The Uprising in Egypt: An Initial Assessment

President Mubarak is currently facing the biggest challenge to his regime since taking

office close to thirty years ago. On January 28, after several days of violent

demonstrations throughout Egypt, the 82-year old Mubarak called on the army to quell the

unrest, announcing he “would not allow anything to threaten the peace, law, and future of

the country.” On January 29, Mubarak appointed Omar Suleiman, head of Egyptian

intelligence, to the post of vice president, and charged Ahmed Shafiq, a former Egyptian

air force commander and the new prime minister, with the task of forming a new

government to undertake reforms and calm the masses. At the time of this writing, the

crisis is in full force and definitive outcomes cannot be predicted.

The Crisis

Egypt has a population of 81 million; the annual growth rate of the population is estimated

at 2 percent, and the GDP is $6,200 (in terms of buying power). The economic situation of

the weaker classes, government corruption, and the encouragement the population drew

from the uprising in Tunisia underlay the spontaneous eruption of the protests. While

those close to the Egyptian regime enjoy a lavish lifestyle, the weaker classes stagger

under the burden of the most basic subsistence and the middle class is disappearing.

Unemployment stands at close to 10 percent and the price of basic foods is skyrocketing –

in part because of the steep rise in food prices worldwide, which despite the subsidies for

basics goods has affected prices on the local market. This phenomenon is also a

fundamental reason for the waves of protest in Tunisia, Yemen, and Algeria.

The standard of living of the lower class in Egypt is particularly low, at the level of basic

existence, because the average income is much lower than the international average and

because the country lacks advanced mechanisms of social welfare available in developed

nations. As a result of urbanization, more than two-thirds of the Egyptian population work

in services, trade, and industry, and unlike in the past, have no access to sources of food in

the rural areas.

The protests are popular in nature and do not seem to be directed by the Islamic opposition

(although the protests were joined by Islamic elements). The lack of a central organization

responsible for the events makes it difficult for the regime to identify targets to suppress.

Opposition leaders, such as Mohamed ElBaradei who sees himself as a candidate in this

year's presidential elections, have joined the protests, but they are not directing the

protesters. Thus far the army has deployed at key locations in the cities but has not reined

in the masses. At this point it seems that military forces are concerned with protecting

government edifices rather than taking significant action to restore public order.

Mubarak’s difficulties are compounded by American pressure. On January 26 Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton said: “We support the universal rights of the Egyptian people

including the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly. And we urge the

Egyptian authorities not to prevent peaceful protests or block communications, including

on social media sites.” On January 28 President Obama made statements to the same

effect. The administration’s reserved stance towards the Egyptian regime's self-defense

efforts are reminiscent of the Carter administration's attitude to the fall of the shah in Iran

on the eve of the Islamic Revolution in 1979; it is liable to affect the standing of the

United States among similar regimes in the region.

As in Tunisia, there has been widespread use of social media resources such as Twitter

and Facebook. Activists use the net not only for propaganda purposes and reports on

regime violence but also to recruit participants, organize protests, and direct events.

Therefore, the regime blocked access to the internet and disrupted some mobile

communications. An additional challenge for the regime is the extensive presence of

foreign media broadcasting directly from the scene, which makes it hard for the regime to

act aggressively toward the protesters.

Historical Precedents

Mubarak is well aware of the risks of a shaky economy to internal stability. In the socalled

“Bread Riots” in January 1977, sparked by the steep increase in prices of basic

foods following the government’s attempt to cut back on subsidies, 50 people were killed

and some 600 were injured. Then-Vice President Mubarak acted to quell the unrest but

after three days, the regime abandoned this attempt. In February 1986, riots were started

by soldiers from the central security units in Cairo and quickly spread to other areas in

Egypt. The Egyptian press reported that the riots rose from the economic situation and the

gap between a rich minority and a poor majority, and that the riots were started by

particularly embittered soldiers who were joined by poor civilians. The rioters, who aimed

their fury at economic targets – stores, banks, and so on – were ultimately stopped by the

army.

Despite the similarity, it seems that the current crisis in Egypt is already larger than those

events, which the regime managed to suppress.

What Lies Ahead

The question of how deep the crisis will go and what the outcomes will be depends on the

ability of the protesters or the opposition to translate the protest into a political force

opposing the president’s power and the apparatus at his disposal. The position of the

generals is likely to be very influential, as was evident in the deposal of Tunisian President

Ben Ali. It is not clear if there are any cracks in the military’s support for the regime, but

there seems to be no willingness on the military’s part to confront the demonstrators. How

much the military will be willing to act to ensure the continuation of Mubarak’s regime is

a critical question.

The outcome of the riots may not necessarily be connected to what or who ignited them,

rather to whatever power structure is created and those who succeed in leveraging it for

their own benefit. In such a power structure, the Islamic opposition is liable to expand its

influence. At the same time, even if the regime succeeds in suppressing the uprising, it

seems that Egypt will not be able to go back to what it was and that the Mubarak regime

will end this year, one way or another.

Even if Mubarak remains in power, it seems that he will have to abandon his attempt to

crown his son Gamal as president in the 2011 presidential elections. This will spell the end

of a move seen by many Egyptians as an attempt to restore the monarchy through the back

door, as Hafez Asad did in Syria by appointing his son Bashar as his successor. And

should the crisis expand, the regime leaders are likely to urge Mubarak to retire early and

appoint a temporary president to serve until the elections, thereby preserving the regime,

albeit in a different composition.

Alternatively, Egypt is liable to find itself in a period of instability, highly undesirable by

all sides. Under certain circumstances, undermining the current power bases may generate

an extremist Islamic regime, in part because of the organizational capabilities of Egypt’s

Muslim Brotherhood.

The shockwaves of the events in Egypt and Tunisia may well spill over to other Middle

Eastern countries, as many of them suffer from similar syndromes. The concern that the

riots in Egypt will spread to other Arab states caused the price of oil to spike by 4.5

percent already on January 28.

The Israeli Context

For now, the crisis has no Israeli connection and Israel has not been mentioned in the

recent clashes. Nonetheless, Israel has excellent reason to follow developments closely, in

light of its interest in maintaining the peace agreement, its growing dependence on

Egyptian gas, and the ramifications for regional stability (e.g., a radical change in Egypt is

liable to generate a dramatic change in the Middle East balance of power).

In any case, a weakened Egypt preoccupied with internal affairs portends poorly for the

pragmatic camp supporting the political process and encourages the radical camp, intent on Israel’s destruction. Even if the regime succeeds in suppressing the uprising, Egypt is

in for a year of difficult political challenges that threaten its stability. In the current crisis,

Israel has neither the capability nor a reason to intervene, and Israeli senior figures would

do well to demonstrate restraint. Still, the possibility that Egypt might pursue a new

direction is no longer theoretical and Israel must consider the implications of the various

possible scenarios.

font:  המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי

dr. Roberto Polastro

The Egyptian Unrest: A Special Report

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak remains the lifeblood of the demonstrators, who still number in the tens of thousands in downtown Cairo and in other major cities, albeit on a lesser scale. After being overwhelmed in the Jan. 28 Day of Rage protests, Egypt’s internal security forces — with the anti-riot paramilitaries of the Central Security Forces (CSF) at the forefront — were glaringly absent from the streets Jan. 29. They were replaced with rows of tanks and armored personnel carriers carrying regular army soldiers. Unlike their CSF counterparts, the demonstrators demanding Mubarak’s exit from the political scene largely welcomed the soldiers. Despite Mubarak’s refusal to step down Jan. 28, the public’s positive perception of the military, seen as the only real gateway to a post-Mubarak Egypt, remained. It is unclear how long this perception will hold, especially as Egyptians are growing frustrated with the rising level of insecurity in the country and the army’s limits in patrolling the streets.

There is more to these demonstrations than meets the eye. The media will focus on the concept of reformers staging a revolution in the name of democracy and human rights. These may well have brought numerous demonstrators into the streets, but revolutions, including this one, are made up of many more actors than the liberal voices on Facebook and Twitter.

After three decades of Mubarak rule, a window of opportunity has opened for various political forces — from the moderate to the extreme — that preferred to keep the spotlight on the liberal face of the demonstrations while they maneuver from behind. As the Iranian Revolution of 1979 taught, the ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that end up in power. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) understands well the concerns the United States, Israel and others share over a political vacuum in Cairo being filled by Islamists. The MB so far is proceeding cautiously, taking care to help sustain the demonstrations by relying on the MB’s well-established social services to provide food and aid to the protesters. It simultaneously is calling for elections that would politically enable the MB. With Egypt in a state of crisis and the armed forces stepping in to manage that crisis, however, elections are nowhere near assured. What is now in question is what groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and others are considering should they fear that their historic opportunity could be slipping.

One thing that has become clear in the past several hours is a trend that STRATFOR has been following for some time in Egypt, namely, the military’s growing clout in the political affairs of the state. Former air force chief and outgoing civil aviation minister Ahmed Shafiq, who worked under Mubarak’s command in the air force (the most privileged military branch in Egypt), has been appointed prime minister and tasked with forming the new government. Outgoing Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, who has long stood by Mubarak, is now vice president, a spot that has been vacant for the past 30 years. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi (who oversees the Republican Guard) and Egypt’s chief of staff of the armed forces, Lt. Gen. Sami Annan — who returned to Cairo Jan. 29 after a week of intense discussions with senior U.S. officials — are likely managing the political process behind the scenes. More political shuffles are expected, and the military appears willing for now to give Mubarak the time to arrange his political exit. Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will tolerate.

The important thing to remember is that the Egyptian military, since the founding of the modern republic in 1952, has been the guarantor of regime stability. Over the past several decades, the military has allowed former military commanders to form civilian institutions to take the lead in matters of political governance but never has relinquished its rights to the state.

Now that the political structure of the state is crumbling, the army must directly shoulder the responsibility of security and contain the unrest on the streets. This will not be easy, especially given the historical animosity between the military and the police in Egypt. For now, the demonstrators view the military as an ally, and therefore (whether consciously or not) are facilitating a de facto military takeover of the state. But one misfire in the demonstrations, and a bloodbath in the streets could quickly foil the military’s plans and give way to a scenario that groups like the MB quickly could exploit. Here again, we question the military’s tolerance for Mubarak as long as he is the source fueling the demonstrations.

Considerable strain is building on the only force within the country that stands between order and chaos as radical forces rise. The standing theory is that the military, as the guarantor of the state, will manage the current crisis. But the military is not a monolithic entity. It cannot shake its history, and thus cannot dismiss the threat of a colonel’s coup in this shaky transition.

The current regime is a continuation of the political order, which was established when midranking officers and commanders under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a mere colonel in the armed forces, overthrew the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Islamist sympathizers in the junior ranks of the military assassinated his successor, Anwar Sadat, in 1981, an event that led to Mubarak’s presidency.

The history of the modern Egyptian republic haunts Egypt’s generals today. Though long suppressed, an Islamist strand exists amongst the junior ranks of Egypt’s modern military. The Egyptian military is, after all, a subset of the wider society, where there is a significant cross- section that is religiously conservative and/or Islamist. These elements are not politically active, otherwise those at the top would have purged them.

But there remains a deep-seated fear among the military elite that the historic opening could well include a cabal of colonels looking to address a long-subdued grievance against the state, particularly its foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. The midranking officers have the benefit of having the most direct interaction — and thus the strongest links — with their military subordinates, unlike the generals who command and observe from a politically dangerous distance. With enough support behind them, midranking officers could see their superiors as one and the same as Mubarak and his regime, and could use the current state of turmoil to steer Egypt’s future.

Signs of such a coup scenario have not yet surfaced. The army is still a disciplined institution with chain of command, and many likely fear the utter chaos that would ensue should the military establishment rupture. Still, those trying to manage the crisis from the top cannot forget that they are presiding over a country with a strong precedent of junior officers leading successful coups. That precedent becomes all the more worrying when the regime itself is in a state of collapse following three decades of iron-fisted rule.

The United States, Israel and others will thus be doing what they can behind the scenes to shape the new order in Cairo, but they face limitations in trying to preserve a regional stability that has existed since 1978. The fate of Egypt lies in the ability of the military to not only manage the streets and the politicians, but also itself.

January 29, 2011
Font: Global Intelligence

Secret Service Site Security Training Gains a High-Tech Edge

An instructor uses a prototype

touch kiosk to move and align 3D

modeled assets with the Site Security Planning Tool.

Photo credit: United States Secret Service.

Chemical releases, suicide bombers, air and subsurface threats:  the U.S. Secret Service needs to be prepared to handle these real-life incidents.  Training to respond to such incidents, however, has been more theoretical than practical. Now, with the help from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), the Secret Service is giving training scenarios a high-tech edge:  moving from static tabletop models to virtual kiosks with gaming technology and 3D modeling.

For the past 40 years, a miniature model environment called “Tiny Town” has been one of the methods used to teach Secret Service agents and officers how to prepare a site security plan. The model includes different sites -- an airport, outdoor stadium, urban rally site and a hotel interior -- and uses scaled models of buildings, cars and security assets. The scenario-based training allows students to illustrate a dignitary’s entire itinerary and accommodate unrelated, concurrent activities in a public venue.  Various elements of a visit are covered, such as an arrival, rope line or public remarks.  The class works as a whole and in small groups to develop and present their security plan. 

Enter videogame technology.  The Secret Service’s James J. Rowley Training Center near Washington, D.C., sought to take these scenarios beyond a static environment to encompass the dynamic threat spectrum that exists today, while taking full advantage of the latest computer software technology.  The agency’s Security and Incident Modeling Lab wanted to update Tiny Town and create a more relevant and flexible training tool.  

A close-up of the prototype touch kiosk.

Photo credit: United States Secret Service.

With funding from DHS S&T, the Secret Service developed the Site Security Planning Tool (SSPT), a new training system dubbed “Virtual Tiny Town” by instructors, with high-tech features:

• 3D models and game-based virtual environments
• Simulated chemical plume dispersion for making and assessing decisions
• A touch interface to foster collaborative, interactive involvement by student teams
• A means to devise, configure, and test a security plan that is simple, engaging, and flexible
• Both third- and first-person viewing perspectives for overhead site evaluation and for a virtual “walk-through” of the site, reflecting how it would be performed in the field.

The new technology consists of three kiosks, each composed of a 55” Perceptive Pixel touch screen with an attached projector and camera, and a computer running Virtual Battle Space (VBS2) as the base simulation game. The kiosks can accommodate a team of up to four students, and each kiosk’s synthetic environment, along with the team’s crafted site security plan, can be displayed on a large wall-mounted LED 3D TV monitor for conducting class briefings and demonstrating simulated security challenges.

In addition to training new recruits, SSPT can also provide in-service protective details with advanced training on a range of scenarios, including preparation against chemical, biological or radiological attacks, armed assaults, suicide bombers and other threats.

Future enhancements to SSPT will include modeling the resulting health effects and crowd behaviors of a chemical, radiological or biological attack, to better prepare personnel for a more comprehensive array of scenarios and the necessary life-saving actions required to protect dignitaries and the public alike.

The Site Security Planning Tool development is expected to be completed and activated by spring 2011.

font: U.S. Department of Homeland Security

The Toppling of the Tunisian Regime: Ramifications for the Arab World

The overthrow of the Tunisian regime, which prompted authoritarian President Zine El Abidine Bin Ali to flee the country on Friday, January 14, 2011, is an unprecedented event among Arab countries. In its short history, the Arab world – which abounds with autocratic regimes – has experienced many military coups that toppled the existing ruler and replaced him with another strongman. However, in recent decades, military coups have nearly disappeared as a result of stronger internal security apparatuses; growth in the size of armies, which has made organizing military coups more difficult; and pervasive mass media. A battalion commander can no longer carry out a coup by taking over a radio station. In the Tunisian case, and for the first time, an autocratic regime was toppled as a result of a popular uprising.

The Tunisian regime fell because it lost control over mass demonstrations that began when an unemployed university graduate working as a peddler set himself on fire after police confiscated his cart. Throughout the demonstrations, the abundance of media channels and the subversive use of the internet played an important role, as in the demonstrations in Iran more than a year ago. Regimes in the Middle East no longer have a monopoly on the mass media, which makes it difficult for them to withhold information and maintain their rule. The internet was also an important conduit for the waves of responses from other Arab countries.

Indeed, the fall of the regime in Tunisia fomented discontent among the public elsewhere in the Arab world, where those at the helm are generally alienated from the masses. In various Arab countries, protestors have rallied in support of change in Tunisia, spouting defiant rhetoric against the regimes of their own countries. This phenomenon was particularly blatant in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Libya.

The fall of the regime in Tunisia also departed from the familiar scripts of Arab regimes falling in a popular uprising. These scenarios generally predicted a popular uprising led by Islamist elements against the backdrop of strengthened Islamic movements in the Arab world. From this point of view Tunisia is an exception, since under the Bin Ali regime it has undergone a process of modernization and fast economic development. In addition, the regime confronted the local Islamic movement with an iron fist, and Islamic leaders that survived fled abroad. The popular uprising was waged mainly by Western-educated young people who were led by activists from the democratic opposition. In fact, this was an uprising by the social class that was essential to the regime in its struggle against the Islamic movement. In contrast, in other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, the democratic opposition does not have a great deal of influence in the local society, while the Islamic movements have a wide circle of supporters and wield much influence.

Nonetheless, it is hard to foresee the outcome of democratic elections in Tunisia after such a long period of autocratic rule, which has prevented the populace from expressing its genuine inclinations. True, the exiled Islamic movement leader declared that his movement would not run its own presidential candidate in forthcoming elections, apparently aware of the difficulty in building a political infrastructure for elections in such a short time. However, the parliamentary elections could reveal Islamic leanings that were concealed during the previous regime, especially in rural areas outside the large cities. This means that free elections, if they are in fact held, could produce a model of a functioning democratic regime or, alternatively, demonstrate the success of the Islamic movement in taking over an Arab state through democratic elections.

Possible reactions in the Arab world to the Tunisian events should be examined in two time frames. In the short term, the demonstrations and protests in some Arab countries could escalate to the point that the regimes would be hard pressed to control them. This scenario pertains primarily to situations in which the regimes use too much force, causing bloodshed and a chain reaction. At this point, it seems that the regimes in most Arab countries have a great deal of experience in controlling situations where the crowd is whipped into a frenzy, and therefore they could manage these events and quell unrest.

Indeed, against the successful example, at least in the short term, of Tunisia is the failure of the mass demonstrations in Iran in 2009, which were firmly suppressed by the Iranian Islamic regime. In any case any regime that wants to suppress a popular uprising at the outset will face a dilemma about how much force to use. Too much force at the start of a demonstration is liable to spark a counter-response that will bring about a more wide scale uprising. However, a response that is seen as sluggish is liable to project a lack of firmness on the part of the regime and encourage those involved in the uprising.

The more difficult question, however, how this uprising will influence Arab countries in the longer term, depends on the developments in Tunisia. If the elections in Tunisia take place in an orderly fashion and seat a Western-oriented government that succeeds in establishing and maintaining a democratic regime, they will produce a model that can influence other Arab publics and enhance domestic democratic oppositions. Two other scenarios – chaos and the democratic opposition’s inability to form a stable government, and the rise of the Islamic movement to power through democratic means – will provide tremendous encouragement to a rising Islamist wave in the Arab world, strengthen the Islamic movements, and even encourage them to take concrete steps towards the overthrow of their host regimes.

The model of revolution through popular uprising will be studied by various opposition movements, which will likely aspire to imitate it. However, there are important differences between the respective Arab societies. Tunisia, for example, with a relatively small but largely Western-educated population, is different from Egypt or Algeria, which have enormous populations. Future uprisings will also to a large extent depend on the particular regime’s determination to maintain its rule and its ability to maintain strong security apparatuses and build broad strata in the population that have a vested interest in maintaining the regime.

Israel should be concerned mainly by the developments in its immediate vicinity, i.e., Egypt and Jordan. For some time now there has been a twilight atmosphere in Egypt because of President Mubarak’s age and his health, and the uncertainty concerning his successor. Although Mubarak is attempting to groom his son Gamal as his successor, there is much opposition in Egypt to this idea. However, the regime in Egypt has succeeded in building effective security organs and a solid elite that has an interest in the continuity of the regime, and this elite includes all the security organizations, including the military. In Jordan, which is suffering a prolonged economic crisis, there is also unrest because of the tension between residents of Transjordanian origin and those of Palestinian origin; the not-insignificant support for the Muslim Brotherhood; and the dissatisfaction of elements in the Transjordanian tribes, who feel that they have been pushed to the sidelines. It appears that in the short term the two regimes are stable, but what can be expected in the longer term is of serious concern.

font:  המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי

dr. Roberto Polastro

1/6/2011 - The DSS Counterintelligence Directorate posted the unclassified edition of the latest.

1/6/2011 - The DSS Counterintelligence Directorate posted the unclassified edition of the latest.

Targeting U.S. Technologies:  A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry.

Chinese Stealth Fighter: J-X / J-XX / XXJ/J-12 / J-13 / J-14 / J-20 (Jianjiji - Fighter aircraft)

On 29 December 2010, the right estimable China Defense Blog published the first no-kidding photographs of the long rumored J-XX Chinese stealth fighter. Unambiguous confirmation of the existence of this program will require re-evaluation of aircraft modernization efforts in a number of countried, including Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Chinese combat aviation has made remarkable strides in recent years, moving from a collection of obsolete aircraft that would have provided a target-rich environment to potential adversaries. Today China flies hundreds of first rate aircraft, and even flies more Sukhoi Flankers [the aircraft the American F-22 was designed to counter] than does Russia. The Chinese stealth fighter has arrived right on schedule. Chinese military technology is generally rated about two decades behind that of the United States. while the advent of a Chinese counterpart to the F-22 fighter might be disconcerting, the first flight of the prototype American F-22 stealth fighter came on September 29, 1990.



There is general agreement in the open literature that China is working on some type of stealthy fighter attack aircraft, and that this program has been underway since the turn of the century. There is very little agreement beyond these basic points. Available treatments of this subject in print and online seem to represent little more than a confusing jumble of informed speculation, wild guesstimates, and active disinformation. The Chinse government is under no obligation to set the record straight, and indeed has every incentive to add to the general confusion.

Russia and India are jointly developing the Sukhoi PAK FA / T-50 , which first flew in January 2010. In June 2001, India was offered 'joint development and production' of this new 5th generation fighter by Russia. Russia had been trying to sell this concept both to China and India for some time. It seems probable that China declined to participate in this project given a belief that Russia stood to gain more from Chinese participation than did China. That is, it would seem that China had determined that it could produce a superior product without Russian help. With the first flight of the Russian stealth fighter in 2010, an arguably superior Chinese steath fighter might be expected to take to the skies not too long thereafter.

A 2006 article in Military Technology referred to three designs; Shenyang J-12 and Shenyang J-14 by 601 Institute Shenyang Aircraft Corporation [SAC] and Chengdu J-13 by 611 Institute Chengdu Aircraft Corporation [CAC]. The report in Military Technology featured a picture of a completely different design, speculatively dubbed J-14 and said to be a Shenyang project, with the designations J-12 and J-13 being applied to (possibly competing) designs by Shenyang and Chengdu respectively.

Shenyang Airplane Corporation (SAC) is in charge of the large, twin-engine J-8 fighters in service with the PLAAF (People's Liberation Army Air Force) as well as of licence production of the Su-27SK under the local designation of J-11. The other study group is the 611 Institute from Chengdu Airplane Corporation (CAC).

By January 2007 Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Co. (CAC), China’s two major fighter aircraft enterprises, were both reportedly working on advanced fighter designs slated to enter the PLAAF service as soon as 2015. Chengdu was focused on an enlarged twin-engine, 4th generation stealthy version of the J-10 fighter, possibly designated J-13. Shenyang was said to be focused on an entirely new 5th generation F-22-class stealth fighter, possibly designated the J-12. Both projects were believed to have benefited from Russian technologies

Chengdu J-13

The Chinese aviation industry reportedly began preliminary research for China’s 4th generation fighter program in the mid-1990s. The new aircraft - tentatively dubbed the J-X and possibly to receive the service designation J-13A - could use the WS10A turbofan engine designed by the Shenyang Liming Motor Company during its development and trials process. In development for more than a decade, the WS10-series power plant completed air trials earlier this year with an Su-27SK (NATO reporting name: 'Flanker-B') fighter. The WS10A is scheduled for introduction with the PLAAF's J-10A fighter. Continuing research into advanced control techniques is expected to in time allow the air force to field WS10A-powered J-10A and J-X fighters equipped with thrust-vectoring nozzles offering improved aircraft manoeuvrability.

Chengdu J-20

In August 2008 it was reported that 611 Institute was selected to be the main contractor for the development of the fifth-generation stealthy J-20, and that 601 Institute was the sub-contractor. It was rumored that 611 Institute has started to issue manufacturing drawings for constructing the first prototype, which is expected to fly by 2012, even though the full configuration one won't fly until a few years later. The latest rumor suggested that a full-scale mock-up had been built at CAC.

Shenyang J-12

In 1998 the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reported that an advanced F-22-class twin-engine stealth fighter known as J-12 was under development at Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC). In 2002, Jane's Defence Weekly reported that Shenyang Aircraft Corporation had been selected to head research and development of a new fighter. In 2003 an online photo showed a wind tunnel test fighter mockup some claimed as linked to the J-12 project. Reports suggested that the fighter would be fitted with an internal weapon bay and possibly active phased array radar.

Besides carrying on with the improvement of the J-8 series and the licensed production of the Su-27, the Shenyang Aircraft Company (SAC) 601 Institute has engaged in preliminary research for the "No. 12" project for the development of the Chinese Air Force's main fighter aircraft for the 21st century. Also known as the "XXJ," this fifth generation PLAAF fighter, is currently projected to enter service in the 2013-2015 timeframe. The aircraft is projected to have a crew of two, is anticipated to be in same class as US F-22 fighter, probably based on significant Russian technical assistance.

By 2002 there were reports that China is developing a new stealthy fighter jet aircraft and many of the design concepts and components had already been created. This is the first Eastern rival to the West’s F/A-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to go into development. [Janes -- “China Reveals New Stealth Fighter Project,” 12/11/02]. At this time, the Russian Sukhoi Company (JSC), which had developed close ties with Shenyang over the licensed co-production of its Su-27SK fighter as J-11, was reported working with Shenyang in developing the next-generation fighter technology and sub-systems. Although Russia had not yet developed an operational stealth fighter, the J-12 project may benefit from its technologies in two areas: thrust vectoring engine and stealth design. China may also seek potential partners from Russia, Israel and Europe to co-develop avionics and weapon suites for its 4th-generation fighter aircraft.

By late 2002 the Shenyang Aircraft Company was reported to have been selected to head research and development of a new heavyweight fighter for China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Development of the engines and weapon subsystems for the fourth-generation fighter had been under way for some time, with a number of design concepts having been created. These include a twin-engine aircraft sharing some design traits with Lockheed Martin's stealthy F/A-22 multirole fighter, such as the internal carriage of its weapon systems. The Chinese designs retain a more conventional wing, however, and use a single vertical tail fin.

The Shenyang proposal was for a twin engine, single seat 15-tonne class heavy fighter, similar to the US F-22 Raptor but featureing canards. At least four different configurations were evaluted before the definitive "New 93" layout was arrived at. Stealth technology was said to be a prominent design feature, with an RCS of about 0.5 square metres beening mentioned. Thrust vectoring technology was said to make the aircraft more agile than the Su-27, in a powerplant with greater than 8000kg thrust.

Considering China’s records in combat aircraft development, a project like the J-12 may prove challenging. It will involves technology advancement in a number of fields including materials, high-performance aviation engine, electronics, flight control software, and stealth technologies. A project of this scale will also require huge amount of investment and considerable knowledge of complex project and manufacturing management. While China may be able to benefit from some “off-the-shelf” dual-use technologies available in the commercial market, it will almost definitely seek assistance from its traditional military technology suppliers such as Russia and Israel. However, none of these two countries possess the experience of developing an advance fighter of this class.

Brigadier Govinda M. Nair wrote in 2005 that "A stealth fighter, XXJ, equivalent to the US F-22 is likely to be inducted by 2015." According to the PLA's Deputy Commander He Weirong, the Chinese fifth generation fighter was expected to be in service with the PLAAF by 2017-2019. In August 2008, a RAND study raised questions about the ability of US tactical aircraft, including the F-22, to counter large numbers of Chinese aircraft in a Taiwan Strait scenario. Though at that time the F-22 was assumed to be able to shoot down 48 Chinese Flankers when outnumbered 12:1 without loss, this did not take into account less-than-perfect US beyond-visual-range performance, or possible deployment of a new Chinese stealth fighter around 2020 or 2025.

In a speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (Economic Club of Chicago, 16 July 2009), he stated "by 2020, the United States is projected to have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. Of those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese..."

Shenyang J-14

In 2006 the respected journal Military Technology reported ["China Develops Stealth Fighter" Vol.30, Iss. 2; pg. 44, 3 pgs] that China was developing new "stealth" fighter, under a program variously referred to as XXJ, J-X, or J-XX by Western intelligence sources, apparently designated as J-14. The first "picture" recently become available, though the authenticity of the image was quickly challenged. The aircraft in the photo looked at first sight as a complete prototype, but was said to be a very detailed full-scale engineering mock-up. It can be speculated that, after having been used to study the aircraft's internal installations, the mock-up has also received an external finish for presentation purposes. Its real function at this point, however, was probably to assist in the definition of the required logistic support (i.e., access to the various avionics boxes and on-board systems, ground support equipment like the various ladders and the external power source units, air conditioning units and so on) as well as to study the engines' removal/installation procedures.

According to this report, it is however still not clear whether the designation of J-14 is intended to suggest a successor design to both the J-12 and the J-13, and whether the existence of the J-14 engineering mock-up (clearly based on the J-12) indicated that the type has been selected for development, or the competition was still going on with parallel activities underway on another such mock-up based on the J-13.

The general configuration of the aircraft ws clearly from CAC's experience in developing the J-10, with its canard layout and ventral air intake. But while the J-10 is known to be related to the Israeli LAVI, this new and much more ambitious design appeared to have a relationship with the ill-fated Russian 5th generation fighter of the 1990s, the MiG 1.44 MFI. While the overall aerodynamic configuration of the J-14 followed that of the MiG 1.44 demonstrator, a canard configuration is hardly the ideal solution from the point of view of a reduced radar signature. A radical redesign had been implemented for a significant reduction in the radar cross-section value. In particular, the aircraft incorporates a pronounced wing-body blending, which was totally lacking in the original Russian design.

These photos from December 2010 are the first look at the actual Chinese stealth fighter