[© Office of Iran's Supreme Leader/Handout/Document Iran/Corbis] |
Iranians went to
the polls Friday to elect outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's successor.
Candidates reported few serious problems with the process, and the losers sent
congratulations to the eventual winner, Hassan Rouhani.
Compared to the
political instability that followed Ahmadinejad's 2009 re-election, this
process was relatively boring. But however the news media felt about the
election, Iran needs domestic stability if it is going to change its foreign
policy in a very challenging geopolitical environment.
Domestic
Stability
Domestic
stability has been the first goal for any regime that would project power from
Iran's central highlands. The Persian Empire first emerged only after a central
power subjugated the various groups of Indo-Iranian, Turkic and Semitic peoples
within its borders. The suppression of 2009's Green Movement is only a recent
example of a strong state apparatus quelling internal dissent. For millennia,
various Persian regimes have sought to keep such domestic pressures at bay
while foreign powers have sought to exacerbate these tensions to distract Iran
or make it vulnerable to invasion.
In today's Iran,
structural economic stresses that have persisted under decades of sanctions are
coming to a head while sectarian competition in the region has halted the
expansion of Tehran's regional influence. The clerical regime that
currently rules the Iranian mountain fortress understands the threats from
beyond its borders, but like its predecessors, it must make peace at home
before it can address external challenges.
Much of the
Western, and especially U.S., coverage of the Iranian elections centered on
Rouhani, a figure known to many in the West. He took part in the Islamic
Revolution and had ties to Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, the founder of the
Islamic republic. He also has ties to Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
Iran's second clerical president, and is a representative of the current
supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, on the Supreme National Security Council. Rouhani
served as secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council for 16 years.
As an extension of this position, he was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator from
2003 to 2005. It was during this period when Rouhani's foreign policy credentials
became best known in the United States and Europe. It was also during this
period when Western and Iranian nuclear negotiators came closest to reaching a
deal.
Paradoxically,
Rouhani combines conservative and reformist tendencies. As a cleric, he does
not seek fundamental changes in Iran's power structure of the sort Ahmadinejad
sought, but he also advocates cooperation with, and outreach to, other branches
of Iran's power structure such as the military and civilian politicians. While
defending Iran's nuclear program and regional agenda, he understands that
simply issuing ultimatums to the West and escalating tensions rather than
striking compromises will not win relief from sanctions. In this regard, he
resembles the reformist former President Mohammed Khatami, under whom Rouhani
served as chief nuclear negotiator. Rouhani can be expected to adopt a less
incendiary tone in foreign policy than Ahmadinejad and to cooperate with other
domestic power centers, like those of the supreme leader and the military and
security forces.
Iran's domestic
woes give it an incentive to pursue the kind of pragmatic engagement and
dialogue with the West Rouhani was known for, especially on issues such as
Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's interests in the Levant, Iraq and
Afghanistan. This means Friday's election represents a relative success
for the Islamic republic, though it denied the West's desire for a disruptive
election that would see Iran's clerical regime fall.
Ahead of any
meaningful traction on its foreign policy agenda, the Iranian government had to
re-engage its electorate, something it has accomplished with this election.
Tellingly, aside from current nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, seven of the
eight candidates approved to run in this election campaigned on moderate or
even reformist platforms, in stark contrast to the nationalist rhetoric of the
firebrand Ahmadinejad.
Although largely
unaffected by the regional unrest in 2011, the clerical regime needed to
demonstrate both to its citizens and foreign capitals that the Iranian people
could still bring about change at the ballot box, not just through the streets.
Given the choice, the Iranian people chose pragmatism in relatively free and
fair elections.
Though the
Islamic republic cannot be changed overnight -- long-term structural changes
are needed to revive the Iranian economy -- Rouhani's campaign and election
have provided a relatively immediate, low-cost way to lessen some of the
domestic pressures on the regime. Large-scale demonstrations in support of the
president-elect following the announcement of his victory took place in Tehran
and throughout many of Iran's urban centers, without the involvement of state
security forces. For now at least, this suggests Iran's large and increasingly frustrated
electorate seems to have been appeased.
While it is, of
course, too early to know how his presidency will play out, the Rouhani
administration at the very least will not begin its tenure plagued with doubts
regarding its legitimacy of the sort that greeted Ahmadinejad's second term.
Also unlike Ahmadinejad, the president-elect has the opportunity to bridge deep
divisions within the clerical elite. With clerical authority and the supreme
leader no longer under attack from the presidency, and with convincing
electoral support behind him, Rouhani has already overcome the largest hurdles
to amending Iranian policy at home and abroad.
Foreign Policy
Shifts
It is in this
framework that the West hopes to eventually re-engage Rouhani and Iran. Fiery
rhetoric aside, Ahmadinejad also sought a strategic dialogue with the West,
especially as his competition with the supreme leader prompted him to seek foreign
policy wins. But the infighting that resulted from Ahmadinejad's attempts
to undermine the pro-clerical structure of the republic impeded any progress in
this arena.
If Rouhani can
get the clerics behind him and accommodate the interests of Iran's military and
security forces and the broader electorate, his chances of reaching a dialogue
or negotiated settlement with the West will be much improved.
Guiding much of
this will not be just the change in personalities but Iran's shifting
geopolitical environment. Since it is no longer on the regional offensive,
Tehran's previous defiant rejection of American interests is now incompatible
with long-term Iranian goals in the region.
There is still
much work to be done at home before Iran can switch gears, and Iran's
president-elect still faces considerable challenges to enacting any major
shifts in policy. Rouhani must still convince many of the stakeholders within
the regime that he can be trusted. He must protect the economic interests of
the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps while building a
relationship with Iran's larger and often overlooked regular army. He must also
manage his relationships with Rafsanjani, his most influential political
backer, and with the supreme leader. Rafsanjani and Khamenei are competitors,
and although the approval and eventual success of Rouhani's candidacy may hint
at a broader clerical rapprochement, the supreme leader will not take kindly to
attempts by Rafsanjani to rule through Rouhani. Rafsanjani, however, is unlikely
to stop trying to capitalize on the successes of his protege.
Against a
backdrop of domestic political reconfiguration, gradual diplomatic outreach to
and from Iran can be expected. Parliamentary elections in 2015 will provide
greater insight into how much change Rouhani can attempt, and it is along
this timeline we should expect to see Iran seriously re-engage in negotiations
with the West. In the meantime, little substantive change will occur beyond
more careful rhetoric regarding both Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's
support for the embattled Syrian regime. While challenges to both Iran's
domestic policy realignment and outreach to the United States thus remain,
Western and regional hopes for such change endure.
Font: Michael Nayebi-Oskoui e Kamran Bokhari
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