Sinai: Implications of the Security Challenges for Egypt and Israel: Egyptian Discourse on the Social Networks..

On Thursday, May 16, 2013, seven Egyptian soldiers were kidnapped in El Arish in northern Sinai. According to the Egyptian press, the kidnappers belonged to a Salafi jihadist group affiliated with al-Qaeda. Sheikh Muhammad al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian Salafist cleric and the brother of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced the kidnappers’ demands for the release of several prisoners who were held as terrorists and tortured at al-Tura prison.

 

Throughout the crisis, a recurrent theme on the Egyptian social media stressed that this was a classic case of negotiating with terrorists in exchange for kidnapped soldiers. According to one prominent Egyptian commentator, “In Egypt, we elect terrorists, release terrorists, and negotiate with terrorists.” Despite army recommendations to the contrary, President Morsi authorized Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim to initiate negotiations, which after one week resulted in the release of the hostages.

 

This article highlights several public opinion trends that emerged in the Egyptian social media against the backdrop of the event, reflecting popular ideas of the “Egyptian street” on Muslim Brotherhood-military relations, Sinai, Gaza, and the peace treaty with Israel.
 

 

The Military vs. the Presidency: An Ongoing Conflict
 

Who holds the power on matters of national security powers? On November 17, 2012, President Morsi issued a presidential decree granting Defense Minister Abdul Fatah el-Sisi exclusive authority on issues of national security, military operations, deployment of troops, and mobilization of the reserves. This transfer of power took place at a time when President Morsi sought the support of the military in the upcoming national referendum on the Egyptian constitution. Since then, however, relations between President Morsi and the Defense Minister have deteriorated. Two incidents surrounding the kidnappings further highlight the growing rift between the two sides and the problematic implications for issues of national security. The first was the President’s decision to retake authority on national security matters into his own hands, violating his earlier decree. Although the army advocated for a military operation, President Morsi opted for negotiations. In the second incident, the President then transferred those powers to the Ministry of the Interior, reflecting his mistrust of the army.
 

 

The Military and the Egyptian Public: The Demand for a “New Army”
 

What follows is a sampling of the Egyptian social media discourse: “Armies are measured by their ability to fight, not by how many pasta factories they own.” “We need a new army.” “Is the Egyptian army just another militia that we, the public, is sponsoring?” “If the army cannot free its own soldiers, why do we think that it can defend Egypt’s borders?”

 

The Egyptian social media clearly demanded the use of military force against the kidnappers. Most social media members advocated cleansing” the Sinai area of jihadist terrorist cells, even at the expense of military and police casualties. The army’s failure to act provoked serious criticism among social media users, many of whom argued that “national security should take precedence over political considerations.”
 

 

The Gaza Nuisance: End of the Romance between the Two Publics
 

Both the Egyptian and the Gazan publics have begun to blame one another for their woes. Many activists in the Egyptian social media have begun to view Gaza as the source of Sinai’s security problems, pointing the finger at Gaza for every terrorist attack or kidnapping before evidence of Palestinian involvement even emerges. Immediately after the abductions, allegations began to appear in the Egyptian social media implicating the Dughmush clan from the southern Gaza Strip. Calls emerged for the immediate closure of the Rafah crossing and a large scale operation against the smuggling tunnels connecting Gaza and Egypt. The public resentment was such that Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh felt obligated to condemn the kidnappings, proclaiming Hamas’ respect for Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai and refuting Palestinian involvement.

 

For their part, commentators in the Gazan social media protested the allegations of the Egyptian street, asking, “Why are Gazans the first to pay the price of security problems in the Sinai?” and asserting that “in the past, we were the scapegoat of Israel, and now, we’re the scapegoat of Egypt.” Soaring Gazan expectations that the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt would bring an improvement in their standard of living was soon followed by disillusionment, disappointment, and frustration. They now accuse Morsi of being worse for Gaza than Mubarak. Some Egyptians and Gazans argue that the Gazan festering resentment will soon explode.
 

 

The Peace Treaty with Israel
 

Egyptian social media activists in do not wish to annul the peace treaty with Israel, but they demand changes in the military annex of the agreement. Many now call for an end to the “winks and hints” method that has replaced official policy between Egypt and Israel in Sinai. Although it is widely known that Israel is now permitting Egyptian forces to enter into the sparsely manned demilitarized zones, many demand that the military annex be revised to legally codify full Egyptian sovereignty throughout Sinai. Many are even prepared to accept closer security cooperation with Israel, provided that it be transparent and open. Some question why the Egyptian military does not enlist Israeli aid in fighting terror, since “in any case, we have an agreement with [Israel], so let’s at least benefit from it.”
 

 

The Fear of a Second Naksa: Will Israel Reoccupy Sinai?
 

There are two prevalent fears expressed on the Egyptian social media in relation to Israel and Sinai: Sinai will continue to be fertile breeding ground for jihadist militias, whose activities could lead to an Israeli decision to reoccupy Sinai (a second Naksa) or an open-ended military operation that would violate Egyptian sovereignty. Even though Israel is not yet considering any such action, Egyptian social media users remain unconvinced because of their collective memory of the naksa in 1967. There is therefore a growing demand for a comprehensive Egyptian military operation in Sinai to cleanse the area of these terrorist elements.
 

 

Conclusion
 

The social media discourse reveals that there is considerable concern over the possible negative consequences for Egypt of the Sinai security and governance vacuum. The three forces competing for dominance in Egypt – the Muslim Brotherhood, the military, and liberal activists – view Hamas in Gaza and other extremist armed organizations as a challenge to Egyptian national security. They fear that their smuggling and terrorist activities could drag Egypt into a military conflict with Israel, which is not in Egypt’s best interests.

 

President Morsi is systematically chipping away at the army’s national security powers in violation of the presidential decree that transferred extraordinary powers to the army during the referendum of the constitution. At the moment, the army has shown restraint, focusing its energies on preserving its assets and interests, as well as the salaries and pensions of its senior officers. The army views its relationship with the IDF as a unique strategic asset that affords it power and authority to deal with future internal and external challenges.

 

Overall, Egyptian social media activists are advocating transparency and an end to political doublespeak and the withholding of information from the Egyptian public. They prefer to expose the entire system of security ties, including increased cooperation with Israel, and amend the military annex of the peace treaty to allow for full Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai.

 

 

 

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Who’s talking the most nonsense about Edward Snowden? It’s a tough contest.

From which of the actors engaged in the thoroughly entertaining case of Edward Snowden has come the biggest spewing-out of cant, do you reckon? Edward himself? The Guardian? Or the Yanks or -Chinese?

Edward was a fairly low-level CIA technical contractor in Hawaii when he released to the world details of his government’s clandestine electronic surveillance programme (Prism) and also some stuff about our own much-loved GCHQ in Cheltenham. Apparently shocked to the core to discover that the security services were secretly spying on people, Edward was gripped by a spasm of narcissistic outrage and said: ‘I don’t want to live in a society which does these sorts of things.’ No, indeed — at which point he duly fled the immoral and abusive USA for a bolthole in the open, transparent, consensual and liberal People’s Republic of China, where ‘these sorts of things’ are beyond the pale.

The Chinese did not arrest Edward and send him back to the USA, as some politicians in Washington — presumably whacked out of their minds on psychotropic substances — fondly imagined they would. Instead they let him get on a plane for another sort of bolthole in a similar paragon of democracy and openness, Russia. Cue, then, some fantastic expressions of faux outrage and cant from Washington about China’s ‘deliberate choice to release a fugitive despite a valid arrest warrant’. Also weighing in was that charismatic political powerhouse and Mr Punch lookalike John Kerry, who described the Chinese inaction as ‘deeply troubling’.

I assume the commies were rendered insensate with laughter for a while after hearing this stern admonition: Snowden’s revelations, of course, concerned covert surveillance directed primarily at the Chinese (in particular, Chinese mobile telephone companies), and Beijing subsequently praised the traitor for ‘tearing off Washington’s sanctimonious mask’. Well, quite. Why on earth should China offer succour to the US, under such conditions — and who would be daft enough to think it would? This was confected outrage for public consumption, of course.

The official reason for not having extradited Snowden was that the American paperwork was said not to be in proper order, but one assumes they chucked the relevant forms in the bin and, sniggering fit to bust, put the bloke on the first plane for Moscow.

‘It’s a request for asylum from Charles Saatchi.’

And of course China’s outrage is a bit on the cantish side too, no? China is considered, not unreasonably, to be the gravest cyber-threat to the USA, with the People’s Liberation Army having been accused of training 30,000 cyber-spies to hack into US defence and financial companies, and another 150,000 private sector cyber-spies paid for by Beijing to wreak similar havoc. A recent US report — Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 — stated: ‘China is using its computer network exploitation to support intelligence against the US diplomatic, economic and defence and industrial base sectors that support US national defence programmes.’

I can’t see much reason to doubt this assertion. I wonder if the CIA contractor Edward Snowden was aware that the Chinese, too, are partial to a bit of jiggery-pokery themselves? We have yet to be offered Edward’s opinion as to whether or not the Chinese electronic espionage is morally OK or not, which is a shame, because I for one need urgent guidance on this issue.

Right now, though, we do not even know where Edward is, so we cannot look to him for further moral guidance. We do know that he got on a plane for Moscow and was holed up for a while in one of those weird capsule hotel rooms at the airport. He had been expected to depart the next day on a flight to the freedom-loving bastion that is Cuba, from which destination he was expected to take a further flight to Venezuela and hence to that last recourse for faux-leftish narcissistic whistle-blowers, Ecuador. This supposed stage of his trip, then, comprises exclusively belligerent and corrupt gringo-hating quasi-socialist banana republics where the respective records on human rights leave a little to be desired, frankly. Ecuador, for example, has recently been castigated by both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for ‘undercutting’ freedom of speech and freedom of the press, as well as having a corrupt and politically partisan judiciary and locking up people on trumped-up terrorism charges. When he eventually arrives in Quito, will Edward be forced to conclude once more that he does not wish to live in a society which ‘does these sorts of things’? Or will he manage, somehow, to square it with his overweening conscience — in the manner of that other supreme narcissist, the WikiLeaks weirdo Julian Assange, who is still holed up in the Ecuadorian embassy and appears every so often on the balcony to wave to his deluded supporters (Mr J. Pilger Esq.) and smirk at Jemima Khan.

The notion, for either Assange or Snowden, that there might be greater evils in the world, and that they might well be aiding these greater evils, simply does not impinge. For Snowden, clearly, it is the precise opposite of that old exhortation, my country right or wrong. It’s any country but my country, no matter how wicked it might be. It is again the unthinking absolutism of the fool, or the tyrant.



Font: Rod Liddle  The Spectator magazine, dated 29 June 2013

.Syrian Christians beheaded by al-Nusra Front islamists

 

 

 



 

Militants in Syria have brutally beheaded two Christians, one of them a priest, because they were suspected of cooperating with the Syrian army. A video released on the internet shows a group of al-Nusra Front terrorists who have roped two Christian men to execute them in front of a gathering in Idlib. The terrorists say in the video that they have found phone numbers in the two men’s cells that belonged to people in the Syrian army. They cut off the men’s heads while shouting victoriously.

Many cities and villages in Syria have been sad scenes of brutal and heartless killings and violations as the country is struggling with a massive foreign-backed insurgency for more than two years. While innocent people are losing their lives every day in Syria, the Unites States, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are pushing hard to send more arms to Syria to topple the government. Syria crisis started as pro-reform protests but with interventions by the US, UK and their regional and Western allies it soon turned to a massive insurgency which took in numerous terrorist groups from all over Europe and the Middle East to wage one of the bloodiest wars the region has ever experienced. The crisis, which many fear is turning to a “war of hatred”, has already taken more than 90,000 lives.

 

 

 

 

 

TRE UOMINI, FORSE MONACI, DECAPITATI DA AL NUSRA IN SIRIA

 Middle East Christian News Agency ha dato la notizia e Radio France International l’ha rilanciata pubblicando un video di 9 minuti che mostra un estremista che arringa una folla e un altro guerrigliero che sgozza tre uomini inginocchiati e con le mani legate dietro alla schiena e li decapita uno a uno, sollevando le teste mozzate.

 Si parla di tre monaci francescani che sarebbero stati prelevati dal convento di Ghassanieh, un monastero nel nord della Siria, vicino a Homs, saccheggiato e devastato dagli jihadisti, notizia contestata da Asia News che pensa non sia vero che si tratti di francescani perchè questi religiosi non sarebbero presenti nella zona di Ghassanieh, teatro della barbara esecuzione.

 L'unica certezza riguarda l'uccisione di padre Francois Mourad, un monaco siriano della cui morte era stata data notizia domenica scorsa in un assalto al convento di Ghassanieh da parte di ribel...li jihadisti, ma non è chiaro se sia uno dei tre uomini che compaiono nel video.

 Padre Francois si era ritirato a vivere come eremita qualche anno fa a Ghassanieh, un villaggio abitato prevalentemente da cristiani nel distretto di Jisr al-Shighur, nella provincia di Idlib, al confine con la Turchia. Avrebbe tentato di difendere le suore del Rosario presenti nel convento.

 I cristiani sono sempre più un bersaglio dei ribelli estremisti sunniti nella guerra civile che ha già fatto oltre 100mila morti in Siria. Secondo Syria report, a maggio un intero villaggio cristiano della provincia di Homs è stato ridotto in cenere e non si hanno più avute notizie di due vescovi rapiti ad Aleppo all'inizio dell'anno.

E Obama sta dalla parte e aiuta questi terroristi!

Obama vuole armare questi Islamici?

Gli stessi che 11 settembre 2011 hanno attaccato gli US ....

A Recurrent Posture: The EU on the Palestinian Issue.

On June 20, 2013, at the end of a routine visit to the region (which included stops in Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority), Lady Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, met in Israel with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As expected, the Israeli-Palestinian issue was a main topic of conversation. The Prime Minister reportedly asked Ashton to withhold publication of a statement by EU foreign ministers condemning Israel for construction in the Jewish settlements on the West Bank and presenting the EU principles for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A senior source explained that publication at this time, just three days before the arrival of Secretary of State John Kerry for another round of talks in Jerusalem, would damage US administration efforts to renew the negotiations. Furthermore, Israel contended, the statement is inappropriate, and its timing does more harm than good.

Ashton likely informed the Prime Minister of the differences of opinion among EU members on the content and timing of the statement that was subsequently issued at the June 24, 2013 meeting of the foreign ministers. Ashton reportedly did not hide her dismay over Great Britain and France’s intention to issue a statement that would elaborate on the EU stances on the process in general and the obstacles in particular that the sides – especially Israel – have posed to negotiations on the two-state solution. Germany and Italy, among others, were of like mind with Ashton.

The short statement issued at the end of the ministers’ meeting, which reaffirms the EU commitment to the two-state solution and supports the efforts of the United States to renew direct, substantive negotiations, is an achievement for Ashton, who argued that since Kerry’s efforts to renew talks between Israel and the Palestinians are the only game in town, it is counterproductive to raise obstacles by issuing statements liable to damage his efforts. The Palestinian side would presumably have welcomed a more detailed statement, which even had it included some criticism of Palestinian conduct in terms of incitement would have directed the brunt of the condemnation at Israel regarding the settlements and would also have spelled out the EU position on the principles of the permanent solution, which are close to their own stances.

The EU’s willingness to accommodate Netanyahu and refrain from major exhortations (which in recent years have become a fixed ritual) is not open-ended and depends on results. A renewal of talks between Israel and the Palestinians, as important as it may be, will not be enough for the EU; the EU wants real progress. In light of the substantive fundamental disagreements between the sides on issues linked to a permanent solution, one may assume that real progress is unlikely. A deadlock in the talks will empower nations such as France and Great Britain to resume public expression on their stances.

A close reading of the May 2012 statement from the meeting of the EU foreign ministers reveals the major differences of opinion between the EU and Israel: 

 a. The changes occurring in the region make the need for progress in the process more urgent.
Prime Minister Netanyahu disagrees; more than a few Israelis feel that the instability surrounding Israel requires it to be all the more cautious on territorial concessions liable to affect the country’s security.

 b. The possibility of a two-state solution must be safeguarded. The EU statement expressed profound concern that developments on the ground threaten to render a two-state solution unfeasible, among them: an accelerated rate of construction since the end of the building freeze in 2010; the evacuation of Arabs from their homes and the razing of houses in East Jerusalem; expanded Jewish construction in several Jerusalem neighborhoods; the prevention of various cultural and economic ventures in East Jerusalem; the deterioration in the living conditions of Palestinians in Area C; and a significant reduction in Palestinian Authority steps for the economic development of Area C. Such steps are liable to endanger the PA’s achievements in state building unless they are resolved.
The reference to concern that a two-state solution could become impracticable was made in the context of placing the blame solely on Israel, whose policy, according to the EU, stands to invalidate the two-state option. The last point and the criticism of limiting the PA’s activities in Area C are new motifs not mentioned in the prior declaration of May 2011. Should Israel’s conduct in Area C, which one day is supposed to be part of the Palestinian state, not change, one can expect that this issue will become a major bone of contention between Israel and the EU.

 c. The EU is determined to safeguard the two-state option based on international law. As in prior statements, the EU holds that the Jewish settlements in the West Bank are illegal according to international law, regardless of Israeli government decisions. There will be no recognition of any change to the 1967 borders, including Jerusalem, unless these are mutually agreed upon by the sides. The EU affirms its commitment to implement legislation and bilateral agreements on products of the West Bank settlements.
Similar to the American position, the EU – unlike Israel – views the 1967 borders as the starting point for negotiations and no change will be supported unless it is mutually acceptable. The statement makes no reference to land swaps. For the first time in the history of EU statements, reference is made to labeling products as made in occupied territory. While ostensibly a technical point, consistent with the agreement signed between Israel and EU, the decision, distinguishing between occupied territory and Israeli territory according to the 1967 borders, has clear political ramifications. Israel contends that territorial issues must be determined on the basis of negotiations. Moreover, in implementing this decision, the EU is bringing pressure to bear on Israel. Even if the economic implications are for the moment slight, the potential for serious damage to Israeli products in general could be extensive. Publication of the guidelines for implementing this policy will likely be postponed because of the effort underway to resume the negotiations; however, in light of the pressure of a significant number of EU members that are displeased with Israel’s settlement policy, implementation of the guidelines will not disappear from the agenda.

 d. The statement reiterates the need to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of both states through negotiations.

 e. The statement speaks of economic and social development of Area C as critical for maintaining the viability of a future Palestinian state, and hence the call on Israel to allow the PA to operate there.

 f. The statement expresses concern about extremism and incitement on the part of Jewish settlers.

 g. The statement expresses concern about reports on journalists being arrested in the PA and calls on the media and others to stop the incitement.

 h. The statement recognizes Israel’s legitimate security concerns, but calls for opening the border crossings to the Gaza Strip for humanitarian assistance.

 Every encounter with representatives of EU member states emphasizes the glaring and seemingly unbridgeable gaps in the major issues for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is also a fundamental difference of opinion on the importance of the conflict on the regional agenda. Israel feels that not only are conditions unripe for a comprehensive resolution of the conflict, but regional instability (e.g., Syria and of course Iran) must be given priority. In contrast, the EU persists in assigning urgency to the conflict precisely because of the regional instability. The EU’s recent decision to make do with issuing a brief statement at the end of the latest meeting of the foreign ministers suited both the Israeli Prime Minister and the American administration. Yet the distrust regarding Netanyahu’s commitment to the two-state solution is evident in talks with European officials, and therefore some are calling on the EU to toughen its stance on Israel and even recognize a Palestinian state unless the talks demonstrate progress. If indeed there are no prospects for serious negotiations, the Israeli government should seriously consider constructive independent proactive steps that will advance a two-state reality.

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China's Space Program Tries to Catch Up



The rocket carrying the Shenzhou 10 spacecraft blasts off June 11. (ChinaFotoPress/Getty Images)

Summary

China's strategic focus on space is less about national pride than about the importance of space for both the military and economic progress of the country. The Chinese space program has developed rapidly over the past decade, illustrating the importance of the program to Beijing. Shenzhou 10, a 15-day mission that began June 11 and returned to Earth the morning of June 26 marked China's fifth manned mission to space. An increasing, ongoing presence in space is essential for civilian and military communications. Satellites' functions include navigation systems such as GPS, weather data and communications relays. But the significance of space goes beyond satellites. Technological advancement and development is required for countries such as China that want to participate in future resource development in space.
 

Analysis

The Chinese space program officially began in 1958. Beijing launched its first earth-orbiting satellite in 1970, and while there were a series of launch failures in the 1990s, China carried out its first manned mission -- Shenzhou 5, which put a man in orbit -- in 2003. More manned missions would follow in 2005, 2008 and 2012. A major uptick in activity began in 2010, when China successfully completed 15 unmanned launches, including a lunar orbiting probe. Nineteen more launches would follow in 2011 and 2012. China is now one of only two countries -- Russia being the other -- actively putting people into space and plans to land an unmanned craft on the moon in late 2013.

The latest mission, Shenzhou 10, was launched as part of the testing process for docking capabilities with Tiangong 1, the small space module that is part of the program that will eventually culminate in China's own full-sized space station, planned for the 2020s. The mission, which reached completion June 26, also set out to advance flying abilities; demonstrate adaptability and efficiency while completing objectives on the complex; and test coordination of various systems.

Benefits of Space Exploration

Continued advancements in space-related technology will enable China to compete on the commercial and military fronts as more activity becomes dependent on space-based infrastructure. Prior to satellite communications, surveillance and detection abilities and communication were limited by line of sight and by the atmosphere, which can reflect signals and can distort and dilute their strength. Space-based infrastructure also enables more efficient communication over time.

Satellites are also essential to the coordination of a global military presence. Modern global warfare requires the acquisition of data and ability to move and utilize data in real time. This need is highly dependent on satellites, which provide the necessary sensors to "see" what is happening and the transmission capabilities to distribute this data.

However, the defense of satellites remains difficult. In addition to anti-satellite missiles, it is also possible to blind and jam satellites. Given the imbalance between the United States and the nearest competitors when it comes to space-based technologies (and reliance on these technologies), the disabling or destruction of U.S. satellites would be a bigger blow than a similar retaliatory response. But as China becomes more reliant on satellites for communications, military or otherwise, it is less likely to interfere with U.S. satellites for fear of retaliation (and vice versa), an effect similar to the nuclear standoff in the Cold War.

The Future of Space Exploration

While the current motivation for an increased space presence is satellite technology, continued progress in space is vital for future strategy as well. Resource acquisition will likely be a priority for future space exploration. The United States, Russia and Europe are all continuing efforts to expand space activity (though the United States is increasingly looking toward the private sector for further space development). Beijing cannot afford to be left behind in the ongoing pursuit to establish a greater presence in space. As the world's most populous country, China will continually have to seek out new resources in order to support and sustain itself. Space cannot be ignored as a potential, critical future source.

For example, asteroid mining may seem farfetched, but it could be a real possibility in the coming decades. NASA's strategy that seeks to find, capture and explore asteroids that may threaten Earth is currently competing for room in the budget with, among other things, exploration of Mars and lunar missions. There are also a few private asteroid-mining companies seeking to develop the necessary technology. There are likely many overlaps between the technology necessary to capture or divert an asteroid and that needed to exploit an asteroid for its resources.

Asteroids are a potential source of many substances, including nickel, iron and even water -- essential starting materials for constructing infrastructure in space or on the moon. The ability to extract resources in space could be instrumental in making space-based construction economical. Currently, lifting costs (the cost to get a material into space) are a limiting factor in the economics of space development.

While the returns on programs aimed at the future development of space are limited at the moment, the infrastructure, once built, can take several forms, including possible bases or colonies on the moon and Mars. Once space-based construction does become economically viable, only the countries that have established programs and research will able to take advantage of the new frontier. Much like the naval powers of history were able to colonize on other continents, it will be the space powers that will have the advantage on the moon or Mars.

As these pursuits move forward, it is important to remember that throughout history, research done to advance space exploration has found a way into everyday life, from something as simple as Velcro to advanced composite materials that can withstand immense heat. Research currently targeted for space also has the potential to improve earth-based technologies. Ongoing development in space has already had tangible benefits, including increased cellphone coverage (and ease of international calls), improved weather and GPS coverage and improved mapping technology.

While the path of ongoing development of space is unknown, the earlier a country enters this new space race, the better. Even so, establishing a strategic presence in space requires an ongoing and active development of space programs. It is for this reason that China, while starting later than the United States and Russia, is quickly and urgently expanding its technological capabilities in space.

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Annual International Cyberspace Conference: Challenges of the Financial Sector.

The goal of the 2013 cyberspace conference is to explore the challenges and threats of cyberspace to the financial sector. Among the issues to be explored; exposure of the financial sector to cyberspace threats; protection of the financial sector from cyberspace threats;links between national security cyber challenges and the financial sector; cyberspace legislation and regulation; security technology; cyber warfare and critical infrastructure protection.

Registration Fee

Convention: 750 NIS

Workshop: 1,600 NIS

Convention + Workshop: 1,900 NIS

Purchase Tickets here
 

Please complete the form and send it by e-mail or fax to the Convention Secretariat

 

Convention Secretariat:

Anastasia Eidinov
Events Coordinator

Tel.+972.3.7330773
Fax.+972.3.7600697
Email: anastasiae@pc.co.il

 

The number of spaces is limited!

 

The convention will be held in English and Hebrew, with simultaneous translation available.

Israel's Public Debate over Natural Gas: Future Confrontations

Israel’s high ranking "quartet" – the Prime Minister, Finance Minister, Minister of Energy and Water Resources, and the Governor of the Bank of Israel – decided last week that 60 percent of the total of Israel's currently known natural gas reserves will be allocated for local consumption, and the rest will in principle be available for export. The quartet thus deviated from the recommendations of the inter-ministerial Tzemach Committee to export about half of the total quantity, thereby ensuring that Israel will be able to supply its energy needs until 2040. Although the decision earned a decisive majority when brought before the government for approval on June 23, 2013, it is highly doubtful that this will end the stormy public debate on the issue.

 

It is not clear what the quartet’s considerations were and why they departed from the working assumptions of the Tzemach Committee. The public pressure and demonstrations against some of the four quartet members presumably had their effect, although the Prime Minister took pride in not surrendering to populism. Thus, the total amount to be allocated for the Israeli economy was raised from 450 billion to 540 billion cubic meters. The Minister of Energy and Water Resources explained that the decision stemmed from the desire to ensure that Israel has gas for thirty years, three years more than the time frame addressed by the Tzemach Committee.

 

Although the decision is not unreasonable, it is difficult to understand the logic behind it, since in its entire history, Israel has not faced a crisis concerning its energy needs. The Defense Minister and senior Defense Ministry and military officials did not participate in the discussions, nor did the Minister of Strategic Affairs. More important, it is also not clear whether the Prime Minister, in his capacity as acting Foreign Minister, addressed the political-strategic considerations during the quartet’s deliberations regarding the twenty-five to thirty year period.

 

Published reports about the quartet’s discussions indicate that the needs of neighboring countries, especially Jordan, were taken into account as political-strategic considerations. This issue was discussed at an INSS conference on June 5-6, 2013 and in testimony before the Knesset Finance Committee, where it was noted that deliberation of these questions should be excluded from the greater deliberations on exports. In fact, the quartet determined that gas can already be exported to Jordan, although contrary to the quartet's recommendations, the government decided that the amount exported to Jordan should be calculated as part of the overall quantity designated for export and not considered as local consumption. At this juncture the difference between the recommendation and the final decision has no significance, as it is immediately possible to connect the pipeline between the Israeli and Jordanian sides of the Dead Sea to transport an annual amount of 500 million cubic meters. Any supply of additional gas to Jordan will be contingent on laying a suitable infrastructure on both the Israeli and Jordanian sides.

 

Yet even after the government's decision, the heated public debate will likely continue. Many questions remain unanswered, and the Knesset will not pass up the opportunity to debate the topic, given the great interest the public has shown in the issue and the pressure exerted by various interest groups. Significant changes in the quantities discovered, strong fluctuations in global gas prices, and disruptions in supply for technical reasons or because of terrorism will lead to a renewal of the public debate, as will construction of gas facilities onshore or a short distance offshore.

 

Among the different questions that have not been discussed at length in the various forums are those connected to Israel’s political and economic ties with its neighbors. Thus, for example, the discovery of gas in the Palestinian Exclusive Economic Zone will affect the overall relationship. There will almost certainly be an argument with any governmental authority in Gaza about the outlines of the maritime border. The economic logic, on the other hand, points to the option of Israel purchasing the Palestinian gas in Gaza and in turn supplying gas to the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. This would make it unnecessary to construct a gas-transmission network from Gaza to the West Bank, some 65 kilometers. Plans for laying the pipeline and any other infrastructure between Gaza and the West Bank would involve prolonged political negotiations and internal debates in Israel, as well as questions of environmental impact, and perhaps other questions as well. These could be avoided by the proposed by the proposed exchange

 

Thus far no discussions have been held on the preferred markets and whether it is possible to leverage the export of gas for diplomatic or economic purposes that go beyond the direct financial return. It is possible that the quantities of gas in Israel’s possession are not sufficiently large to be a decisive element in the long term diplomatic considerations of states such as India, China, and Russia and the European Union. However, even before such a review of Israel's long term interests is held, Woodside, the large Australian oil and gas company, has reached the advanced stages of negotiations to acquire one-third of the value from the partners that make up the consortium that today has control over Israel’s natural gas fields. Gazprom, the large Russian gas company, has reached an agreement in principle to purchase 84 billion cubic meters from the Tamar gas field. Now, in light of the decision to increase the amount of gas allocated for the Israeli economy, it is not clear whether it will be possible to implement this agreement. The interest shown in Israeli gas by countries and companies even before the government decision on the scope of the exports indicates that at the very least there is a need to examine the issue before the companies make huge investments and irrevocable facts are established.

 

Turkey is an example of the need for such a discussion, both as a potential consumer and as a transit state for Israeli gas transported to European markets. Given that delivering the gas to Cyprus or Israel, liquefying it and transporting it tankers to Europe is preferable economically, the discussion may be superfluous. However, the discussion is warranted if the difference in cost between this option and the option of connecting to pipelines in Turkey is negligible. This discussion must weigh the risks and opportunities of transporting gas through Turkey, be it from Israel or from neighboring states. There are certainly political considerations that go beyond the considerations of a gas company, no matter how large this company may be.

 

The Israeli government’s decision about the ratio of natural gas for local consumption versus export is only one decision, and many others must still be reached. The question of the taxation of the exports has not been decided, and this also has international economic implications that the government must address. The debate on this issue will be deferred for at least four months, until the Finance Ministry submits its recommendations. The states with companies vying for pieces in the greater natural gas pie will likely level significant pressure to limit the amount they will be taxed. Thus the long journey to wealth, mentioned by the prime minister in the government meeting of June 23, 2013, is only just beginning. The first stop is clear: the Supreme Court. Initially the appeals will question which institution – the Knesset or the government – is mandated to decide issues such as the ratio between local consumption and export. In the future, appeals will concern transport of the natural gas, taxation of corporate revenues from exports, and the government's use of these revenues.

 

Natural gas is of course an important part, but only a part, of a wider range of energy issues. The ratio between sources of irrecoverable energy and renewable energy; the exploitation of additional sources, such as shale oil; regional cooperation; and the location of various kinds of energy facilities are just some of the issues that require the government’s attention. Therefore, the government should establish a National Energy Authority that will deal with all aspects of energy in Israel while making use of all relevant government ministries and other institutions that have an interest in energy production, the various uses of energy, ways of transporting energy, economic aspects, safety and security issues, and joint projects with neighboring countries. The Tzemach Committee can be seen as the labor pains toward the birth of a National Energy Authority and proof of its necessity.

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The Superpowers and the Struggle over Syria.

Along with the events on the ground in Syria, the war for the country’s future is being waged on the international level. The principal players are the United States and Russia, conducting this clash while resorting alternately to pressure, threats, and attempts at dialogue. The most recent round occurred on June 17-19, 2013 at the G-8 summit in Northern Ireland. The summit, which generally deals with all major issues on the international agenda, was devoted this time almost entirely to Syria, and at the center was a charged interchange between the American and Russian Presidents about convening an international conference on Syria. Questions that will arise during the conference (dubbed Geneva-2) are now hotly debated, the key issue being Assad’s ouster.

Although the battle in Syria has become an important international issue that will affect not only the future of the region but in many ways likewise the status of the superpowers involved, the conflict between Russia and the West is not limited to Syria alone. It has increased in tenor since the start of the Arab Spring as part of an ongoing global confrontation. In this context, Russia chose the Syrian civil war as the main arena of conflict where it maintains a provocative policy that couples increased assistance to the Assad regime with military and political activity to prevent external intervention. Russia’s conduct has proven far more effective than what could reasonably have been expected, at least regarding Assad's survival. Russia would like to translate this achievement into success by promoting the idea of an international conference to determine Syria’s future and thereby enhance Russia’s status in the region and reap other dividends on the global arena. Hence the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the United States and its allies in the region to embrace the idea, the assumption being that Assad’s days are in any case numbered and that one ought not help him survive or help Russia score points in the Middle East or in its other spheres of interest.

The first – and failed – attempt to promote an international solution to the crisis occurred in late June 2012, when a group in support of Syria, composed of Security Council and regional representatives, met in Geneva (in a meeting now referred to as Geneva-1). The group formulated a joint statement calling for the establishment of a transitional government in Syria. More recently, apparently as the result of a sense that the tide has turned in Assad’s favor, an attempt to promote Geneva-2 is underway. The United States agreed to the initiative during Kerry’s visit to Russia in early May and was joined by other Western nations, with the new conference designed to begin with the conclusions reached at Geneva-1. Since then, the issue has become a key item on the international agenda, and the lack of agreement between the sides on the essence of future solutions is accompanied by respective efforts to wield influence. One can point to Russia’s intentions – not yet realized and apparently not to be fulfilled for quite some time – to supply Syria with Russian S-300 missiles, or to Western declarations to cancel the embargo on supplying the rebels with weapons, the threats to operate a no-fly zone, and the statements on red lines, along with the stationing of American anti-aircraft missiles and fighter jets in Jordan, the joint maneuvers, and more.

The G-8 summit came at the height of this contest. The issue of Syria, with emphasis on convening Geneva-2, was at the forefront of the summit. The main disagreement on the contents of the conference has to do with the future of the Syrian regime. During the summit, the topic was discussed in meetings between President Putin and President Obama and among other heads of state, with efforts made to bridge the gaps. It seems the sides reached a compromise on the very convening of a conference and the topics that will be discussed, but there are still differences on two key issues for the Russians: a statement on the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and Assad’s future. The first was resolved through the use of careful wording. The second was incorporated in the formulation of a paragraph on instituting a transitional government in Syria, leaving the main bones of contention in place.

The joint communiqué issued at the end of the summit included six paragraphs touching on Syria. These speak of:
a. A commitment to act to stop the civil war.
b. A commitment to provide a total of $1.5 billion in humanitarian aid.
c. A commitment to convene a Geneva conference as soon as possible on the basis of the understandings reached in 2012, including the establishment of a “transitional governing body with full executive powers.”
d. A commitment by the conference participants to implement its decisions and work to achieve stability and reconciliation.
e. An expression of concern about an increase in terrorism and extremism in Syria and a commitment to expel these elements, specifically al-Qaeda, from the country.
f. A strong condemnation of chemical weapons and a demand for oversight of the sites where they are stored.

The problematic paragraph, which continues to arouse controversy, speaks of the transitional government. The wording chosen as a compromise with the Russians does not refer to a government, rather to a “governing body with full executive powers.” It seems that this wording leaves the door open, at least temporarily, for Assad’s inclusion in the process, thereby giving a relative advantage to the Russians and their future plans for Syria. This reality leaves all sides deeply frustrated, despite the positive summary for a comprehensive resolution to the Syrian crisis mentioned in the joint communiqué, including the convening of an international conference. This was soon reflected by the resumption of threats issued before the summit, such as the future supply of S-300 missiles to the Syrian regime and declarations of Western intent to aid the rebels.

Meantime, the question of Geneva-2 remains open. Although the joint communiqué speaks of holding the conference as soon as possible, no specific dates were mentioned. On the summit’s sidelines it was noted that the conference date would in all likelihood be set after a meeting between American and Russian representatives and UN representatives on Syria expected to take place on June 25, 2013. It seems that a date for Geneva-2 will eventually be chosen and the conference will ultimately take place, though probably not in July as was expected, rather in August.

Beyond this, follow-up meetings between President Obama and President Putin, in the context of the G-20 summit, have already been scheduled for this coming September in Russia. It has also been reported that during the summit, all issues concerning both Syria and bilateral and global aspects will be discussed. Until then, continued demonstrations of power and the mutual exertion of pressure to safeguard partisan interests in future agreements can be expected.

The convening of a conference in the format preferred by Russia indicates the gradual change in Russia’s standing, as it becomes an increasingly important player on the international arena.

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The Return of Liberal Interventionism?

Susan Rice and Samantha Power

US President Barack Obama recently appointed Susan Rice as national security adviser and nominated Samantha Power as the next US ambassador to the United Nations. Many viewed the Rice appointment as a response to Republican criticism of her role in the scandal over the Benghazi attack. Still, the two moves add a twist to the administration’s foreign policy, and the Middle East should take note: liberal interventionism may be back. If so, this may signal definite advantages for Israel.

America’s liberal interventionists believe the United States should use its power to intervene to stop massive human rights abuses, even if such moves have only a loose connection to the more standard concept of national interest. The doctrine reached its heyday in the late 1990s, when the end of the Cold War led to both unparalleled US power and the humanitarian crises of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. The soul searching of the liberal policymaking elite after the Rwandan genocide and the decision – not coincidental – to intervene in Kosovo were liberal interventionism’s high water marks. Susan Rice was converted to the doctrine when serving in the National Security Council at the time of the Rwandan genocide. Samantha Power became the camp’s leading voice after three years as a war correspondent in the Balkans.

 With the election of George W. Bush and the 9/11 attacks, neo-conservatism replaced liberal interventionism as the doctrine-du-jour. Then came the disillusionment with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2008 financial crisis. The new public mood called for “nation building at home.” “Can America Be Fixed?” asked Fareed Zakaria in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order, was put forward by Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations.

President Obama was associated with the liberal interventionism worldview, though not completely. His first term advisers straddled both the non-interventionist and interventionist camps. Joe Biden and Robert Gates urged caution on the use of military force. Meanwhile, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but especially Rice and Power, formed an interventionist camp that lobbied successfully for military action in Libya. Yet despite that internal policy victory, the opening of Obama’s second term seemed to spell decline for the liberal interventionists. New cabinet members John Kerry and Chuck Hagel are not viewed as part of the camp. Angst over the mounting crisis in Syria was matched only by angst over potential military involvement. Meanwhile, Washington became consumed first by the wrangling over cutting government deficits and then by the Benghazi, IRS, Associated Press, and NSA scandals.

Into this picture walk Rice and Power. Their entry does not mean that the United States will restore its defense budget, reverse its pivot to Asia, or impose a no-fly zone over Syria. But it does signal that Obama is personally interested in liberal interventionists sitting at the decision table. In an unstable Middle East where other powers have become active in arming supporters, even a subtle shift toward a more active US policy could have strategic implications.

For Israel, these developments are important – and in some respects, ironic. Israeli policymakers, as well as the public, have long viewed liberal interventionism with suspicion. The instinct of liberal interventionism is to support the weak against the strong and to promote idealistic objectives over realpolitik. Both on the Israeli street and in the halls of power, this perspective is suspected to be contrary to Israel’s interests. Liberal interventionism has been associated with support for the Palestinians. The 2002 video clip of Samantha Power toeing a hostile anti-Israel line fits well with this preconception.

Yet the bias may be outdated, as may be the fear. The greater risk for Israel is not that the United States will arm Fatah gunmen to attack the IDF. The US is highly unlikely to turn its aid toward Palestinian militants, as Power strangely argued in 2002. Instead, the greater risk is that the United States will draw back from the Middle East entirely. Here Israel has a common interest with the liberal interventionists, just as it did with the neo-conservatives. Israel’s interest is for the United States to exercise influence and power in the Middle East, containing uncertain forces such as Russia or China or hostile ones such as the Iranian regime or Sunni jihadists. If liberal interventionists endorse that goal – even if to promote human rights rather than help Israel per se – it would work to Israel's advantage.

Moreover, the liberal interventionists could help Israel on another key front: the battle for US public opinion. Liberal interventionists such as Power are opinion leaders among Democratic constituencies. In the long term, support for Israel in the United States will depend in large part on a continued strong position for Israel in US public opinion. Good standing among liberal interventionist elites could help Israel achieve that objective and buttress its bipartisan support. Israel and its supporters would do well, therefore, to opt for cooption, not confrontation.


Some leading American Jewish voices may have started, cautiously, on this tack. The strong support for Samantha Power from the Anti-Defamation League and Alan Dershowitz may prove leading indicators. The Israeli government, which must maintain distance in internal US matters, cannot follow suit in so open a voice, but it should not be seen as adopting an opposite position.

In meeting that threat of disengagement, liberal interventionists could be Israel’s friends. It would be wise to start making those friends now.

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The Foreign Policy Impact of Iran's Presidential Election.

[© Office of Iran's Supreme Leader/Handout/Document Iran/Corbis]

 

Iranians went to the polls Friday to elect outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's successor. Candidates reported few serious problems with the process, and the losers sent congratulations to the eventual winner, Hassan Rouhani.

Compared to the political instability that followed Ahmadinejad's 2009 re-election, this process was relatively boring. But however the news media felt about the election, Iran needs domestic stability if it is going to change its foreign policy in a very challenging geopolitical environment.

Domestic Stability

Domestic stability has been the first goal for any regime that would project power from Iran's central highlands. The Persian Empire first emerged only after a central power subjugated the various groups of Indo-Iranian, Turkic and Semitic peoples within its borders. The suppression of 2009's Green Movement is only a recent example of a strong state apparatus quelling internal dissent. For millennia, various Persian regimes have sought to keep such domestic pressures at bay while foreign powers have sought to exacerbate these tensions to distract Iran or make it vulnerable to invasion.

In today's Iran, structural economic stresses that have persisted under decades of sanctions are coming to a head while sectarian competition in the region has halted the expansion of Tehran's regional influence. The clerical regime that currently rules the Iranian mountain fortress understands the threats from beyond its borders, but like its predecessors, it must make peace at home before it can address external challenges.

Much of the Western, and especially U.S., coverage of the Iranian elections centered on Rouhani, a figure known to many in the West. He took part in the Islamic Revolution and had ties to Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic republic. He also has ties to Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's second clerical president, and is a representative of the current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, on the Supreme National Security Council. Rouhani served as secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council for 16 years. As an extension of this position, he was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005. It was during this period when Rouhani's foreign policy credentials became best known in the United States and Europe. It was also during this period when Western and Iranian nuclear negotiators came closest to reaching a deal. 

Paradoxically, Rouhani combines conservative and reformist tendencies. As a cleric, he does not seek fundamental changes in Iran's power structure of the sort Ahmadinejad sought, but he also advocates cooperation with, and outreach to, other branches of Iran's power structure such as the military and civilian politicians. While defending Iran's nuclear program and regional agenda, he understands that simply issuing ultimatums to the West and escalating tensions rather than striking compromises will not win relief from sanctions. In this regard, he resembles the reformist former President Mohammed Khatami, under whom Rouhani served as chief nuclear negotiator. Rouhani can be expected to adopt a less incendiary tone in foreign policy than Ahmadinejad and to cooperate with other domestic power centers, like those of the supreme leader and the military and security forces.

Iran's domestic woes give it an incentive to pursue the kind of pragmatic engagement and dialogue with the West Rouhani was known for, especially on issues such as Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's interests in the Levant, Iraq and Afghanistan. This means Friday's election represents a relative success for the Islamic republic, though it denied the West's desire for a disruptive election that would see Iran's clerical regime fall.

Ahead of any meaningful traction on its foreign policy agenda, the Iranian government had to re-engage its electorate, something it has accomplished with this election. Tellingly, aside from current nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, seven of the eight candidates approved to run in this election campaigned on moderate or even reformist platforms, in stark contrast to the nationalist rhetoric of the firebrand Ahmadinejad.

Although largely unaffected by the regional unrest in 2011, the clerical regime needed to demonstrate both to its citizens and foreign capitals that the Iranian people could still bring about change at the ballot box, not just through the streets. Given the choice, the Iranian people chose pragmatism in relatively free and fair elections.

Though the Islamic republic cannot be changed overnight -- long-term structural changes are needed to revive the Iranian economy -- Rouhani's campaign and election have provided a relatively immediate, low-cost way to lessen some of the domestic pressures on the regime. Large-scale demonstrations in support of the president-elect following the announcement of his victory took place in Tehran and throughout many of Iran's urban centers, without the involvement of state security forces. For now at least, this suggests Iran's large and increasingly frustrated electorate seems to have been appeased. 

While it is, of course, too early to know how his presidency will play out, the Rouhani administration at the very least will not begin its tenure plagued with doubts regarding its legitimacy of the sort that greeted Ahmadinejad's second term. Also unlike Ahmadinejad, the president-elect has the opportunity to bridge deep divisions within the clerical elite. With clerical authority and the supreme leader no longer under attack from the presidency, and with convincing electoral support behind him, Rouhani has already overcome the largest hurdles to amending Iranian policy at home and abroad.

Foreign Policy Shifts

It is in this framework that the West hopes to eventually re-engage Rouhani and Iran. Fiery rhetoric aside, Ahmadinejad also sought a strategic dialogue with the West, especially as his competition with the supreme leader prompted him to seek foreign policy wins. But the infighting that resulted from Ahmadinejad's attempts to undermine the pro-clerical structure of the republic impeded any progress in this arena.

If Rouhani can get the clerics behind him and accommodate the interests of Iran's military and security forces and the broader electorate, his chances of reaching a dialogue or negotiated settlement with the West will be much improved.

Guiding much of this will not be just the change in personalities but Iran's shifting geopolitical environment. Since it is no longer on the regional offensive, Tehran's previous defiant rejection of American interests is now incompatible with long-term Iranian goals in the region. 

There is still much work to be done at home before Iran can switch gears, and Iran's president-elect still faces considerable challenges to enacting any major shifts in policy. Rouhani must still convince many of the stakeholders within the regime that he can be trusted. He must protect the economic interests of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps while building a relationship with Iran's larger and often overlooked regular army. He must also manage his relationships with Rafsanjani, his most influential political backer, and with the supreme leader. Rafsanjani and Khamenei are competitors, and although the approval and eventual success of Rouhani's candidacy may hint at a broader clerical rapprochement, the supreme leader will not take kindly to attempts by Rafsanjani to rule through Rouhani. Rafsanjani, however, is unlikely to stop trying to capitalize on the successes of his protege.

Against a backdrop of domestic political reconfiguration, gradual diplomatic outreach to and from Iran can be expected. Parliamentary elections in 2015 will provide greater insight into how much change Rouhani can attempt, and it is along this timeline we should expect to see Iran seriously re-engage in negotiations with the West. In the meantime, little substantive change will occur beyond more careful rhetoric regarding both Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's support for the embattled Syrian regime. While challenges to both Iran's domestic policy realignment and outreach to the United States thus remain, Western and regional hopes for such change endure. 

Font: Michael Nayebi-Oskoui e Kamran Bokhari

Hassan Rowhani’s Election as President of Iran: Initial Assessments.

Hassan Rowhani’s

The election of Hassan Rowhani as Iran's president is surprising – not only in the very fact of his election, but particularly in the large majority he received, which made a second round of voting unnecessary. Prior to the elections, two candidates were considered to lead the race: Saeed Jalili, who is Iran's national security advisor and head of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team, and is very close to Supreme Leader Khamenei; and Tehran’s popular mayor, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. In the elections themselves, Rowhani earned 50.7 percent of the total vote, with each of the other candidates receiving less than 17 percent.

Rowhani, who was the only cleric among the candidates and who holds a doctorate in law, is not one of the leaders of the reformist camp, which rose following the last presidential election in 2009. However, of all the candidates Rowhani is closest to the reformers, and he is their main hope. Presumably, therefore, he was elected mainly by three groups: the reformists, various minorities that he addressed, and those who saw him as a chance for relief from the sanctions imposed on Iran and a chance for improvement in the Iranian economy. In this election, followers of Supreme Leader Khamenei likely did not attempt to falsify the election results, as they apparently did in 2009, because they feared that it would lead to unrest this time, as it did four years ago. As such, the election of Rowhani appears to reflect both a real desire for change among the Iranian public and the impact of the sanctions and the deteriorating economic situation.

 

The fact that Rowhani was not disqualified as a candidate for the presidency, as many others were – in particular, former president Rafsanjani – may indicate that Khamenei did not feel he would constitute a major challenge as a president. Nonetheless, his term as president could create serious difficulties for the Supreme Leader and his associates, for several reasons. First, Iran has long experienced tensions between the Supreme Leader and the three presidents who served during his tenure: Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad. These tensions stemmed from the structure of the regime, which is based on a supreme leader appointed in effect for his entire life and a president elected in general elections, and from the friction resulting from the division of powers between them. Second, the election of Rowhani could revive and strengthen the reformist camp, which has kept a low profile since it was suppressed in the demonstrations in the summer of 2009. If this occurs, Rowhani’s election could serve as an important milestone in shaping the regime. Third, the fact that Rowhani earned such broad popular support could give him power vis-à-vis Khamenei and the conservatives.

 

Nevertheless, Khamenei may well have an interest in exploiting Rowhani’s image as a moderate to attempt to have the sanctions lifted and improve Iran’s international standing without paying too heavy a price on the nuclear issue.

 

It is clear to everyone that the main decision maker in Iran is the Supreme Leader. However, the president is the second most important figure, especially in domestic affairs. He appoints the ministers (in Iran, there is no prime minister under the president), and he is responsible for the management and performance of the government and for shaping and implementing economic policy. While his authority in the realm of foreign policy and the nuclear issue in particular is limited – the official who decides this issue is the Supreme Leader – the president does not lack influence in this area because he is the head of the Supreme National Security Council, and he presents Iranian policy to the outside world. The fact that Rowhani has in the past dealt with foreign affairs and the nuclear issue as head of the nuclear negotiating team under President Khatami, while Khamenei has not left Iran since his appointment as Supreme Leader in 1989, could enhance the President's influence.

 

Rowhani will likely lend high priority to the effort to promote a solution to the nuclear issue in order to ease the sanctions on Iran. During the election campaign, he stressed his commitment to a moderate approach and a solution to the problem of sanctions and Iran’s international isolation, although like the other candidates, he vowed to continue the nuclear program. To that end, he is likely to attempt to formulate new proposals in order to reach an agreement with Western governments. He may also initiate direct contact with the US administration on this issue. The question is how much leeway Khamenei will give him; it will likely not be much. Khatami, Iran's president from 1997 to 2005 and considered a moderate, attempted to publicly initiate a dialogue with the American people, but was stopped by Khamenei; and during his term in office, an important breakthrough in uranium enrichment occurred with the construction of the enrichment facility in Natanz. The more likely possibility is that during the coming period, Iran will perhaps be prepared to make tactical concessions on the nuclear issue, but that Khamenei will not permit concessions with strategic significance.

 

Rowhani’s election has been welcomed by the US administration and other Western governments, which expect that his presidency will allow real progress on the nuclear issue and will perhaps even strengthen the reformists and see the start of internal changes in Iran. They also eye his election as a first sign indicating that the sanctions are beginning to affect Iran, and therefore they will likely seek to give another opportunity to the diplomatic option while examining Rowhani’s internal room to maneuver and his ability to advance a settlement. It is also possible that in this framework, there will be elements in the West that propose to lighten the sanctions on Iran in order to provide Rowhani with an achievement and strengthen his power domestically in advance of a settlement. In this spirit, at this stage the US administration will likely take the military option off the table and demand that Israel do so as well, until the chances of achieving a settlement with Iran become clear.

 

From Israel’s point of view, Rowhani’s election involves both opportunities and risks. The former include the possibility of a settlement that would be acceptable to Israel, and the possibility of the start of internal change in Iran. For now, these possibilities are not very likely. For his part, Rowhani will likely shun Amadinejad's rhetoric on the need to wipe Israel off the map and denial of the Holocaust, which many in Iran see as a gratuitous error. If this happens, Israel will lose a public relations asset because Ahmadinejad’s harsh statements helped Israel illustrate the threat of a nuclear Iran. More importantly, the moderate image of the new president could help lessen the international pressure on Iran, and later, perhaps even encourage a deal on the nuclear issue that would not be acceptable to Israel.

 

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