Israeli Official: Sudan is a 'Terrorist State'

A top Israeli defense official said that Sudan was a terrorist state, and that its accusations against Israel could not be taken seriously

Israel hit back at Sudan Thursday, after Khartoum on Wednesday accused Israel of attacking a military installation in the country. A top Israeli defense official told Army Radio that Sudan was a terrorist state, and that its accusations that Israel engaged in terrorism against that country could not be taken seriously.

“Sudan is a dangerous terrorist state. To know exactly what happened (there), it will take some time to understand," said Amos Gilad, director of policy and political-military affairs at the Defense Ministry. "There are different versions of the Sudanese side, so there is no reason to go into details," Gilad responded to questions of Israeli involvement in the attack.

Amos Gilad

 

Sudan says it has evidence that Israeli warplanes carried out the attack, although it has so far failed to present that evidence. Sudan claimed that four Israeli aircraft fired missiles that hit a military factory and killed two people in Khartoum. The explosion at the military factory in Sudan's capital before dawn Wednesday sent detonating ammunition flying through the air, causing panic among residents, the official news agency and local media reports said. Sudan has demanded that the UN Security Council condemn Israel for the raid. A Sudanese official, Bilal Osman, said that a response by Sudan for the attack would be forthcoming, although “we reserve the right to react at a place and time we choose."

 

Israeli officials have long been following the situation in Sudan, which security officials said was a major source of weapons for Gaza Arab terrorists. Gangs of terrorists trained and set up areas of influence in the remote parts of the country, with large weapons warehouses. According to security officials, Sudan is a major hub on the route of smugglers moving weapons from Iran and Syria to terror groups in Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Several months ago, a car carrying several weapons smugglers and a large amount of weapons exploded at Port Sudan. Sudan accused Israel of involvement in that attack as well.

 

Meanwhile, a report in Arab media Thursday said that the U.S. had closed its embassy in Khartoum, Sudan's capital, on Tuesday – just before the attack took place, as if the U.S. had advanced knowledge of the attack. Hundreds of Sudanese gathered outside the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum calling for “death to Israel” and “death to America,” as they burned American and Israeli flags.

 

Font: By David Lev

U.S. redesigns terrorist target list.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (UPI)

The Obama administration is planning a next-generation terrorist targeting list that transforms the CIA into a paramilitary force, The Washington Post reported.

The secret list, called the "disposition matrix," contains terrorism suspect names laid out against resources available to track them down, the Post said in a report published Tuesday.

The report, the first of three on changing U.S. counterterrorism policies, is based on interviews with current and former White House, Pentagon, intelligence and counterterrorism officials, the Post said.

The White House, National Counterterrorism Center, CIA and other agencies declined to comment on the matrix or other counterterrorism programs.

The National Counterterrorism Center is part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which integrates intelligence information, and draws on CIA, FBI, Pentagon and other experts who seek to ensure all potential terrorist-attack clues are detected and acted on when necessary.

The matrix -- designed to go beyond existing kill lists -- is a continually evolving database cataloging terror suspects' biographies, locations, acquaintances and alliances, the Post said. Strategies for taking targets down are also spelled out, including extradition requests, capture operations and drone patrols, the newspaper said.

The database, which officials said was not in operation, is designed to map out contingencies, creating a ready menu for multiple agencies' roles in case a suspect surfaces in an unexpected spot, the Post said.

"If he's in Saudi Arabia, pick up with the Saudis," a former official said. "If traveling overseas to al-Shabaab [a fundamentalist militia in Somalia], we can pick him up by ship. If in Yemen, kill or have the Yemenis pick him up."

Officials declined to disclose the identities of suspects on the matrix.

The database also reflects a change in Washington's worldview about terrorism, officials said, reflecting its evolution from finite emergency measures after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States to institutionalized fixtures of the national security apparatus.

Senior Obama administration officials agree such counterterrorism operations are likely to extend at least another decade, with some saying they saw no end in sight as al-Qaida continues to metastasize, the Post said.

"We can't possibly kill everyone who wants to harm us," a senior administration official told the newspaper. "It's a necessary part of what we do. ... We're not going to wind up in 10 years in a world of everybody holding hands and saying, 'We love America.'"

Although the matrix is still in development, some officials -- including those from the White House, Congress and intelligence agencies -- described it as a blueprint that could help Washington adapt to al-Qaida's morphing structure and its increasing efforts to exploit turmoil across North Africa and the Middle East.

The report follows news Friday the CIA has urged the White House to increase the agency's armed drone fleet to fight new North Africa al-Qaida threats. The request by CIA Director David Petraeus for up to 10 remotely piloted aircraft would strengthen Washington's ability to stop the growth of an increasingly aggressive al-Qaida affiliate known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, White House officials cited by the Post Friday said.

The request to expand the CIA's arsenal and growing involvement in lethal paramilitary operations reflects the agency's transition into a paramilitary force, the Post said. It also makes clear the CIA does not intend to return to its pre-Sept. 11, 2001, focus on gathering intelligence.

The CIA started out as a civilian intelligence agency in September 1947.

Font: © 2012 United Press International, Inc

The Obama-Romney Foreign Policy Debate: Continuity in Policy.

Obama - Romney

 

 

President Barack Obama and Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney met on stage on Monday night, October 22, 2012, for their foreign policy debate. The headline was clear: continuity and consensus on the fundamentals of US policy. Neither candidate charted a grand new course for US policy. Neither declared he would attack Iranian nuclear sites or push for peace on the Palestinian track. Rather, both appealed to the consensus in US public opinion that has led to a reluctance to use force and to a slow disengagement from the Middle East. And come January 2013, Israel will have a friend in the White House, one who is willing to “stand with” America’s “greatest ally in the region.”

Still, to the extent the debate reflects the candidates’ actual visions, this is a different United States from the Clinton or George W. Bush eras: this United States will continue to give Israel strong diplomatic and financial support, and will even enhance military and intelligence cooperation. On issues of war and peace, though, the vision may be for Israel to sort out its travails on its own, with the United States “standing with” it.

The Clinton and Bush eras saw a different United States, one that for better or worse pressed forward in the peace process and was less reluctant to use US troops to shape the Middle East. This United States remained active in the early years of Obama’s term, famously clashing with Prime Minister Netanyahu on the peace process. However, the mounting US national debt, a war-weary American public, and the Arab Spring have brought changes in tack. The United States did use force in Libya, but during the debate neither candidate recommended it for Syria. The two agreed on the need to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, and they discussed the Iraq War and its ramifications only in passing. The Palestinian issue – once a mainstay in US foreign policy discussion – came up only in passing, mentioned once by Romney and not at all by Obama.

On Iran, both sounded a cautious note. Both supported sanctions, with Romney arguing that they should have come earlier and been stronger. This demonstrates that there is strong support in the United States for sanctions on Iran – perhaps an obvious point, but one with overlooked importance. Neither candidate renounced a military option, each calling it “the last resort.” Neither seemed enthusiastic for moderator Bob Schieffer’s proposal of a common defense pact with Israel (though Israel itself has not asked for such a pact). The most significant policy difference, as in the past, was over the point by which Iran must be stopped. Romney repeated that Iran must not “develop nuclear capability,” again opposing Iran reaching a point at which it could break out toward a bomb. Obama said that US policymakers would have timely enough information should Iran move to break out, hinting at the reasoning for his opposing an Iranian nuclear “weapon” (and not “capability”). This is, indeed, a significant distinction in policy, but without a clear sense of consequences for Iran, it risks being a distinction without a difference.

In that sense, Obama and Romney, on Iran as on other issues, appealed to undecided centrist voters in a tired, war-weary nation. That said, if the substantive differences were not great, the two tried to distinguish themselves on style. Romney has criticized Obama for projecting weakness, last night repeating his charge that Obama had embarked on an “apology tour” of the Middle East. Romney also reiterated his calls for increases in the defense budget, including buffing up the US navy. Obama rejected the “apology tour” charge, calling it “probably the biggest whopper” of the campaign. He also chided Romney for lacking knowledge of the military’s real needs, likening the building of more ships to supplying more horses and bayonets made useless by technological advance. Romney tried to draw distinctions between strength and weakness; Obama tried to distinguish between thoughtfulness and impulsiveness. The voters will decide.

The United States seems to have lost its energy and vigor for the Middle East and to have lost its sense of imagination abroad. The best the candidates could muster was Romney’s pledge – again with implicit agreement from Obama – to help Arab societies implement democracy and free markets through aid and programs to implement rule of law. The democracy promotion goal was a tenet of administrations from Kennedy to Bush, while the strategy is that of the European Union. For that matter, Europe was hardly mentioned at the debate, and other important regions, including Russia, India, Africa, and Latin America, garnered only passing references.

As for the Israeli angle, the United States will stand by Israel. The core US-Israel relationship has not been a casualty of the changing mood. Both candidates proudly touted their allegiance to the “greatest ally in the region,” proving the relationship’s durability. The relationship has survived the decade of wars, survived the delegitimization campaigns, survived the anxiety about the US national debt, and survived the Arab Spring. Neither candidate wants his reluctance on Iran to come across as an expression of distancing from Israel. Both felt it important to stress that they want to manage the US-Israel relationship and that they want the relationship to continue to succeed.

Nonetheless, the debate contains a warning for Israeli policymakers. The results of the presidential election in the United States and the upcoming elections in Israel are of course of great significance. A like-minded Israeli government and US administration may find it easier to cooperate on issues ranging from the peace process to the Iranian issue to the regional ramifications of the Arab Spring. That does not, however, exclude the possibility of cooperation and coordination between a center-right government in Israel and a second-term Obama administration. However, that would require a recalibration of foreign policy priorities and ways and means of attaining objectives. More than that, it would require rebuilding confidence and trust at the highest levels in the two countries’ leaderships.

Whichever candidate wins, the public mood in the United States reflects a formidable obstacle to intervention. Whether in Syria or Iran or elsewhere, either man likely will feel political pressure to hold back on using force. The presumption, it seems, is that the United States will not use force unless those proposing it meet a heightened burden of proof. An Israeli government arguing for military involvement could still win the argument, but it must address the American public’s concerns. Indeed, in the coming years, this may be a key to managing the broader US-Israel relationship.

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Jack Keane: Al Qaeda Is Making a Comeback.

Across the Middle East and South Asia, the group isn't dead or dying but on the rise.

US Marines of the 1st battalion 7th Marines

 Regiment walk towards a helicopter before

 leaving for camp Leatherneck.

With Afghanistan the forgotten war this election season, many Americans might be wondering why we have 68,000 U.S. troops there at all. Sure, the Obama administration says they'll be out "on schedule" in 2014, but can't the U.S. immediately pull back and protect its interests with drones and special-operations forces alone?

To better understand the battle in Afghanistan, look to Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Sinai, Syria or Iraq—all places where al Qaeda and associated groups are a growing presence. (Al Qaeda in Iraq has doubled in size in the year since U.S. troops left the country.) These terrorists have already killed Americans, and they have planned and executed several attacks on the U.S. homeland that have failed only thanks to technical problems or outstanding police work.

While not the catalyst of the Arab Spring, al Qaeda and its friends are seeking to take advantage of the opportunities posed by revolutionary change throughout the Middle East. Despite the obvious intelligence and security failures that contributed to the attack against the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, the reality is that in one night an al Qaeda-affiliated group destroyed a diplomatic post, killed a U.S. ambassador and three other Americans, and forced an end to clandestine U.S. activity in the area.

With al Qaeda not dead or on the run but on the rise across the Middle East and South Asia, there is only one place where the U.S. is on the ground and aggressively fighting back: in Afghanistan, al Qaeda's heartland.

But Americans receive limited news from the front. The latest headlines are dominated by so-called green-on-blue attacks in which Afghan soldiers or police have attacked their U.S. or allied trainers. These attacks are appalling, but it is important to understand that the attackers aren't our "Afghan partners." They are Taliban foot soldiers and sympathizers exploiting the very real partnership we have with the growing Afghan National Security Forces. The attackers represent perhaps 0.01% of the approximately 345,000 Afghan security forces. These terrorists are loud and bloody, but they are statistically rare.

Americans also hear little about the success of our troops in isolating al Qaeda and the Taliban, cutting them off from the local population, and helping Afghans stand against them. Or how U.S. troops are restoring security to areas such as Kandahar that have lived under the thumb of Islamists and warlords for years. Or how sustainable that security is: This year we dramatically reduced our military presence in Helmand and Kandahar, but residual allied forces, our Afghan partners and locals have prevented the Taliban from regaining its positions.

The fight is hard and the Afghans aren't easy partners, but we're not in this for the Afghans. We're in this for ourselves, and for our nation's security.

So why Afghanistan and not Libya, Yemen, Syria or Somalia? Simple. Because we are in Afghanistan, and in numbers substantial enough to secure and hold territory—denying Ayman al Zawahiri and his followers a foothold. Afghanistan remains an opportunity to deal al Qaeda a vital strategic blow, especially since we have abandoned all operations—including counterterrorism operations—in Iraq.

Afghanistan is where much of the al Qaeda journey began. It is the main site where Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and their cohort rose to prominence fighting the Soviets in the 1980s. Afghan territory holds special significance to the group, which is committed to retaking it and re-establishing it as the base of a global movement.



Considering all this still leaves a few reasonable questions, such as why U.S. forces can't leave and have counterterrorism troops take the lead. The answer is that special-operations forces are among the best and bravest of our troops, but they aren't magicians. They can't ensure that extremists don't find haven among 35 million Afghans, and they can't stop al Qaeda or the Taliban from preying on Afghan cities and towns.

Without the Afghans helping us in our mission, pretty soon we won't know of anyone to target with drones, and our special operators will roam through hostile territory unequal to the inflow of terrorists. We need the Afghans' help in this fight. They are giving a lot—and taking the casualties to prove it. But if we abandon them, they'll stop.

Anyone wondering what Afghanistan will look like if we abandon the war or draw down troops too rapidly should look to Iraq, where a residual force would almost certainly have halted the current re-emergence of al Qaeda. Or to Syria, where more moderate forces are being increasingly overrun by hard-line Islamists. Or to Yemen, where al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has carved out territory and an operational headquarters to plan attacks against America. Or to Libya, where the facts about Benghazi are still trickling out, but where we know that an al Qaeda-affiliated group was behind the deadly attack.

The only talking point on Afghanistan that the American people have heard this election season is "2014"—as in withdrawal. But al Qaeda and its friends world-wide have heard that too. And it gives them hope that in two short years their heartland will be ripe for retaking. They know full well—based on U.S. actions from Afghanistan to Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria—that U.S. policy is to disengage, and that momentum is on their side.

Gen. Keane, a former vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, is chairman of the Institute for the Study of War.

Font: JACK KEANE

FBI Team to Help Investigate Beirut Blast.

The United States will send an FBI team to help Lebanon probe the Beirut car bombing that killed the country's internal security chief.



The coffins of Wissam al-Hassan and his bodyguard

AFP/File

The United States will send a Federal Bureau of Investigation team to help Lebanon probe the Beirut car bombing that killed the country's internal security chief, officials said Monday, according to AFP.
“There is going to be an FBI team headed to Lebanon to help them with their investigation. But we'll certainly wait for the results of that investigation" before deciding any further response, State Department spokesman Mark Toner told reporters.

Toner added that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed Washington's support for Lebanon's sovereignty, in a phone call with Prime Minister Najib Mikati.
Describing Clinton's conversation with Mikati, he said "she was very, very clear in stressing our support for Lebanon's sovereignty" and also "stressed the importance of all political leaders working together."

Toner did not say whether the FBI team had already arrived in Lebanon, where there have been violent protests since Friday, when police intelligence chief General Wissam al-Hassan died in the Beirut bombing.

"It's a very sensitive time," he added, saying, "There's an investigation under way, and we're going to look to the results of that investigation. And we also would urge calm."
On Friday, the United States condemned the blast as a terrorist strike. On Sunday, Clinton underscored "the United States' firm commitment to Lebanon's stability, independence, sovereignty and security."

Hassan's funeral on Sunday had been billed as a protest against Syrian meddling in Lebanon, but quickly turned into anger at Mikati, whose government is dominated by pro-Syria parties.
Despite calls for him to quit, Mikati said he would stay on at President Michel Sleiman's request to avoid a "political vacuum" in volatile Lebanon.

The opposition has widely blamed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for Friday's attack, as it did in 2005 when former premier Rafiq Hariri was killed in a huge Beirut blast.

Hizbullah terrorists were believed to be responsible for the operational portion of the attack. The Shi'ite Muslim terror organization, which has representatives in the Lebanese government, is generously backed by both Iran and by the Assad regime.


Font: By Elad Benari

Israel, U.S. Initiate Antimissile Practice Maneuvers.

Israel and the United States on Sunday initiated their largest-ever bilateral effort aimed at preparing to guard against ballistic missile threats, Agence France-Presse reported.

Approximately 1,000 U.S. European Command staffers would take part in the Austere Challenge 12 maneuvers from Israel, while roughly 2,500 more U.S. participants would join from the Mediterranean Sea and Europe, Air Force Lt. Gen. Craig Franklin said to journalists several days ago. One thousand Israeli military members are slated to support the planned three-week activity, according to AFP.

"Austere Challenge 12 is the largest aerial defense exercise to take place between the two militaries," according to an Israeli armed forces release. "These exercises are part of a planned training schedule that seeks to increase cooperation interoperability between the militaries. Planning for the exercise began over two years ago and is not a response to specific events in the region."

The maneuvers were set to incorporate Arrow missile interceptor equipment as well as state-of-the-art Patriot antimissile gear; a U.S. Aegis warship was slated to provide command support.

The effort would probably be interpreted as a gesture to Iran over its disputed atomic ambitions, AFP said. Franklin, though, echoed the Israeli comments in saying there was no connection.

"While the scenario is driven by the overall situation in the Middle East, AC12 is not re
lated to any specific current event ... nor to any perceived tensions in the Middle East," said the three-star general, who commands 3rd Air Force at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

Physical weapon activities were expected to take a backseat role to virtual management simulations in Austere Challenge 12, RIA Novosti reported on Sunday. The activity has absorbed $30 million in U.S. funds and $8 million in Israeli spending.

Font: NTI

Does Iran Have an "Inalienable Right" to Enrich Uranium?

 

 

Most articles in the Iranian media on the nuclear issue reiterate Iran's "inalienable right" to enrich uranium according to the NPT. Iran contends that as a member of the NPT, it is treated unfairly by the international community when demands are made that it suspend enrichment. Iran has repeated this mantra so often that many experts and policymakers – even if critical of Iran's nuclear program – concede that as a member of the NPT, Iran indeed has the right to enrich uranium. Ahead of a fresh round of negotiations with Iran that could begin soon after the US presidential elections, it is important to examine the veracity of this claim.

Since 2006, Iran's claim is actually negated by the six resolutions passed by the UN Security Council instructing Iran to suspend enrichment-related activities, which Iran has blatantly violated. These Security Council resolutions "trump" any privilege provided by the NPT, as was clarified in analyses published by the Carnegie Endowment.[1] The demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment is currently a legally binding demand.

But there is a more fundamental issue at stake. The right of Iran – or any other non-nuclear state – to pursue nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment activities, is not absolute. According to the NPT, this right is explicitly conditional. Iran's ongoing claim to an inalienable right is based on a partial reading of the relevant clause in Article IV of the NPT. What the continuation of the critical sentence clarifies is that the right to nuclear energy – including enrichment activities – is contingent upon upholding Articles I and II of the treaty, including the stipulation that states not manufacture nuclear weapons.[2] In other words, if a state engages in weapons-related activities, the right no longer holds.

The crux of the question of Iran's right to enrich, therefore, is whether it has been engaged in military work. Because Iran has not yet produced a nuclear device, and because it is making every effort to conceal its military program, the question – pressing for the past decade – is not easy to answer. What would serve as acceptable evidence? There is a need to define relevant criteria short of an actual nuclear weapon, at which time the question loses its relevance. What follows are some ideas based on the Iranian case, but setting clearer criteria for determining that a state is "working on a military program" is essential for stopping additional nuclear proliferators down the road.

One important criterion for making this call is evidence of concealment efforts on the part of the proliferator. In a recent article in the New York Times, Ray Takeyh recalls that both of Iran's known uranium enrichment plants, at Natanz and Fordow, began as "surreptitious plants that were later discovered by the International Atomic Energy Agency."[3] Indeed, the violation of its safeguard agreements with the IAEA is the reason why the Iranian case was reported to the UN Security Council in the first place.

The evidence does not stop there, and another important category relates to details regarded by the IAEA as highly suspicious. In February 2008, then-deputy director general of the IAEA, Olli Heinonen, convened a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in order to present the evidence he possessed regarding Iran's nuclear program, and was quoted as saying that some of the evidence was "not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon."[4] This later evolved into a long debate over the fate of the full Iranian nuclear file that then-director general Mohamed ElBaradei refused to include in his open reports. The issue was resolved only after ElBaradei was replaced by Yukiya Amano in late 2009, and the full annex was included in Amano's report on Iran in early November 2011.

 

This development underscored a third and related concern: lack of cooperation with the IAEA. The 2011 report set the stage for renewed IAEA requests to visit the military facility at Parchin, where the IAEA suspects that high explosive testing has been carried out. In the early months of 2012, Iran twice led inspectors to believe they would be allowed to visit Parchin, and then denied them access. In parallel, satellite imagery over recent months shows evidence of a clean-up operation at the facility. This is not the first time Iran has cleaned up suspicious evidence: in 2004, following IAEA suspicions of undeclared and problematic nuclear activities at Lavizan, Iran razed the site in order to interfere with soil samples.

A final criterion can be called analytic inference. One piece of evidence that fits this category is that the facility at Fordow has room for only about 3000 centrifuges, which is not nearly enough to logically serve as part of a civilian nuclear program, but would make perfect sense as a clandestine facility where stocks of LEU could be secretly enriched to the high levels needed for a nuclear device. Another relevant issue is Iran's enrichment to 20 percent. Iran's civilian explanation here is weak because Iran was offered fuel for its Tehran reactor in the context of a deal proposed by the P5+1 in October 2009, and rejected by Iran. The military-related explanation – namely, that 20 percent enrichment advances Iran significantly toward the level needed for breakout capability – is much more plausible. One can add the US National Intelligence Estimate released in late 2007, whereby at least up until 2003 – which means for close to 20 years – Iran had been working on a military nuclear program, under government direction. There is no reasonable basis for believing that it scrapped this program.

The suspicions that have arisen with regard to Iran's nuclear program are strong in all of the aforementioned categories, and because waiting until there is evidence of a bomb means waiting until it is too late, this is the kind of evidence that must be taken as indication that Iran has worked on a military program and continues on that route today. Stopping uranium enrichment should thus not be considered a confidence-building measure on Iran's part. Rather, it is a requirement, until Iran abandons its military program. Iran is not being discriminated against – it has no inalienable right to enrich.

A final word: initiating an international effort to begin codifying criteria for "work on a nuclear weapon" along the lines drawn above is highly advisable, including assigning relative weights to the different categories. This would help the international community better evaluate future cases of nuclear proliferation and confront proliferators more effectively, and hopefully at a much earlier stage, than was the case with Iran.

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

 

[1] See Amy Reed, "UN Resolution 1696 Moots Iranian Legal Claims," Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment, August 21, 2006; and a continuation of this debate in "Continued Analysis of 1696," Carnegie Endowment, August 24, 2006. See also David Albright and Andrea Stricker, "NAM Countries Hypocritical on Iran," The Iran Primer, USIP, September 7, 2012.

[2] From the NPT: "Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty" (emphasis added). In Article II the non-nuclear weapons states undertake, inter alia, "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

[3] Ray Takeyh, "Talk to Iran's Leaders, but Look beyond Them," New York Times, September 19, 2012.

[4] William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Meeting on Arms Data Reignites Iran Debate," New York Times, March 3, 2008.

 

 

Jordan disrupts major al-Qaeda terrorist plot.

Authorities in Jordan have disrupted a major terrorist plot by al-Qaeda-linked operatives to launch near-simultaneous attacks on multiple civilian and government targets, reportedly including the U.S. Embassy in the capital, Amman, Western and Middle Eastern officials said Sunday.

The Jordanian government issued a statement describing the plot and saying that 11 people with connections to al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq have been arrested.

The foiled attack, described as the most serious plot uncovered in Jordan since at least 2005, was viewed with particular alarm by intelligence agencies because of its sophisticated design and the planned use of munitions intended for the Syrian conflict — a new sign that Syria’s troubles could be spilling over into neighboring countries, the officials said.

The alleged plotters are Jordanian nationals. The officials said the group had amassed a stockpile of explosives and weapons from Syrian battlefields and devised a plan to use military-style tactics in a wave of attacks across Amman.

The scheme called for multiple strikes on shopping centers and cafes as a diversionary tactic to draw the attention of police and security officials, allowing other operatives to launch attacks against the main targets, which included government buildings and embassies.

A Western official briefed on details of the plot confirmed that the heavily fortified U.S. Embassy in Amman was among the targets. Like others interviewed for this report, the official spoke on the condition of anonymity because the investigation is still unfolding.

The Jordanian government’s statement said its intelligence service had broken up a cell that had been planning the attacks since June, arresting 11 people described as “supporters” of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group had intended to use explosives and mortar rounds acquired from Syria, as well as machine guns, car bombs and militia-style guerrilla tactics, to ensure “the highest death toll,” according to the statement.

The suspects had traveled to Syria multiple times and brought weapons with them, government officials said. They were arrested less than a week after Jordanian officials captured three Jordanians as they attempted to cross illegally into Syria, allegedly to join radical Islamist militias fighting Syrian loyalists there.

In a news conference late Sunday in Amman, Jordanian government spokesman Samih Maaytah said that the plot was “not related to the Syrian crisis” and that “Jordan will not change its approach” to the conflict in response to the discovery.

The timing of the plot was viewed as curious. Jordan has increasingly allied itself with forces seeking the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian autocrat opposed by rebels as well as a growing cadre of foreign Islamist militants inside Syria. Jordan hosts hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees within its borders and has helped deliver humanitarian aid to rebel-held cities.

But intelligence gleaned from surveillance of the cell suggests that the plotters intended to destabilize Jordan’s pro-Western government with massive blows against government institutions and tourism-dependent economy, the officials said.

“This was a serious plan, with a great potential for loss of life,” said a former Western intelligence official briefed on the details. For Jordan, beset by economic problems and deepening political unrest, he said, “this may not have been a tipping point, but it could have been a very hard blow.”

The former intelligence official said the plotters had access to large amounts of explosives from Syria and intended to use them to construct massive bombs.

“Weapons are everywhere right now, flowing from Iraq into Syria, and back and forth into Lebanon,” the former official said. “The longer the conflict goes on, the worse it gets.”

Also Sunday, a Jordanian soldier was killed in a clash between government security forces and a band of 16 armed militants seeking to cross illegally into Syria, government officials said. Four of the gunmen also were killed in the 20-minute firefight, the first to claim the life of a Jordanian officer since the Syrian uprising began.

The State Department had no immediate comment on the plot and declined to confirm or deny that the U.S. Embassy in Amman had been on the target list.

The last major terrorist strike in Jordan occurred in 2005, when al-Qaeda militants launched simultaneous attacks against three Amman hotels, killing 60 people and wounding 115.

Font: By Joby Warrick and Taylor Luck

Obama-Khamenei summit would cap long back-channel dialogue

US President Barack Obama has agreed to hold direct talks on Iran’s nuclear program with its leaders, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Is this a surprise? On April 16, 2012, debkafile disclosed that Washington and Tehran were conducting back-channel talks in Paris and Vienna, Sources close to Obama have now leaked word to the New York Times that the dialogue is to be elevated to direct talks at summit level. This disclosure, despite its subsequent denial by the White House, has three clear objects:

1. To slow down the Republican contender Mitt Romney’s momentum in opinion polls ahead of the Nov. 6 election. Obama’s campaign advisers believe the president’s willingness to engage Iranian leaders directly on their nuclear program, in contrast to Romney’s tougher stance, will appeal to the American voter’s reluctance for US military action.
2. To preempt Romney’s presumed plan to drop the disclosure of the back-channel dialogue as a bombshell in their last debate on foreign policy scheduled for Monday, Oct. 22 in Florida.

3. To reassure Tehran that the Austere Challenge 12 joint US-Israeli war game starting Sunday Oct. 21 – albeit in reduced form - will not be the opening shot for an “October surprise” on Iran.
This kite was flown by David Rothkopf, who is close to the Democratic leadership, in Foreign Policy on October 9, although it was not picked up by anyone else in Washington or Jerusalem. Under the heading an “October surprise,” he cited a White House faction as recommending to Obama that the US join Israel in launching a surgical operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities before the US election.
Obama is now signaling Tehran that he has rejected this advice in favor of upgrading his dialogue with Iranian leaders.
However, beyond the calculus of campaign strategy, it is important to note that the clandestine dialogue in progress for the best part of a year has produced no breakthrough in the controversy on Iran’s nuclear aspirations. This is mainly because Obama’s emissaries have never stipulated plainly that Tehran must stop uranium enrichment as a quid pro quo for the dialogue to continue. Just the reverse: they let it be known that Washington does not object to Iran’s enrichment program per se so long as it is not used for building a nuclear weapon.
The differences between the two sides centered on the American demand for the International Atomic Energy Agency to be allowed 24/7 monitoring access to the enrichment projects to determine that parts of the stock did not suddenly disappear for use in manufacturing a bomb. Tehran has only agreed to inspectors paying visits once a fortnight.

Vice President Joe Biden was outspoken about this during his debate with Paul Ryan on Oct. 11. He actually said that the quantities of enriched uranium accumulated don’t matter - only what Iran does with it. This admission aroused little notice although it implied that the Obama administration is willing to let Iran approach a very risky threshold.
It also indicated a very wide gulf still existing between the Obama administration’s indulgent attitude toward a nuclear Iran and Israel’s insistence on red lines for limiting the quantities and grades of enriched uranium Iran is permitted to accumulate.

At the same time, Israel keeps on backtracking on those red lines: When Iran moved its enrichment plant into an immune zone earlier this month, one red line disappeared. And Israel is no longer openly challenging Washington’s assurance that a decision by Khamenei to go forward and start building a weapon would reach US intelligence at the precise moment it is made.
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have therefore been forced back step by step and have silently fallen in behind Obama.
For his part, the US president believes a summit with Iran’s rulers will enhance his chances of reelection. But he is leaving Netanyahu to face the Israeli voter in three months with nothing remaining of his pledge to prevent a nuclear Iran, and clutching at the outward concurrence between Israeli and US intelligence appraisals of Iran’s nuclear progress.
There is no real concurrence; the gap is as wide as ever. But by failing to deny Israeli affinity with the United States on this issue, Netanyahu and Barak are not only helping Barack Obama but also encouraging Tehran to keep going.

Font: DEBKAfile Exclusive Report October 21, 2012, 3:48 AM (GMT+02:00)

Curious U.S. and French Military Deployments

IAN HITCHCOCK/Getty Images
Four F/A-18 Super Hornets from U.S. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314



September 28, 2012 | 2008 GMT


Summary

Stratfor and S.I.S has received multiple reports of U.S. and French military movements that we would like to highlight to our readers. These movements could have multiple explanations and might not be linked. But given the numerous ongoing crises specifically centered in North Africa and the Middle East, we consider these developments to be worth following.


Analysis

According to a worldwide network of aircraft spotters and trackers, at least a dozen MC-130H, HC-130N, HC-130P and AC-130U military transport planes and gunships crossed the Atlantic Ocean on Sept. 13 heading eastbound. These aircraft are typically used for a variety of special tasks, including in close cooperation with special operations forces. The last reported stop for the aircraft was Souda Bay, Crete. It is unclear whether the aircraft have left Crete, but we are working on tracking them down.

A week and a half later, on Sept. 24, the same network of aircraft spotters noted 12 U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets arriving in two waves at Moron air base in Spain. It is not known where the squadron is heading, though it could be en route to Afghanistan to reinforce elements there. The Harrier squadron that suffered heavy losses in the Sept. 14 attack on Camp Bastion has already been replaced by another Harrier unit, so it is unlikely that the squadron's deployment is directly linked to that event. It is also possible that the F/A-18s are heading to the Gulf Cooperation Council region. A number of air superiority squadrons, including an F-22 Raptor squadron, have already deployed to the region. If that is the case, the squadron is intended simply as reinforcements or replacements for assets currently deployed there.

Also on Sept. 24, The New York Times published an article stating that Iraq and the United States were negotiating an agreement that could result in the return of small units of U.S. soldiers to Iraq on training missions. At the request of the Iraqi government, according to U.S. Gen. Robert Caslen, a unit of Army special operations soldiers was recently deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and to help with intelligence. It is possible that at least some of the MC-130 aircraft previously mentioned were delivering these special operations troops to Iraq.

Another report on Sept. 24, this one by the Le Figaro French-language newspaper, said some 100 French special operations troops had been deployed in the sub-Saharan region to counteract militants in northern Mali. Le Figaro also reported that maritime patrol aircraft that can be used to collect intelligence will be deployed to the region and that commandos of the French navy will reinforce the French special operations troops.

Finally, Italian journalist Guido Olimpio reported in September that U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles are currently tracking militants in Cyrenaica, the historical name for eastern Libya. He also said "reliable sources" had confirmed that U.S. special operations forces were planning to carry out intelligence operations that could be in preparation for surgical strikes in North Africa, including in Libya and in Mali.

All these deployments could be previously scheduled movements for training or part of ongoing operations. They also do not necessarily mean any one mission is imminent. The United States and France could simply be positioning military assets in a region that is rife with conflict and that may eventually require rapid military intervention or action.

Whatever the intent, these deployments, taken together, are too compelling to ignore. Given the fluid conflicts in North Africa, Syria and Afghanistan, as well as the current tensions with Iran, these movements and reports are important to highlight to our readers.

Can a Red Line be Drawn on Iran?

We can define “red lines” as acts, activities, or situations that if carried out or reached mandate actions to redress the situation. The purpose of drawing these lines is twofold: to deter these said acts or activities, and to judge that the situation is serious enough to warrant reactions. Red lines, virtual or real, have been drawn in the past as part of strategies to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue. These lines were defined and later crossed without any action taken – other than verbal.

The issue is now resurfacing as part of a proposed understanding between the US administration and Israel, with the intention of lowering the tension between them. The main point of contention is that Israel assesses that Iran has already gone far enough with its nuclear weapons development program to produce them at will, while the US administration thinks that there is time enough for a “diplomatic solution” to this issue.

The US also assesses that it will know well in advance if the Iranians are “breaking out” and starting the relatively short route towards the production of nuclear weapons. The Times of Israel reported that on August 10, 2012, Jay Carney, spokesman for the White House, said that the United States “can see what’s going on with Iran’s nuclear program” and that it would know “if Tehran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon. I would also say that we have eyes – we have visibility into the program, and we would know if and when Iran made what’s called a breakout move towards acquiring a weapon.” He later said he was referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency officials who are mandated to inspect Iran’s nuclear sites. This, in a way, set a red line for Iran.

There are two implicit assumptions here: the first is that the US intelligence system is infallible, and the second is that the IAEA inspectors would discover an Iranian “breakout” in time to sound a reliable warning. The problem is that Israel does not share these assumptions, and indeed, both are difficult to embrace. Intelligence is not infallible, as history has shown, and the IAEA is very limited in its observational powers, especially in Iran. Reliance on intelligence can lead to overconfidence and misread facts, and the stakes, at least for Israel, are too high for that.

In order to be effective, red lines must fulfill several conditions. They must be well-defined and realistic, referring to determinable parameters; they must be timely, in that there would be enough time left for preventive actions; the consequences of crossing the lines must be serious enough to be considered a deterrent; and they must be made known to the other side, or even be made public.

Setting the red line at the breakout point could be effective only if the consequences of crossing it would be serious enough for Iran. In a larger view, consider a breakout scenario against the conditions listed above. In order to be well-defined, the term “breakout” must be well-defined. Does crossing the 20 percent enrichment level fulfill this condition? The Iranians have already started to delegitimize this criterion by announcing that they are planning to use nuclear energy for submarine propulsion, which will need highly enriched uranium (which is not necessarily technically true). Does working on the nuclear weapons explosive mechanism constitute a red line? According to IAEA indications, they have been already doing this for some time.

Is the breakout red line timely? Probably not. As time goes on, Iran is perfecting its breakout technology and accumulating more and more low enriched uranium. Because of uncertain intelligence (especially if this depends on the IAEA inspection teams), information concerning Iran’s breakout activities would be considerably delayed. What would be the consequences of crossing the red line? Is the US prepared to take military action to stop Iran’s progress in producing nuclear weapons? Although the US made several statements referring to this possibility, it has never stated it as such in clear language. Is it ready and prepared to resort to military action if the signal comes from the intelligence community tomorrow? This is highly uncertain. The fact that the US has maintained that there is still time for a diplomatic solution may also imply that the US has not issued any warning or even an ultimatum to Iran, so that the third and fourth conditions are not fulfilled. Is there an alternate red line to be applied?

There certainly is. It is simply the setting of a deadline. One deadline could be a date for acquiescing to the Security Council resolutions concerning Iran. Another could involve the unending talks with Iran, with the P5+1 setting the requirements for an interim arrangement: the suspension of work at the Fordow enrichment site; the stopping of uranium enrichment at 20 percent, and the transfer of all 20 percent enriched uranium out of Iran. If a deadline for this is set, with the threat of military action if the conditions are not met, this could be considered a reasonable red line. The deadline should not be too far in the future, so as not to enable an Iranian breakout and the production of a first nuclear weapon; it is verifiable; the threat is serious enough; especially if issued by the US; and it will be well known to all Iranians. This red line has another advantage: it could be the first stage in a longer process, without demanding at first a total surrender of Iran to the demands of the Security Council and the IAEA (and even these are not the final stage in a possible settlement).

Is this doable? Probably not, at least at the present time, before the upcoming US elections. On the apparent down side, setting a time limit forces the hands of both sides, forcing Iran to make a decision, if it believes the red line, and driving those who set it to action. At present, Iran is comfortable not having to deal with an ultimatum, and the US is not in a position to be forced to take action.

Thus, the talk of setting red lines seems to be little more than a method of dousing the public disagreements between the governments of Israel and the US, at least until after the elections. The Iran issue, however, will only grow more and more serious – and less reversible – as time goes on

Font: המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומ

Was Yasser Arafat Poisoned?

The mysterious circumstances of Yasser Arafat's death are now the subject of a criminal investigation in France. But if it is true that the Palestinian leader was poisoned, then who might have been behind his killing?

 

 

Suha Arafat says she knew it all along. Someone like Yasser Arafat doesn't die so easily because his body suddenly gives up, even if he was 75 years old. Someone like him had to have been killed, poisoned or exposed to radiation, whether from enemies or rivals. Though many have suspected the same thing, there has never been any proof. Eight years after the death of the legendary Palestinian leader, it looked like things would stay that way.

But then, two months ago, the Institute of Radiation Physics based in Lausanne, Switzerland, announced that it had found a potential contamination with a fatal amount of polonium-210 on Arafat's underwear, toothbrush and hat. The radioactive heavy-metal isotope is tasteless and almost undetectable. A dose of 0.1 micrograms is already fatal.

Suha Arafat, his now 49-year-old widow, had submitted the test samples with the assistance of al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based television network. Since then, what had been for years merely a conspiracy theory has become a bona fide criminal case -- especially since Suha Arafat lodged a criminal complaint and French prosecutors launched a murder investigation last week.


'We Will Finally Learn the Truth'
The women who put this all in motion is hard to locate. It even took the taxi driver a long time to arrive via winding roads at Suha Arafat's home in Malta, a half-hour by car from the capital city of Valletta. The unimposing house on a hillside has a front garden which is too small for parties. A compact Korean-made car is parked out front.

Suha Arafat has lived here with her mother for over two years. Her 17-year-old daughter, Zahwa, attends a boarding school in France.

The widow opens the door wearing a dress and flat shoes. She looks much more like a housewife than the supposed she-devil the Palestinians have hated since her husband, who they think should have only been wed to the Palestinian cause, married her -- a Muslim convert who was born a Palestinian Christian in Jerusalem and raised Catholic -- in 1990. But, more than anything, she has been hated since 1995, when she moved from the Gaza Strip to Paris because she found life there more comfortable.

Suha Arafat talks about the suspicion she has carried with her since Oct. 12, 2004. That was the day when Arafat's illness reportedly began, when he had diarrhea and complained of stomach pains and dizziness. The symptoms quickly worsened and left him as thin as a rail. Finally, wearing a training outfit and a wool cap, Arafat was taken from the West Bank town of Ramallah to a military hospital near Paris, where he died on Nov. 11. Already then, many thought that the death seemed unnatural.
During a recent studio interview with al-Jazeera, a choked-up Suha Arafat demanded an investigation. Now, sitting in her living room, where a portrait of Arafat hangs on the wall, she feels she is finally approaching her goal. "I am very confident," she says, "that the entire case will reach a positive end in very little time and that we will finally learn the truth." This is not wishful thinking, she adds, noting that there are reasons for being so optimistic.

Since polonium-210 has a half-life of 138 days, things need to proceed quickly. Therefore, Arafat's body will be examined in the coming weeks, believes Saad Djebbar, one of Suha Arafat's lawyers in Paris. In a television interview, he said that the French legal system has jurisdiction because the murder began in the Palestinian territories and ended in France. He then added the curious sentence that Suha Arafat wants to prevent the Palestinian Authority from obstructing the investigation.


The Missing Piece of the Puzzle
This is a charge that enrages Tawfik Tirawi, Arafat's former intelligence chief, because it is also directed against him. For the last two years, Tirawi has headed the official Palestinian commission charged with investigating the cause of Arafat's death. Since the scandal involving possible polonium poisoning erupted, he has been repeatedly forced to explain why it was al-Jazeera, rather than him, that came up with the idea of taking a closer look at Arafat's underwear.

During the three years leading up to his death, the Israeli siege prevented Arafat from leaving the Mukataa, his government headquarters in Ramallah. In that period, Tirawi encountered Arafat on an almost daily basis. "I saw very clearly how things got increasingly worse with him," he says. "At first, he had spots on his face. Then, he was constantly throwing up, he lost weight, and the skin on his feet dissolved so that he could only wear sandals." Then he adds: "We were always certain that the Israelis had poisoned Arafat."

As Tirawi sees it, it was just an accident that al-Jazeera discovered the last missing piece of the puzzle. He claims that his commission has tirelessly investigated the case, but that its activities have been secret because such things are obviously kept out of the public gaze. Although he is either unwilling or unable to discuss the commission's findings, he will say that it has been quite successful.
Not only Suha Arafat, but also many Palestinians in Ramallah see things differently. They believe that Palestinian Authority officials never made any real effort to solve the mystery surrounding his death. The first investigative commission was dissolved six months after Arafat's death and only reappointed in 2010.

In all of this, the Palestinians had good cause for looking into things more closely. After all, the French clinic's 558-page report on the death of their national hero raises more questions than it provides answers. For example, why did Suha Arafat refuse to allow a liver biopsy to be taken? Why didn't anyone demand that an autopsy be conducted? How can it be that even the best doctors in France didn't find the cause of this strange infection, which caused blood to coagulate and led to a stroke? Could it be that the French government wants to keep the cause of death secret?

Moreover, why is there so much missing in the report, and why does it seem like "someone has played around with it," as Avi Issacharoff, a reporter with the Israeli daily Haaretz, says? Likewise, he also finds it somewhat odd that he, an Israeli journalist, was the only one to publish the secret French medical report, rather than Suha Arafat or the Palestinian Authority.


Inconsistencies and Rumors
There are many inconsistencies and many rumors. They start with the allegation that Arafat died of AIDS or that Arafat's rivals poisoned him, and there are many more. Still, in the search for a motive to murder Arafat, it is hard to ignore Israel.

In 2002, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv that he regretted not having killed Arafat when Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in 1982. In 2003, then-Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that murder was an option for getting rid of Arafat. But is that any proof?

When asked about this, Israeli officials say: "It has nothing to do with us." For example, Dov Weissglass, who was the bureau chief of then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, says: "We didn't kill Arafat when the terror had reached its high point, so why would we kill him in 2004, when he was sitting isolated in the Mukataa and his political influence was already waning?"

Still, polonium-210 is not something one finds at the grocery store. There are only a few countries that can make it, and doing so requires a nuclear reactor. What's more, Israel reportedly had some polonium in the past.

Another question is: Why is all of this coming out now, eight years after Arafat's death and six years after the death of Alexander Litvinenko, the former KGB agent and Kremlin opponent, who became the first well-known victim of a polonium poisoning attack?


The Search for the Truth
Suha Arafat says she is driven by the search for the truth. But it might also have something to do with the fact that, in addition to being widely despised in Ramallah, she has also fallen into disfavor in France and Tunisia, where she is under investigation for suspicious cash flows and corruption. There is also the persistent rumor that she had a hand in the disappearance of $300 million (€240 million) after Arafat's death. In any case, it would certainly seem opportune for her to now assume the role of the widow avenging her husband's death in the name of the Palestinian people.

Enthusiasm for the investigation is more tempered in Ramallah, partly because some people there suspect al-Jazeera of wanting to help topple Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. But, of course, Palestinian officials also realize that they can take advantage of the search for Arafat's alleged murderer. At the moment, there are no peace talks with Israel, the economy is in a slump and there continue to be deep divisions between Hamas and Fatah, the rival Palestinian groupings ruling the Gaza Strip and West Bank, respectively. Under these circumstances, it would be a perfect time to have news of a poisoned martyr to deflect from the political deadlock and disorientation.

For these reasons, the debate might say more about the Palestinians' situation today than about Arafat's death. "To this day, we have avoided accusing Israel of being responsible for Arafat's death," says Nimr Hamad, Abbas' political adviser. "But if we find polonium in his body, it is 99.9 percent certain that it was Israel. That would help us because it proves that Israel doesn't want peace." He adds that they would demand the appointment of a special tribunal "like the one that was supposed to explain the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. But the evidence is clearer in Arafat's case than it was in Hariri's."

When asked what the situation for Palestinians would be like if Arafat were still alive, General Tirawi guardedly says: "The situation would presumably be more difficult." Nimr Hamad, on the other hand, only smiles. There is hardly anyone these days who would want Arafat to still be president. Indeed, most of the formerly ubiquitous images of Arafat's face on the streets have disappeared.

 

Full of Rubble
These days, one can't even visit Arafat's mausoleum on the edge of the Mukataa. The entrance is full of rubble and men are pushing wheelbarrows. This is the last work going on in the effort to transform Arafat's formerly bullet-riddled headquarters into a smart-looking official seat of government.

"Not finished," says a security guard, shooing visitors away. The wreaths have been cleared away, and the honor guard is somewhere else. Within the cube-shaped mausoleum, there is just a single memorial stone above a burial vault housing a coffin. That coffin holds not only Arafat's body, but also the secret behind his death -- though perhaps not for much longer.

Font: The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 36/2012 (September 03, 2012) of DER SPIEGEL.