play the ferocity game, but the North Koreans added a brilliant and subtle twist to it: being weak. The North Koreans advertised the weakness of their economy, particularly its food insecurity, by various means. This was not done overtly, but by allowing glimpses of its weakness. Given the weakness of its economy and the difficulty of life in North Korea, there was no need to risk trying to undermine the North. It would collapse from its own defects.

This was a double inoculation. The North Koreans' ferocity with weapons whose effectiveness might be questionable, but still pose an unquantifiable threat, caused its enemies to tread carefully. Why risk unleashing its ferocity when its weakness would bring it down? Indeed, a constant debate among Western analysts over the North's power versus its weakness combines to paralyze policymakers.

The North Koreans added a third layer to perfect all of this. They portrayed themselves as crazy, working to appear unpredictable, given to extravagant threats and seeming to welcome a war. Sometimes, they reaffirmed they were crazy via steps like sinking South Korean ships for no apparent reason. As in poker, so with the North: You can play against many sorts of players, from those who truly understand the odds to those who are just playing for fun, but never, ever play poker against a nut. He is totally unpredictable, can't be gamed, and if you play with his head you don't know what will happen.

So long as the North Koreans remained ferocious, weak and crazy, the best thing to do was not irritate them too much and not to worry what kind of government they had. But being weak and crazy was the easy part for the North; maintaining its appearance of ferocity was more challenging. Not only did the North Koreans have to keep increasing their ferocity, they had to avoid increasing it so much that it overpowered the deterrent effect of their weakness and craziness.

A Cautious Nuclear Program

Hence, we have North Korea's eternal nuclear program. It never quite produces a weapon, but no one can be sure whether a weapon might be produced. Due to widespread perceptions that the North Koreans are crazy, it is widely believed they might rush to complete their weapon and go to war at the slightest provocation. The result is the United States, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea holding meetings with North Korea to try to persuade it not to do something crazy.

Interestingly, North Korea never does anything significant and dangerous, or at least not dangerous enough to break the pattern. Since the Korean War, North Korea has carefully calculated its actions, timing them to avoid any move that could force a major reaction. We see this caution built into its nuclear program. After more than a decade of very public ferocity, the North Koreans have not come close to a deliverable weapon. But since if you upset them, they just might, the best bet has been to tread lightly and see if you can gently persuade them not to do something insane.

The North's positioning is superb: Minimal risky action sufficient to lend credibility to its ferocity and craziness plus endless rhetorical threats maneuvers North Korea into being a major global threat in the eyes of the great powers. Having won themselves this position, the North Koreans are not about to risk it, even if a 20-something leader is hurling threats.

The China Angle and the Iranian Pupil

There is, however, a somewhat more interesting dimension emerging. Over the years, the United States, Japan and South Korea have looked to the Chinese to intercede and persuade the North Koreans not to do anything rash. This diplomatic pattern has established itself so firmly that we wonder what the actual Chinese role is in all this. China is currently engaged in territorial disputes with U.S. allies in the South and East China seas. Whether anyone would or could go to war over islands in these waters is dubious, but the situation is still worth noting.

The Chinese and the Japanese have been particularly hostile toward one another in recent weeks in terms of rhetoric and moving their ships around. A crisis in North Korea, particularly one in which the North tested a nuclear weapon, would inevitably initiate the diplomatic dance whereby the Americans and Japanese ask the Chinese to intercede with the North Koreans. The Chinese would oblige. This is not a great effort for them, since having detonated a nuclear device, the North isn't interested in doing much more. In fact, Pyongyang will be drawing on the test's proverbial fallout for some time. The Chinese are calling in no chits with the North Koreans, and the Americans and Japanese -- terribly afraid of what the ferocious, weak, crazy North Koreans will do next -- will be grateful to China for defusing the "crisis." And who could be so churlish as to raise issues on trade or minor islands when China has used its power to force North Korea to step down?

It is impossible for us to know what the Chinese are thinking, and we have no overt basis for assuming the Chinese and North Koreans are collaborating, but we do note that China has taken an increasing interest in stabilizing North Korea. For its part, North Korea has tended to stage these crises -- and their subsequent Chinese interventions -- at quite useful times for Beijing.

It should also be noted that other countries have learned the ferocious, weak, crazy maneuver from North Korea. Iran is the best pupil. It has convincingly portrayed itself as ferocious via its nuclear program, endlessly and quite publicly pursuing its program without ever quite succeeding. It is also persistently seen as weak, perpetually facing economic crises and wrathful mobs of iPod-wielding youths. Whether Iran can play the weakness card as skillfully as North Korea remains unclear -- Iran just doesn't have the famines North Korea has.

Additionally, Iran's rhetoric at times can certainly be considered crazy: Tehran has carefully cultivated perceptions that it would wage nuclear war even if this meant the death of all Iranians. Like North Korea, Iran also has managed to retain its form of government and its national sovereignty. Endless predictions of the fall of the Islamic republic to a rising generation have proved false.

I do not mean to appear to be criticizing the "ferocious, weak and crazy" strategy. When you are playing a weak hand, such a strategy can yield demonstrable benefits. It preserves regimes, centers one as a major international player and can wring concessions out of major powers. It can be pushed too far, however, when the fear of ferocity and craziness undermines the solace your opponents find in your weakness.

Diplomacy is the art of nations achieving their ends without resorting to war. It is particularly important for small, isolated nations to survive without going to war. As in many things, the paradox of appearing willing to go to war in spite of all rational calculations can be the foundation for avoiding war. It is a sound strategy, and for North Korea and Iran, for the time being at least, it has worked.


Read more: Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy | Stratfor

F-35

Two F-35 Lightning II carrier variants complete an aerial refueling for the first time at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, in this U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Lockheed Martin's Andy Wolfe. This was the first dual aerial refueling for the F-35C.

The Israeli Elections: Indications and Implications.

Certain common assumptions held among the media and the Israeli public were refuted by the results of the recent elections in Israel. Based on these results, this essay will assess various possibilities for the composition of the next Israeli government and their implications for Israel's national security policy. Prime Minister Netanyahu will likely aim to form a broad coalition, possibly reaching eighty-one seats if it includes Likud Beitenu, Yesh Atid (led by Yair Lapid), HaBayit HaYehudi (under Naftali Bennett), Shas, Hatnuah (led by Tzipi Livni), and Kadima (led by Shaul Mofaz). This possibility would allow Netanyahu the greatest freedom of action on political and security issues and on social and economic matters.

The Knesset

Courtesy: Government Press Office

Elections for the nineteenth Knesset were held in Israel on Tuesday, January 22, 2013. The results refute certain common assumptions among the media and the Israeli public. Based on these results, this essay will assess various possibilities for forming the next Israeli government and their implications for Israel's national security policy.

Voter Turnout
The voter turnout was 68 percent, about 3 percent more than in the elections of 2009 and the largest turnout since 1999. However, the true turnout was even higher. Voter turnout is calculated as the percentage of those who actually voted – 3,834,136 people – out of the number of eligible voters, 5,656,705. Yet according to the estimate of the Central Bureau of Statistics, the voter registry, which is based on the population registry, includes between 400,000 and 500,000 people who live permanently abroad or at least have lived abroad for a long time and do not currently reside in Israel. These people are not physically in Israel on Election Day and thus cannot vote. Accordingly, the voter turnout among those who could physically vote is 5 percent higher than what was reported, that is, 73 percent.

Voter turnout among Israeli Arabs was 56 percent, which was also higher than in the 2009 elections, although it is still significantly lower than among Israeli Jews. On the basis of data aggregation, voter turnout among Jews, i.e., not counting those who are abroad, was approximately 75 percent, which is among the highest in the world, and much higher than in the United States and most European countries. This fact refutes the assumption that a large portion of the Israeli public is alienated and apathetic. Although some commentators labeled this election the most boring election in many years, nearly three of every four Israelis came to exercise their right to vote. This is a tribute to Israeli citizens and Israeli democracy.

Distribution of Seats
The most significant result of the election, in terms of its impact on future Israeli policy, is the decline in power of the bloc of right wing parties (which includes the ultra-Orthodox parties), especially the significant drop in the strength of Likud Beitenu, and the meteoric rise of Yesh Atid, headed by Yair Lapid. In the 2009 elections, the right wing bloc received sixty-five seats and enjoyed a clear majority in the Knesset. In last week's elections, the right wing bloc – Likud Beitenu, HaBayit HeYehudi (Jewish Home), Shas, and United Torah Judaism – won sixty-one seats, only a one-seat majority in the Knesset. Likud Beitenu itself lost about a quarter of its strength, and went from forty-two Knesset members to thirty-one: seven seats went to right wing bloc partners (five to HaBayit HeYehudi and two to United Torah Judaism), and another four seats to parties outside the right wing bloc. This slight decline in the strength of the right wing parties refutes the widely held assumption that there is a swing to the right in Israeli public opinion. Yesh Atid, a party that did not exist until a year before the elections, won nineteen seats, an achievement unprecedented in Israeli history.

These numbers have several implications. First, the ability of the right wing bloc to promote its political agenda – continued development of settlements throughout Judea and Samaria; maintaining and legalizing all unauthorized outposts; and for the more extreme among them, preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state – is very limited; in certain areas, such as restricting the far reaching authority of the Supreme Court or limiting the ability of human rights organizations to function, it does not exist. Second, the position of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been weakened: he is perceived as having led his party to a stinging loss in the elections and as responsible for a serious reduction in the number of Likud MKs. This is likely to harm Netanyahu's freedom of action in Cabinet appointments and in the future, in making diplomatic moves, especially in light of the extreme right wing makeup of the Likud Knesset faction.

An additional issue is the great weight Yesh Atid will have in future diplomatic and security decisions. To be sure, Yesh Atid’s positions on diplomacy and security issues, led by the peace process with the Palestinians and Iran, are not fully clear. Yesh Atid, like Yair Lapid, focused on domestic issues throughout the election campaign, foremost among them an equal distribution of the burden and improving the situation of the middle class, and barely discussed political issues. Among the nineteen MKs from this party are those who are to the left of center and those who are to the right. However, the party’s – and Lapid’s – declared position supports two states for two peoples and a rapid renewal of the political process.

A final point: the right wing bloc includes two factions formed by combining two separate parties: Likud Beitenu, which is composed of Likud (twenty seats) and Yisrael Beitenu (eleven seats); and HaBayit HaYehudi, comprising HaBayit HaYehudi (eight seats) and Tekuma (previously part of the National Union, four seats). There is always the possibility that in the future, there will be a split in these factions. Such a split requires approval by one third of the faction members, and each of the two smaller parties indeed has the required one third. The first hint of such a possibility came the day after the elections, when Avidgor Lieberman held a separate meeting of Yisrael Beitenu MKs; some even saw this as a threatening message to Netanyahu. Lieberman made sure to declare that the future government must deal with domestic issues and not political issues that are a source of disagreement. This can be seen as a warning of sorts by Lieberman against possible political moves by the Prime Minister.

Forming the Coalition
The first stage in forming a coalition is the decision by the President to ask a Knesset member to form the government. Lapid’s statement that he does not intend to join a bloc that will prevent Netanyahu from forming a government assures Netanyahu that at least sixty-two MKs (Likud Beitenu, Yesh Atid, and HaBayit Hayehudi) will recommend to the President that Netanyahu be given the job of forming the government. Netanyahu will have forty-two days to present his new government to the Knesset.

In the current electoral constellation, forming a coalition is difficult. One possibility is a coalition of sixty-one, comprising right wing parties only. Although a highly unlikely possibility and clearly unpalatable to Prime Minister Netanyahu, it cannot be ruled out entirely. Such a government would be paralyzed on all political issues. A second possibility is a national unity government that would include most of the parties, other than Meretz and the Arab parties on the left and United Torah Judaism on the right, and would have ninety-six seats. This is also unlikely, and it is very doubtful that such a large government could work effectively and endure over time.

The most likely possibility is a coalition of Likud Beitenu, Yesh Atid, Hatnuah (led by Tzipi Livni), and Kadima (led by Shaul Mofaz), with the addition of Shas (sixty-nine seats in total), forming a government that could resume the peace process; or with the addition of HaBayit HaYehudi (seventy seats altogether), forming a government that could work toward a more equal distribution of the burden and even make progress – at least to a certain extent – on the peace process; or both latter parties, forming a coalition of eighty-one seats. This last possibility is presumably the most desirable for Netanyahu and would in fact allow him the greatest freedom of action on political and security issues and on social and economic matters.

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Has the Campaign in the Maghreb and in West Africa Reached a New Level?

France’s military intervention in the campaign underway in Mali is connected to the recent hostage attack in southern Algeria by the Masked Battalion, a faction that split off from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a long-time Algerian activist who fought alongside al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1980s. After ten months in which global jihadist elements succeeded in taking over the north of Mali and instituting sharia law, on the model of the Taliban in Afghanistan, France decided to send troops to Mali to assist the local army in obstructing the Islamists’ movement southward, on their way to conquering the cities of Kona and Bamako, the capital. The purpose of the military effort, which initially received only lukewarm support from other EU countries, was to encourage the mobilization of other African and Western elements to provide active military support and prevent the direct threat to the economic and political interests of France and other countries posed by the spread of global jihadist elements in western and northern Africa.

However, France’s action in Mali was a catalyst for the deadly terrorist attack on the Ain Amenas gas plant in southern Algeria. The modus operandi chosen by the terrorists deviated from the organization's familiar repertoire, which specialized in criminal activity and kidnapping Western citizens and demanding ransom for their release. This frontal attack on a sensitive and explosive gas plant, in which more than thirty men armed with numerous weapons, explosives, and explosive belts took hundreds of hostages, intended to achieve a number of objectives. First, it challenged the sovereignty of the Algerian government and dealt a serious blow to a major industry that is important to the national revenue. Second, it presented a complex security challenge to the Algerian government’s counterterrorism policy against al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. Third, it was an attempt to prevent active support by Algeria or the participation of Algerian soldiers alongside the foreign African and Western troops fighting with the weak Malian army to remove global jihadist elements from the north of the country. Fourth, the kidnapping of many foreign hostages was designed both to acquire bargaining chips and deter the Western countries whose citizens were being held hostage from supporting the French action and the Malian army.

 

The Algerian government, loyal to its tough policy in the war on terror, rejected the demands to release terrorists imprisoned in Algeria. After four days, it ended the incident with two waves of attack by special forces. The result was the death of the attackers (who apparently numbered between thirty-two and forty) and several dozen hostages, including at least some two dozen foreign nationals, out of hundreds of hostages who were in the plant during the attack.[1]

 

While the Algerian affair has reached its operational end, the local military effort in Mali continues, supported by some two thousand French soldiers and an aerial force, with the goal of removing global jihadist elements from the north of the country. Following the French action and on the basis of an emergency meeting of the Economic Community of West African States that took place recently in the Ivory Coast, African states, including Nigeria and Togo – whose vanguard forces have already arrived in Mali – as well as Chad, Senegal, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Guinea, have promised to send soldiers to help the Malian army. In northern Mali they face a coalition of three Salafist jihadi organizations, including Ansar al-Din, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and elements from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Ansar al-Din was established in late 2011 by a Tuareg mercenary who left the NMLA (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) because of differences with the separatist movement’s senior leadership and their lack of response to his desire to receive a leadership position. Several hundred Tuareg fighters who earned much experience in terrorism and guerilla fighting in the war in Libya have joined his organization. Ansar al-Din has a large number of sophisticated weapons that were captured or bought from Qaddafi’s arsenal. The group has adopted the Salafist jihadist approach and has worked to impose sharia law in the north of Mali with the goal of impose it in other parts of the country as well. Working alongside this group are members of MOJWA, which was established in January 2012 by natives of Africa who also left al-Qaeda in the Maghreb due to internal sectarian disputes and who share the same world view. Members of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, who fled Algeria because of pressure from Algerian security forces, have joined in operations.

 

In spite of intervention by France and its allies, it appears that the campaign to liberate Mali from global jihadist elements is just beginning. The attempt to remove these organizations from the north of Mali is likely to lead to a bloody campaign throughout the country, and possibly beyond. France’s entry into the fighting in Mali may expand or may even, despite their reservations, involve other NATO member countries in a long and bloody military campaign such as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, which featured involvement by the United States and its allies, including France. Along with support for Algeria from major Western countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain, for refusing to surrender to terror, and even before the full details of the operation were known, the deadly results of the hostage-taking incident led to international criticism over the way in which the hostage rescue was handled.

 

It remains an open question whether Algeria’s tough stance toward the terrorist attack will prevent similar incidents in the future, or whether, along with the fighting developing in Mali, it will actually open a Pandora’s box in the region that could spill over into Europe as well and result in reprisals by al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and its partners in global jihad. Furthermore, the fighting by global jihadist elements in the border areas of states with a problem of governance and large Muslim populations offers a lifeline for the battered organization of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda, and a source of rejuvenation for the global jihadist camp. Therefore, al-Qaeda’s leader will likely seek to exploit the events in Algeria and Mali to fish in these troubled waters and encourage his affiliates to wage jihad to defend the occupied lands of Islam while removing the local rulers who collaborate with their Western crusader patrons.

 

 

Font: Yoram Schweitzer is a senior research fellow and head of the program on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict at INSS. Olga Bogorad is an intern in the program, and Einav Yogev is a research assistant and Partnerships Manager at INSS.
 

[1] These were the figures publicly released at the time of this writing.

Failed Attack on Ahmed Doğan in Sofia 19/01/2013

Failed assassination attempt on Ahmed Dogan, a Bulgarian politician and chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, during his speech at the National Palace of Culture in Sofia

Renewed Negotiations between Turkey and the PKK: Hopes for a Breakthrough?

The reports of a resumption of negotiations between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan represent one of the positive developments of early 2013. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan is highly popular among his public, and one of the major expectations of him is that he will be able to achieve a solution to this painful issue, which has already caused the death of 40,000 people in Turkey, including 700 in 2012. While under ErdoÄŸan Turkey has made unprecedented progress towards a solution,recently, however, and especially since the 2011 parliamentary elections, it appeared that the "Kurdish Opening" had come to a halt.

As in the preceding round of talks, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization is in charge of the talks. This time, however, the talks are being publicly acknowledged in their initial stages. In addition to these contacts, two members of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) were authorized to meet with Öcalan. This is a significant development, because over the past 14 years, Öcalan on principle was allowed to meet only with his lawyers and his family, and recently, not even that. In November 2012, when Öcalan ordered an end to the hunger strike of hundreds of Kurdish prisoners in Turkish jails after over two months, rumors circulated that this order was part of a more extensive deal. At the same time, however, there were also alarming signals, when ErdoÄŸan said that a restoration of the death penalty in Turkey should be considered, thereby hinting at the fate of Öcalan, who was already sentenced to death, although in 2002 his sentence was commuted to life in prison (following legislation abolishing the death penalty in Turkey).

The Kurdish question, which constitutes a fundamental problem for Turkey, is significant not only for the internal Turkish political sphere, but for Turkey’s relations with its neighbors, including Iraq, Iran, and Syria as well. Turkey’s recent relations with these three countries have been rocky, and Turkey fears that these states will use the PKK to promote their anti-Turkish interests. Overall, Turkey has made substantial progress over the past decade in its readiness to discuss the Kurdish question. Formerly a taboo, the subject is currently debated widely in the media, and innumerable opinion pieces explore the question of how to deal with the issue. This openness is important preparation for the concessions that will be required of both sides for the sake of an historic reconciliation between them.

The upheaval in the Arab world affected the Kurds in Turkey indirectly. It appears that the uprisings encouraged Kurdish demands in Turkey, and the fact that the civil war in Syria engendered hope of Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria was perceived as a positive development by Kurds. Nevertheless, while the effect of the "Arab awakening" on the renewal of negotiations with Öcalan should not be underestimated, past experience indicates that whenever Kurdish independence in the neighboring countries seemed more likely, Turkey often responded with repression, not dialogue. Turkey’s good relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq are also only part of the explanation. Given the tension and instability in Iraq, the KRG is highly dependent on its partnership with Turkey, so its ability to exert pressure is limited.

What has probably already influenced ErdoÄŸan’s considerations, and will continue to do so, are the forthcoming 2014 Turkish presidential elections (and local elections before that throughout the country). For the first time in the history of the Turkish republic, the Turkish president will be elected by popular vote, and ErdoÄŸan, who has not denied that he is interested in the job, wants to win enough votes to triumph in the first round. While before the 2011 parliamentary elections ErdoÄŸan tried to increase his support in part by appealing to nationalistic voters, it appears that purpose of the negotiations with Öcalan is to persuade at least some Kurdish voters to support him, and to regain the votes of liberal elements in Turkey.

An encouraging sign of success in the current round of talks with the PKK is the broad support that the negotiations are attracting, ranging from the Republican People’s Party, the leading opposition party in Turkey, to strong support from the prominent Turkish religious leader Fethullah Gülen. The only ones expressing opposition are members of the National Movement Party, but they are the last ones from whom support could be expected on this issue. On the Kurdish side, the situation is somewhat more complicated. Many will follow Öcalan’s orders, but the fact that he has been in prison for 14 years has generated new leadership that is more independent in its views. The recent mysterious murders of three PKK members in Paris may be an indication of such an internal rift in the movement.

In the past, Israel was among those who aided Turkey in its struggle against the PKK. When relations between Turkey and Israel deteriorated, this cooperation was discontinued. Nevertheless, over the years (before the downturn in relations, and especially after it), Israel has been accused from time to time of cooperation with the PKK against Turkey. The Turkish press recently renewed the charge that on the same day the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara was intercepted on its way to the Gaza Strip, Israel helped the organizers of a PKK terrorist attack against Turkish soldiers. These repeated accusations, despite being based on the flimsiest of evidence, are grounded in traditional Turkish paranoia about foreigners being the main source of strength of the PKK. In any case, such accusations do nothing to alleviate the already tense relations between Israel and Turkey. Fruitful negotiations with the PKK might ease this element of suspicion toward Israel in Turkey. More fundamentally, solving the deep problem of Turkey’s relations with its Kurdish minority would help it come closer to the West and also contribute to Turkey’s becoming a more relevant model for its neighbors with regard to majority-minority relations.

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Tunisia Releases Suspect in Benghazi Attack.

A court in Tunis ordered the release of Ali Hamzi, a Tunisian suspected of involvement in the terror attack on the U.S. consulate in Libya.





A court in Tunis on Monday ordered the release of Ali Hamzi, a Tunisian suspected of involvement in the terror attack on the U.S. consulate in Libya last September, his lawyer Abdelbasset Ben Mbarek said, according to AFP.

The ruling came after Hamzi, 26, was interrogated by four FBI agents and a translator in Tunisia last month, in the absence of a defense lawyer, with Mbarek describing the methods used during the interrogation of his client as "scandalous."

"He has returned to his family," the lawyer told AFP.

"If he had been implicated in the attack, he would not have been released," he said, adding that his client remained under judicial control because he was still charged with belonging to a terrorist group.

Hamzi was detained while trying to enter Turkey after the September 11 attack on the U.S. mission in Libya's eastern city of Benghazi, in which the ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans were killed, AFP reported.

He was deported back to Tunisia in October, where he was charged with belonging to "a terrorist group based abroad."

He had refused to be interrogated by FBI agents.

Tunisia's justice ministry has defended its right to cooperate fully with the United States in combating terrorism.

Others involved in the Benghazi attack were terrorists affiliated with the groups Ansar al Shari'a and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), based in Algeria.

Another suspect arrested in connection with the Benghazi attack is believed to be organizing a new terror group.

The suspect, Mohammed Abu Jamal Ahmed, was arrested in Egypt on suspicion of involvement in the attack.

Font: By Elad Benari

Following Egypt's Constitutional Referendum: Polarization and Collapse: Egyptian Discourse on the Social Networks,

In the two rounds of voting in the referendum on Egypt's constitution (December 15 and December 22, 2012), only 17 million Egyptians – 32 percent of the 52 million Egyptians eligible to vote – cast ballots. Of these, 10 million, i.e., 64 percent of those voting, voted in favor of the constitution, and 7 million, 36 percent, voted against. For every 100 Egyptians, 20 voted in favor, 12 voted against, and 68 did not bother to vote.

 

The dialogue in the Egyptian social media paints a dismal picture: “forgery, fraud, fear, despair, anger, depression, polarization, and rage” are words that appear frequently in connection with current events in Egypt. The constitution was intended to be a cornerstone of Egypt post-revolution: a reflection of Egyptian society, revolutionary demands, and a national consensus on Egyptian values. Instead, however, the constitution is deepening religious and social rifts in Egypt – between Islamists and secularists, extremists and liberals, rural and urban, and rich and poor, and between those who claim to speak in the name of God and those who speak in the name of liberalism and freedom.

 

Since President Morsi pushed his constitution through, a sense of social chaos – due to incompetent governance, lack of personal safety, and impending economic collapse – has been expressed on the social networks. This has led Egyptian citizens to arm themselves for self-protection, buy up US dollars, and hunker down against the approaching storm. In other words, there is a sense that it is only a matter of time before Egypt’s socioeconomic pyramid collapses. What follows is a breakdown of the main trends now being discussed on Egypt's social networks.

 

The Shrinking Base of the Muslim Brotherhood

Public opinion leaders on the networks emphasize that only 10 million Egyptians voted in favor of the constitution that affects 90 million citizens, while 7 million voted against. The fact that 68 percent of those eligible to vote boycotted the referendum is a reflection of the lack of confidence in the system.

 

Cairo: In the capital city, 57 percent of voters rejected the constitution. A statistical analysis shows that the Islamic camp has lost the support of the social and intellectual elite, the middle class, and in some urban neighborhoods, even the poor.

 

Alexandria: Alexandria has long been known as the primary support base of the Salafist parties in Egypt. In the parliamentary elections, 66 percent of the city's voters cast their ballots for the Freedom and Justice Party or the al-Nour Party. In the referendum, only 56 percent voted in favor of the constitution. The explanation given in the social media is that the tools for mobilization traditionally employed by the Islamists – namely, religious ceremonies and Friday sermons in the mosque – have lost their efficacy.

Lower Egypt (north): In Monufia, Sharqia, Kafr el-Sheikh, and Dakahlia, poor regions with high illiteracy rates, 60 percent of voters approved the constitution, significantly less than the 84 percent who voted for the Islamist parties in the parliamentary elections in 2011. Many on the social networks believe that vote rigging flourishes in impoverished areas, where the votes of the poor are easily bought with handouts of bread, sugar, and fuel. The results of the referendum, however, reveal that even in the poor governorates, such traditional methods are becoming less effective.

Upper Egypt (South): Although the south is also poor with high illiteracy rates, 81 percent voted in favor of the constitution, which the social networks attribute to hatred of and prejudice against the large Coptic population. Islamist imams played the ethnic card, preaching in their Friday sermons: “You have to choose: the Christians or us. Decide whom you want: Muhammad or George." The majority of the Copts boycotted the elections. In the sentiment voiced on the Egyptian social networks, Egypt "is truly a country where the dead can vote, but the Copts can't.”

 

Chaos: Lawlessness and Poor Governance

The regime's incompetence in running the country, its failure to deal with the economic crisis, and the weakening of law and order are popular topics of discussion in the social media. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is successful in mobilizing support in elections, it is unable to govern effectively. Five months after President Morsi was elected, he is still unable to pass laws without being forced to suspend or rescind them shortly afterwards. Between early October and December, Morsi enacted four laws: a “constitutional declaration” that granted him absolute power, a ban on pornography, a curfew on shops and cafes, and tax hikes on soft drinks, alcohol, and cigarettes. All were suspended or rescinded because of widespread outrage on the social networks. In December, after the decision was announced that the referendum would proceed as scheduled even in the absence of a national consensus, many senior officials announced their resignation: Egyptian Central Bank Governor Farouq el-Oqda, Egyptian Vice President and former Judge Mahmoud Mekki, the new public prosecutor Talaat Ibrahim, Minister of Communications Hany Mahmoud, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Mohamed Mahsoub, and several presidential advisors. Attempting to preserve a facade of stability, President Morsi announced that he did not accept their resignations, forcing the officials to withdraw them.

 

Weakening of Internal Security

Descriptions abound of entire neighborhoods that have armed themselves to protect their residents from theft, violence, and other criminal activity. In December, 30 party headquarters and offices of the Muslim Brotherhood were vandalized, and some even torched. The main office of the al-Wafd party, the offices of the independent media, and several Cairo police stations were attacked, and two Salafi preachers in Alexandria were forced to take refuge in mosques after being chased by angry mobs. Meanwhile, the Sinai Peninsula has become fertile ground for terrorism and organized crime, including weapons and drug smuggling, which has created a flourishing black market in gas and basic foodstuffs.

The Collapse of the Socioeconomic Pyramid

One of the goals of the Egyptian revolution was to replace the traditional socioeconomic and political structure with a more democratic and liberal alternative. The first year of the revolution witnessed the collapse of the top tier of the pyramid, including the removal of President Mubarak, senior officials in his administration, and later, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. The second year of the revolution featured the victory of political Islam and its clash with the secular liberal camp. However, the battle between these two middle class forces over Egypt's future identity is becoming increasingly burdensome on the lower class. In the third year of the revolution, two groups from the bottom of the pyramid are expected to make their own breakthrough: the poor and the radical Salafis. These groups were among the 68 percent who did not vote in the referendum, either because of a lack of interest and frustration, or because the only law they recognize is “God’s law.” Any economic reform that results in price hikes of food, fuel, and cigarettes could easily ignite this highly volatile situation.

 

Future Challenges: Polarization and Collapse

Taken together, incompetent governance, weak internal security, economic deterioration, the stagnant tourism industry, and the ongoing civil revolt in Egypt are driving the country towards a severe crisis. Despite the success of the Islamist camp in every election thus far, the secular liberal camp is gaining momentum and their political and organizational power is growing stronger. Although the leaderships of both camps want to avoid complete economic collapse, fear and rejection of the other distracts them from the nation's needs. Locked in this zero-sum struggle over the rule of sharia or liberal freedoms, it is clear to both sides that whoever blinks first will lose. The social networks note that until now, “Sharia has yet to feed even a single empty stomach,” and that freedom and human rights will therefore prove triumphant.

The balance of power between the Islamist and secular liberal camps will inevitably affect the character and identity of Egypt. The current socioeconomic structure is unstable given the imbalance between government, the economy, civil society, religion, and internal security. According to the assessment of public opinion leaders on the social networks, despite domestic and foreign interests in Egypt's stability, socioeconomic collapse is inevitable unless the two camps reach a consensus.


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